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PETITIONER: MADHAV HAYAWADANRAO HOSKOT

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

DATE OF JUDGMENT17/08/1978

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. DESAI, D.A. REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J)

CITATION:  1978 AIR 1548            1979 SCR  (1) 192  1978 SCC  (3) 544  CITATOR INFO :  R          1979 SC1369  (6)  RF         1980 SC1579  (21)  R          1980 SC1789  (112)  RF         1981 SC  28  (13)  RF         1981 SC 674  (8)  RF         1981 SC 746  (3)  RF         1981 SC 818  (22)  D          1982 SC 710  (92)  F          1983 SC 109  (10)  RF         1983 SC 361  ((2)19)  RF         1983 SC 465  (5)  R          1983 SC 624  (10)  RF         1983 SC 803  (22)  RF         1985 SC 231  (2)  R          1986 SC 180  (39)  R          1986 SC 991  (5)

ACT:      Right to  free copy  of the  judgment  by  the  accused under. 5.  363 read with S. 387, 388 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (Act 2 of 1974), scope of-Duties of the Court to furnish  the copy  and duty  of the  jail authorities  to obtain the  signature  of  the  accused  when  the  copy  is delivered through  the  jail  authorities-  Constitution  of India 1950 Act. 19(1)(d) read with sub-Act. (S) and Act 21.      Right to counsel by the accused- Constitution of India 1950. Articles  21, 22  39A and  142 read with S. 304 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 explained.      Words and  Phrases "procedure  established by  law"  in Art.. 21  of the  Constitution,  explained-"Fair  Procedure" ingredients of.      Punishment and sentence-Correctional approach by Courts to  prison  treatment  and  nominal  punishment  verging  on decriminalisation of serious social offence, explained.      Special  leave  petition  grant  of  Art.  136  of  the Constitution is  subject to the fundamental  rules laid down by this Court.

HEADNOTE:      Under s.  363(1) of  the Criminal  Procedure Code, 1973 "when the  accused is  sentenced to  imprisonment, a copy or

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the judgment  shall immediately  after  the pronouncement of the judgment,  be given  to him  free  of  cost".  Under  s. 363(2), "on the application of the accused, a certified copy of the  judgment or when he so desires z. translation in his own language if practicable or in the language of the Court, shall be  given to him without delay and such copy shall in, every case  where the  judgment is appealable by the accused be given  free of  cost: Provided that where the sentence of death is  passed or confirmed by the High Court, a certified copy of  the judgment  shall be  immediately  given  to  the accused free  of cost  whether or  not he  applies  for  the same". By. s. 387 of the Code, these provisions contained in Chapter XXVII are applicable so far as may be practicable to the judgment  in appeal  by a  Court of  Sessions  or  Chief Judicial Magistrate.  S. 388,  however,  requires  that  the order of  the High  Court on  appeal should  be certified to lower court  and the court to which the High Court certifies its judgment  shall make  such orders  as are comfortable to the judgment of the High Court.      The petitioner was tried for the various offences under s.417 read  with s.511  I.P.C‘., s. 467 I.P.C. s. 468 I.P.C. and 471  read with  s. 467  I.P.C. by the Sessions Court and found guilty  of the  said offences  but sentenced to a soft sentence of simple imprisonment till the rising of the Court and some  fine. Two appeals were filed one by the petitioner and the  other by  the State.  The High  Court dismissed the petitioner’s  appeal   and  accepting   the  State’s  appeal enhanced the  sentence to three years on 22-11-73. On 26-11- 73, in  conformity with the Judgement of the High Court, the Sessions Court passed necessary orders to the Central Prison Authority Bombay  to take  him into custody. He was later on transferred to  Yeravada Jail,  Pune. The  petitioner  under went the full period of im- 193 prisonment and  filed the  special  leave  petition  with  a petition for  condonation ,  of delay contending that on 10- 12-73 he had applied under s. 363(2) read with s. 387 of the Code for  a certified  copy of  the judgment  dated 22-11-73 through the  jail authorities  and that  though the copy was received by  the jail  authorities in  March 1 1974 from the High Court it was never delivered to him, with the result he not only  lost his  right to appeal by special leave but was forced  to   come  up  with  a  condonation  petition  after obtaining another certified copy from the High Court.      Condoning the  delay and  dismissing the  petition  the Court ^      HELD: l.  Freedom is  what freedom  does. In Art. 21 of the Constitution  the guarantee  of the  personal liberty is phrased with  superb amplitude  with the  words, "No  person shall be  deprived of  his life  or personal  liberty except according  to  procedure  established  by  law".  "Procedure established by law" are words of deep meaning for all lovers of  liberty   and  judicial  sentinels.  Amplified  activist fashion, ’procedure’  means ’fair  and reasonable procedure’ which comports  with civilised  norms like  natural  justice rooted  firm   in  community   consciousness  not  primitive processual  barbarity   nor  legislated  normative  mockery. [201C-E]      2.  One   component  of  ’fair  procedure’  is  natural justice. Generally  speaking and subject to just exceptions, at least  a single  right of appeal on facts, where criminal conviction is fraught with long loss of liberty, is basic to civilized jurisprudence.  It is  integral to fair procedure, natural justice  and normative  universality save in special

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cases like  the original tribunal being a high bench sitting on a   collegiate  basis. In  short, a first appeal from the Sessions Court  to  the  High  Court,  as  provided  in  the Criminal Procedure Code, manifests this value upheld in Art. 21. Every  step that  makes the  right of appeal fruitful is obligatory and  every action or inaction which stultifies it is unfair and, ergo, unconstitutional (In a sense, even Art. 19 may  join hands  with  Art.  21,  as  the  Maneka  Gandhi reasoning discloses).  Maneka Gandhi’s  case has  laid  down that personal liberty cannot be cut out or down without fair legal procedure. [197F, 203D-E. F 208E]      Pertinent  to   the  point   in  the   case   are   two requirements: (i)  service of  a copy of the judgment to the prisoner in  time to  file an  appeal an(l (ii) provision of free legal  services  to  a  prisoner  who  is  indigent  or otherwise disabled  from securing legal assistance where the ends of justice call for such service. Both these are. State responsibilities under  Art. 21  and apply  where procedural law provides. for further appeals as well. [203F-G]      Maneka Gandhi  v. Union  of India  [1978]  1  SCR  621, referred to.      3. Judicial  Justice with procedural intricacies, legal submissions and critical examination of evidence, leans upon professional expertise; and a failure of equal justice under the law  is on  the cards  where such  supportive  skill  is absent for  one side.  Our Judicature  and Judicial Process, engineered  by   kindred  legal   technology,   compel   the colloboration of  lawyer-power for  steering the  wheels  of equal justice under the law. [204C-D]      If a  prisoner who  is  sentenced  to  imprisonment  is virtually  unable   to  exercise   his  constitutional   and statutory right  of appeal,  inclusive of  special leave  to appear for  want of  legal assistance,  there is implicit in the Court under Art. 142 194 read with  Articles 21  and 39A of the Constitution power to assign counsel  for such  imprisoned individual  "for  doing complete justice". This is a necessary incident of the right of appeal  conferred by  the Code and allowed by Art. 136 of the Constitution.  The accused has a right to counsel not in the permissive  sense of  Art. 22(1) and its wider amplitude but in  the peremptory  sense of  Art. 21 confined to prison situations. [28F-G, 209C]      4. Where  the prisoner  seeks  to  file  an  appeal  or revision every  facility for exercise of that right shall be made available by the jail administration. [209E]      (a)Courts shall  forthwith furnish free transcript copy OF the  judgment when sentencing a person to prison term. In the  event   of  any  such  copy  being  sent  to  the  jail authorities   for delivery to the prisoner by the appellate, unrevisional or  other Court,  the official  concerned shall with quick  despatch. get  it delivered to  the sentence and obtain written  acknowledgement thereof from him. Any jailor who by  indifference or vendetta, withholds the copy thwarts the Court  process and violates Art. 21 and may pavc the way for  holding   the  further   imprisonment  illegal.   These obligations are  necessary implied  in the  right of  appeal conferred by the Code read with the commitment to procedural fairness in  Art. 21.  S. 363 of the Cr. P.C. is an activist expression of  this import  of Art.  21 and  is  inviolable. [204A-B & 209DE]      John Richard Argersinger v. Raymond Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 32 LED. 2d. 530 at 535-36 and 554, quoted with approval.      Art. 8 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and Art. 14(3)  of the  International   Covenant  on  Civil  and

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Political Rights referred to.      (b) The  State which prosecuted the prisoner and set in motion the  process which  deprived him of his liberty shall pay to  the assigned  counsel such  sum  as  the  Court  may equitably  fix.  the  Court  may  judge  the  situation  and consider from all angles whether it is necessary in the ends of justice  to make  available legal  aid in the particular. case. That discretion resides in the Court. [209A-B, & G]      (c) These benign prescriptions operate by force of Art. 21 "strengthened  by Art. 19(1)(d) read with sub-article (5) from the  lowest to  the highest  Court where deprivation of life and personal liberty is in substantial peril. [209H]      5. Since  the Supreme  Court  is  the  last  in  Indian pyramid of  justice every  party in  person elicits from the Court extra  solicitude so  that he  may not  suffer from  a sense of  handicap due  to the absence of professional legal service.     The  present   petition,   the   party   though proffessional legal  aid by  the Court  preferred  to  argue himself [1971H. 198A, 209B]      6.  (a)   The  Supreme  Court  has  laid  down  certain fundamental principles  its governing  its jurisdiction when special leave  is sought under Art. 136 of the Constitution. The Court  cannot depart from this criteria lest the endless chase for  justice by  every defeated  litigant,  civil  and criminal should flood it into dysfunction.[198A-B] 195      Ujjagar Singh  & Anr.  v. State  (Delhi Admn), order in S.L.P.  (Crl.)   No.  A   1319  etc.  Of  1977  dt.  31-7-78 (unreported case).      (b) The  soft justice  syndrome vis-a-vis  white collar offenders  scandalizes   the  Court.  It  stultifies  social justice and camouflages needed severity with naive leniency. [196G]      (c) Social  defence is the criminological foundation of punishment.  In  the  instant  case,  the  trial  judge  has confused between  correctional approach  to prison treatment and  nominal  punishment  verging  on  decriminalisation  of serious social  offences. The  first is basic and the second pathetic. That  Court which  ignores  the  grave  injury  to society  implicit  in  economic  crimes  by  the  upperberth ’mafia’ ill  serves social  justice. Soft sentencing justice is gross  injustice   where many innocents are the potential victims. It  is altogether  a different  thing to  insist on therapeutic treatment,  hospital  setting  and  correctional goals  inside   the  prison   "even  punctuated  by  parole, opportunities for  welfare work  meditational  normalisation and healthy  self-expression so  that  the  convict  may  be humanised and  on release  rehabilitated as  a safe citizen. Coddling is  not  correctional  any  more  than  torture  is deterrent. While  iatrogenic prison  terms are  bad  because they dehumanize,  it  is  functional  failure  and  judicial pathology to hold out a benignly self defeating non-sentence to deviants  who endanger  the morals and morale, the health and wealth of society. [199E-H, 200A]      Mohammad Giasuddin  v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1978] I SCR 153. applied.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Special  Leave  Petition (Criminal) No. 408 of 1978.      From the  Judgment and  order dated  22-11-1973 of  the Bombay High  Court in  Criminal  Appeal  No.  747/  72  with Criminal Review Application No. 685/72.

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    In person for the Petitioner      H. R. Khanna and M. N. Shroff for the Respondent.      The order Gr the Court was delivered by      KRISHNA IYER,  J.-A short  paragraph might perhaps have been   sufficient as  obituary note  on this  Special  Leave Petition but  two basic issues-one of prison justice and the other of  sentencing  caprice-challenge  our  attention  and deserve more elaboration.      The facts,  more flabbergasting  than fantasy,  present themselves in  this Special  Leave Petition.  The appeal  is against a conviction con- currently rendered for a novel and daring set  of crimes  and follow-up  sentence of three year prison term. ’The offence is bizarre, the 196 offender perplexing,  the sentence  incredibly indiscreet at the Sessions  Court stage  but reasonably  just at  the High Court level  and, to  cap it  all the delay in seeking leave from this Court is doubly shocking be cause it is inordinate and implicates the prison administration.      A miniaturised  version of  the prosecution,  which has culminated in  the conviction,  is all  that is necessary in view  of   the  ultimate  order  we  propose  to  make.  The petitioner, a Reader in the Saurashtra University, claims to be a  Ph. D.  Of Karnataka  University, although  there is a controversy as  to this  high academic qualification being a fabrication. In  the present  case we are not concerned with it  directly.  His  moot  academic  proficiency  apart,  his abortive enterprise  in an other field has landed him in the present criminal  case. According  to the  prosecution,  Dr. Hoskot, the petitioner, approached Dabhol kar, a block-maker of Bombay,  placed an  order to prepare an embossing seal in the name  of the Karnataka University, Dharwar, and forged a letter of  authority purporting  to have  been signed by the Personal  Assistant  to  the  Vice-Chancellor  of  the  said University authorisig  him  to  get  the  seals  made.  This Project Counterfeit  Degrees, if  we may  so call  it,  had, perhaps, as  its object  the concoction  of certificates  of degrees  by   the  Karnataka   University.  A  degree-hungry community like  ours  offers  a  happy  hunting  ground  for professionals  in  the  fine  art  of  fabricating  academic distinctions. If  the expertise  is perfect and its exercise undetected there  is more  money in  it that  in  an  honest doctorate.  Anyway,   the  petitioner’s   mis-adventure  was intercepted before it could fulfil itself because Dabholkar, the Bombay  block-maker, was  too clever a customer. He gave pre-emptive  information   to  the  police  leading  to  the unearthing in  time of  the criminal  scheme.  The  Sessions court  tried  the  petitioner  and  held  as  proved  beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner was guilty of the grave offences charged,  namely,  under  ss.  417  read  with  511 I.P.C.. s.  467 I.P.C.,  s. 468 I.P.C. and ss. 471 read with 467 I.P.C.  After having  rendered  this  draconian  verdict against a  person who  was a  Reader  in  a  University  and claimed to  be M.Sc., Ph. D., around 30 years old and coming from a  middle-class family  beyond economic  compulsions to make a living by criminal means, the court swerved towards a soft sentence  of simple imprisonment till the rising of the court and some fine. We are scandalized by this soft justice syndrome vis-a-vis  white collar  offenders.  It  stultifies social justice  and camouflages  needed severity  with naive leniency. However,  two appeals  were carried  to  the  High Court, one  by the petitioner against his conviction and the other by  The State  against the  naive sentence.  The  High Court dismissed  the appeal  against the  conviction and, in allowance of the State’s

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197 prayer for  enhancement, imposed  rigorous imprisonment  for three   years. The  present petition  for special  leave  to appeal is against this heavy sentence.      The High  Court’s judgment  was pronounced  in November 1973 but  the Special Leave Petition has been made well over four years later. This hiatus may appear horrendous, all the more so  because the  petitioner has undergone his full term of  imprisonment   during  this   lengthy  interregnum.  The explanation offered  by him for condonation of the delay, if true, discloses a disturbing episode of prison injustice. To start with  the petitioner  complained that  the High  Court granted a  copy of  the judgment  of 1973  only in  1978,  a further probe  disclosed that  a free  copy  had  been  sent promptly by  the High Court, meant for thc applicant, to the Superintendent.   Yeravada   Central   Prison,   Pune.   The petitioner denies  having been served that copy and there is nothings on  record which  bears his  signature in  token of receipt  of   the  High   Court’s   judgment.   The   Prison Superintendent on The other hand, would have us believe that a clerk  of his  office did  deliver it  to the prisoner but took it  back for the purpose of enclosing L it with a mercy petition to  the Governor  for remission  of sentence.  This exonerative story  may be  imaginary or true but there is no writing to  which the petitioner is a party to validate this plea. The  fact remains  that prisoners are situationally at the mercy  of the  prison ’brass’ but their right to appeal, which is  part  of  the  constitutional  process  to  resist illegal deprivation  of liberty,  is in  peril, if  district jail officials’  ipse dixit  that copies have been served is to pass muster without a title of prisoner’s acknowledgment. What is more, there is no statutory provision for free legal serives to  a prisoner,  in absence  of which,  a  right  of appeal for  the legal illiterates is nugatory and therefore, a negation of that fair legal procedure which is implicit in Art. 21  of the Constitution, as made explicit by this Court in Maneka Gandhi(1).      Having narrated  the necessary  facts which project the two   profound    but   neglected   problems   of   criminal jurisprudence we should have proceeded to discuss the merits of the evidence to decide whether leave should be granted to this petitioner.  Indeed, although  the court had assigned a lawyer to  render free  legal service  to the petitioner and argue the case on his behalf, Dr. Hoskot decided to dispense with legal  assistance and  argued on his own. Of course, he has presented his case capably and with analytical precision in  his  endeavor  to  controvert  the  correctness  of  the findings of  the courts  below. We  have listened  to him at some length since this Court is the last in the (1) [1978 2 S.C.R. 621. 198 Indian pyramid of justice and a party in person elicits from us extra  solicitude so  that he may not suffer from a sense of  handicap  due  to  the  absence  of  professional  legal service. Nevertheless  this  Court  has  laid  down  certain fundamental  principles   governing  its  jurisdiction  when special  leave  is  sought.  We  cannot  depart  from  these criteria 13  lest the  endless chase  for justice  by  every defeated litigant,  civil and  criminal, should  flood  this Court into dysfunction by a docket flood. It is dangerous to be too  good. The  recent pronouncement  of a  Bench of This Court, through  the  Learned  Chief  Justice,  settles  with clarity the decisive jurisdictional guideline. We quote:           "In  view   of  the  concurrent  findings  of  the      Sessions Court  and the  High Court  on  the  principal

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    issues arising  in the case we see no justification for      granting special  leave for  a reconsideration  of  the      question as  regards the  guilt  of  the  petitioners..      There is  hardly a  case, civil or criminal, which does      not raise  some question  of law  or the  other. But no      question  of   law  of  general  public  importance  is      involved in  these petitions.  It is  time that  it was      realised that  the jurisdiction  of this Court to grant      special leave  to appeal  can be  invoked only  in very      exceptional circumstances. A question of law of general      public  importance  or  a  decision  which  shocks  the      conscience  of   the  court   are  some  of  the  prime      requisites for the grant of‘ special leave.(1)              [Ujjagar Singh & Anr. v. State (Delhi Admn..) ] Bearing this  policy in  mind, coupled  with the efficacy of concurrent findings  of Fact,  we decline  the  request  for leave even  assuming there  are some  improbabilities in the prosecution case  or errors  in the con current holdings. In this view,  we do  not examine the merits further but insist on clarifying the two larger questions lying half-hidden. No observations made  by us  should be  understood as affecting the petitioner’s  plea in  any other criminal case he may be facing.      The Sessions Court. having found a university professor guilty of  organising (abortively though) a scheme of making bogus degrees  suddenly slumped at the sentencing stage and, awarded a  single day’s  simple  imprisonment.  The  reasons given arc  symptomatic or  chaotic sentencing  and confusion about the  correctional orientation of punishment. The court observed:           "Accused is  a  young  man.  He  has  no  previous      conviction .  He has  a  good  family  background.  His      father was  a Deputy  Collector and  Magistrate in  the      Mysore State. He (1)    order     in    SLP(Crl.No.1319ete.Of    1977dt.31-7- 1978(unreported case) 199      struck mc  as having intelligence above the average. He      is  not  a  person  with  a  criminal  tenancy.  It  is      suggested   by   the learned P.P. that possibly accused      did this  in a fit of despartion as he was given notice      of discharge by The Saurashtra University regarding his      Readership in Mathematics.           The modern  emphasis on  the corrective aspect  of      punishment  cannot   be  ignored  in  this  case  which      determining the  adequacy of sentence, having regard to      the nature  of the  offence and  the background  of the      accused, I  think that I should give one chance for the      accused to  improve. Hence  I do not think it desirable      to send  him to  jail as he might return as a confirmed      criminal? which  may he a liability to the society. If,      on the  other hand, mercy is shown to him at this stage      of his  first impact  with justice, then it is probable      that he  may be  reclaimed as  a good  citizen who call      harness his  talent for  desirable activities. In view.      of this  T propose to pass the following order to which      the learned  Spl. Public  prosecutor has  no  objection      Substantive  sentences   of  one   day  S.I.   to   run      concurrently.                                             (emphasis added) It is  surprising that  the Public Prosecutor has consented, on behalf  of the  State, to  this unsocial  softness to  an anti-social offender  on conviction  for grave charges. Does the Administration  sternly view  white-collar offenders, or abet them  by agreeing  to award of token punishment, making

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elaborate trials mere tremendous trifles ?      Social defence  is  the  criminological  foundation  of punishment.   The   trial   judge   has   confused   between correctional  approach   to  prison  treatment  and  nominal punishment verging  on decriminalisation  of serious  social offences. The  first is  basic, the  second  pathetic.  That Court which  ignores the grave injury to society implicit in economic crimes by the upper-berth ’mafia’ ill serves social justice. Soft  sentencing justice  is gross  injustice where many innocents are the potential victims. It is altogether a different thing to insist on therapeutic treatment, hospital setting and  correctional  goals  inside  the  prison  (even punctuated  by   parole,  opportunities  for  welfare  work, meditational normalisation  and healthy self-expression), so that  the   convict  may   be  humanised  and,  on  release? rehabilitated as  a safe  citizen. This  Court has explained the  correctional  strategy  of  punishment  in  Giasuddin’s case(1). Coddling is not correctional, any more than torture is deter-  rent.  While  iatrogenic  prison  terms  are  bad because they dehumanize, (1) Mohammad  Giasuddin   v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1978]1 S.C.R.153. 200 it is  functional failure and judicial pathology to hold out a  benignly   self-efeating  non-sentence  to  deviants  who endanger the  morals and  morale, the  health and  wealth of society.      The 47th  Report of the Law Commission of India noticed this  weakness   for  economic  offenders  in  the  judicial personnel  (of   course,  also  in  the  administrative  and legislative actors) and recommended:           "18.2. Suggestions  are often  made that  in order      that the  lower Magistracy  may realise the seriousness      of some  of the  social  and  economic  offences,  some      method  should  be  evolved  of  making  the  judiciary      conscious of  the grave  damage caused to the country’s      economy and  health by  such  anti-social  crimes.  The      frequency and  emphasis with  which  these  suggestions      have  been  made,  and  the  support  which  they  have      received  from  very  high  officers  has  caused  some      anxiety to  us. But  we hope that the higher courts are      fully alive  to the  harm, and we have no doubt that on      appropriate occasions,  such as,  judicial conferences,      the subject  will receive  attention. It  is of  utmost      importance that all State instrumentalities involved in      the  investigation,  prosecution  and  trial  of  these      offences must  be  oriented  to  the  philosophy  which      treats these  economic Offence  as a  source  or  grave      challenge to the material wealth of the nation.           18.3. We  hope we shall not be misunderstood if we      suggest that even the holding of periodical meetings on      sentencing may  be beneficial,  not in  the context  of      economic offences  only, but  in  the  evolution  of  a      rational   and   consistent   policy   of   sentencing.      Experience of  England is,  by now,  familiar to  those      interested in the subject.           A meeting of over 100 judges was held in the Royal      Courts of  Justice in  London on  January 7-8,  1965 to      take  part   in  exercises  designed  to  increase  the      uniformity  of   sentencing.  The  Lord  Chief  Justice      expressed the  hope that  the meeting  would be a model      for similar ones throughout the country.           Conferences between  judges, magistrates and penal      administrators  are,   in   England,   organised   with      increasing frequency  in many parts of the country with

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    an annual  conference  in  London  for  judges  of  the      Supreme Courts.           18.4. Besides  holding councils  on sentencing, it      may be  worthwhile to  hold "workshops’  which would be      less formal 201      but equally useful and likely to give concrete results.      Such workshops  could, for  example, be attended by all      Special  Judges   or  other   officers  concerned  with      economic offences. National courses  on sentencing  strategies vis-a-vis social justice is  a neglected  cause and the Administration is, as yet, ’innocent’ of this imperative need.      The second  profound issue,  thrown up  accidentally by Dr. Hoskot’s  sojourn in the Yeravada jail, disturbs us more because less  capable men-most  prisoners  in  this  country belong  to   the  lower,  illiterate  bracket-suffer  silent deprivation   of   liberty   caused   by   unreasonableness, arbitrariness and unfair procedures behind the ’stone walls’ and ’iron bars’.      Freedom is  what freedom  does, and here we go straight to Art.  21 of  the Constitution,  where  the  guarantee  of personal liberty is phrased with superb amplitude:           Art. 21: Protection of life and personal liberty:-           No  person  shall  be  deprived  of  his  life  or      personal  liberty   except   according   to   procedure      established by law. (emphasis added). ’Procedure established by law’ are words of deep meaning for all lovers  of liberty  and judicial  sentinels.  Amplified, activist fashion,  ’procedure’ means  ’fair  and  reasonable procedure’ which  comports with civilised norms like natural justice  rooted   firm  in   community  consciousness,   not primitive  processual  barbarity  nor  legislated  normative mockery. In a land-mark case, Maneka Gandhi(1), Bhagwati, J. (on this point the Court was unanimous) explained:           "Does Article 21 merely require that there must be      some semblance  of procedure,  howsoever  arbitrary  or      fanciful. prescribed  by law  before a  person  can  be      deprived of  his personal liberty or that the procedure      must satisfy  certain requisites  in the  sense that it      must be fair and reasonable ? Article 21 occurs in Part      III  of   the  Constitution   which   confers   certain      fundamental rights".           "Is the  prescription of  some sort  of  procedure      enough or must the procedure comply with any particular      requirements  ?  obviously,  the  procedure  cannot  be      arbitrary, unfair  or  unreasonable.  This  indeed  was      conceded by  the learned  Attorney General who with his      usual candour frankly (1) [1978] 1 SCC 248 at 277, 281 and 284 14-520 SCI/78 202      stated that it was not possible for him to contend that      any procedure howsoever arbitrary, oppressive or unjust      may be prescribed by the law."           "The principle of reasonableness, which legally as      well. as  philosophically, is  an essential  element of      equality or nonarbitrariness pervades Article 14 like a      brooding omnipresence and the procedure contemplated by      Article 21  must answer  the test  of reasonableness in      order to  be in  conformity with Article 14. It must be      "right and just and fair and not arbitrary, fanciful or      oppressive; otherwise  it would  be no procedure at all      and  the  requirement  of  Article  ’21  would  not  be      satisfied.

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         Any procedure  which  permits  impairment  of  the      constitutional  right   to  go  abroad  without  giving      reasonable opportunity  to show  cause can  not but  be      condemned as  unfair an(3 unjust and hence, there is in      the present  case clear infringement of the requirement      of Article 21".      One of us in his separate opinion there observed(u):           "Procedure established  by law",  with its  lethal      potentiality,  will   reduce  life  and  liberty  to  a      precarious plaything it we do not ex necessitate import      into those  weighty words  an adjectival  rule of  law,      civilised in  its soul,  fair in  its heart  and fixing      those imperatives of procedural protection absent which      the processual  tail will wag the substantive head. Can      the sacred  essence of  the human right to secure which      the  struggle   for  liberation,   with  ’do   or  die’      patriotism, was  launched be  sapped by formalistic and      pharisaic  prescriptions,   regardless   of   essential      standards ?  An enacted  apparition is a constitutional      illusion.  Processual   justice  is  writ  patently  on      Article 21.           Procedure  which  deals  with  the  modalities  of      regulating; restricting or even rejecting a fundamental      right falling  with in  Article 21  has to be fair, not      foolish,  carefully  designed  to  effectuate,  not  to      subvert, the substantive right itself. Thus understood,      ’procedure’ must  rule out anything arbitrary, freakish      or bizarre.  A valuable  constitutional right II can be      canalised  only   by  civilised   process..   What   is      fundamental is  life and liberty. What is procedural is      the manner (1) per Krishna lyer, J. at 337, 338. 203      of its  exercise.  This  quality  of  fairness  in  the      process  is emphasised by the strong word ’established’      which  means   ’settled   firmly’   not   wantonly   or      whimsically. If it is rooted in the legal consciousness      of the  community it  becomes ’established’  procedure.      And  ’law’  leaves  little  doubt  that  it  is  normae      regarded as  just since law is the means and justice is      the end.           Procedural  safeguards   are   the   indispensable      essence of  liberty. In  fact, the  history of personal      liberty is largely the history of procedural safeguards      and right  to a  hearing has  a  human-right  ring.  In      India, because  of poverty  and illiteracy,  the people      are  unable   to  protect   and  defend  their  rights;      observance of  fundamental rights  is not  regarded  as      good politics and their transgression as bad politics.           To sum  up, ’procedure’  in Article 21 means fair,      not formal  procedure. ’Law’ is reasonable law, not any      enacted piece.’‘           one  component   of  fair   procedure  is  natural justice. Generally  speaking and subject to just exceptions, at least  a single  right of appeal on facts, where criminal conviction is  fraught with long loss of liberty is basic to civilised jurisprudence.  It is  integral to fair procedure, natural justice  and normative  universality save in special cases like  the original tribunal being a high bench sitting on Lt  collegiate basis.  Ill short, a first appeal from the Sessions Court  to  the  High  Court,  as  provided  in  the Criminal Procedure Code, manifests this value upheld in Art. 21.      What follows from the appellate imperative ? Every step that makes  the right  of appeal  fruitful is obligatory and

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every action  or in-  action which  stultifies it  is unfair and, ergo,  unconstitutional (  In a sense, even Art. 19 may join hands  with Art.  21, as  the  Menka  Gandhi  reasoning discloses).  Pertinent  to  the  point  before  us  are  two requirements: (1)  service of  a copy of the judgment to the prisoner in  time to  file all  appeal and (ii) provision of free legal  ser- vices  to a  prisoner who  is  indigent  or otherwise disabled  from securing legal assistance where the ends of  justice call for such service. Both these are State responsibilities under  Art. 21.  Where the  procedural  law provides for  further appeals  what we  have said  regarding first appeals will similarly apply.      In the  present case  there is  something dubious about the delivery  of the  copy of  the judgment by the Jailor to the prisoner.  A  simple  proof  of  such  delivery  is  the latter’s written acknowledgment. Any 204 jailor who,  by indifference or vendetta, withholds the copy thwarts the court process and violates Art. 21, and may pave the way  for holding  the further  imprisonment illegal.  We hope that  Jail Manuals  will  be  updated  to  include  the mandate,  if   there  be  any  omission,  and  deviant  jail officials punished.  And courts,  when  prison  sentence  is imposed, will make available a copy of the judgment if he is straight marched  into the  prison. All  the obligations  we have specificated  are necessarily  implied in  the right of appeal conferred  by the  Code read  with the  commitment to procedural fairness  in Art.  21. Section  363 of the Cr. P. Code is  all activist  expression of  this import of Art. 21 and is  inviolable. We  say no more because we have condoned the delay  in the  present case although it is pathetic that for want of a copy of judgment the leave is sought after the sentence has been served out.           The  other  ingredient  of  fair  procedure  to  a prisoner, who  has to  seek his liberation through the court process  is   lawyer’s  services.   Judicial  justice,  with procedural  intricacies,   legal  submissions  and  critical examination of  evidence, leans upon professional expertise; and a failure of equal justice under the law is on the cards where such  supportive skill  is absent  for one  side.  Our judicature,  moulded   by  Anglo-American   models  and  our judicial process,  engineered by  kindred legal  technology, compel the  collaboration of  lawyer-power or  steering  the wheels of  equal justice  under the law. Free legal services to the needy is part of the English criminal justice system. And the  American jurist, Prof. Vance of Yale, sounded sense for India too when he said(1):           "What does  it profit a poor and ignorant man that      he is  equal to his strong antagonist before the law if      there is no one to inform him what the law is ? or that      the courts  are open to him on the same terms as to all      other persons  when he  has not  the wherewithal to pay      the admission fee ?"      Gideon’s trumpet  has been  heard across  the Atlantic. Black, J: there observed(2):           "Not only  those precedents  but also  reason  and      reflection  require   us  to  recognise  that  ill  our      adversary system  of criminal justice, any person haled      into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be      assured a  fair trial  unless counsel  is provided  for      him.  This   seems  to  us  to  be  an  obvious  truth.      Governments, both State and Federal, quite (1) Justice and Reform, Earl Johnson Jr. p. 11. (2) Processual Justice to the People (May, 1973) p. 69. 205

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    properly  spend   vast  sums   of  money  to  establish      machinery   to try defendants accused of crime. Lawyers      to prosecute are everywhere deemed essential to protect      the public’s interest in an orderly society. Similarly,      there. are  few defendants  charged with crime who fail      to hire  the best  lawyers they  can get to prepare and      present their  defences. That  government hires lawyers      to prosecute  and defendants  who have  the money  hire      lawyers to  defend are the strongest indications cf the      widespread belief  that lawyers  in criminal courts are      necessities, not  luxuries. The  right of  one  charged      with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and      essential to  fair trials  in some countries, but is in      ours. From  the very  beginning, our state and national      constitutions and  laws have  laid  great  emphasis  on      procedural  and   substantive  safeguards  designed  to      assure fair  trials before impartial tribunals in which      every defendant stands equal before the law. This noble      idea cannot  be realised  if the  poor man charged with      crime has  to face  his accusers  without a  lawyer  to      assist him".      The philosophy  of legal  aid as an inalienable element of fair  procedure is  evident from Mr. Justice Brennan’s(1) well-known words:           "Nothing rankles  more in  the human  heart than a      brooding sense  of injustice.  Illness we  can  put  up      with. But  injustice makes us want to pull things down.      When only  the rich  can enjoy  the law,  as a doubtful      luxury, and  the poor, who need it most, cannot have it      because its  expense puts  it beyond  their reach,  the      threat to  the continued existence of free democracy is      not imaginary  but very  real, because democracy’s very      life depends  upon making  the machinery  of justice so      effective that  every  citizen  shall  believe  in  and      benefit by its impartiality and fairness".      More recently,  the  U.S.  Supreme  Court,  in  Raymond Hamlin  has   extended  this  processual  facet  of  Poverty Jurisprudence. Douglas, J. there explicated(2):           "The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of      little avail  if it  did not comprehend the right to be      heard by  counsel. Even  the intelligent  and  educated      layman has  small and sometimes no skill in the science      of law. If (1) Legal aid and Legal Education p. 94. (2) United States Supreme Court Reports, Vol. 32 p. 530. 206      charged with  crime, he  is  incapable,  generally,  of      determining for  himself whether the indictment is good      or bad.  He is  unfamiliar with  the rules of evidence.      Left without  the aid of counsel he may be put on trial      without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent      evidence,  or  evidence  irrelevant  to  the  issue  or      otherwise inadmissible.  He lacks  both the  skill  and      knowledge  adequately  to  prepare  his  defense,  even      though he  have a  perfect one. He requires the guiding      hand of  counsel  it  every  step  in  the  proceedings      against him.  Without it,  though he  be not guilty, he      faces the danger of conviction because he does not know      how to  establish his innocence. If that be true of men      of intelligence,  how much  more  true  is  it  of  the      ignorant and illiterate or those of feeble intellect."           The right of one charged with crime to counsel may      not be  deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials      in some  countries, but  it is  in ours.  From the very      beginning, our  state and  national  constitutions  and

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    laws have  laid  great  emphasis  on    procedural  and      substantive safeguards  designed to  assure fair trials      before impartial  tribunals in  which  every  defendant      stands equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot he      realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face      his accusers  without a lawyer to assist him. 372 US at      344. 9 L Ed 2d at 805, 93, AL R 2d 733.      Both Powell  and Gideon  involved felonies.  But  their rationale has  relevance to  any criminal  trial,  where  an accused is deprived of his liberty. The court  should consider  the probable  sentence that will follow if  a conviction  is obtained.  The more  serious the likely consequences,  the greater  is the probability that a lawyer should  be appointed....... The court should consider the individual  factors peculiar  to each  case.  These,  of course, would  be the  most  difficult  to  anticipate.  One relevant factor  would be  the competency  of the individual defendant to present his own case.           (Jon Richard Argersinger v. Raymond Hamlin (407 US      25 32L Ed 2d 530 at 535-36 and 554. (Emphasis added)      The American Bar Association has upheld the fundamental premise that  counsel should  be provided  in  the  criminal proceedings for  offences punishable  by  loss  of  liberty, except those  types of offences for which such punishment is not likely to be imposed. Thus in 207 America, strengthened  by  the  Powell,  Gideon  and  Hamlin cases,  counsel for the accused in the more serious class of cases which  threaten a person with imprisonment is regarded as an  essential component of the administration of criminal justice and  as part  of procedural  fair-play. This  is  so without  regard   to  the   VIth  amendment  because  lawyer participation is ordinarily an assurance that deprivation of liberty will not be in violation of procedure established by law. In  short, it is the warp and woof of fair procedure in a  sophisticated,  legalistic  system  plus  lay  illiterate indigents aplenty. The Indian social legal milieu makes free legal service,  at trial  and higher  levels. an  imperative processual piece  of criminal  justice where  deprivation of life or personal liberty hangs in the judicial balance.      The widespread  insistence on  free  legal  assistance, where liberty  is in jeopardy? is obvious from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights           Art. 8.  Everyone has  the right  to an  effective      remedy by  the competent  national tribunals  for  acts      violating  the   fundamental  rights   granted  by  the      Constitution or by law. Art. 14(3)  of  the  International  Covenant  on  Civil  and Political Rights guarantees to everyone:           "the right  to be  tried in,  his presence, and to      defend himself in person or through legal assistance of      his own  choosing; to  be informed, if he does not have      legal assistance,  of his  right;  and  to  have  legal      assistance assigned  to  him  in  any  case  where  the      interests of justice shall require, and without payment      by him  in any such case if he does not have sufficient      means to pay for it." Many  high-level  Indian  Committees  and  Commissions  have emphasised the free legal service desideratum as integral to processual            fair-play            for            pr sellers. For example, one such committee has stated(1):           93. Prisoners, men and women, regardless of means,      are a  peculiarly handicapped  class. The  morbid  cell      which con-  fines them  walls them  off from  the world      outside. Legal  remedies, civil and criminal, are often

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    beyond their  physical and  even financial reach unless      legal aid is available within the prison as is provided      in some States in India and in other countries. Without      legal  aid,   petitions  of  appeal,  applications  for      commutation or parole, bail motions and claims (1) Processual Justice to the people May, 1973, p. 34. 208      for  administrative   benefits   would   be   well-nigh      impossible.  There  is  a  case  for  systematised  and      extensive assistance  through legal  aid lawyers to our      prison population.      The Central  Government  is  evolving  a  comprehensive programme  while   many  States   already  have  fragmentary schemes.      It needs no argument to drive home this point, now that Arts 39A, a fundamental constitutional directive, states:           39A. Equal Justice and free legal aid.           The State  shall secure  that the operation of the      legal system  promotes justice,  on a  basis  of  equal      opportunity, and  shall, in  particular,  provide  free      legal aid, by suitable legislation or schemes or in any      other way,  to ensure  that opportunities  for securing      justice are  not denied  to any  citizen by  reason  of      economic or other disabilities. (emphasis added) .           This article  is an  interpretative tool  for Art. 21.      Partial statutory  implementation  of  the  mandate  is found in  Sec. 304,  Cr. P.  Code, and  in other  situations courts cannot be inert in the face of Art. 21 and 39A.      We may  follow up  the  import  of  Maneka  Gandhi  and crystallise the  conclusion. Maneka  Gandhi’s case  has laid down that  personal liberty  cannot be  cut out  or cut down without fair  legal procedure.  Enough has  been set  out to establish that  a prisoner, deprived of his freedom by court sentence but  entitled to  appeal against  such verdict, can claim, as  part of  his protection  under  Art.  21  and  as implied in  his statutory  right to  appeal,  the  necessary concomitant of  right to  counsel to  prepare and  argue his appeal.      If a  prisoner sentenced  to imprisonment, is virtually unable to exercise his constitutional and statutory right of appeal, inclusive  of special  leave to  appeal, for want of legal assistance,  there is implicit in the Court under Art. 142, read  with Arts. 21, and 39A of the Constitution, power to assign  counsel for  such imprisoned individual for doing complete justice.  This is a necessary incident of the right of appeal  conferred by  the Code and allowed by Art. 136 of the Constitution. The inference is inevitable that this is a State’s  duty   and  not   government’s   charity.   Equally affirmative is  the implication  that while  legal  services must be  free to  the beneficiary, the lawyer himself has to be reasonably  remunerated for  his  services.  Surely,  the profession has  a public  commitment to  the people but mere philanthropy of its members yields short mileage in the long run. Their services, 209 especially when  they are  on behalf  of the  State, must be paid for.    Naturally,  the  State  concerned  must  pay  a reasonable sum that the court may fix when assigning counsel to  the  prisoner.  Of  course,  the  court  may  judge  the situation  and  consider  from  all  angles  whether  it  is necessary for  the ends  of justice  to make available legal aid in  the particular  case. In  every country  where  free legal services  are given  it is  not done  in all cases but only where public justice suffers otherwise. That discretion

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resides in the court.      In the  present petition,  the party,  though proferred legal aid  by the court, preferred to argue himself. Even so we uphold  the right  to counsel not in the permissive sense of Art.  22(1) and its wider amplitude but in the peremptory sense of Art. 21 confined to prison situations.      While dismissing  the Special Leave Petition we declare the legal position to put it beyond doubt:      1. Courts  shall forthwith furnish a free transcript of the judgment when sentencing a person to prison term;      2. In the event of any such copy being sent to the jail authorities for  delivery to the prisoner, by the appellate, revisional or  other court,  the official  concerned  shall, with quick  despatch, get  it delivered  to the sentence and obtain written acknowledgment thereof from him.      3. Where  the prisoner  seeks  to  file  an  appeal  or revision, every facility for exercise of that right shall be made available by the Jail Administration.      4. Where  the prisoner  is  disabled  from  engaging  a lawyer,  on   reasonable  grounds   such  as   indigence  or incommunicado   situation,   the   Court   shall,   if   the circumstances of  the case, the gravity of the sentence, and the ends  of justice so requires assign competent counsel of for the  prisoner’s defence,  provided the  party  does  not object to that lawyer      5. The  State which  prosecuted the prisoner and set in motion the  process which  deprived him of his liberty shall pay to  assigned counsel  such sum s the court may equitably fix.      6. These  benign prescriptions operate by force of Art. 21 [strengthened by Art. 19(1)(d)] read with sub-article (5) from the  lowest to  the highest  court where deprivation of life and personal liberty is in substantial peril. S.R.                                     Petition dismissed. 210