http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 10  

CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.)  1285 of 2003

PETITIONER: Madan Singh                                                      

RESPONDENT: State of Bihar                                                   

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/04/2004

BENCH: DORAISWAMY RAJU & ARIJIT PASAYAT

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T [With Crl. Appeal No. 1297 of 2003]

ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

       In this appeal under Section 19 of Terrorist and  Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (in short the  ’TADA Act’) the appellants question their conviction for  offences punishable under Section 302 read with Sections  149, 307 read with Sections 149, 352, 379 of Indian Penal  Code, 1860 (in short ’the IPC’), Section 27 of the Arms Act,  1959 (in short ’the Arms Act’) and Section 3 (2)(i) of the  TADA Act as done by the Sessions Judge, Jahanabad-cum- Special Judge, TADA.   

       Twenty persons faced trial for alleged commission of  various offences punishable under IPC, TADA Act and Arms  Act. Two of them (i.e. A-8 and A-9) died during trial.  Two  other accused persons were held to be juveniles within the  meaning of Juvenile Justice Care Protection of Children Act,  2000 (in short ’the Juvenile Act’).  It was held that they  were entitled to the benefit under the said Act. Each of the  convicted accused-appellants was given life imprisonment for  the offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section  149 IPC and Section 3 (2)(i) of the TADA Act in addition to  7 years and one year custodial sentence imposed for the  offence relatable to Section 307 read with Sections 149 and  353 IPC respectively. No separate sentence was imposed for  the offence relatable to Section 379 IPC and 27 of the Arms  Act.   

Prosecution version as unfolded during trial is as  follows:

According to the first information report (Ext.4)  lodged on 27.11.1988 Sri Rasid Imam (hereinafter referred to  as ’deceased’) the officer-in-charge of Arwal Police Station  on receiving information about assemblage of extremists at  village Bhadasi in the house of acquitted accused Vakil Ram,  with police revolver and other ammunitions looted from the  police giving rise to Arwal P.S. Case No. 174/88 and their  plan to attack their adversaries to kill them, formed a  raiding party with the other police officials including Sub  Inspector Mohan Singh, the informant (PW-12), Sub Inspector  Gajadhar Chaubey (PW-22), Assistant Sub Inspector S.N.  Pandey (PW-11), Constable Ram Binay Singh (PW-9), Constable  Amul Kumar Singh (PW-10), Constable Md. Najim (PW-8),  Constable Babu Mahto (PW-5) and others. He also

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 10  

requisitioned additional force from Kishan Bhavan,  Baidrabad. After entering the information in the station  diary he proceeded to village Bhadasi. On the way he met  another police official Irshad Ahmed who was going to see  the DSP. He was asked by the deceased to inform the DSP in  regard thereto. On reaching Jahanabad, more additional force  consisting of Hridyanand Puri (PW-17), Babu Lal Manjhi (PW- 18) and others reported to him. At about 11.30 a.m. on  reaching village Bhadasi, the police party proceeded towards  the house of acquitted accused Vakil Ram along with Sant  Prakash (PW-3) and Jitendra Prasad (PW-4) by observing the  required procedures. On reaching the house of Vakil Ram, the  deceased posted some police personnel with Sub Inspector  Gajadhar Choudhary at the gate of the house, and sent  another section of force with S.N. Pandey towards eastern  northern direction. The deceased along with others on  entering the house saw 20-25 persons there.  On seeing the  police party accused Mukaiya Shah Chand of Bhadasi (A-1)  directed others to bring rifles and carbines and to kill the  police party, whereupon the accused persons started firing  by going inside a room. As a result of the firing, constable  Amul Kumar Singh (PW-10) was hit on his left side of the  body. In spite of the injury, said Amul Kumar Singh (PW-10)  fired one round, but fell on the ground. One of the  extremists snatched his rifle who was shot at by firing made  by Babu Mahto (PW-5). Again while one of the extremists  attempted to flee away with the rifle, the deceased snatched  it after chasing him. But in between the extremist had made  firings as a result of which the deceased died at the spot.

In the meantime, the extremists started firing upon the  police party, who by taking position behind a door fired at  the extremists. As a result of firing by the extremists  Hridyanand Puri received injury in his hand. Taking stock of  the situation, the informant apprehending threat on the life  of police party as well as snatching of the ammunition,   ordered for firing. On the firing made by Hridyanand Puri,  one of the extremists was killed followed by three rounds of  firing by Babu Lal Manjhi (PW-18) and five rounds of firing  by Md. Nazim (PW-8). As a result of the firing, one more  extremist was killed.  Even after firing by the police the  accused persons continued firing on the police party which  compelled the police party for further firing, which caused  injury in the leg of one extremist, who started fleeing  away. While the accused persons started fleeing, some of  them Lakshman Sao (A-5), Lakhi Choudhary, Shyama Choudhary  (A-7), Madan Singh (A-10), Ajit Kumar (A-6), Ram Janam Ram  (A-3), Nanhe Rajwar (A-4), Manhgu Choudhary (A-15), Mahendra  Choudhary, Shorai Choudhary (A-12), Baleshwsar Choudhary (A- 14), Arvind Chaudhary (A-13) were apprehended by the police  party. They also apprehended Shanti Devi (A-8) along with  two children Lila and Chandan from a room situated south of  the courtyard of the house.  In the meantime DSP Arwal  arrived along with Sub Inspector Irshad Imam and additional  reinforcement. It came to light  that the extremists were  fleeing away by making firing and he along with other police  personnel chased the extremists for seizing their arms, but  they managed to flee away.

On search of the house of Vakil Ram in presence of  witnesses, arms, ammunitions, several documents, files,  letters regarding banned organisations, rifles, cartridges  and carbine were seized. A copy of the seizure list was  handed over to Ram Janam Ram son of Vakil Ram. The informant  claimed to have identified Tribhuwan Sharma (A-18), Dr.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 10  

Jagdish (A-16), Arun Kumar Bharti (A-17), Churaman Bhagat  (A-2) besides Shah Chand Mukaiya (A-1) while they were  fleeing.

After investigation charge sheet was placed and  cognizance was taken for offences relatable to Sections 302,  307, 353, 379, 411, 324, 326, 414, 124A read with Section 34  IPC and Sections 25, 27 and 35 of the Arms Act and Sections  3 and 4 of the TADA Act.  Charges were framed for offences  punishable under Sections 302 and 307 read with Section 149  IPC and Sections 353, 379, 124A IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of  the Explosive Substances Act, 1908  (in short ’the Explosive  Act’) and Section 3(5) of the TADA Act.  Acquitted-accused  Vakil Ram was separately charged for offence punishable  under Sections 3 (4) of the TADA and 25(1B) and 27 of the  Arms Act. In order to substantiate its accusations, 25 witnesses  were examined by the prosecution. The accused persons  pleaded innocence and examined 5 witnesses. On consideration  of the materials on record the Trial Court recorded  conviction and imposed sentences as aforesaid.                                       In support of the appeal, Mr. Shanti Bhushan, learned  senior counsel for the appellants in Criminal Appeal No.1297  of 2003 submitted that the judgment of the Trial Court  cannot be maintained on several grounds. Firstly, there is  no evidence to show that the accused persons were terrorists  or extremists or that the activities or actions alleged are  encompassed by Section 3 (1) of the TADA Act to be described  as terrorist acts. Further, the prosecution evidence is to  the effect that on getting secret information the police  officials went to the spot of occurrence and then some one   amongst them is supposed to have cried out that police  officials have come and got weapons. Thereafter, the firing  is supposed to have started from both sides. 3 persons have  been killed who were claimed to be terrorists by the  prosecution.  It may be that they are responsible for the  killing of the deceased and for the injuries on the police  constables.  The witnesses have admitted that they did not  know the accused persons earlier and after firing started  when some persons were fleeing away they were caught. There  is no reason to hold that they were guilty of any offence  when admittedly large number of villagers had assembled on  hearing the gun fire. It has also come on record that when  the persons were apprehended no arms were recovered, from  any of the persons who were apprehended while allegedly  fleeing, though one witness has stated that some arms were  recovered from the persons running away.  Even if there was  any assembly it cannot be said that the same was unlawful to  bring in application of Section 149 IPC.  There is no  evidence to show as to who had fired the gun or had asked to  start firing.  The definite case of the accused persons,  right from the beginning, was that there was dispute  regarding cutting of singadas. Investigating Officer  accepted that he had not made any investigation to find out  as to whether persons had assembled for cutting singada.  Documents were produced to show that some of the accused  persons had raised singada crops. The accused persons have  taken a definite stand that they were apprehending danger  from the higher caste people and, therefore, some of them  may have been armed to protect themselves in case of attack  by the higher caste people.  The Trial Court has acquitted   Vakil Ram in whose house the alleged occurrence took place.   It has not been shown that the assembly had any common  object to commit any crime or any member of the assembly had

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 10  

knowledge that crime was likely to be committed. Those who  were supposedly present may not have information about  presence of arms which were seized. Therefore, Section 149  IPC has no application. The place of occurrence has not been  established by cogent evidence. The defence stand that  occurrence took place near Singara pond is more probable in  view of the evidence adduced. In this background it was  submitted that conviction as done is uncalled for. Learned  counsel for appellants in Crl.A. No.1285/2003 advanced  similar arguments.    

       In response, Mr. H.L. Agrawal, learned senior counsel  for the respondent-State submitted that the assembly was in  an isolated place.  The materials seized clearly show that  there was planned preparation and intention to cause  terrorist activities.  Sophisticated arms were used and  seized.  Common object can develop at the spot.  It is the  existence of the common object at the time of actual  occurrence which is to be seen.  The factual scenario  clearly goes to show the existence of common object. If the  assembly was for protection from an attack by higher caste  people as claimed, the arrival of the police would have been  welcomed because that would have provided protection.  When  the call was given to start firing, after collecting arms  several persons started firing.  All the arms were inside  the house and it is not the stand of the accused persons  that anybody went outside to collect them.  Therefore, the  accused persons were well prepared to commit violent acts.  If really there was any apprehension of attack by the higher  caste people, the normal conduct would have been to inform  the police personnel on their arrival about their so called  fears and sought their assistance or protection and not to  start firing at them.  The acts referred to in Section 3 (1)  of TADA Act are comprehensive in nature and, therefore, the  acts committed are clearly covered by said provision. The  plea that place of occurrence was different and was near the  singada pond is clearly disproved by the fact that dead  bodies of the 3 terrorists were recovered from the house  itself.   

Major plea which was emphasized relates to the  question whether Section 149, IPC has any application for  fastening the constructive liability on the basis of  unlawful acts committed pursuant to the common object by  any member or the acts which the members of the unlawful  assembly knew to be likely to be committed which is the  sine qua non for its operation.  The emphasis is on the  common object and not on common intention.  Mere presence  in an unlawful assembly cannot render a person liable  unless there was a common object and he shared the same or  was actuated by that common object and that object is one  of those set out in Section 141.  Where common object of an  unlawful assembly is not proved, the accused persons cannot  be convicted with the help of Section 149.  The crucial  question to determine is whether the assembly consisted of  five or more persons and whether the said persons  entertained one or more of the common objects, as specified  in Section 141.  It cannot be laid down as a general  proposition of law that unless the commission of an overt  act is proved against a person, who is alleged to be a  member of unlawful assembly, it cannot be said that he is a  member of an assembly.  The only thing required is that he  should have understood that the assembly was unlawful and  was likely to commit any of the acts which fall within the  purview of Section 141.  The word ’object’ means the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 10  

purpose or design and, in order to make it ’common’, it  must be shared by all.  In other words, the object should  be common to the persons, who compose the assembly, that is  to say, they should all be aware of it and concur in it.  A  common object may be formed by express agreement after  mutual consultation, but that is by no means always  necessary.  It may be formed at any stage by all or a few  members of the assembly and the other members may just join  and adopt it. Once formed, it need not continue to be the  same.  It may be modified or altered or abandoned at any  stage.  The expression ’in prosecution of common object’ as  appearing in Section 149 have to be strictly construed as  equivalent to ’in order to attain the common object’.  It  must be immediately connected with the common object by  virtue of the nature of the object.  There must be  community of object and the object may exist only up to a  particular stage, and not thereafter.  Members of an  unlawful assembly may have community of object up to  certain point beyond which they may differ in their objects  and the knowledge, possessed by each member of what is  likely to be committed in prosecution of their common  object may vary not only according to the information at  his command, but also according to the extent to which he  shares the community of object, and as a consequence of  this the effect of Section 149, IPC may also vary on  different members of the same assembly.

       ’Common object’ is different from a ’common intention’  as it does not require a prior concert and a common meeting  of minds before the attack.  It is enough if each has the  same object in view and their number is five or more and  that they act as an assembly to achieve that object.  The  ’common object’ of an assembly is to be ascertained from  the acts and language and utterances of the members  composing it the nature of arms carried , and from a  consideration of all the surrounding circumstances.  It may  be gathered also from the course of conduct adopted by and  behaviour of  the members of the assembly at or before the  actual conflict.  What the common object of the unlawful  assembly is at a particular stage of the incident is  essentially a question of fact to be determined, keeping in  view the nature of the assembly, the arms carried by the  members, and the behaviour of the members at or near the  scene of the incident.  It is not necessary under law that  in all cases of unlawful assembly, with an unlawful common  object, the same must be translated into action or be  successful. Under the Explanation to Section 141, an  assembly which was not unlawful when it was assembled, may  subsequently become unlawful.  It is not necessary that the  intention or the purpose, which is necessary to render an  assembly an unlawful one comes into existence at the  outset.  The time of forming an unlawful intent is not  material. An assembly which, at its commencement or even  for some time thereafter, is lawful, may subsequently  become unlawful. In other words it can develop during the  course of incident at the spot eo instante.

Section 149, IPC consists of two parts.  The first  part of the section means that the offence to be committed  in prosecution of the common object must be one which is  committed with a view to accomplish the common object.  In  order that the offence may fall within the first part, the  offence must be connected immediately with the common  object of the unlawful assembly of which the accused was  member.  Even if the offence committed is not in direct

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 10  

prosecution of the common object of the assembly, it may  yet fall under Section 141, if it can be held that the  offence was such as the members knew was likely to be  committed and this is what is required in the second part  of the section.  The purpose for which the members of the  assembly set out or desired to achieve is the object.  If  the object desired by all the members is the same, the  knowledge that is the object which is being pursued is  shared by all the members and they are in general agreement  as to how it is to be achieved and that is now the common  object of the assembly.  An object is entertained in the  human mind, and it being merely a mental attitude, no  direct evidence can be available and, like intention, has  generally to be gathered from the act which the person  commits and the result therefrom.  Though no hard and fast  rule can be laid down as to the circumstances from which  the common object can be called out, it may reasonably be  collected from the nature of the assembly, arms it carries  and behaviour at or before or after the scene of incident.   The word ’knew’ used in the second branch of the section  implies something more than a possibility and it cannot be  made to bear the sense of ’might have been known’. Positive  knowledge is necessary. When an offence is committed in  prosecution of the common object, it would generally be an  offence which the members of the unlawful assembly knew was  likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object.   That, however, does not make the converse proposition true;  there may be cases which would come within the second part  but not within the first part.  The distinction between the  two parts of Section 149 cannot be ignored or obliterated.   In every case it would be an issue to be determined,  whether the offence committed falls within the first part  or it was an offence such as the members of the assembly  knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of the  common object and falls within the second part. However,  there may be cases which would fall within first part being  offences committed in prosecution of the common object,  while at the same time, though not always falling within  the second part, as  offences which the members of the  unlawful assembly  knew to be likely to be  committed by a  person engaged in the prosecution of the common object and  acting with the purpose of executing it. (See Chikkarange  Gowda and others v. State of Mysore : AIR 1956 SC 731.)

As noted by this Court in Sukhbir Singh v. State of  Haryana (2002 (3) SCC 327) common object in terms of Section  149 can develop at the spot. Existence of the object has to  be considered at the time of actual occurrence and not  necessarily from anterior point of time.         

When the factual scenario is considered in the  background of the legal position enumerated above, the  inevitable conclusion is that Section 149 has been rightly  applied. The fact that the unlawful assembly’s common object  was to resist the enforcement of law, and to commit criminal  offences and to overawe the authorities/public servants by  use and show of criminal force stood firmly established on  the evidence on record.  Consequently, the criminal acts  committed in furtherance of the common object, which acts  were not only part of the common object of the unlawful  assembly but also such which the members of the assembly  knew reasonably well are such as are likely to be committed  squarely attract Section 149 I.P.C. Certain salient factual  aspects clearly establish prosecution version.  Firstly,

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 10  

defence plea regarding alleged apprehended attack by higher  caste people has been found to be of no substance.  If  really the accused persons had gathered for reaping singada  as claimed, there was no reason for the call to be given to  start shooting at the police and then actual firing.  A  person who apprehends attack from some other person would  rather welcome the arrival of the police and  bring to  notice of the officials about the apprehended danger and not  to start firing at the police officials knowing them to be  police, with defiance adopting a violent posture . This  itself is sufficient to discard the defence version about  nature and object of assembly.  Further, the materials  seized show that the object of the assembly was preparation  for commission of crime. The presence of huge quantity of  arms and that too sophisticated arms unerringly shows the  nature of the assembly was unlawful. One of the printed  materials i.e. literatures seized clearly indicates their  involvement in nature and type of activities which were  envisaged in and covered by section 3 (1) of the TADA Act.  The plea that place of occurrence was different and was near  pond where singadas were grown is also without substance.   The dead bodies of the 3 persons who fired at the police  officials were found in the house said to belong to the   acquitted accused Vakil Ram and the dead body of the  deceased was also nearby.  The evidence of the injured  police officials is also relevant, and there is no reason as  to why they would falsely implicate the accused persons.  It  is not correct as submitted by the learned counsel for the  appellants that none the persons who were arrested were  carrying arms.  In fact, some of the prosecution witnesses  have stated that they were also carrying arms, and this  evidence has not been successfully rebutted.   

A ’terrorist’ activity does not merely arise by causing  disturbance of law and order or of public order. The fallout  of the intended activity is to be one that it travels beyond  the capacity of the ordinary law enforcement agencies to  tackle it under the ordinary penal law. It is in essence a  deliberate and systematic use of coercive intimidation.  It is a common feature that hardened criminals today  take advantage of the situation and by wearing the cloak of  terrorism, aim to achieve acceptability and respectability  in the society; because in different parts of the country  affected by militancy, a terrorist is projected as a hero by  a group and often unfortunately even by many misguided  youth. As noted at the outset, it is not possible to  precisely define "terrorism". Finding a definition of  "terrorism" has haunted countries for decades. A first  attempt to arrive at an internationally acceptable  definition was made under the League of Nations, but the one  which the convention drafted in 1937 never came into  existence. The UN member States still have no agreed-upon  definition apparently on account of what at times reveal to  be state sponsored terrorism, both at national and  international levels. Terminology consensus would, however,  be necessary for a single comprehensive convention on  terrorism, which some countries favour in place of the  present 12 piecemeal conventions and protocols. The lack of  agreement on a definition of terrorism has been a major  obstacle to meaningful international countermeasures. Cynics  have often commended at national and international levels  that one State’s "terrorist" is another State’s "freedom  fighter" and that too with the blessings of those in power.  Crime became an highly politicised affair and greed  compounded by corruption and violence enabled

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 10  

unscrupulousness and hypocrisy reigns supreme, supported by  duplicity and deceitful behaviour in public life to amass  and usurp public power to perpetuate personal  aggrandizement, pretending to be for the common good.  If  terrorism is defined strictly in terms of attacks on non- military targets, a number of attacks on military  installations and soldiers’ residences could not be included  in the statistics. In order to cut through the Gordian  definitional knot, terrorism expert A. Schmid suggested in  1992 in a report for the then UN Crime Branch that it might  be a good idea to take the existing consensus on what  constitutes a "war crime" as a point of departure. If the  core of war crimes - deliberate attacks on civilians,  hostage-taking and the killing of prisoners - is extended to  peacetime, we could simply define acts of terrorism  veritably as "peacetime equivalents of war crimes".  

League of Nations Convention (1937)  "All criminal acts directed against a State along with  intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the  minds of particular persons or a group of persons or the  general public."  (GA Res. 51/210 - Measures to eliminate international  terrorism)  "1. Strongly condemns all acts, methods and practices of  terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by  whomsoever committed;  2. Reiterates that criminal acts intended or calculated to  provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of  persons or particular persons for political purposes are in  any circumstances unjustifiable, whatever the considerations  of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic,  religious or other nature that may be invoked to justify  them."  3. Short legal definition proposed by A.P. Schmid to United  Nations Crime Branch (1992)  Act of terrorism = peacetime equivalent of war crime  4. Academic consensus definition  "Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring of repeated violent  action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or  State actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political  reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct  targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate  human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly  (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or  symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as  message generators. Threat-and violence-based communication  processes between terrorist (organization), (imperilled)  victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main  target [audience(s)], turning it into a target of terror, a  target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on  whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily  sought." (Schmid, 1988)  

Definitions : Terrorism by nature is difficult to define. Acts of  terrorism conjure up emotional responses in the victims  (those hurt by the violence and those affected by the fear)  as well as in the practitioners. Even the U.S. Government  cannot agree on one single definition. The old adage "one  man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter" is still  alive and well. Listed below are several definitions of  terrorism used by the Federal Bureau of Investigation :   "Terrorism is the use of threatened use of force designed  to bring about political change." Brian Jenkins

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 10  

"Terrorism constitutes the illegitimate use of force to  achieve a political objective when innocent people are  targeted."   Walter Laqueur  

"Terrorism is the premeditated, deliberate, systematic  murder, mayhem, and threatening of the innocent to create  fear and intimidation in order to gain a political or  tactical advantage, usually to influence an audience."                                  James M. Poland  

"Terrorism is the unlawful use or threat of violence  against persons or property to further political or social  objectives. It is usually intended to intimidate or coerce a  Government, individuals or groups, or to modify their  behavior or politics." Vice-President’s Task Force, 1986  

"Terrorism is the unlawful use of force or violence against  persons or property to intimidate or coerce a Government,  the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in  furtherance of political or social objectives."                                           FBI definition  

Terrorism is one of the manifestations of increased  lawlessness and cult of violence. Violence and crime  constitute a threat to an established order and are a revolt  against a civilised and orderly society. "Terrorism" though  has not been separately defined under TADA there is  sufficient indication in Section 3 itself to identify what  it is by an all inclusive and comprehensive phraseology  adopted in engrafting the said provision, which serves the  double purpose as a definition and punishing provision nor  is it possible to give a precise definition of "terrorism"  or lay down what constitutes "terrorism". It may be possible  to describe it as use of violence when its most important  result is not merely the physical and mental damage of the  victim but the prolonged psychological effect it produces or  has the potential of producing on the society as a whole.  There may be death, injury, or destruction of property or  even deprivation of individual liberty in the process but  the extent and reach of the intended terrorist activity  travels beyond the effect of an ordinary crime capable of  being punished under the ordinary penal law of the land and  its main objective is to overawe the Government or disturb  the harmony of the society or "terrorise" people and the  society and not only those directly assaulted, with a view  to disturb the even tempo, peace and tranquility of the  society and create a sense of fear and insecurity.            

       In the aforesaid background, the inevitable conclusion  is that the appeals are sans merit and deserve dismissal,  which we direct.                         

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 10