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PETITIONER: MADAN GOPE

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL

DATE OF JUDGMENT12/02/1975

BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH KRISHNAIYER, V.R.

CITATION:  1975 AIR  953            1975 SCR  (3) 531  1975 SCC  (1) 415

ACT: Maintenance  of Internal Security Act, 1971, s.  3(1)--Order of  detention  for maintenance of public  order--If  can  be justified     as     for    maintenance     of     essential supplies--’Smuggling’ if can prejudice public order--’Public Order’, scope of.

HEADNOTE: The-petitioner  was detained by an order made under s. 3  of the  Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971, to  prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, on two grounds.  The activity which consti- tuted the substratum of the first ground of detention was  a case of inter-state smuggling of essential commodities.  The other  facts  mentioned,  in addition to  smuggling  in  the ground,  are  (a)  that the detenu and  his  associates  had threatened  the Home Guards who arrested them, and  snatched away  the  seized commodities from the custody of  the  Home Guards.  and, (b) that his activity came within the  purview of ss. 143/185/332/506, I.P.C. and s. 7(i) (a) (ii) of Act X of 1955. Allowing the petition under Art. 32 challenging the order of detention, HELD:     (1)  Section 3(1)(a) of the Act confers  power  on the  authority for detain a person if it is  satisfied  that such detention is necessary to prevent him from acting in  a manner  prejudicial  to,  (i)  the  defence  of  India,  the relation  of India with foreign powers, or the  security  of India, or (ii) the security of the State or the  maintenance of  Public Order. or (iii) the maintenance of  supplies  and services  essential  to  the community.  The  power  can  be exercised  only on, one or more of the  grounds  enumerated, and if the exercise of the power is not, on the face of  the order,  correlated  to  any of  these  grounds  or  concerns activities  which are not germane to any of  those  grounds, such  exercise would be vitiated for lack  of  jurisdiction. Further  the satisfaction spoken of in s. 3(i) which is  the sine  qua non for the exercise of power, is  the  subjective satisfaction  of  the authority which cannot  be  tested  in court  by objective standards.  Ordinarily,  therefore,  the court  cannot  go behind the satisfaction expressed  on  the face  of the order.  Thus, where the order ex facie is  made

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with a view to prevent an act prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, the detaining authority cannot be permitted ’to  show that in fact the order was made to prevent an  act prejudiced to the maintenance of   supplies   and   services essential to the life of the community. [534B-G] (2)  Ordinarily,  smuggling is a calendestine  activity  and its concept is repugnant to   what is public.  But cases are conceivable where the act of smuggling may be accompanied by such  violence  or disorder that it throws out of  gear  the even  tempo of the life of the community in the locality  or disturbs public tranquility. [535F-H] In the present case, there is no mention that the detenu  or his  associates were armed with any deadly weapons, or  that their  acts had caused panic and terror among the people  of the  locality.  The incident was confined to the detenu  and his  associates on one hand and the home guards who  checked them  on  the  other.  it was  not  an  activity  which  was prejudicial  to the maintenance of public order.  The  first ground  of detention had, therefore, no real nexus with  the maintenance of public order. [536B-C] (3)  The  activity  could  at  the most be  said  to  be  an activity  affecting  law  and order.  The  order  cannot  be justified on the ground that the activity was prejudicial to the  maintenance of supplies and services essential  to  the community,   because,  the  Court  cannot  go   behind   the subjective  satisfaction  of  the  detaining  authority   as expressed  in the detention order and permit it  to  justify its  order on a ground different from the one  mentioned  on the face of the order.  The fact that the activities of  the detenu  constituted  the various offences mentioned  in  the order was only a conclusion drawn by the authority. [536A-B, C-E] 532 (4)  It  could  not  be  said  that  whenever  any  act   is accompanied by show of force or threat to any public servant entrusted  with  the maintenance of law and order,  it  must necessarily fall within the category of art act  prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.  In every case the broad test  to  be  applied  is whether the  act  was  of  such  a magnitude  and gravity that it had disturbed the even  tempo of  the  life  of  the  community  in  the  area  and  that, essentially,  is  a  question  of  fact  depending  on   the circumstances of each case. [536F-G] Indradeo Mahato v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1973 SCC 4; Dr. Ram  Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar and Ors. [1966] 1,  SCR 709  and Ram Ranjan Chatterjee v. The State of West  Bengal. Writ Petition No. 476/74 decided on 22-1-75 referred to. (5)  If one of the several grounds of detention is found  to be irrelevant, the order of detention shall stand  vitiated, because,  it cannot reasonably by predicated to what  extent the   irrelevant  ground  had  influenced   the   subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. [536E-F]

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 559 of 1974. Petition Under Article 32 of the Constitution Gautwn Goswami, for the petitioner. G. S. Chatterjee, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SARKARIA, J.-Madan Gope, petitioner challenges the  validity of  the  order  of  his  detention  made  by  the   District Magistrate,  Purulia  under  s.  3  of  the  Maintenance  of Internal  Security  Act, 1971.  The order  states  that  the

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detention  has been made to prevent him from acting  in  any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The  impugned order is founded on two grounds which  run  as under :               " 1. On 1-1 1-73 at about 09.00 hrs. you along               with  your associates attacked Home Guard  No.               900 Aswini Mohanti and 3 others of Layadi Home               Guard  Camp who were on cordoning patrol  near               Kashipur village, P.S.. Joypur close to  Bihar               border  when  they  arrested  you  with  rice,               Dalda,  Kerosene Oil, wheat, which were  being               carried by you and threatened them with  death               and snatched away the seized commodities  from               their custody.               In  consequence  of your said  activity  which               comes   within   the   purview   of    section               143/186/332/506, I.P.C. and 7 (i) (a) (ii)  of               Act  X  of  1955, the  maintenance  of  Public               ,Order was disturbed.               The said activity thus attract sub-clause (ii)               of  Clause (i) of sub-section(1) of section  3               of  the Maintenance of Internal Security  Act,               1971 (Act 26 of 1971).               2.    On  6-11-73  at about 19.00  hours,  you               along   with  your  associates  attacked   the               investigating  Police Officer and  his  Police               Party  with  deadly weapons and  attempted  to               resist  your arrest while they went  to  Sidhi               village under Joypur P.S..                533               District  Purulia to investigate a case.   You               and one of your associates were arrested  with               deadly weapons.               These violent and dangerous activities on your               part  created  terror and  panic  amongst  the               local  people who were over-awed and thus  you               have disturbed Public Order.               In  consequence  of your said  activity  which               comes within the purview of sections  148/149,               307/5o6/186 I.P.C., the maintenance of  public               order was disturbed.               The  said  activities thus  attract  Sub-Cause               (ii)  of  Clause  (a) of  Sub-section  (1)  of               Section  3  of  the  Maintenance  of  Internal               Security Act, 1971 (Act 26 of 1971)." The  return has been filed by the, District  Magistrate  who had passed the impugned order in which it is averred :               "I  say that I made the detention order  after               being satisfied from the materials on  records               in  support  of the grounds  of  detention  in               question  that with a view to  preventing  the               said   detenu  from  acting  in   any   manner               prejudicial  to  the  maintenance  of   Public               Order,  it was necessary to detain  him....  I               further say that the grounds furnished to  the               said  detenu are the grounds on which I  based               my  satisfaction  for  making  the  order   of               detention taking those grounds separately  and               collectively. . . . The  main  contention  of  Shri  Goswami,  learned   Counsel appearing  as  amicus  curiae for the  petitioner,  is  that neither  of the grounds of detention was relevant to  Public Order.   According to Counsel these incidents, at the  most, affect ’law and order’.  In support of his contention he has referred  to Bakhtawar Singh v. The State;(1) Man  Singh  v.

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State;(2) Arun Ghosh v. State of W. Bengal(3) Kanu Biswas v. The State of West Bengal(3); Kishori Mohan Bera v. The State of  West Bengal(3) and Shyamlal Chakravarty v.  Commissioner of Police, Calcutta and another(1). In  reply  Mr.  Chatterjee, learned Counsel  for  the  State submits that in these criminal incidents, the petitioner had threatened  and  tried to obstruct public  servants  in  the discharge  of their duty.  When-aver a criminal incident  is accompanied  by  such  threat or  resistance,  proceeds  the argument,   it  raises  a  problem,  of  Public   Order   as distinguished  from  a  simple problem  of  law  and  order. Reference in this connection has been made to Kanu Biswas v. State  of West Bengal (supra); Babul Mitra v. State of  West Bengal(7) and Indradeo Mahato v. State of West Bengal(8). (1)  AIR 951 Punjab 157. (2)  AIR 1953 Pepsu 16. (3)  [1970] 3, S.C.R. 288. (4)  AIR 1972 S.C. 1656; (5)  AIR 1972 SC 1749. (6)  AIR 1970 SC 269. (7)  AIR 1973 SC 197. (8)  AIR 1973 SCC 4. 534 Times  out of number, it has been emphasized by  this  Court that  since  the  Act  gives  extraordinary  powers  to  the Executive  to  detain  a person  without  trial,  meticulous compliance  with  the  letter and  requirements  of  law  is essential  for  the validity of an order of  detention  made thereunder. Section 3 (1 ) (a) of the Act confers power on the authority to detain a person if it is satisfied that such detention is necessary   to  prevent  him  from  acting  in  any   manner prejudicial to :               (i)   the  defence of India, the, relation  of               India  with foreign powers of the security  of               India or               (ii)  the   security  of  the  State  or   the               maintenance of Public Order, or               (iii) the maintenance of supplies and services               essential to the community. Clause  (b) of s. 3 (1 ) applies to a foreigner and  is  not relevant for our purpose. It will be seen that the power can be exercised only on  one or more of the grounds enumerated above.  If the exercise of the power is not on the face of the order correlated to  any of  these  grounds  or concerns activities,  which  are  not germane  to  any of these grounds, such  exercise  would  be vitiated   for   lack   of   jurisdiction.    Further,   the satisfaction spoken of in s. 3 (1) which is the sine qua non to the exercise of the power is the subjective  satisfaction of  the  authority  which  cannot be  tested  in  court  by. objective  standards.   Ordinarily,  therefore,  the   court cannot  go behind the satisfaction expressed on the face  of the order.  As pointed out by this Court in Dr. Ram  Manohar Lohia  v. State of Bihar and Ors. (1) "when an order on  the face  of  it, is not in terms of the rule,  a  court  cannot equally  enter  into an investigation whether the  order  of detention  was in fact, that is to say irrespective of  what is  stated  in it, in terms of the rule".   Thus  where  the order  ex  facie  is  made with a view  to  prevent  an  act prejudicial   to  the  maintenance  of  Public  Order,   the detaining authority cannot be permitted to show that in fact the  order  was made to prevent an act  prejudicial  to  the maintenance  of supplies and services essential to the  life of the community.

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The  distinction between ’Public Order’ and ’Law and  Order’ has frequently come up for consideration before this  Court. Recently,  in  Ram Ranjan Chatterjee v. The  State  of  West Bengal, (2) this Court explained the distinction between the two, thus :               "it may be remembered that qualitatively,  the               acts  which  affect ’law and  order’  are  not               different  from the acts which affect  ’public               order’.   Indeed a state of peace or,  orderly               tranquility which prevails as a result of  the               observance or enforcement of internal laws and               regulations by the Government, is a               (1)   [1966] 1 SCR 709.               (2)   Writ  Petition  No.  476/74  decided  on               22-1-75.               535               feature  common  to the concepts of  ’law  and               order’  and  ’public order’.   Every  kind  of               disorder or contravention of law affects  that               orderly tranquility.  The distinction  between               the  areas  of  ’law and  order’  and  ’public               order’  as  pointed  by  this  Court  in  Arun               Ghosh’s  case (supra) ’.’is one of degree  and               extent of the reach of the act in question  on               society". it is the potentiality of the act to               disturb  the  even tempo of the  life  of  the               community  which makes it prejudicial  to  the               maintenance   of   public   order.    If   the               contravention  in its effect is confined  only               to  a few individuals, directly  involved,  as               distinguished  from a winder spectrum of  the-               public,  it would raise a, problem of law  and               order only.  These concentric concepts of ’law               and  order’  and  ’public order’  may  have  a               common  epicenter’,  but  it  is  the  length,               magnitude  and  intensity of  the  terror-wave               unleashed by a particular eruption of disorder               that.   helps  distinguished  it  as  an   act               affecting ’public order’ from that  concerning               "law and order". We  may further, observe that the various grounds  indicated in  clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of Section 3(1) (a) are  not always mutually exclusive.  Nor can the prejudicial acts  be categorized  into water-tight compartments.  As pointed  out by this Court in Indradeo Mahato’s case (supra)               "Similar acts in different situations may give               rise  to  different problems : in one  set  of               circumstances  an act may pose only a law  and               order problem whereas in another it may  gene-               rate  deep  and widespread  vibrations  having               serious enough impact on the civilized  peace-               abiding society so as to affect public  order,               one  has to weigh the degree and sweep of  the               harm the act in question is capable of in  its               context.   Every  case has  therefore,  to  be               considered   on   its  own  facts   and   cir-               cumstances." Considered in the light of the above principles, it is quite clear that the activity which constitutes the substratum  of the  first  ground  of detention, is manifestly  a  case  of interstate   smuggling  or  attempt  to  smuggle   essential commodities  such  as rice, Dalda, Kerosene oil  and  wheat. Smuggling, ordinarily, is a calendestine activity.   Broadly speaking, its concept is repugnant to what is ’public’.   As rightly  observed  by Falshaw J. in Bakhtawar Singh  v.  The

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State(1)  :  "Prima  facie there is  no  connection  between smuggling  which is essentially a secret operation  and  the maintenance  of public order in which the operative word  is ’public"’.  We will, however, hasten to add that this  broad proposition  as  to  the  distinction  between  an  act   of ’smuggling’  and an act affecting ’public order’ is  not  an abstract   or  absolute  proposition  of  law.   Cases   are conceivable where the act of smuggling may be accompanied by such  violence and disorder that it throw,% out of gear  the even  tempo of the life of the community in the locality  or disturbs public tranquility.  The broad distinction  between an  act of smuggling and one Prejudicial to  ’Public  Order’ drawn by us is helpful only for the purpose of deter- (1) AIR 1951 Simla 151. 3-470SCI/75 536 mining whether in the circumstances of the present case, the smuggling activity attributed to the detenu, as incorporated in  his  first  ground  of  detention  was  germane  to  the maintenance  of  public  order,  for  achieving  which   the preventive  detention in question has been professedly  made In  our opinion the answer to this question must be  in  the negative.   The  only  fact  which  has  been  mentioned  in addition  to the smuggling of some essential commodities  in that  ground  is  that the detenu  and  his  associates  had threatened  the  Home-Guards and snatched  away  the  seized commodities  from their custody.  Further fact mentioned  is that   this  activity  comes  within  the  purview  of   Ss. 143/186/332/506  I.P.C. and 7(i) (a) (ii) of Act X of  1955. This  latter fact to the effect that such and such  offences were committed was only a conclusion drawn by the authority. There  is absolutely no mention that any was caused  in  the locality    Nor  is  it  alleged  that  the  detenu  or   his associates were armed with any deadly weapons, or that their acts  had  caused panic and terror among the people  of  the locality.   The incident was confined to the detenu and  his associates on one handand the, Home-guards who checked  them on  the  other.  Clearly therefore, it was nit  an  activity which  was prejudicial to the maintenance of  Public  Order. At  the most, it could be said to be an  activity  affecting law  and order Nor can the order be justified on the  ground that  this  activity  was  manifestly  prejudicial  to   the maintenance  of  supplies  and  services  essential  to  the community.  We have stated earlier that the court cannot  go behind   the  subjective  satisfaction  of   the   detaining authority as expressed in the detention order and permit  it to  justify  its order on a ground different  from  the  one mentioned on the face of the order. We  are  therefore  of  the opinion  that  first  ground  of detention  had no Teal nexus with the maintenance of  Public Order.  In view of this finding, it is not necessary for  us to consider whether the criminal act act incorporated in the second  ground of detention falls within the category of  an ad  affecting Public Order or one concerning law and  order. If  one out of several grounds of detention is found  to  be irrelevant,  the  order of detention shall  stand  vitiated. The  reason is that in such cases, it cannot  be  reasonably predicated  as  to what extent the  irrelevant  ground  ’had influenced  the  subjective satisfaction  of  the  detaining authority. We have gone through the cases cited by Mr. Chatterjee.   It has not been laid down therein as a proposition of law  that whenever  any act is accompanied by show of force or  threat to  a public servant entrusted with the maintenance  of  law and  order, it must necessarily fall within the category  of

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an act prejudicial to the maintenance of Public Order.  Even in those cases, the broad test applied was, whether the  act was  of such a magnitude and gravity that it  had  disturbed the  even  tempo of the life of the community in  the  area. Indeed, this is essentially a question of fact depending  on the circumstances of each case. in  the result, we allow this petition, quash  the  impugned order  of detention, make the rule absolute and direct  that the petitioner be released forthwith. V.P.S.                  Petition allowed. 537