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PETITIONER: M/S. VARIETY EMPORIUM

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: V. R. M. MOHD. IBRAHIM NAINA

DATE OF JUDGMENT27/11/1984

BENCH: CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ) BENCH: CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ) THAKKAR, M.P. (J)

CITATION:  1985 AIR  207            1985 SCR  (2) 102  1985 SCC  (1) 251        1984 SCALE  (2)829  CITATOR INFO :  R          1987 SC 741  (13)  F          1987 SC2055  (13)  RF         1988 SC1074  (7)  RF         1991 SC1760  (20)

ACT:      Constitution   of India,  1950,  Article  136-Power  to grant special  leave in  Rent cases  where three courts have accepted   the plea  of bona fide personal requirements-onus of  proof  lies  on  the  petitioner    tuition    to  prove unjustness of  t   decisions   o   the court  as to bonafide personal need-Subsequent events must also be looked  into by the Courts  as regards  continued  requirement  for personal purposes-Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent  Control) Act, 1960, Section 10 (3) (i) and (iii), scope of,

HEADNOTE:      The respondent-landlord  through  an  instrument  inter vivos ,   filed  seven petitions for ejectment under section 10   (3)   (i) and  (iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and  Rent  Control) Act,  1960 (Tamil Nadu Act XVIII of 1960 as amended  by Act   I   of  1980) against  seven  different tenants. Four  out of  these occupied  shop premises  on the ground floor  while the  other three   occupied  residential premises on  the first floor of a building  situated at Door No.   14, Pursuawalkam High Road, Madras. The plea  of  bona fide  personal  requirement was accepted by the trial  Judge who decreed all the petitioner and passed orders of eviction against every   one  of the seven tenants. One of these, who occupied a   so-called   shop   measuring   4’  x 4’ under a stairway,   and   another tenant  in the residential portion on the  first floor   acquiesced  in  the decree of eviction passed against  them. Five  out  of  the seven tenants filed appeals against the orders of their eviction. The  Appellate Authority dismissed  all the  three appeals  of  the tenants of the  shop premises  on the  ground floor, but allowed the appeals   filed  by  the  two  tenants  of  the  residential premises   on the   first    floor.    Thus  the  respondent succeeded   in  obtaining decrees for possession against all the four  tenants on  the ground floor and one tenant on the first floor.  Against the  said   orders of   the  Appellate Court, the  appellant alone  preferred   a   Civil  Revision

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Petition (CRP. 122 of 1979) before the High Court.  The High Court dismissed  the petition. Hence the tenant’s appeal  by special leave of the Court.      Allowing the appeal, the Court ^      HELD: 1.1  The jurisdiction  of the  Supreme  Court  to grant special  leave to  appeal under  Article  136  of  the Constitution has to  be  exercised sparingly. Concurrence of three Courts,   as   in  this  case  that the respondent has proved that  he   requires  the suit  premises bona fide for his personal  need,   UNDOUBTEDLY    has  relevance  on  the question whether the Supreme Court should 103 exercise     its  jurisdiction  under  Article  136  of  the Constitution to   review a particular decision of the Courts below.  But,  that cannot  possibly mean that injustice must be perpetuated   because  it has  been done three times in a case. [105-H]      1.  2   In  the  instant  case,  by  drawing  a  priori conclusions the Courts have denied justice to the appellant. The trial   court deluded  itself  into believing as proved, what  remained  to  be proved  by the production of evidence which could  have been    produced  but  was  not  only  not produced but  was suppressed.  The first  appellate    court decided the  question of landlord’s bonafide  requirement by the application of formula which confuses  ’requirement’  or ’need’ with ’desire’. And, the High Court  refused  to apply its   mind   to a question which, if  examined,  could  have altered the course of justice. [106E-F]      1. 3  The burden  of showing that a concurrent decision of two or more Courts or Tribunals is manifestly unjust Iies on  the appellant.  But once that a burden is discharged, it is not   only the right but the duty of the Supreme Court to remedy the  injustice. [IIIA-B]      1.   4 The  argument that  such an interference by  the Supreme   Court   may lead  and in  practice, does  lead  to different standards  being applied  by different  courts  to find out  whether a concurrent  decision is patently illegal or unjust  is    inevitable  in  the  present  dispensation. Quantatively, the  Supreme Court   has  a  vast jurisdiction which extends  over matters  as far   apart   as  Excise  to Elections and  Constitution to  Crimes. The  Court  sits  in Benches   and   not en banc, as the American  Supreme  Court does. Indeed,  even if  the entire Court were to sit to hear every one of the  matters  which  have been filed during any year  a  certain amount  of individuality in the response to injustice   cannot   be avoided.  It is a well-known fact of constitutional history,   even  in countries where the whole court sits  to hear  every case,   that the  composition  of majorities is  not static.   It   changes   from subject  to subject though,  perhaps, not  from case  to case.  Personal responses   to   injustice are not  esotenic.  Indeed,  they furnish refreshing  assurance of close and careful attention which the  Judges give  to the  cases which come before them The   litigating   public will  not  prefer  a  computerised system of   administration   of   justice:  only,  that  the Chancellor’s  foot  must  treadwarily. [lO6A-D]      1.   S In  appropriate cases the Court must have regard to events  as they present themselves at the time when it is hearing the   proceeding   before it and mould the relief in the  light  of those events.[lIIE]      Hasmat  Rai  v.  Raghunarh  Prasad  [1981]  3  SCR  605 followed      OBSERVATlON:   [It  is  quite disparaging  to  describe a tenant’s  attempt to  resist eviction by lawful means as a

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"hue and cry". And, it is inequitous in the extreme that any court of  law, and   least  of all a Rent Act tribunal which has to  deal   with   a human  problem of  great  magnitude, should regard  it as  a matter of no moment that an order of eviction will  throw the  tenant on   the  street.  A  judge does not  have to  wear a  shoe in order  to  know where  it pinches. Therefore,  he does  not have to face the  prospect of being driven to the street in order 104      to    realise  what  it  means.  His  training    legal equipment and    experience    of  life  are  his  tools  of education   and  social awareness. This does not mean that a decree of  eviction can  never be   passed  against a tenant but, whether  the provisions of a  law specifically  require it or  not the  court has  to have  regard   for  all    the aspects   of the  matter before  it   and   the  foreseeable consequences of the order which it proposes to pass]. [IO8D- F]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDlCTlON: Civil Appeal No. 3358 of      1979.      Appeal by  Special leave  form the  Judgment and  order dated the  31st October, 1979 of the Madras High Court in C. R. P.  No. 122 of 1979.      C. S. Vaidyanathan for the appellant.      V. M. Tarkunde and Shakeel Ahmed for the Respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      CHANDRACHUD,  C.J.:  The  respondent-landlord  filed  7 petitions  for  ejectment against 7 different tenants.  Four out  of these occupied shop premises on the ground floor and the other   3  occupied   residential premises  on the first floor  of    a    building  situated    at    Door  No.  14, Pursuawalkam High  Road,  Madras.  The appellant  is  one of the four tenants of a shop  on  the  ground floor.      The case  of the  respondent is  that he  is running  a wholesale business  in textiles  on the  first  floor  of  a building  at   93,Godown     Street,  Madras;   that  it  is inconvenient and   uneconomical  for   him   to carry on his business there; that he  was  incurring heavy  losses in his wholesale business by reason  of  conditions peculiar to the location of his business and that, therefore,  he wanted  to wind   up the  wholesale business  and   start   a    retail business  in  the  building which was in the  occupation  of his tenants.      The   learned   trial Judge  decreed all the  petitions and passed  orders of  eviction against  every one  of the 7 tenants.  One  of  these,  who  occupied  a  so-called  shop measuring 4’  x 4’  under a  stairway,   acquiesced   in the decree of  eviction   passed   against him.   The   other  3 tenants of  the shop   premises   challenged  the decrees of eviction passed  against them  by filing appeals  before the Appellate Authority. 105 In so  far as  the residential premises are concerned, 2 out of the  3 A tenants on the first floor filed appeals against the eviction  decrees. The  third tenant,  like  the  ground floor tenant under the stairway,  acquiesced  in the decree. In short,  S out   of  the  7 tenants  against  whom decrees for eviction   were    passed,    filed  appeals  while  the remaining two did not.      The   Appellate Authority  dismissed all the 3  appeals of the tenants of the shop premises on the ground floor but,

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allowed  the  appeals  filed  by  the  two  tenants  of  the residential   premises on  the  first  floor.  The  combined result of  the proceedings  in the trial Court and the first appellate Court  was  that  the  respondent  succeeded    in obtaining decrees  for possession against all the  4 tenants on the ground floor and 1 tenant on the first floor.      Out   of   the 3  tenants on  the ground floor  against whom decrees   for eviction were confirmed by the  Appellate Authority (the   fourth  tenant not  having appealed),  only one,   namely,  the appellant herein, went to the High Court by way  of a  civil   revision petition  (C.R.P. No.  122 of 1979). The  other two  tenants  on the ground floor accepted the decree of eviction confirmed by the Appellate Authority. Thus, the position which obtained during the tendency of the civil revision  petition before the High Court was that  the respondent had  succeeded, finally  and  conclusively,    in establishing   his   right to  recover  or  in    recovering possession from  3 out of the 4 tenants of the shop premises on   the   ground floor   and  1 out of the 3 tenants of the residential premises   on  the first  floor. The  High Court having dismissed  the  civil    revision    petition,    the appellant has filed this appeal  by  special leave.      It   cannot   be   overlooked that  three  courts  have held concurrently  in this  case  that  the  respondent  has proved that  he required the suit premises bona fide for his personal  need.     Such   concurrence,    undoubtedly,  has relevance  on  the  question    whether  this  Court  should exercise  its   jurisdiction  under  Article  136    of  the Constitution  to   review  a   particular   decision.   That jurisdiction   has   to be  exercised sparingly.  But,  that cannot   possibly mean  that injustice  must be  perpetuated because it has been  done three   times in  a case.  The burden  of showing  that    a concurrent decision  of two  or more  Courts or Tribunals is manifestly   unjust lies  on the  appellant. But  once  that burden is  discharged, it   is not  only  the  right but the duty of  this Court    to    remedy    the  injustice.  Shri Tarkunde, who appears 106 for   the respondent,  argued that  this may  lead  and,  in practice, does  lead  to  different standards being  applied by   different courts   to   find  out whether  a concurrent decision   is   patently illegal  or  unjust.  That  in  the present dispensation,  is   inevitable.  Quantitatively, the Supreme Court  has a  vast  jurisdiction which  extends over matters  as   far  apart  as  Excise    to    Elections  and Constitution to  Crimes. The  Court sits  in Benches and not en banc,   as  the American Supreme Court does. Indeed, even if   the entire  Court were  to sit to hear every one of the eighty-thousand matters  which  have been filed this year, a certain   amount    of  individuality  in  the  response  to injustice cannot  be avoided.   It  is a  well-known fact of constitutional history,  even in  countries where  the whole court sits  to hear  every case,  that the   composition  of majorities is not static. It changes  from  subject  to subject  though,  perhaps, not from case to  case.  Personal responses   to   injustice  are not esoteric.  Indeed,  they furnish  refreshing     assurance    of  close  and  careful attention   which   the Judges  give to the cases which come before them.  We do   not   believe   that   the  litigating public  will     prefer     a     computerised   system   of administration of justice: only, that the  Chancellor’s foot must tread warily.      Counsel   for the  appellant, Shri  Vaidyanathan,   has discharged admirably  the heavy  onus which lies upon him to

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establish that  the decision come to by three courts in this case is such as cannot possibly be accepted. We will proceed to show  immediately how  by  drawing  a priori conclusions, the   courts,   with  great respect,  have denied justice to the appellant.  The   trial   court deluded   itself    into believing as  proved, what   remained  to  be proved  by the production of  evidence which  could have been  produced but was not  produced. The  first appellate  court  decided  the question    of  landlord’s  bona  fide  requirement  by  the application of   a   formula which confuses ’requirement’ or ’need’   with   ’desire’.   And, the  High Court  refused to apply its  mind to  a   question   which, if examined, could have altered the course  of  justice.      The     firm  called   ’Artex  company’  of  which  the respondent is   a  partner, is  in  occupation  of  business premises situated  at 93,  Go  down Street, Madras. The firm took those  premises   on  a lease  dated  December 21, 1973 for a  period of  21   years   ending with December21, 1994. Even to-day  that lease  is good for another ten  years. The reasons given  by the  respondent for  seeking  the eviction of the  appellant and the other six tenants  are  these. The main  gate of the Godown Street premises is opened  at  9.OO a.m. and 107 is   closed at  5.OO p.m.,  making it  impossible for him to receive his   A   customers  before 9.OO  A.M. Or after 5.00 P.M.;  there  is severe  competition  amongst  the wholesale businessmen   in   the Godown  Street; and, there is a great deal of  traffic   congestion on  the Godown  Street.  These circumstances have  enormously affected   the  business  and since, the  firm is  incurring losses   day   by  day,    it wanted to  wind up  the wholesale  business   and   start  a retail     business  in   the  premises  which  are  in  the occupation  of the tenants.      The  appellant   challenged  the   contention  of   the respondent   that   he was incurring losses in his wholesale business   at Godown   Street and called upon him to produce the   balance-sheet, Incometax   returns  and  account books of the   firm.  instead  of producing  these documents which would have  reflected  the    financial    position  of  the wholesale business,  the  appellant  offered the lame excuse that the  balance-sheet was  in the  custody of  his auditor who was  out of  station. It  seems to  us surprising  that, instead   of drawing  an  adverse  inference  against    the respondent for   non-production   of  documents which he was called   upon  to produce, the trial court accepted the ipse dixit of  the  respondent  that  he  was incurring losses in his   wholesale   business, wherefor it had become necessary for him to obtain possession  of the  suit premises in order to start  a retail  business. The   sole  or,  at least, the main reason why the ’ respondent requires  the suit premises is that  his present  place of business is so located as  to cause   loss to  the business.  Evidence  showing  that  the business was  running into  a loss was not only not produced but  t suppressed.      Having seen  that the  trial Court accepted the case of the respondent  without  an objective and careful assessment of   the evidence  bearing upon the so-called requirement of the   landlord, we   will   turn  to  the  judgment  of  the Appellate   Authority.   The learned   appellate  Judge says that the  single   circumstance   that  the  respondent  was running his  business in  tenanted premises   was sufficient to justify  the conclusion that his requirement  of the suit premises was bonafide. After recording this conclusion,  the learned appellate Judge proceeds to say:

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    "The   hue and cry of the tenants in the  ground  floor      portion  of  the petition-mentioned premises that  they      will  be thrown  to the street in the event of an order      of  eviction     being   passed  need  not  at  all  be      considered. The very fact H 108      that     the  respondent   had  filed   this   petition immediately after   his purchase of the property in the year 1975 goes  a   long way   to  prove that his very purpose of purchasing   the   premises must  have been  to set  up  his business  whether  wholesale  or  retail  in  the  petition- metioned premises."      The  appellate   Court  went  one  step  ahead  of  the respondent by   making  out a  case for him which he himself did not   think  it proper to make. It was not his case that he wanted  possession  of the  suit  premises for the reason that he  was   carrying   on   his  business    in  tenanted premises. His case was that it  had  become uneconomical  to run the  wholesale business  in the  Godown  Street premises and therefore  he wanted to start a retail  business  in his own  building which was in possession of the  appellant  and other tenants.      Apart   from this, it is quite disparaging to  describe a tenant’s  attempt to  resist eviction by lawful means as a "hue and cry". And, it is inequitous in the extreme that any court of  law, and   least  of all a Rent Act tribunal which has to  deal   with   a human  problem of  great  magnitude, should regard  it as  a matter of no moment that an order of eviction will  throw the  tenant on   the  street.  A  judge does not  have to  wear a  shoe in order  to  know where  it pinches. Therefore,  he does  not have to face the  prospect of being  driven to the street in order to realise  what  it means.  His training, legal equipment and experience of life are his  tools education  and social  awareness. We  do  not suggest   that a   decree  of eviction  can never  be passed against a   tenant   but,  whether   the provisions of a law specifically require  it or   not,  the   court has  to have regard for all the aspects of  the  matter before it and the foreseeable consequences of the order which  it proposes  to pass. Finally, it is impossible to subscribe to  the view of the appellate  Court that the very fact that the  respondent had filed  the eviction  petitions  immediately  after    he purchased     the  property,  proves  that  the  purpose  of purchasing   the property  was to  set up  a business there, "whether wholesale or retail"      The   judgment   of the High Court is in the nature  of an order  of summary  dismissal of  the  revision  petition. After allotting   a  page and  three  quarters  to  the  re- statement of  the  arguments  made before it, the High Court disposed of the  proceeding in the following I I few lines: 109      "l am afraid that once the authorities below have taken      into   account   all  these circumstances and have come      A   to   the conclusion  that the  requirement  of  the      respondent is bonafide, it is not for this Court, as if      a court  of appeal,  to go  into  these facts again and      hold against  the respondent  herein. Consequently, the      civil revision petition fails and is dismissed." B      The   High   Court is right that, sitting in  revision, it could  not have reappreciated the evidence in the case as if   it were  a court of appeal. But, in saying so, the High Court,  with respect, missed the real point in the case.      The   main   contention of  the appellant   before  the High Court  was that  so long as the eviction petitions were pending   in the  trial Court and the first appellate Court,

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it could   not   be  predicated with  certainty as to in how many cases  the   respondent would   succeed  finally.  That position had crystalised  after  the Appellate Authority had rendered its judgment. As stated by us at the  beginning  of this judgment,  I out of the 3 tenants  on  the first  floor did not  challenge the  decree for  eviction passed   by the trial Court. The landlord had, therefore, succeeded  finally against  him.  Out of the 4 tenants of the shop premises  on the ground  floor, the  tenant under  the stairway  did  not challenge the  decree   for   eviction passed against him by the trial   Court.   We will,  however, leave that gentleman alone, since  he was in  possession  of an area measuring 4’ x 4’  only. The  remaining 3  tenants  on  the ground floor, including the   appellant,   had  filed appeals  against the decrees of  eviction but,  all the    three    appeals  were dismissed by  the Appellate  Authority. Two  out of  these 3 tenants  did   not  challenge  the  decrees  passed  by  the appellate Authority,  with the  result that  the  respondent succeeded  finally and conclusively against those 2 tenants. The position which thus emerged  for the first time when the civil revision  petition  was being  argued  before the High Court was  that, the   landlord   had  succeeded finally  in obtaining orders  for eviction  against 3   out  of   the  4 tenants on  the ground  floor and 1 out of the 3  tenants on the first floor. This position had undoubtedly brought about a change  in the  state of  affairs  which  existed  at  the inception   of the  ejectment  proceedings and which existed partly   during   the tendency   of  the  proceedings before the  Appellate  Authority. Erasing  himself on the change in the factual  position which   had  come    about  after  the Appellate Authority gave its decision,  the appellant argued before the High 110 Court   that the  subsequent events  ought to  be taken into account for   the    purpose  of  finding  out  whether  the landlord   still   required  the shop premises in possession of the  appellant,   which, it would appear, admeasure about 308 square  feet. That  contention was  brushed aside by the High Court with the short order extracted above.      No   authority   is needed  for the  proposition  that, in appropriate   cases, the Court must have regard to events as   they present them selves at the time when it is hearing the proceeding  before  it and mould the relief in the light of those  events.   We may,   however,  draw  attention to a decision of   this   Court   in  Hasmat   Rai v. RaghuC nath Prasad,(l) the ratio of which  may  be stated thus:      When an  action  is  brought  by  a  landlord  for  the eviction  of     a     tenant  on  the  ground  of  personal requirements,  the  landlord’s  need  must not only be shown to exist  at the   date   of the suit,  but it must exist on the date  of the  appellate decree,   or  the   date when  a higher Court  deals with  the matter.   During  the progress and passage of proceeding from court to court, if subsequent events  occur   which,  if  noticed,  would  non-suit    the landlord,   the   court has  to examine  and evaluate  those events   and mould  the decree  accordingly. The  tenant  is entitled to  show  that  the  need  or  requirement  of  the landlord no  more exists by  pointing  out  such  subsequent events, to  the  court,  including  the appellate  court. In such a  situation, it  would be  incorrect  to say that as a decree or  order for eviction is passed against  the tenant, he   cannot invite  the Court  to take   into  consideration subsequent events.  The tenant  can  be  precluded  from  so contending only   when  a decree  or order  for eviction has become final.  (See pages 606-607).

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Justice  R.S. Pathak, who concurred with Justice D.A. Desai and Justice Venkataramiah, expressed the same view thus:      It   is   well settled  now that  in a  proceeding  for the ejectment   of  a tenant  on the  ground   of   personal requirement under   a  statute controlling  the eviction  of tenants, unless  the statute prescribes to the contrary, the requirement must  (1) [1911] 3 S.C.R. 605 111      continue   to   exist on  the date when the  proceeding is finally  A disposed  of either  in appeal or revision, by the  relevant authority. That position is indisputable. (See page 624).      The   High   Court  having  failed  to  consider    the circumstances which had arisen before it for the first time, it becomes  our    duty  to  have  regard  to  them.  Having considered the   evidence in the case, particularly the fact that the  landlord has  obtained decrees   for    possession against 3  out of the 4  tenants  on  the ground floor and 1 out of the 3 tenants on the first floor, we do not  see  any justification for evicting the appellant  from  the premises in his  occupation. The  landlord’s requirement, such  as it is,   is more  than adequately met by the eviction of  those 4 tenants.       It  is doubtful  whether the  respondent would have at all succeeded   in   any   one of the 7 cases if, the  trial court   had correctly  appreciated the effect of suppression of the  material documentary   evidence   by him.  But, the eviction  decrees passed  against    6  out  of  the  7  tenants  are  now  an accomplished fact   and those  matters,  having been finally determined, cannot  be  reopened.      For   these reasons,  we allow  this appeal  and    set aside  the  judgments  of  the  High  Court,  the  Appellate Authority and   the  trial Court.  The respondent’s petition for  eviction   of  the   appellant  will  stand  dismissed. Respondent shall pay to the  appellant the  costs of all the three Courts, which we quantify  at  rupees five thousand. F S.R.                                         Appeal allowed. 112