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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  3467 of 2007

PETITIONER: M/s Trutuf Safety Glass Industries

RESPONDENT: Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/08/2007

BENCH: Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT & D.K. JAIN

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T  

CIVIL APPEAL NO.   3467    OF 2007 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 2674 of 2006)

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1.      Leave granted.

2.      Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a learned  Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court allowing the revision  filed under the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 (in short the ’Act’). It  was held by the impugned order that the articles  manufactured by the appellant i.e. toughened safety glass  including wind screen, door screen, side screen and back  screens were taxable as these articles did not constitute  "glass" or "glassware" within the meaning of the Notification  under Section 4-B of the Act. Accordingly, the order passed by  the Sales Tax Tribunal, Ghaziabad (in short the ’Tribunal’) was  set aside.  

3.      Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

       Appellant (hereinafter referred to as the ’assessee’) filed  an application for grant of recognition certificate under Section  4-B of the Act in respect of notified goods mentioned in  Annexure-III of the Notification No.7551 dated 31st December,  1976. By order dated 22.12.1987 the Assessing Authority  granted recognition certificate in regard to "Automobile Safety  Toughened Glass" whereby the assessee was authorized to  purchase raw materials and packing materials at the  concessional rate of tax. Being aggrieved by the denial of total  exemption of sales tax on the purchase of raw materials and  packing materials, an appeal under Section 9 of the Act was  filed which was allowed by the Assistant Commissioner  (Judicial) by order dated 11.1.1989. Consequentially, the  recognition certificate was directed to be amended to the effect  that the assessee would be entitled to purchase raw materials  and packing materials without payment of any sales tax on  such purchases. This order was confirmed in Second appeal  by the Tribunal, as Revenue’s appeal before the Tribunal was  dismissed. An application for revision was filed before the High  Court which, by the impugned order, confirmed the view of the  Assessing Officer. It was held that the expression "glass" or  "glass ware" does not include the articles manufactured by the  assessee. While coming to this conclusion reliance was placed  on a decision of this Court in Atul Glass Industries (Pvt.) Ltd.  v. Collector of Central Excise (1986 (3) SCC 480).

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4.      Revenue’s stand before the High Court was that the entry  "glass and glass wares in all forms" cannot include the articles  manufactured by the assessee. Reference was made to para 17  of the judgment in Atul Glass’s case (supra). The stand of the  revenue was accepted as noted by the High Court. 5.      In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the  appellant submitted that the crucial expressions in the entry  i.e. "in all forms" had not been considered by the High Court  in proper perspective. When the meaning of the expression is  clear, there was no need to find out any technical meaning.  

6.      At this juncture, the relevant entries in the various  Notifications need to be noted.  

7.      Notification No.ST-II-7551/X-9(1)-76 dated 31.12.1976  issued under Section 4-B of the Act is of considerable  significance. Clause 2 of the said Notification provides that no  tax shall be payable on the sale to or, as the case may be,  purchase by any units in respect of raw materials required by  it for use in the manufacture of  the goods mentioned in  Annexure III or for the packing materials for the said goods  manufactured by it. Entry 2 of Annexure III is the pivotal entry  so far as the present dispute is concerned. Same reads as  follows: "2.     Glass and glass wares including optical  glass in all forms."    

                               (underlined for emphasis)

8.      The crucial expression in the entry is "in all forms". By  subsequent Notification the State Government superseded all  the previous notifications under Section 4-B of the Act. In  Notification No.ST-II-4519/X-7(19)/87 dated 29.8.1987 Entry  II of Annexure I to the said Notification reads as follows:

"2.     Glass and glassware including optical  glass in all its forms but excluding ornamented  or cut glass bangles."                                                                                                                                                   (Underlined for emphasis)

9.      A comparison of the previous and subsequent entry  shows that ornamented or cut glass bangles were specifically  excluded.      10.     In view of Clause 2(b) of the said Notification no tax shall  be payable in respect of sale to or as the case may be purchase  by a dealer holding a recognition certificate under Sub-section  (2) of Section 4-B of the Act of any raw materials accessories  and component parts required for use in manufacture by him  of the notified goods mentioned in column 2 of Annexure I or  of any goods required for use in the packing of such notified  goods manufactured by him.   

11.     Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that para 17  of the judgment in Atul glass’s case (supra) has no relevance.  In that case the effect of a special entry and item was under  consideration. Therefore, this Court had held that the special  must include the general. Such is not the position here. What  was required to be considered was the effect of the expression  "in all forms".

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12.     Learned counsel for the revenue on the other hand  submitted that in Atul Glass’s case (supra) this Court  observed that for determining as to whether a new commodity  is substantially different from the original has to be found out  by analyzing as to how the product identified by the class or  sections of people dealing or using the product treat the  product. That is a test which is so attracted whenever the  Statute does not contain any definition. It is generally by its  functional character that the product is so identified.  

13.     The expression used is "in all forms". The Entry contains  an expansive description i.e. "glass" and "glasswares" in all  forms". There is no dispute that the articles manufactured by  the assessee are articles made of glass. The word ’form’  connotes a visible aspect such as shape or mode in which a  thing exists or manifests itself, species, kind or variety. The  use of the word ’in all forms’ is different from the expression  ’all kinds’. The conceptual difference between the words "all  kinds’ and ’in all forms’ is that the former multiplies items of  the same kind while the latter multiplies the same commodity  in different forms. The use of the word ’in all forms’ widens the  scope of the Entry.  

14.     It is settled position in law that while interpreting the  entry for the purpose of taxation recourse should not be made  to the scientific meaning of the terms or expressions used but  to their popular meaning, that is to say, the meaning attached  to them by those dealing in them. This is what is known as  "common parlance test". The dictionary meaning of ’glassware’  means an article made of glass. The High Court proceeded on  the basis that while interpreting the words ’glass and glass  wares’ in the entry, it should be interpreted as it is understood  by the persons dealing in them. It held that the articles  manufactured by the assessee cannot be described as glass or  glass wares. The view of the High Court would have been  correct had the expression "in all forms" not succeeded the  expression "glass and glass wares".  

15.     It is to be noted that the entry which was under  consideration in Atul Glass’s case (supra) was "glass and glass  wares" and not the entry to which this case relates. In the  amendment made by Notification dated 1.9.1987 certain  specified articles which otherwise fall within the definition of  glass and glass wares were excluded i.e. ornamented or cut  glass bangles. But no such exclusion was made in respect of  articles manufactured by the assessee.  16.     It is well settled principle in law that the Court cannot  read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and  unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the Legislature. The  language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of  legislative intent.  

17.     Words and phrases are symbols that stimulate mental  references to referents. The object of interpreting a statute is  to ascertain the intention of the Legislature enacting it. [(See  Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. M/s Price  Waterhouse and Anr.  (AIR 1998 SC 74)].  The intention of the  Legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used,  which means that attention should be paid to what has been  said as also to what has not been said. As a consequence, a  construction which requires for its support, addition or  substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as  meaningless has to be avoided. As observed in Crawford v.  Spooner (1846 (6) Moore PC 1), Courts, cannot aid the  Legislatures’ defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or

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mend, and by construction make up deficiencies which are left  there. [(See The State of Gujarat and Ors. v. Dilipbhai  Nathjibhai Patel and Anr. (JT 1998 (2) SC 253)]. It is contrary  to all rules of construction to read words into an Act unless it  is absolutely necessary to do so. [(See Stock v. Frank Jones  (Tiptan) Ltd. (1978 1 All ER 948 (HL)]. Rules of interpretation  do not permit Courts to do so, unless the provision as it  stands is meaningless or of doubtful meaning. Courts are not  entitled to read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear  reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the Act  itself. (Per Lord Loreburn L.C. in Vickers Sons and Maxim Ltd.  v. Evans (1910) AC 445 (HL), quoted in Jamma Masjid,  Mercara v. Kodimaniandra Deviah and Ors.(AIR 1962 SC 847).  

18.     The question is not what may be supposed and has been  intended but what has been said. "Statutes should be  construed not as theorems of Euclid". Judge Learned Hand  said, "but words must be construed with some imagination of  the purposes which lie behind them". (See Lenigh Valley Coal  Co. v. Yensavage 218 FR 547). The view was re-iterated in  Union of India and Ors. v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem  Vasco De Gama (AIR 1990 SC 981).  

19.     In Dr. R. Venkatchalam and Ors. etc. v. Dy. Transport  Commissioner and Ors. etc. (AIR 1977 SC 842), it was  observed that Courts must avoid the danger of a priori  determination of the meaning of a provision based on their  own pre-conceived notions of ideological structure or scheme  into which the provision to be interpreted is somewhat fitted.  They are not entitled to usurp legislative function under the  disguise of interpretation.  

20.     While interpreting a provision the Court only interprets  the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused  and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is for the  legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary.  (See Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. v. Popular Trading  Company, Ujjain (2000 (5) SCC 515). The legislative casus  omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process.  

21.     Two principles of construction \026 one relating to casus  omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute as a  whole \026 appear to be well settled. Under the first principle a  casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court except in the  case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the  four corners of the statute itself but at the same time a casus  omissus should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all  the parts of a statute or section must be construed together  and every clause of a section should be construed with  reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the  construction to be put on a particular provision makes a  consistent enactment of the whole statute. This would be more  so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to  manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have  been intended by the Legislature. "An intention to produce an  unreasonable result", said Danackwerts, L.J. in Artemiou v.  Procopiou (1966 1 QB 878), "is not to be imputed to a statute  if there is some other construction available". Where to apply  words literally would "defeat the obvious intention of the  legislature and produce a wholly unreasonable result" we  must "do some violence to the words" and so achieve that  obvious intention and produce a rational construction. (Per  Lord Reid in Luke v. IRC (1966 AC 557) where at p. 577 he  also observed: "this is not a new problem, though our  standard of drafting is such that it rarely emerges".

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22.     It is then true that, "when the words of a law extend not  to an inconvenience rarely happening, but due to those which  often happen, it is good reason not to strain the words further  than they reach, by saying it is casus omissus, and that the  law intended quae frequentius accidunt." "But," on the other  hand, "it is no reason, when the words of a law do enough  extend to an inconvenience seldom happening, that they  should not extend to it as well as if it happened more  frequently, because it happens but seldom" (See Fenton v.  Hampton 11 Moore, P.C. 345). A casus omissus ought not to  be created by interpretation, save in some case of strong  necessity. Where, however, a casus omissus does really occur,  either through the inadvertence of the legislature, or on the  principle quod semel aut bis existit proetereunt legislators, the  rule is that the particular case, thus left unprovided for, must  be disposed of according to the law as it existed before such  statute - Casus omissus et oblivioni datus dispositioni  communis juris relinquitur; "a casus omissus," observed  Buller, J. in Jones v. Smart (1 T.R. 52), "can in no case be  supplied by a court of law, for that would be to make laws."

23.     The golden rule for construing wills, statutes, and, in  fact, all written instruments has been thus stated: "The  grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered  to unless that would lead to some absurdity or some  repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument,  in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the  words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and  inconsistency, but no further" (See Grey v. Pearson 6 H.L. Cas.  61). The latter part of this "golden rule" must, however, be  applied with much caution. "if," remarked Jervis, C.J., "the  precise words used are plain and unambiguous in our  judgment, we are bound to construe them in their ordinary  sense, even though it lead, in our view of the case, to an  absurdity or manifest injustice. Words may be modified or  varied where their import is doubtful or obscure. But we  assume the functions of legislators when we depart from the  ordinary meaning of the precise words used, merely because  we see, or fancy we see, an absurdity or manifest injustice  from an adherence to their literal meaning" (See Abley v. Dale  11, C.B. 378).

24.     Above being the position, the High Court was not justified  in interfering with the order of the Tribunal. We set aside the  order of the High Court and restore that of the Tribunal. The  appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.