09 July 2008
Supreme Court
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M/S. TATA INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs M/S. GRASIM INDUSTRIES LTD.

Bench: V.S. SIRPURKAR, , , ,
Case number: ARBIT.CASE(C) No.-000005-000005 / 2007
Diary number: 31057 / 2006
Advocates: Vs BHARAT SANGAL


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“REPORTABLE”

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

ARBITRATION PETITION NO. 5 OF 2007

M/s.Tata Industries Ltd. & Anr. …. Applicants

Versus

M/s.Grasim Industries Ltd. …. Respondent

J U D G M E N T

V.S. SIRPURKAR, J

1. Two companies, first being M/s.Tata Industries Ltd., and the second

being  M/s.  Apex  Investments  (Mauritius)  Holding  Private  Limited

(hereinafter  referred  to  Applicant  Nos.1  and  2  respectively)  have

approached  this  Court  under  Section  11(6)  of  the  Arbitration  and

Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) for appointment

of the Arbitrator in a commercial dispute which has arisen between them

and  Grasim  Industries  Limited  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  “the  non-

applicant”).  Initially the applicants had approached Bombay High Court by

way of an application under Section 11(6) of the Act, however, a stand was

taken  by  the  non-applicant  that  this  would  amount  to  an  international

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commercial arbitration and, therefore, it would be the Chief Justice of India

alone who would have the powers to constitute the Arbitral Tribunal under

Section 11(12) of the Act.  It is, therefore, that the matter has come before

this Court.   The parties are ad idem on this jurisdictional issue that the

jurisdiction to appoint the Arbitrator lies with the Chief Justice of India or as

the case may be, his nominee.

2. There is no dispute between the parties that there is an arbitration

agreement  between the  parties  vide  Clause  12.04  of  the  Shareholders

Agreement  dated  15.12.2000  and  Clause  9  of  the  Share  Transfer

Agreement  dated 1.6.2006.   That  issue  need not,  therefore,  be  dilated

upon.

3. The parties are also ad idem that the claims are within limitation.

4. The  only  question  to  be  decided,  on  which  the  parties  have

extensively argued, is whether there is a live arbitrable issue.   

5. Following  background  facts  would  help  to  understand  the

controversy between the parties.

6. M/s.Tata  Industries  Limited  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  “TIL”)  is  a

company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1956 (Applicant

No.1)  while  Apex  Investments  (Mauritius)  Holding  Private  Limited

(Applicant No.2) is a company incorporated under the Laws of Mauritius.

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The Applicant No.2 has its registered office at Mauritius while non-applicant

M/s.Grasim is also a company incorporated under the Indian Companies

Act, 1956.

7. Tata Cellular Limited (hereinafter called the “TCL”) had obtained a

CMTS licence for Andhra Pradesh Circle on 19.12.2005.  Similarly, Birla

AT &T Communications Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “BACL”) which was

a joint venture undertaking of A.V. Birla Group and AT&T Wireless Group

held CMTS licences for Maharashtra and Gujarat Circles since 15.12.1995.

Tata Teleservices Limited (hereinafter referred to as “TTSL”) was granted a

basic  service  licence  for  Andhra  Pradesh  Circle  on  4.11.1997.   A

Memorandum of Understanding was arrived at  between AT&T Wireless

Inc.,  AV  Birla  Group  and  Tata  Industries  Limited  on  1st March,  2000

whereby they agreed to provide CMTS service through a single entity.  As

per  this  Memorandum of  Understanding  AT&T  Wireless  Inc.,  AV  Birla

Group and TIL agreed to provide services through a single entity or an

alliance of entities and agreed to merge themselves to form IDEA Cellular

Limited  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  “IDEA”).   The  Memorandum  of

Understanding  was  entered  into  on  13.11.2000  by  merging  TCL  with

BACL.   

8. A  Shareholders  Agreement  came  into  existence  on  15.12.2000

between AT&T Wireless Inc., AV Birla Group (through Grasim Industries

Limited) and Tata Group through TIL.  In this Agreement respective rights

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and obligations of the parties for the merger/amalgamation of the TCL into

BACL  and  modalities  and  functions  of  merged  entities  were  recorded.

Under  that  Agreement,  the  applicants,  the  non-applicant  and  AT&T

Wireless Services Inc., were to hold 44,72,35,136 shares being one-third of

the subscribed and paid up Equity Share Capital of the merged entity, i.e.,

IDEA.   Article 3.04(b) of the Shareholders Agreement provides as under:

“Each founder covenants and agrees that except as set out in Section  3.04(c)  and  Section  3.04(d),  it  will  not  engage  in, either directly or indirectly though an affiliate, (i) any activity that  would  constitute  the  business  of  the  merged company within the territorial telecom circles covered by the licences; or (ii)  any  opportunity  outside  the  territorial  telecom  circles covered by the licences that would constitute the business or the merged company in India and the neighbouring territories unless the opportunity has been first  offered to the merged company to undertake such new business by placing the same before the Board of Directors of the merged company.  The Board of Directors shall deliberate, without the participation of the  India  placing  the  opportunity  before  the  Board  (the Opportunity  Shareholder”)  on  whether  to  avail  of  such  an opportunity.  If  the Board decides not to avail  itself  of  such opportunity or does not convey the decision in respect thereto within a period of 120 days (or such shorter period as may be necessary in the context of the nature of the opportunity) from the date of receipt of such offer by the merged company then;

(i) the Opportunity Shareholder shall invite the other Founders for discussions on whether a joint venture for availing the opportunity may be undertaken;

(ii) If the other Founders do not wish to participate in a joint venture the Opportunity Shareholder shall be free to avail of the opportunity on its own.”

Article 8 is the Confidentiality Clause which reads as under:

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“8.01 Confidential Information Defined:

For the purposes of this Agreement, “confidential information” shall mean all oral, written and/or tangible information created by the merged company or disclosed by a Founder (in either case “owner”) to the receiving Founder (“Recipient”) which is confidential,  proprietary and/or not generally available to the public, including but not limited to information relating in whole or in part to present and future products, services, business plans and strategies, marketing ideas and concepts, especially with respect of unannounced products and services, present and future product plans, pricing, volume estimates, financial data,  product  enhancement  information,  business  plans, marketing  plans,  sales  strategies,  customer  information (including customer’s  applications  and environment),  market testing  information,  development  plans,  specifications, customer  requirements,  configurations,  designs,  plans, drawings,  apparatus,  sketches,  software,  hardware  data, prototypes  or  other  technical  and  business  information. Notwithstanding  the  foregoing,  information  shall  not  be deemed confidential  and  Recipient  shall  have  no  obligation with respect to any such information which:

(a) is already known to Recipient, or  

(b) is or becomes publicly known, through any means including  publication,  inspection  of  a  product,  or otherwise, and through no negligence or other wrongful act of Recipient, or

(c) is received by recipient from a third party without similar restriction and without breach of this Agreement, or

(d) is independently develop by Recipient, or

(e) is  furnished to a third party by owner without a similar restriction on the third party’s rights.

8.02 Treatment of Confidential Information

From the  execution of  this  Agreement  until  three  (3)  years after  the  Recipient  ceases  to  be  a  shareholder,  Recipient shall, and shall cause its affiliates to, keep confidential and will

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not disclose, and will cause its affiliates not to disclose, to third parties,  the  confidential  information  receive  from,  or  made available  by  owner  in  the  course  of  the  transactions contemplated hereby and will  use and cause its affiliates to use, the same level  of  care with respect  to  the confidential information  as Recipient  employees with  respect  to  its  own proprietary and confidential information of like importance, and will  not  use  and  will  cause  its  affiliates  not  to  use  such confidential  information  for  any  purpose  other  than  the performance of its obligations under this Agreement.  Promptly upon  the  Recipient  ceasing  to  be  a  shareholder,  written confidential information will be returned to Owner or destroyed immediately  upon  the  request  of  owner,  and  no  copies, extracts  or  other  reproductions  shall  be  retained  by  the Recipient.   All  documents  memoranda,  notes  and  other writings whatsoever prepared by recipient which contain the confidential  information  shall  be  returned  to  owner  or destroyed  at  owner’s  request.   Confidential  information provided by owner shall remain the property of owner.  For the avoidance of doubt, the merged company shall not be deemed to be a Recipient for purposes of this Section.

8.03 Notice prior to disclosure:

If  Recipient (or its affiliate) is requested or required (by oral questions,  interrogatories,  requests  for  information  or documents,  subpoena,  civil  investigative  demand  or  similar process) to disclose any confidential information, Recipient will promptly notify owner of such request or requirement so that owner  may  seek  an  appropriate  protective  order  or  waive compliance with the provisions of this Section 8.03.  If, in the absence  of  a  protective  order  or  the  receipt  of  a  waiver hereunder, Recipient (or any of its affiliates) is in the written opinion  of  Recipient’s  counsel  compelled  to  disclose  the confidential  information or  else stand liable  for  contempt  or suffer  other  censure  or  significant  penalty,  Recipient  (or  its affiliates)  may  disclose  only  so  much  of  the  confidential information to the party compelling disclosure as is required by law.   Recipient  will  exercise  (and  will  cause  its  affiliate  to exercise)  reasonable  efforts  to  obtain  a  protective  order  or other  reliable  assurance  and  confidential  treatment  will  be accorded to confidential information.”

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Article 9 of the Agreement deals with the effectiveness and termination.

Article 9.02 relates to right to terminate for cause.  It specifically provides

that  in the event of  occurrence of a material  breach on the part  of  the

Defaulting Founder, each Founder shall have right to make the election as

provided in  Clause  9.02(b).   However,  for  that  purpose the  electioning

Founder  should  have  given  written  notice  of  the  alleged  breach  to

Defaulting Founder and in terms of that notice the Defaulting Founder has

not cured, within 60 days, the said breach, if the said breach is capable of

being cured within such period, or the Defaulting Founder has not taken

substantial  and  appropriate  steps  to  cure  the  breach.   The  “material

breach” is defined in this Clause as:

(i) a breach of confidentiality provisions set forth in Article VIII of

the Agreement;

(ii) breach of  the provisions of  Section 3.04(b)  relating to  non-

competition;

(iii) the failure to contribute capital as required under Section 2.04

(a);  

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(iv) a breach of provisions relating to election of Directors, filling of

Board vacancies, removal of Directors and election of Chairman of

the Board;

(v) a breach of the provisions under Article 10 relating to transfer

of equity, capital or voting interest;

(vi) a breach by a party of the provisions under Section 6.02.

Article  10.06  provides  that  if  any  party  receives  from  or  otherwise

negotiates with third parties a bonafide offer to purchase any of the equity

capital owned or held by such party and intends to make sale of its shares

to such third party, such founder must notify the other two parties of the

Shareholders Agreement  by way of  a notice mentioning offer  price,  the

third parties making the offer and the number of  shares that  such third

party  wants  to  purchase  on  which  the  offeree  would  have  option  to

purchase such amount of shares at the offer price within 45 days of the

offer notice.   

9. The Arbitration clause worded in Article 12.04 and Article 12.04(a),

(b), (c), (d) and (e) are as under:

“12.04 Governing  law  and  consent  to  Jurisdiction: Arbitration:

(a) This  Agreement  and all  questions of  its  interpretation shall be construed in accordance with the laws of the Republic of India without regard to its principles of conflict of laws.

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(b) The  parties  agree  that  they  shall  attempt  to  resole through good faith consultation in their behalf, disputes arising in connection with this Agreement and such consultation shall begin promptly after a party has delivered to another party a written request for such consultation.

(c) In  the  event  that,  after  exhausting  the  efforts  for resolution of  dispute described in paragraph (b),  the parties have been unable to resolve a dispute, and if the dispute is one which relates to an alleged breach of any representation, warranty,  covenant  or  agreement  under  or  the  validity  or termination of, covenant or agreement under or the validity of termination of  this  agreements,  such dispute shall  be finally settled according to the procedure set forth in paragraph (d).

(d) A dispute subject to resolution under this paragraph (d) shall be finally settled by binding arbitration in Mumbai, India before and pursuant to the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.  Each party shall select an arbitrator within fifteen (15) days from the initial arbitration request.

Promptly  upon  their  selection,  such  arbitrators  shall  agree upon and select a third arbitrator from the panel of arbitrators UNCITRAL.  The parties shall agree in advance as to manner in which the arbitration panel shall  promptly hear witnesses and arguments, review documents and otherwise conduct the arbitration proceedings.   Should the parties fail  to  reach an agreement  as  to  the  conduct  of  the  arbitration  proceeding within  twenty  (20)  days  from  the  selection  of  the  third arbitrator,  the  arbitration  panel  shall  formulate  its  own procedural  rules  and  promptly  commence  the  arbitration proceedings.  The arbitration proceedings shall be conducted as  expeditiously  as  possible  with  due consideration  for  the complexity of the dispute in question.  The arbitration panel shall issue its decision in writing within thirty (30) days from the hearing of final arguments by the parties.  The parties agree that the arbitrators will have the power to rule on questions of its own jurisdiction over any dispute, to award damages and, in appropriate circumstances, to award equitable relief but shall not be authorized to award punitive or exemplary damages to any party.  The parties specifically agree to be bound by the decisions rendered by the arbitration panel provided for herein and agree not to submit a dispute subject to this Section 12.04 (d) to any federal, State or local court or arbitration association except as may be necessary to enforce the procedures of this

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Section 12.04(d) or to enforce the decision rendered by the arbitrators.  The parties to any dispute submitted to arbitration hereunder shall share equally the costs of the arbitral  panel and  shall  each  bear  their  own  attorneys’  fees  and  other expenses  incurred  in  connection  with  any  arbitration proceedings.  If court proceedings to stay litigation or compel arbitration  are  necessary,  the  party  who  unsuccessfully opposes  such  proceedings  shall  pay  all  associated  costs, expenses and attorneys’ fees which are reasonably incurred by the other party.

(e) During  the  pendency  of  a  dispute/arbitration proceedings the parties shall be bound by the terms of this Agreement.”

The parties point out that in 2004 AT&T Wireless Services Inc., which was

the holding company of AT&T Cellular Private Limited (Mauritius), merged

with  New  Cingular  Wireless  Services  Inc.  (hereinafter  referred  to  as

“NCW”)  pursuant  to  a  global  restructure cum merger.   Subsequently in

September,  2005 TIL acquired the entire shareholding of  AT&T Cellular

Pvt. Ltd. from NCW and the Birla Group acting through Aditya Birla Nuvo

Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “ABNL”) acquired 16.45% shares in IDEA

from AT&T Cellular Private Limited.  AT&T Cellular Private Limited was

subsequently  renamed as  Apex  Investments  (Mauritius)  Limited.   As  a

result of this, the shareholding of Birla Group in IDEA increased to 50.14%

while  TIL  continued  to  have 31.69% of  the  issued share  capital.   The

balance 1.70% of IDEA was held by AIG (Mauritius) LLC.   

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10. On  31.1.2006,  the  Applicant  No.1  served  a  notice  on  the  non-

applicant under Article 9.02 of the Shareholders Agreement in which it was

stated that pursuant to an e-mail communication received by it from one

Mr.Sanjeev Aga, it was clear that Aditya Birla Telecom Limited (hereinafter

referred to “ABTL”), a subsidiary of ABNL had applied to the Department of

Telecommunication for grant of UAS license for the Mumbai Metro Circle.

It was further stated in that notice that vide Board Circular dated 29.7.2005,

the Board of Directors of IDEA had accepted proposal to apply for UAS

licence for the Mumbai Metro Circle and consequently the said application

was filed on 3.8.2005.  The Applicant No.1 thus asserted that the filing of

the application for UAS licence by ABTL for the Mumbai circle was in clear

violation of Article 3.04(b) of the Shareholders Agreement and amounting

to  a  material  breach  by  Aditya  Birla  Group  under  Article  9.02  of  the

Shareholders Agreement and accordingly it was requested to cure the said

material  breach  within  60  days  of  the  receipt  of  the  said  letter  by

withdrawing the said application made by ABTL for grant of UAS licence for

Mumbai Circle.   

11. On  27.2.2006,  Applicant  No.1  sent  the  Termination  Notice  under

Article 9.02 (b) of the Shareholders Agreement that ABNL, which was an

affiliate company of Aditya Birla Group, for the purposes of Shareholders

Agreement  had  displayed  confidential  financial  data  of  IDEA  including

particulars  of  revenue,  PBDIT,  OPM%,  PBIT,  Net  profit/loss,  capital

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employed, ROCE (annualized)% and projections, on its website.  It  was

asserted that  this  information displayed on the website was confidential

information within the meaning assigned to the said term in Article 8.01 of

Shareholders Agreement.  Since such confidential information was not in

the public domain and since none of the exceptions to the protection of

confidential  information  contained  in  Section  8.01  of  the  Shareholders

Agreement  were  available  to  ABNL,  the  disclosure  of  confidential

information  was  a  clear  breach  of  Article  8.02  of  the  Shareholders

Agreement.   It  was  also  asserted  that  such  material  breach  was  not

capable of being cured and, therefore, the said letter was to be treated as

the Termination Notice in accordance with Article 9 of the Shareholders

Agreement  and  the  Applicant  No.1  was  proceeding  to  purchase  the

shareholding of AV Birla Group within 90 days of the receipt of the said

notice.  A copy of the notice was also endorsed to IDEA in order to take

steps to facilitate access to an international firm of auditors appointed by

Applicant No.1 for computing the fair market value of the IDEA shares.  12.

These letters dated 20.2.2006 and 1.3.2006 were disputed by letters

dated 31.1.2006 and 27.2.2006 respectively wherein a clear cut denial was

asserted to the effect that there was no violation of the provisions of the

Shareholders  Agreement  relating  to  non-competition  and  confidentiality.

Then  vide  the  subsequent  correspondences  dated  16.3.2006  and

27.3.2006,  Applicant  No.1 reaffirmed all  its  stand and its  entitlement  to

purchase the entire equity share capital  of  the non-applicant in IDEA in

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accordance with the provisions of Shareholders Agreement.  There was a

further denial on the part of the non-applicant by its letters dated 17.3.2006

and 3.4.2006.

13. However,  in  the  meantime,  the  applicant  received  an  offer  for

purchasing  its  stake  as  well  as  the  stake  of  M/s.  Apex  Investments

(Mauritius)  Holding Private Limited in IDEA from Global  Communication

Services Holding Limited.  In such an eventuality, in terms of Clause 10.06,

the applicants were bound to offer the shares at the same price to the non-

applicant.   Accordingly,  a  notice dated 5.4.2006 came to  be served by

Applicant No. 1 on its  behalf  and on behalf  of  its  subsidiary M/s.  Apex

Investments (Mauritius) Holding Private Limited, offering the said shares to

the non-applicant.  In this notice, the material terms and conditions of the

offer were specified vide para 3.  It was stated:

“By this letter, TIL and Apex are intimating the AV Birla Group of their having received a bonafide offer for purchase of the Sale Shares and of TIL and Apex having accepted the offer made to them, subject to this prior offer being made to the AV Birla Group.  Without prejudice to the notices of termination dated January 31, 2005 and February 27, 2006 issued by TIL to the AV Birla Group, TIL and Apex are hereby making the first  offer  for  purchase  of  the  Sale  Shares  to  the  AV Birla Group at the price and on the material terms and conditions mentioned above.  This Offer Notice shall remain irrevocable for a period of 45 days after the Notice Date (i.e., 45 days after the receipt of this Offer Notice by yourselves).

On  the  very  next  day  of  this  Offer,  the  non-applicant  vide  its

communication dated 6.4.2006 accepted the Offer of Purchase.  However,

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it was specified in that reply that their acceptance of the Offer was without

prejudice to their contentions that the notices of termination referred to in

the said Offer Notice were not tenable.  The applicant TIL on the very next

day, i.e. 7.4.2006, conveyed that they would be shortly forwarding two Draft

Share Purchase Agreements for  the sale  of  IDEA shares held  by Tata

Industries  Limited  and  Apex  Investments  (Mauritius)  Holding  Private

Limited.  However, in the second para of this Notice, it was reiterated as

under:

“We reiterate that  our  offer  and your acceptance thereof,  is without prejudice to the notices of termination dated January 31, 2006 and February 27, 2006 issued by us, and your rival contentions which we have not accepted.”

14. On 10.4.2006, the letter dated 7.4.2006 was replied to.  There again,

it was reiterated:

“As regards our position regarding the notices of termination, we wish to reiterate your position already communicated.”

On 19.4.2006, by the even dated letter, the applicant reiterated that

the  non-applicant  had breached the Confidentiality  Clause and that  the

claim of the non-applicant that the data displayed on the website was not

confidential  under  the  Shareholders  Agreement,  is  misplaced.   It  was

asserted  in  para  6  of  the  letter  that  non-applicant  No.  1  was  making

contradictory statements.  It was lastly asserted:

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“As already explained above, since the AV Birla Group is in violation of the provisions of the Shareholders Agreement, the First Notice and the Second Notice issued by us cannot be withdrawn.  Since you have failed in agreeing upon the name of the international firm of auditors we shall therefore proceed in  accordance  with  the  Shareholders  Agreement  to  do  the needful in connection with determining the Fair Market Value of IDEA shares.”

Again on 19.4.2006 by the letter of even date, the applicants reaffirmed the

contents of Notices of Termination dated 31.1.2006 and 27.2.2006.

15. On 24.4.2006 the Non-applicant replied to the letter dated 19.4.2006

and intimated the applicants their readiness to make full and final payment

against  the delivery of shares by TIL and the Apex.  On 24.4.2006 the

applicants  issued  a  notice  requesting  to  commence  the  process  of

consultation  with  respect  to  the  dispute  which  had  arisen  between the

parties and which was more particularly highlighted in their earlier notices.

In that notice it was said:

“We note that vide your letters dated February 28, 2006, March 1, 2006, March 17, 2006, April 3, 2006 and April 24,  2006, you have disputed the contents of  the said Notices and have also disputed the fact of commitment of  “material  breaches”  of  Section  3.04  and  9  of  the Shareholders Agreement by you.

It  is,  therefore,  apparent  that  a  dispute  has  arisen between  us  in  connection  with  the  terms  of  the Shareholders Agreement.”

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A further  reference was given to  Clause 12.04 (b)  of  the Shareholders

Agreement which provided for  consultation and,  therefore,  by the same

notice  the  process  of  consultation  was  called  upon  by  the  applicants.

Lastly it was straightaway suggested that:

“In case you are not interested in exploring the process of consultation as aforesaid, and would like to proceed with  arbitral  proceedings  straight  away,  we would  be agreeable to that procedure also.”

On 27.4.2006 the non-applicant responded to the applicants consultation

notice and asserted that there was no arbitral dispute surviving between

the  parties  and,  therefore,  there  was  no  longer  a  basis  for  arbitration

regarding the issues set forth in the termination notices.  The non-applicant

also requested the applicants to withdraw the consultation notice.  It was,

therefore, pointed out through the notice dated 5.5.2006 by the applicants

that  the  termination  of  the  agreement  on  their  part  was  made  without

prejudice to the pendency of the dispute and/or arbitration proceedings and

the position was clarified from time to time.  On 5.5.2006 the applicants

formally served a letter by way of formal notice for arbitration.  This notice

was contested by the  non-applicant  by its  letter  dated 17.5.2006 again

reiterating  its  position  that  there  was  no  arbitrable  dispute  surviving

between the parties.  Hence on 19.5.2006, the applicants communicated to

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the non-applicant that they had appointed their nominee Arbitrator under

Clause 12.04 (d) of the Shareholders Agreement.   

16. So far  so good.  Thereafter  two share purchase agreements were

entered into between the applicants and the non-applicant.  There was a

specific reference made to the claim of arbitration made on behalf of the

TIL in Clause (d) which runs as under:

“In  relation  to  the  notices  dated  January  31,  2006  and February  27,  2006  issued  by  TIL  (as  a  founder  under  the Shareholders  Agreement  as  hereinafter  defined)  to  the  AV Birla Group, TIL has pending arbitration disputes with the AV Birla Group, TIL has not accepted the rival contentions of the AV Birla Group in respect of the said notices nor has the AV Birla  Group  accepted,  TIL’s  claim  pending  Arbitration.   As such, the execution of and consummation of the transaction contemplated by this Agreement shall not prejudice or affect the  pendency of  continuation  of  the  arbitration  proceedings between TIL and AV Birla Group.”

In Clause 2.3 it was further specified in this Agreement that:

“TIL for itself and Apex has issued the Termination Notices. The offer made by TIL to the AV Birla Groupa pursuant to the offer  notice,  was  made  without  prejudice  to  he  said Termination Notices, Grasim Industries Limited, as part of the AV Birla Group has refuted the Termination Notices.  Further, in  order  to  enforce  the  rights  accrued to  TIL  and Apex on account of the Termination Notices, TIL,  for  itself  and Apex has  pursuant  to  clause  12.04(d)  of  the  Shareholders Agreement on May 5, 2006 issued a notice to arbitrate to the AV  Birla  Group.   Accordingly,  this  Agreement  is  being executed without  prejudice to  the rival  contentions of  either party with reference to the Termination Notices and the legal

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rights which have accrued to each party (including Apex acting through TIL as founder) under the Shareholders Agreement.”

In pursuance of this an application was filed before the Bombay High Court

and as has been stated earlier, the said application came to be withdrawn

and  a  fresh  application  came  to  be  made  before  this  Court  for  the

appointment of Arbitrator.

17. Mr.Harish N. Salve, Mr.R.F. Nariman and Mr.Mukul Rohtagi, Senior

Counsel on behalf of the applicants painstakingly took the court through the

Shareholders Agreement as well as the Share Purchase Agreement.  The

Court  was  taken  through  the  whole  history  along  with  necessary

documents and it was reiterated that the appointment of Arbitral Tribunal

was a must  for  resolving the live issues between the parties.   Learned

counsel  firstly  urged  that  there  was  no  dispute  about  there  being

Shareholders Agreement to which contesting entities were the parties and

further  that  the  applicants  held  shares  in  IDEA subject  to  discipline  of

Shareholders  Agreement.   Learned  counsel  thereafter  relied  upon  the

Notice dated 31.1.2006 whereby a material breach was alleged on the part

of the non-applicant, i.e., to secure the licences which would necessarily

involve business in competition with IDEA.  The attention of the Court was

also  drawn  to  the  second  notice  dated  27.2.2006  by  which  the

confidentiality clause was alleged to have been breached, which breach

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was an incurable  breach.   Thus the applicants  asserted that  under the

terms  of  the  Shareholders  Agreement,  the  applicants  were  entitled  to

purchase the shares of the non-applicant in the event of the breach at a

price that was heavily discounted price, i.e., at 25% less than the market

price as per clause 9.02(b)&(c) of the Shareholders Agreement.  It was,

therefore, urged that the dispute had arisen which has been shown in the

Termination  Notices  dated  31.1.2006  and  27.2.2006,  which  has  been

disputed by the non-applicant’s reply dated 28.2.2006 and 1.3.2006.   It

was, therefore,  urged that such dispute clearly fell  within the Arbitration

Clause.

18. It was further urged that there was a live issue between the parties

and that there was a difference between a live issue and a live claim.  It

was urged that whether the claim had any merit or not was a matter which

could be considered at the stage of appointing an Arbitrator and an issue

which has never been closed or treated to have been closed remains a live

issue.  Heavy reliance was placed on the judgment of this Court reported in

Shree Ram Mills Ltd. v. Utility Premises (P) Ltd.     [(2007) 4 SCC 599 at

p.607].  It was, therefore, urged that as per the principles laid down, the

initial notices of termination were disputed by the non-applicant; that on 27th

March,  2006  an  international  firm  of  auditors  was  appointed  by  the

applicants to determine the fair value of shares; that on 5th April, 2006, the

applicant had received an offer for selling these shares to a third party and

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on  that  very  date  the  applicant  had  raised  the  dispute  although  the

arbitration proceedings had by then not yet commenced.  It was pointed out

by the learned counsel that the non-applicant in its reply dated 28.2.2006

had very  clearly  understood this  position  and has  reiterated  therein  as

under:

“Your  Second  Notice  is  wrongful,  illegal,  malafide,  non  est factum and designed to take advantage of your own wrongs. The Shareholders Agreement continues to subsist under law and contract, despite the second notice.  Such notice is of no consequence  under  the  Shareholders  Agreement  or  in  the eyes of  law.  You are not entitled to rely upon or  take any advantage based upon the Second Notice.”

Learned counsel pointed out that in the first notice there was no termination

of  contract  but  it  was a notice to  correct  the material  breach while  the

second notice purported to terminate the Agreement.   Learned counsel

also  pointed  out  that  in  the  reply  dated  28.2.2006  there  was  a  tacit

agreement  that  the  Shareholders  Agreement  remained  in  existence

inasmuch as it was stated in its notice that:

Any  breach  by  you  of  the  provisions  of  the  Shareholders Agreement relating to transfer of shares will result in an invalid and illegal transfer, which will not be binding on either Idea or the Birla Group.  Also, such breach will be a material breach under Section 9.02 of the Shareholders Agreement.  Please be advised that the Birla Group is committed to asserting its rights in respect of any attempted breach in accordance with law.  Please also note that any third party participating in any sale of the shares of Idea held or controlled by the Tata Group will also be liable to the Birla Group.  We also hereby put all

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such third  parties  on notice  of  your  obligations  towards the Birla  Group,  and  the  Birla  Group’s  potential  claims  against them for inducing the breach of the Shareholders Agreement.”

Learned counsel further argues that the offer which was made on 5th April,

2006 was a “without prejudice” offer which was accepted by non-applicant

on “without prejudice” basis on 6th April, 2006 and therefore, when on 24th

April, 2006 the non applicant informed the applicants that they were ready

to make full and final payment on the same day, the applicants requested

to commence the process of consultation to resolve the dispute which had

arisen.   Learned  counsel  also  pointed  out  that  subsequently  when the

Share Purchase Agreement was executed on 1st June, 2006, it contained

clauses which made it clear that the disputes were being kept outside this

arrangement and they would be resolved separately and thus the live issue

remained to be alive.

19. It  was further argued that though the non-applicant had contested

the notices of termination suggesting that there was no arbitrable issue, still

an agreement was entered into on 1st June, 2006 wherein there was clear

reference to the clauses keeping the disputes arising out of the live issues

alive.   Learned counsel  relied upon the following observations made in

Heyman & Anr. v. Darwins Ltd. [(1942) 1 All E.R. 337]:

“Repudiation,  then,  in  the sense of  a refusal  by one of  the parties to a contract to perform his applications, thereunder,

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does not of itself abrogate the contract.  The contract is not rescinded.  It obviously cannot be rescinded by the action of one of the parties alone.  Even if the so-called repudiation is acquiesced in or accepted by the other party, that does not end the contract.  The wronged party has still his right of action for damages under the contract which has been broken, and the contract provides the measures of those damages.  It  is inaccurate  to  speak  in  such  cases  of  repudiation  of  the contract.   The  contract  stands,  but  one  of  the  parties  has declined to fulfil his part of it.  There has been what is called a total breach or a breach going to the root of the contract, and this relieves the other party of any further obligation to perform what he for his part has undertaken.”

“I  am  accordingly  of  opinion  that  what  is  commonly  called repudiation or total breach of a contract, whether acquiesced in  by the other  party or  not,  does not  abrogate a  contract, though it may relieve the injured party of the duty of further fulfilling the obligations which he has by a contract undertaken to  the  repudiating  party.   The  contract  is  not  put  out  of existence,  though  all  further  performance of  the  obligations undertaken by each party in favour of the other may cease.  It survives for the purpose of measuring the claims arising out of the breach, and the arbitration clause survives for determining the  mode of  their  settlement.   The purpose of  the  contract have  failed,  but  the  arbitration  clause  is  not  one  of  the purposes of the contract.”

Similarly other observations by House of Lords reported in the above case

were also heavily relied upon to the effect:

“To say that the contract is rescinded or has come to an end or ceased to exit may in individual cases convey the truth with sufficient accuracy, but the fuller expression that the injured party  is  thereby  absolved  from  future  performance  of  his obligations under the contract is a more exact description of the position.  Strictly speaking, to say that, upon acceptance of the  renunciation  of  a  contract,  the  contract  is  rescinded  is incorrect.   In such a case the injured party may accept the renunciation as a breach going to the root of the whole of the

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consideration.   By  that  acceptance  he  is  discharged  from further performance and may bring an action for damages, but the contract itself is not rescinded.

The injured party may therefore  rely  upon the contract  and apply to have the action stayed if he desires to do so.”

“The  same  observations  as  apply  to  accepted  repudiation apply,  I  think  to  frustration.   The  phrase  ‘frustration  of  the contract’  is  as  inaccurate  in  expression  as  is  the  phrase ‘rescission of the contract by repudiation’.  The contract is not frustrated.   Its  future  performance  or  the  adventure  is frustrated.   The  damages  are  still  at  large  and  so  is  the question whether, having regard to the terms of the contract express or  implied,  there has been frustration or  not.   This appears to have been recognized in  Scott & Sons v. Del Sel [(1923)  S.C.  (H.L.)  37)  which  though  a  Scottish  case  was decided on the same principles as apply in English law, and is binding upon your Lordships’ House.  So far as the case of Hirji Mulji [(1926) AC 497], which is not binding, lays down a different principle, I do not think it should be followed, despite the authority which is undoubtedly possesses.”

Shortly stated the claim of the applicants is for the profits they had become

entitled to by the breach of confidentiality clause on the part of the non-

applicant which profit was on account of applicant’s entitlement to purchase

the shares of non-applicant at the rate 25% less than the market price.  Its

reiteration is that  though subsequently it agreed to sell all its shares to the

non-applicant on account of the offer having been made to it  by Global

Communication  Services and though  subsequently  the  Share  Purchase

Agreement dated 1.6.2006 was executed between the applicants and the

non-applicant, since the said agreement was subject to the disputes raised

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earlier and without prejudice to its rights it  could still  lay its hand on its

claim.

20. As against this Shri K.K. Venugopal, Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi and

Shri Shyam Diwan, learned senior counsel for the Non-applicant opposed

the appointment of Arbitral Tribunal on various grounds and basically on

the ground that there was no live issue remaining pending between the

parties.  The major contention is that by Share Purchase Agreement, the

applicants had made an exit from the company and, therefore, they were

left  with  no  rights  under  the  Shareholders  Agreement.   A  very  heavy

reliance was placed by Shri Venugopal on Clauses 7.01 (a) and (b) which

are as under:

“7.01 (a) For  a  founder  to  exercise  its  rights  under  this Agreement,  the  Founder  must  hold  15%  of  the  issued, subscribed and paid up Equity Capital (the “Threshold Limit”).

(b) Should the shareholding of any Founder fall below the Threshold Limit;

i) Such Founder shall not be entitled to exercise any rights under this Agreement;

ii) Such Founder shall comply with all obligations set forth in this Agreement;

iii) Such Founder  shall  act  in  accordance with  the instructions of the other founders;

iv) any disposal by such Founder of any shares held by it shall be in accordance with Article X.”

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Heavily relying on this clause, the learned Senior Counsel argued that once

by a Share Purchase Agreement, the applicants agreed to sell their shares

to the non-applicant  and due to such act  once the shareholding of  the

applicants fell below 15%, it had no right to assert more particularly under

the Shareholders Agreement.  Learned counsel argues that there were two

options  to  the  applicants  when  they  received  an  offer  from  Global

Communications Services, a third party, for the sale of their shares if the

applicant  had  accepted  the  offer.   First  option  was  to  sell  the  entire

shareholding to Global Communications and exit IDEA in which case the

non-applicant could also choose to sell its entire shareholding in IDEA to

Global Communications by giving a Special Disposal Notice and once the

Tata  Group  allowed  the  Birla  Group  to  sell  all  its  shares  to  Global

Communications, it could no longer require the Birla Group to then sell the

same shares to the Tata Group for the reason that Birla Group would no

longer have those shares.  The second option, according to the learned

counsel was to sell  the entire shareholding in IDEA to the non-applicant

and exit IDEA.  According to the learned counsel in both these cases on

acceptance of  the offer  by the applicants  from Global  Communications,

there would be an inevitable result of voluntary effacement of all rights that

the  applicants  claim on  the  Birla  Group shareholding  in  IDEA.   It  was

pointed out  that  the applicants had accepted this  offer  from the Global

Communications much before it attempted to reserve any rights against the

non-applicant and, therefore, had irrevocably elected to exit IDEA, electing

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for  second option.   It  was, therefore,  urged that there was a concluded

contract between Global Communications and the applicants even before a

letter dated 5.4.2006 was sent by the applicants to Birla Group to purchase

their shareholding in IDEA and hence the applicants had elected to exit

IDEA themselves.  In support of this proposition, the learned counsel relied

on three cases:

(i) Sargent and ASL Developments Limited, reported at

(1974) 4 Australian Law Reports (A.L.R.) 257.

(ii) Jai  Narain  Parasrampuria  (Dead)  and  others  Vs.

Pushpa Devi Saraf and others, reported at 2006       7

SCC 756.

(iii) National  Insurance  Company  Limited  Vs.  Mastan

and another, reported at 2006 2 SCC 641.

21. In  short,  it  was  contended  that  by  accepting  the  offer  of  Global

Communications  the  claim  made  by  the  applicants  under  Termination

Notices for purchase of Birla Group shareholding in IDEA at a defaulting

price got necessarily effaced with the subsequent option given in the offer

notice  to  Birla  Group  to  sell  their  entire  shareholding  to  Global

Communications.  It was further urged that with the offer of sale to Global

Communications, the applicants recognized and acquiesced that the Birla

Group’s  shareholding  in  IDEA was not  subject  to  any encumbrance or

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reservations  and  the  applicants,  therefore,  necessarily  abandoned  all

purported claims for the purchase of Birla Group’s shareholding and there

was nothing left  with the applicants to reserve in the offer notice or any

documents executed thereafter.  It is pointed out that the Agreement to Sell

to Global Communications took place without any notice to the Birla Group

and contrary to the alleged right of applicants to buy out Birla Group and

remain  invested  in  IDEA  with  increased  shareholding,  the  applicants

themselves exited IDEA by selling their shares to Birla Group companies

and thereby reducing the Tata Group’s shareholding in IDEA to Nil.  It is

accordingly suggested that as a result all rights of Tata Group pursuant to

Termination  Notices  were  effaced  and  there  was  no  arbitrable  dispute

surviving between the parties.  It is pointed out that there was no claim for

damages in the Termination Notice and in fact such a claim was not even

possible because it was excluded by the decision to seek a buy out under

Section 9.02 of the Shareholders Agreement.  It was then stated that the

claim by the applicants was frivolous and unsustainable because of the

alleged loss  of  an opportunity  to  buy out  Birla  Group’s  shareholding in

IDEA  was  not  caused  by  any  breach  of  contract  by  any  Birla  Group

company  but  it  was  by  applicants’  own  voluntary  decision  to  exit  the

company and thereby lost the right to acquire Birla Group’s shareholding in

IDEA.  It is pointed that the purported rights of the applicants under the

Termination Notice is not possible in law also particularly because the Tata

Group’s election to exit  IDEA and to let  Birla  Group remain invested in

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IDEA and as such all  their  claims were erased.   Learned counsel  also

relied on  Clause 7.01(b)(i)  of  the Shareholders  Agreement  which is  as

under:

i) Such Founder shall not be entitled to exercise any rights under this Agreement;

It was suggested that even if the Arbitration clause remains inspite of the

termination  of  the  Shareholders  Agreement,  because  of  the  above

mentioned clause, there is complete bar created on the exercise by the

applicants of the substantive right to seek a buy out.  A live procedural

mechanism  of  dispute  resolutions  through  arbitration  cannot  be  set  in

motion to enforce a dead claim and, therefore, there would be no question

of starting an arbitration proceeding.  

22. As to what should be the approach of the Court in an application

under Section 11(6) was explained by this Court  in  SBP Co. Vs. Patel

Engineering Ltd. and Another reported in 2005 8 SCC 618.  This was a

decision to resolve as to whether the Chief Justice of India or his nominee,

while dealing with the matters under Section 11(6) acts in his administrative

capacity or his judicial capacity.  The Court ultimately, held that the Chief

Justice of India acts in his judicial capacity.  Hon. P.K. Balasubramanyan,

J., who authored the judgment on behalf of the majority, in his conclusions,

pointed out clearly in point iv (points i, ii and iii not relevant) that:-

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“(iv) The Chief Justice or the designated Judge will have the right to decide the preliminary aspects as indicated in the earlier part of this judgment.  These will be his own jurisdiction to entertain the request, the existence of a valid arbitration agreement, the existence or otherwise of  a  live  claim,  the existence of  the  condition  for  the exercise of  his power and on the qualifications of  the arbitrator or arbitrators………………………”

The  law,  thus,  stands  crystalised  by  this  judgment  indicating  the

exact scope of the Judge in dealing with an application under Section 11(6)

of the Act.  The judgment was thereafter considered in number of cases.

In Shree Ram Mills Ltd. Vs. Utility Premises (P) Ltd. reported in 2007 4

SCC 599, it was observed relying on observations made in paragraph 39 of

SBP Co. Vs. Patel Engineering Ltd. and Another reported in 2005 8

SCC 618 (cited supra):

“A glance on this para would suggest the scope of the order under Section 11 to  be passed by the Chief  Justice or  his designate.   Insofar  as  the  issues  regarding  territorial jurisdiction and the existence of the arbitration agreement are concerned, the Chief Justice or his designate has to decide those  issues  because  otherwise  the  arbitration  can  never proceed.   Thus,  the  Chief  Justice  has  to  decide  about  the territorial  jurisdiction  and  also  whether  there  exists  an arbitration agreement between the parties and whether such party  has  approached  the  court  for  appointment  of  the arbitrator.  The Chief Justice has to examine as to whether the claim is a dead one or in the sense whether the parties have already  concluded  the  transaction  and  have  recorded satisfaction of their mutual rights and obligations or whether the  parties  concerned  have  recorded  their  satisfaction regarding the financial claims.  In examining this if the parties have recorded their satisfaction regarding the financial claims, there will be no question of any issue remaining.  It is in this sense that  the Chief  Justice has to  examine as to  whether there remains anything to be decided between the parties in

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respect of the agreement and whether the parties are still at issue on any such matter.  If the chief Justice does not, in the strict  sense,  decide the issue,  in  that  event  it  is  for  him to locate such issue and record his satisfaction that such issue exists between the parties.  It  is  only in that sense that the finding on a live issue is given.  Even at the cost of repetition we must  state  that  it  is  only  for  the  purpose of  finding out whether the arbitral procedure has to be started that the Chief Justice  has  to  record  satisfaction  that  there  remains  a  live issue in between the parties……..”

“It is for this reason that it was pointed out in the above para that it would be appropriate sometimes to leave the question regarding the live claim to be decided by the Arbitral Tribunal. All  that  he  has  to  do  is  to  record  his  satisfaction  that  the parties  have not  closed their  rights and the matter  has not been barred by limitation.”

In  the  wake  of  above  decision,  it  will  be  now necessary  to  see

whether a live claim or a live issue exists in between the parties.

23. As has already been clarified in the earlier part of the judgment that

there is jurisdiction in this Court to decide the application, secondly, there is

arbitration  agreement  between the parties,  and  thirdly,  the  claim is  not

barred by limitation,  the only issue which has to be decided is whether

there is a live issue in the sense as to whether the parties have already

concluded or recorded their satisfaction regarding the issues or whether

the parties are still in contest regarding certain issues.

24. In the backdrop of what has been asserted by the applicant and the

stands taken by the non-applicant, it would be first better to note certain

dates, which are of extreme importance.  It will be seen there as below:

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15.12.2000: A  Shareholders  Agreement  (SHA)  came  into

effect  between  AT&T  Group,  Birla  Group  and

Tata Group.

9.11.2005: The name of  AT&T Cellular  Pvt.  Ltd.,  Mauritius

was  changed  to  M/s.  Apex  Investments

(Mauritius) Holding Private Limited (APEX).

31.1.2006: The  first  termination  notice  was  served  by  the

applicant on the non-applicant, alleging breach of

Shareholders Agreement on account of the non-

applicant  Company  having  applied  for  Unified

Access  Service  Licenses  (UAS  Licenses),

enabling  license  holder  to  provide  any  kind  of

telecommunication  service  for  Mumbai  Metro

circle  and  thereby  committing  breach  of  Article

3.04  (b)  of  the  Shareholders  Agreement  and

asking  the  non-applicant  to  remedy  the  breach

within 60 days.

27.2.2006: A  second  termination  notice  was  sent  by  the

applicant to the non-applicant claiming that there

was a breach of confidentiality clause committed

by the non-applicant and since this breach was

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incapable of being cured, the applicant demanded

to purchase the shareholding of the Birla Group

within 90 days of the said notice at a default price.

28.2.2006: The  non-applicant  disputed  the  first  termination

notice  dated  31.1.2006,  while  on  1.3.2006,  the

non-applicant  replied  to  the  second  termination

notice dated 27.2.2006.

16.3.2006: The  applicants  reiterated  both  the  termination

notices.

17.3.2006: The  non-applicant  wrote  a  letter  observing

therein:

“…..  Based  upon  your  above- referenced two letters,  we conclude the  Shareholders  Agreement continued to remain valid, subsisting and enforceable.”

27.3.2006: The  applicants  reiterated  the  second  notice  of

termination  insisting  that  they  were  entitled  to

acquire  shares  and  shown  their  readiness  to

appoint international firm of auditors to determine

the  fair  market  value  of  the  shares  to  be

purchased by them.

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3.4.2006: The non-applicant refused the claim once again.

5.4.2006: The  applicant  received  the  offer  from  Global

Communication Services for purchasing its stake

in IDEA and hence, it makes offer for the sale of

its shareholding under clause 10.06 to the non-

applicant.   This  offer  notice  was  expressly

“without prejudice” to both the termination notices.

6.4.2006: This  offer  was  accepted  by  the  non-applicant.

However, it  was clarified that the acceptance of

this offer was without prejudice to the contention

that the notices of termination were not tenable.

7.4.2006: The applicant sent the letter stating therein that it

would  be  shortly  forwarding  two  Draft  Share

Purchase Agreement for the sale of IDEA shares

held by it and M/s. Apex Investments (Mauritius)

Holding  Private  Limited.   There  was  again  a

reiteration  that  the  offer  made  by  it  and  the

acceptance thereof was without prejudice to the

termination notices dt. 31.1.2006 and 27.2.2006.

10.4.2006: The non-applicant submitted the particulars of the

Birla  Group  Companies,  which  would  be

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purchasing  the shares of the applicant and M/s.

Apex  Investments  (Mauritius)  Holding  Private

Limited  under  the  two  Share  Purchase

Agreements with the percentage of shares to be

purchased by such companies.

19.4.2006: The applicant reaffirmed its termination notices dt.

31.1.2006 and 27.2.2006 and also informed that it

would proceed to appoint an international firm of

auditors for determining the fair market value of

IDEA shares.

24.4.2006: The non-applicant replied and informed that they

were ready to make full and final payment against

the delivery of shares held by TIL and M/s. Apex

Investments (Mauritius) Holding Private Limited in

IDEA Cellular Ltd.

24.4.2006: The applicant made a request to commence the

process of consultation with respect to disputes

which have arisen between the parties on account

of breach of Shareholders Agreement.

27.4.2006: A letter was sent by the non-applicant that in view

of  the  agreement  between  the  parties  for

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purchase of the shares of applicant by the non-

applicant  and  the  further  stands  having  been

taken  by  the  parties,  there  was  no  arbitrable

dispute  survived  between  the  parties  and

requested  the  applicants  to  withdraw  the

consultation notice.

5.5.2006: A formal notice was issued for arbitration.

17.5.2006: The  non-applicant  reiterated  that  there  was  no

arbitrable dispute survived.

19.5.2006: The  applicant  conveyed  the  appointment  of

nominee arbitrator under Clause 12.04(d).

1.6.2006: Two formal  Share  Purchase  Agreements  came

into existence.  A clause 2(D) was inserted:

“2(D)  In  relation  to  the  notices  dated January 31,  2006 and February 27,  2006 issued  by  TIL  (as  a  founder  under  the Shareholders  Agreement  as  hereinafter defined)  to  the  A.V.  Birla  Group,  TIL  has pending  arbitration  disputes  with  the  AV Birla Group, TIL has not accepted the rival contentions  of  the  AV  Birla  Group  in respect of the said notices nor has the AV Birla Group accepted, TIL’s claims pending arbitration.  As such, the execution of and consummation  of  the  transaction contemplated by this  Agreement  shall  not prejudice  or  affect  the  pendency  or

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continuation  of  the  arbitration  proceeding between TIL and the AV Birla Group.”

Another Clause 2.3 was inserted:

“2.3 TIL,  for  itself  and  Apex  has  issued the Termination Notices.   The offer  made by TIL  to  the AV Birla  Group pursuant  to the  Offer  Notice,  was  made  without prejudice to the said Termination Notices, Grasim Industries Limited, as part of the AV Birla  Group  has  refuted  the  Termination Notices.   Further,  in  order  to  enforce  the rights accrued to TIL and Apex on account of  the  Termination  Notices,  TIL,  for  itself and Apex has pursuant to clause 12.04(d) of the Shareholders Agreement on May 5, 2006 issued a notice to arbitrate to the AV Birla Group.  Accordingly, this Agreement is being executed without prejudice to the rival contentions of either party with reference to the Termination Notices and the legal rights which have accrued to each party (including Apex acting through TIL as founder) under the Shareholders Agreement.”

25. A glance on these dates would clearly suggest that the first salvo

was fired by the applicant when it first sent the notice dated 31.1.2006.  In

this way, the only complaint made was that ABTL, which was a subsidiary

of  ABNL,  had  made  an  application  on  3.1.2006  to  the  Department  of

Telecommunication for grant of Unified Access Services License (UASL)

for  Mumbai  Metro  circle.   It  was complained that  this  amounted to  the

breach of clause 3.04(b) of the Shareholders Agreement as the Aditya Birla

Group could not be permitted to engage in, directly or indirectly through an

Affiliate, (i)   any activity that  would constitute the Business of  the IDEA

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Cellular  Ltd.  without  complying  with  the  provisions  of  Clause  3.04(b).

Noticee  then  was  to  remedy  the  breach  within  60  days  as  per  the

Shareholders Agreement.  It is only to that extent that the dispute arose.

It would be remembered that there is a provision in the Shareholders

Agreement, by which even if the breach is committed by one party, the

other party could ask for remedying the same within 60 days.  This was not

a termination of the Agreement.  However, the second salvo came to be

fired  on  27.2.2006,  which  was  on  account  of  the  breach  of  the

Confidentiality clause.  A position was taken  that this breach was not such

as could be remedied and on that account, the applicants claimed all the

shareholding of Birla Group at the price, which would be 25% less than the

fair market price of the shares.  In the subsequent correspondences, they

also offered to appoint a firm of Chartered Accountants for assessing the

fair market value of the shares.

26. The non-applicant was not to be left behind in disputing this claim by

its reply dated 1.3.2006.  In this reply, it was suggested that the termination

notice was only by way of  a counter  action to the Birla  Group’s recent

letters  to  the  Department  of  Telecommunications,  Ministry  of

Communication and Information & Technology (DoT), complaining against

Tata Group’s continuing breach of the relevant telecom licenses.  It was

thereafter denied that the investor presentations made by ABNL, and the

further presentation dated 12.9.2005 posted on the website of ABNL could

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constitute a breach on the part of Birla Group of the restrictions contained

in Section 8.01 of the Shareholders Agreement.  It was further reiterated

that the said presentation could not be deemed to be confidential under the

Shareholders  Agreement,  and  that  information  conveyed  in  those

presentations was not confidential information at all.  A further stand was

taken that since ABNL was a publicly listed company, any consolidated

accounts prepared by ABNL had to be disclosed to the investors, which

was  consistent  with  its  disclosure  obligations  and  a  good  corporate

governance practice, and that the Tata Group was fully aware that ABNL

would be disclosing such information to the investors and the analysts.  It

was further reiterated that since the information was received from IDEA

regarding consolidation and disclosure, such information was used for that

purpose  and  there  was  no  impropriety  or  breach  of  Shareholders

Agreement  by  these  disclosures,  and  that  information  was  not  at  all

confidential.  An allegation was made that the Tata Group was trying to sell

its  shares  to  the  third  party  and  that  it  could  not  do  so  unless  the

obligations in favour of Birla Group, as contemplated in the Shareholders

Agreement, were not met.  

27. In short, till this reply was given, the only defense that was raised by

the  non-applicant  was  that  there  was  no  breach  of  the  Confidentiality

clause, as the information itself was not confidential.  There was probably

an  inkling  to  the  non-applicant  that  the  Tata  Group  was  interested  in

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disposing of its shareholding in favour of some third party and, therefore, it

merely  asserted  it  rights  in  case  such  sale  to  the  third  party  of  the

shareholding materializes.  Therefore, at least up to this date, there was a

live issue as to whether there had been a breach of Confidentiality clause

on the part of the non-applicant.

28. However,  that  is  not  where  the  things  stopped  as  merely  a  few

weeks  thereafter,  the  applicants  having  received  the  offer  from  Global

Communication  Services,  offered  their  own  shareholding   to  the  non-

applicant  on  5.4.2006,  reiterating  therein,  that  this  offer  was  without

prejudice to the dispute which has arisen between the parties.  The offer so

made, was accepted by the non-applicant, however, with a caveat in the

following words:

“This is without prejudice to our contentions that the notices of termination  referred  to  in  the  said  Offer  Notice,  are  not tenable.”

Therefore, even at this point of time, when the offer was accepted,

the  issue  was  very  much  there  as  to  whether  there  was  a  breach  of

Confidentiality clause on the part of the non-applicant.  On 7.4.2006, the

applicants offered to send two Draft Share Purchase Agreements for the

sale and again reiterated that the offer and the acceptance by the non-

applicant  was  without  prejudice  to  the  notices  of  termination  dated

31.1.2006 and 27.2.2006.  On 10.4.2006, again the non-applicant wrote

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back giving the details regarding the shares and the percentages, where

again  they  disputed  the  question  of  termination.   There  was  a  further

reiteration  on  19.4.2006,  of  its  stand,  in  details,  and it  was specifically

reiterated in the letter dated 19.4.2006:

“As already explained above, since the AV Birla Group is in violation of the provisions of the Shareholders Agreement, the First Notice and the Second Notice issued by us cannot be withdrawn.  Since you have failed in agreeing upon the name of the international firm of auditors we shall therefore proceed in  accordance  with  the  Shareholders  Agreement  to  do  the needful in connection with determining the Fair Market Value of Idea Shares.”

By their  letter dated 24.4.2006, the applicants again showed their

readiness  to  purchase  the  shares.   However,  the  earlier  position  was

reiterated by them to the effect that the stand taken by Tata Group was not

correct.  On 24.4.2006, the applicants clearly reiterated that a dispute had

arisen between the applicants and the non-applicant in connection with the

terms of  Shareholders  Agreement  and that  for  that  purpose,  they were

ready to start the process of consolidation as an initial step.  It was also

conveyed that in case the non-applicant was not interested in process of

consolidation,  the  applicants  would  like  to  proceed  with  the  arbitral

proceedings straight away.  Lastly, the non-applicant wrote a letter dated

27.4.2006  in  which  for  the  first  time,  the  position  was  taken  that  the

Agreement which was concluded between the parties consequent to the

offer  notice and acceptance notice, and the further steps taken by both

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would be that  there was no arbitrable dispute surviving pursuant  to  the

notices.   

29. It  is  here for  the  first  time,  that  a  stand was shifted  by the non-

applicant from its earlier stand.  Earlier, the contention was that there was

no breach of Confidentiality clause.  The shifted stand was that because of

the subsequent  Agreement, the earlier issue was already obliterated.  It is

on this background that ultimately the formal Agreements dated 1.6.2006

came to be entered into by the parties.  But before that, a notice for the

Arbitration  was  already  issued  by  the  applicants  by  their  letter  dated

5.5.2006.   Even on this  backdrop,  the  only  position  taken  by the  non-

applicant by its letter dated 17.5.2006 was that Tata Group was estopped

from asserting its alleged claims against the Birla Group.  In view of the

election made by Tata Group by giving the offer notice dated 5.4.2006 to

the  Birla  Group  and  the  acceptance  by  Birla  Group  dated  6.4.2006.

Therefore, it was concluded that there was no arbitrable dispute surviving

and yet in the Agreement dated 1.6.2006, the non-applicant again allowed

to insert the clauses regarding the Agreements being without prejudice to

the earlier rights.  In fact, if the stand taken was that there was no arbitrable

issue because  the offer concluded sale, there was no question of any such

“without prejudice” clause being inserted in the Agreement dated 1.6.2006.

It must be remembered that on the date when the formal Agreements were

signed on 1.6.2006, the non-applicant was already facing an arbitral notice

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and yet  the two clauses,  viz.,  2(D)  and 2.3  (which we have mentioned

earlier in this judgment), came to be inserted.  All this would suggest that

there indeed was an issue and a live one in between the parties till then as

described  in  (See  Chairman  and  MD,  NTPC  Ltd.  Vs.  Reshmi

Constructions,  Builders & Contractors reported in 2004 2 SCC 663

(Paras 35 and 36).  

30. On  the  other  hand,  Shri  Venugopal,  learned  counsel  invited  my

attention to  a  decision  of  High Court  of  Australia  in  Sargent  and ASL

Developments Limited, reported at (1974) 4 Australian Law Reports

(A.L.R.) 257 (cited supra).  The decision of the Australian High Court is on

the question of Doctrine of  election.   In my opinion,  the decision is not

applicable to the present controversy as there was no question of election

on the part of the applicant herein.  It is merely basing its claim on account

of the alleged clear breach of Shareholders Agreement in respect of the

Confidentiality  clause.   Even  the  second  decision  in  Jai  Narain

Parasrampuria (Dead) and others Vs. Pushpa Devi Saraf and others,

reported in 2006 7 SCC 756(cited supra) has no application.  That is a

case where this Court explained the principles  of estoppel and waiver and

whether a party could be permitted to take a different stand and the duty of

the court in such matters.  No such questions arise in the present matter.

The third decision in  National Insurance Company Limited Vs. Mastan

and another, reported in 2006 2 SCC 641, is again on the question of

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Doctrine of election, where this Court has observed that the Doctrine of

election  postulates  that  when two remedies  are  available  for  the  same

relief, the aggrieved party has an option to elect either of them, but not

both.  The fact situation is not like that in the present case.  This case,

therefore, has no application.

31. The other major limb of the argument was, however, that this issue

could not arise and became a dead issue at least after the applicants sold

out  all  their  shares  and  their  shareholding  fell  below  15%.   The

aforementioned  clause  on  which  Shri  Venugopal,  Dr.  Singhvi  and  Shri

Shyam Diwan, Advocates for the non-applicant heavily relied, being clause

No.  7.01(a)  and  7.01(b),  as  also  7.02  (b)  provided  that  in  case  the

shareholding falls below 15%, and in this case it has actually fallen below

15%, such party would not have any rights left with it under the Agreement

(Shareholders Agreement).   The argument is obviously incorrect,  as the

Arbitration Agreement under clause 12.04 would be clearly autonomous of

the Shareholders Agreement.  Law is settled on this point that even if the

whole  Agreement  is  terminated,  the  Arbitration  Agreement  would  still

remain (See Chairman and MD, NTPC Ltd. Vs. Reshmi Constructions,

Builders & Contractors reported in 2004 2 SCC 663 (Para 39).  It was

argued that clause 7.01 (b) operates as a complete bar on the exercise by

the applicants of the substantive right to seek a buy-out.  That may be so,

however, that is only an eventuality subsequent to the crystalisation of the

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live issue between the parties for which the arbitration clause would come

handy to the applicants.

32. The learned counsels for the non-applicant very vehemently argued

that the issue had become dead.  The issue cannot be held to be dead for

the  simple  reason  that  even  in  the  subsequent  Agreements  (Shares

Purchase Agreements), there is a “without prejudice” clause and that too

despite the vehement claims and refusals of those claims on the part of the

parties.

33. Whether there was a breach of Confidentiality clause and whether

the applicants were entitled to any damages on account of that clause in

favour of the applicants, would be a matter in the helm of arbitration and

this Court would not go into that question.   

34. It was tried to be argued that the cause of action for the arbitration

was based entirely on the offer notice, which was given by the applicants to

the non-applicant on account of the applicants having received the offer

from  Global  Communication  Services.   It  is,  therefore,  argued  by  the

learned counsel that since the cause of action was on the offer notice and

since the Share Purchase Agreements were concluded on account of that

offer notice, any disputes arising would be solved in accordance with the

Share Purchase Agreement and not with the Shareholders Agreement and,

therefore, they would be resolved under English Law and LCIA Arbitration

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Rules.  These clauses are to be found at pages 286-288 as also on pages

328-332 of the main Paper Book vide clauses 9.1, 9.4 and 9.5 in the First

Agreement dated 31.1.2006, as also 9.2.1 to 9.2.5 on pages 330 and 331

of the main Paper Book.   

35. The  contention  is  clearly  incorrect,  as  the  present  dispute  is  not

based on the notice of offer dated 5.4.2006.  The contention raised by the

learned counsels that the cause of action arose only from that notice, is

obviously incorrect, as has been shown in the earlier parts of the judgment.

The live issue was clearly there, much before the notice was given on    05-

04-2006 and the second agreement was even contemplated.  That was the

issue whether there was a breach of Confidentiality clause on the part of

the non-applicant and what are the effects thereof.  That issue continued to

be in existence and was never given up by the applicants.  Therefore, that

contention is rejected.

36. By way of last argument, it was argued that M/s. Apex Investments

(Mauritius) Holding Private Limited was never a party to the Shareholders

Agreement.   It  was  suggested  that  M/s.  Apex  Investments  (Mauritius)

Holding Private Limited was originally  a member of  the AT&T Wireless

Group  and  held  32.9% shares  in  IDEA.   It  was then  known as  AT&T

Cellular Pvt. Ltd.  It was then argued that it was required under Article 4.01

(a) of the Shareholders Agreement to execute a Deed of Adherence as

provided  in  “Annex  C”  to  the  Shareholders  Agreement  in  order  to   (i)

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designate AT&T Inc. as its representative to exercise all rights and perform

all obligations under the Shareholders Agreement;  (ii)  agree to be bound

by all  the provisions of  the Shareholders Agreement;  (iii)   agree not  to

revoke the designation of the representative without prior written consent of

the AV Birla  Group and the Tata Group.   It  was also required that  the

counter-part  of  the  executed  Deed  of  Adherence  should  have  been

delivered to Grasim Industries Ltd. and TIL.  It was then pointed out that

after TIL acquired AT&T Cellular Pvt. Ltd. itself which held the remaining

16.45% shares in IDEA, M/s. Apex Investments (Mauritius) Holding Private

Limited became a wholly owned subsidiary of TIL. It was then pointed out

that  on  28.09.2005,  AT&T  Cellular  Pvt.  Ltd.,  New  Cingular  Wireless

Service Inc. (successor-in-interest to AT&T Inc.) entered into a Sale and

Purchase Agreement  with Indian Rayon and Industries Ltd.  (now called

ABNL), whereby the Shareholders Agreement was specifically terminated

as between the Birla Group and the AT&T Wireless Group and all  pre-

existing rights/liabilities, if any, were specifically extinguished and waived.

So also  on the  same date,  the AT&T  Wireless  Group (of  which AT&T

Cellular  Pvt.  Ltd.  was  a  part),  executed  a  similar  Sale  and  Purchase

Agreement  with  the  Tata  Group,  whereby the  Shareholders  Agreement

was terminated between the Tata Group and the AT&T Wireless Group,

and thus the Apex Investments (Mauritius) Holding Private Limited (which

is  a  fall  out  from  the  AT&T  Cellular  Pvt.  Ltd.)  had  terminated  the

Shareholders Agreement and extinguished and waived all accrued rights

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and obligations against the Birla Group and, therefore, Apex Investments

(Mauritius)  Holding  Private  Limited  ceases  to  be  a  party  to  the

Shareholders Agreement and to any arbitration clause contained therein.

Apex Investments (Mauritius) Holding Private Limited, therefore, could no

longer have  any claim for arbitration or assert any rights or liabilities under

the  Shareholders  Agreement.   It  was  further  pointed  out  that  on

15.12.2000, when the Shareholders Agreement was executed, there were

only three parties, viz., (i)  AT&T Inc., which was acting on behalf of itself

and AT&T Wireless Group; (ii) Grasim, acting on behalf of itself and the

Birla Group  (iii)  TIL, acting on behalf of itself and the Tata Group.  The

argument,  therefore,  is  that  since Apex Investments  (Mauritius)  Holding

Private Limited was not a party then, there could be no privity of contract

between  Apex  Investments  (Mauritius)  Holding  Private  Limited  and  the

non-applicant  Birla  Group.   It  was  pointed  out  that  since  the  modality

drafted by clause 4.02 of Shareholders Agreement was not followed, Apex

Investments  (Mauritius)  Holding  Private  Limited  could  not  join  the

Shareholders  Agreement  and  as  such,  Apex  Investments  (Mauritius)

Holding Private Limited not being a party to the Shareholders Agreement, it

cannot  demand  an  arbitration  through  the  arbitration  clause.   This

argument is obviously incorrect for the following reasons:

(i) It must be seen that after the offer was received from Global

Communications, both TIL on its behalf and on behalf of the Apex

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Investments (Mauritius) Holding Private Limited, offered to sell their

entire shareholding in IDEA in terms of the right of first refusal, which

offer has been accepted by the non-applicant.

(ii) Apex Investments (Mauritius) Holding Private Limited is now a

part and parcel of the Tata Group and is its subsidiary.  Further, its

interests are bound to be affected.  

(iii) In raising this issue, the non-applicant is making a complete

volte  face, inasmuch as, when the application had been filed before

the Bombay High Court, an objection was taken by the non-applicant

that Apex Investments (Mauritius) Holding Private Limited being a

foreign company and claiming an arbitration along with Tata Group,

the  Bombay  High  Court  had  no  jurisdiction  to  entertain  the

application  under  Section  11  (6).   It  was  in  pursuance  of  that

objection only that the Bombay High Court did not proceed further to

decide the application under Section 11 (6).  The learned counsel

argues that this objection regarding the Apex Investments (Mauritius)

Holding Private Limited being foreign party, arose on the face of it,

but the merits of the case did not fall for consideration in Bombay

High Court and as such the issue of Apex  Investments (Mauritius)

Holding Private Ltd. not being a party to shareholder agreement can

still  be raised.   The contention is not  correct.   The non-applicant

having raised an objection on the ground that the applicant Apex

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Investments  (Mauritius)  Holding  Private  Limited  was  a  foreign

company, and, therefore, could not have filed an application before

Bombay High  Court,  cannot  now turn  around and say that  Apex

Investments (Mauritius) Holding Private Limited was not a party to

the Arbitration Agreement.  That will not be permissible.  The learned

counsel points out that this objection was raised without prejudice,

would also be of no consequence, as having succeeded in stalling

the decision of the application under Section 11(6), it  cannot now

raise  the  argument  before  this  Court  that  Apex  Investments

(Mauritius)  Holding  Private  Limited  was  never  a  party.   This

argument should have been addressed to the Bombay High Court, at

least in the alternative form.  If in the affidavit before the Bombay

High Court filed on their behalf of the non-applicant had raised the

issue  and  still  chose  not  to  go  into  the  issue  whether  Apex

Investments (Mauritius)  Holding Private Limited was or was not a

party to the Shareholders Agreement, that will not be permitted to be

raised before this Court.   In fact,  in restricting to the jurisdictional

issue and in not perusing the  issue of Apex Investments (Mauritius)

Holding  Private  Limited  not  being  a  party  to  the  Shareholders

Agreement  before  Bombay  High  Court,   the  non-applicant

abandoned that issue.  The argument is, therefore, rejected.   

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37. Ultimately,  considering  the  overall  situation,  it  is  held  that  the

application under Section 11(6) is liable to be allowed.  In that view, the

following order is passed:

Hon’ble  Dr.  Justice   A.S.  Anand,  former  Chief  Justice  of  India,

Hon’ble  Mr.  Justice  Arun  Kumar  and  Hon’ble  Mr.  Justice  P.K.

Balasubramanyan,  former  Judges  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  India  are

appointed as the Arbitrators.  Their terms shall be decided by themselves.

…………………………J. (V.S. Sirpurkar)

New Delhi;

July 09, 2008.

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  Digital  Performa   

Case  No. : Arbitration Petition No. 5 of 2007

Date of Decision : 09.7.2008

Cause Title :  M/s Tata Industries Ltd. & Anr.

Versus

   M/s. Grasim Industries Ltd.

Coram :   Hon’ble Mr. Justice V.S. Sirpurkar      

Judgment delivered by  :   Hon’ble Mr. Justice V.S. Sirpurkar

Nature of Judgment :  Reportable

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