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PETITIONER: M/S. SUNIL INDUSTRIES

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: RAM CHANDER PRADHAN & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       14/11/2000

BENCH: S. Rajendra Babu, & S.N. Variava,

JUDGMENT:

S. N. VARIAVA, J. L...I...T.......T.......T.......T.......T.......T.......T..J

   This  Appeal is against an Order dated 7th May, 1997  by which  the  first  appeal filed by the  appellant  has  been dismissed in limine.

   Briefly stated the facts are as follows:  The Petitioner is  a  sole  proprietory concern.  It runs its  workshop  of shaping steel sheets into various shapes and forms.  The 1st Respondent  was,  at the relevant time, working as  a  press operator  with  the Appellant.  On 27th January, 1993  while working on a press, the 1st Respondent sustained injuries to his  right index finger and thumb.  The Appellant rushed the 1st  Respondent to the Civil Hospital at Gurgaon  (Haryana). The  injuries necessitated amputation of 2.5 x 0.5 Cms.   of the index finger.

   On  14th  June, 1993, the 1st Respondent filed  a  claim under   the  Workmen’s  Compensation   Act,  1923   claiming compensation  in  the  sum of Rs.   25,000/-  with  interest thereon  @ 16% per annum.  The Appellant in his reply, inter alia,   claimed  that  the   provisions  of  the   Workmen’s Compensation Act would not apply to his establishment.

   On  15th  October  1996 the Commissioner held  that  the Workmen’s  Compensation  Act applied and that the  Appellant was  liable  to  pay compensation in a  sum  of  Rs.29,814/- together  with Rs.5,000/- as penalty and interest at 12% per annum.   The Appellant preferred an Appeal under Section  30 of  the  Worken’s Compensation Act before the High Court  of Punjab  &  Haryana.   That Appeal came to  be  dismissed  in limine by the impugned order dated 7th May, 1997.

   It  is admitted that the 1st Respondent was working as a press  operator with the Appellant at the relevant time.  It is  admitted  that  the  accident did  took  place  on  27th January,  1993 and that it resulted in injuries to the right index  finger and thumb of the 1st Respondent and that  this necessitated  amputation  of  2.5 x 0.5 Cms.  of  the  index finger.   Mr.  Vasdev however, submitted that the  Workmen’s Compensation   Act   did  not   apply  to  the   Appellant’s establishment.   He submitted that Section 2(n) (ii) of  the Wormen’s  Compensation  Act  provides that a  workman  is  a person  employed in a capacity specified in Schedule II.  He

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then  referred to Schedule II of the Workmen’s  Compensation Act  and  pointed  out that under item 2 of  Schedule  II  a person  would  be a workman provided he is employed  in  any premises  where a manufacturing process as defined in clause (k) of Section 2 of the Factories Act 1948 was being carried on.   He  submitted that this showed that the provisions  of the Factories Act were being incorporated into the Workmen’s Compensation Act.  He submitted that this is also clear from the  fact  that over the years there have been a  number  of amendments  to the Workmen’s Compensation Act  incorporating therein provision of the Factories Act or provisions similar thereto.   He then referred to Section 2(k) and 2 (m) of the Factories Act and submitted that under the Factories Act the manufacturing process must be in a factory where ten or more workers  are working (if the manufacturing process is  being carried  on with the aid of power) or twenty or more persons are  working (if the manufacturing process is being  carried on  without  the aid of power).  He submitted that  a  joint reading of all these provisions makes it clear that even for the  purposes  of the Workmen’s Compensation Act only  those persons  who are employed in a factory within the meaning of the  Factories  Act, 1948 would be entitled to make a  claim under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

   We  are unable to accept the submissions of the  learned counsel.   It  is true that the Workmen’s Compensation  Act, 1923  has  been amended on a number of  occasions.   However inspite of numerous amendments the Legislature has purposely omitted  to specifically provide that only a workman who  is employed  in  a  factory, as defined in the  Factories  Act, could  make  a  claim.  All that has been done  is  that  in Schedule  II  of the Workmen’s Compensation Act it is  inter alia  clarified  that persons employed, otherwise than in  a clerical  capacity, in any premises wherein a  manufacturing process  as  defined  in  clause (k) of  Section  2  of  the Factories  Act,  1948,  are   workmen.   Significantly   the definition  of the term "Factory" as appearing in clause (m) of  Section  2  of  the  Factories Act  1948  has  not  been incorporated  in the Workmen’s Compensation Act.  Thus it is clear that for the Workmen’s Compensation Act to apply it is not  necessary  that  the  workman should be  working  in  a Factory  as defined in the Factories Act, 1948.  It has  not been  denied  that the workshop of the Appellant would  fall under  clause  (k)  of  Section  2  of  the  Factories  Act. Therefore,  the 1st Respondent would be a Workman within the meaning of the term as defined in the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

   Under  the circumstances, we see no merit in the Appeal. The same stands dismissed.  There will, however, be no order as to costs.