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PETITIONER: M. S. SHVANANDA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: KARNATAKA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT18/09/1979

BENCH: SEN, A.P. (J) BENCH: SEN, A.P. (J) FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA KAILASAM, P.S.

CITATION:  1980 AIR   77            1980 SCR  (1) 684  1980 SCC  (1) 149  CITATOR INFO :  F          1989 SC1614  (17)  RF         1991 SC1789  (4,6)

ACT:      Karnataka Contract  Carriages  (Acquisition)  ordinance 1976,   Cl.    20(3)   of   Karnataka   Contract   Carriages (Acquisition) Act  1976, Sections  19(3) and 31(2)-Scope and effect of-Contract carriages acquired-Whether employees have a vested right of absorption.      General Clauses  Act 1597  (X of  1897) S.  6-Repeal of Statute-Right acquired  or accrued  unaffected-Mere hope  or expectation of or liberty to apply for acquiring a right nor preserved.

HEADNOTE:      The   Karnataka    Contract   Carriage    (Acquisition) ordinance, 1976 was promulgated on January 30, 1976 with the object of  acquiring the contract carriages operating in the State. Sub-clause  (3 )  to cl. 20 of the ordinance provided for  absorption   of  certain  categories  of  employees  of contract  carriage   operators  in   the  service   of   the Corporation, and  the ratio for absorption for the different categories of  employees that  were entitled to be absorbed. On the  same day,  the State  Government made an order under sub-cl. (I)  to cl.  20 of  the ordinance  transferring  the contract carriages  that vested  in the  State Government to the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation.      This  ordinance   was  subsequently   replaced  by  the Karnataka Contract  Carriages (Acquisition)  Act, 1976 which was published  in the  Gazette dated  March  12,  1976.  The ordinance was  repealed by  the Act,  which  re-enacted  the provisions of  the repealed  ordinance, with a saving clause in sub-s. (2) of s. 31 for presentation of any thing done or any action  taken. The  Act  was  substantially  in  similar terms, except  for the  difference that the ratio prescribed by proviso  to sub-cl.  (3) to cl. 20 of the ordinance which laid down the categories of persons who could be absorbed in the service  of the  Corporation, was  substantially altered and a new ratio was inserted in the proviso to sub-s. (3) of s. 19  of the Act. Otherwise, sub-s. (3) of s. 19 of the Act and sub-cl. (3) to cl. 20 of the ordinance were identical in

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every respect.  Under the  Proviso to sub-cl. (3) to cl. 20, the  total  strength  of  the  employees  of  the  erstwhile Carriage operators  allowable for  absorption  was  7.9  per vehicle while  under the  proviso to  sub-s. (3) of s. 19 of the Act,  the ratio worked out to 4.45 per vehicle. Further, while under  the ordinance,  conductors were  entitled to be absorbed, the  ratio provided  under  the  Act  showed  that conductors were  not included  in the  categories of persons who could be absorbed in the service of Corporation.      The change  in the  ratio of  absorption from  7.9  per vehicle under.  sub-cl. (3)  to cl.  20 of  the ordinance to 4.45 per  vehicle under  sub-s. (3)  of s.  19  of  the  Act adversely affected  a  large  number  of  employees  of  the erstwhile  contract   carriage  operators   who  filed  writ petitions in the High Court, 685 challenging the  vires of the proviso to sub-s. (3) of s. 19 of the Act, which dismissed the writ petitions.      In the  appeal and the writ petitions to this Court the question for consideration was, whether the employees of the erstwhile  contract  carriage  operators  in  the  State  of Karnataka acquired  a vested  right  of  absorption  in  the service with  the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation under sub-cl.  (3) to  cl.  20  of  the  Karnataka  Contract Carriage (Acquisition) ordinance 1976.      Dismissing the appeal and writ petitions; ^      HELD: 1. The High Court rightly observed that there was neither anything  done nor  action taken and, therefore, the petitioners did  not acquire  any right  to absorption under sub-cl. (3) to cl. 20. [692 C]      2. The  ordinance promulgated  by the  Governor in  the instant case  was a  ’legislative act’ of the Governor under Art. 213(1) and, therefore, undoubtedly a temporary statute, and while it was still in force the repealing Act was passed containing the  saving clause in s. 31(2)(i) providing that, notwithstanding such  repeal, ’anything done’ or any ’action taken’ under  the repealed ordinance shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of the Act. [691 C-D]      3. In  considering the  effect of  an expiration  of  a temporary Act, it would be unsafe to lay down any inflexible rule. It  requires very clear and unmistakable language in a subsequent Act  of the legislature to revive or re-create an expired right. If, however, the right created by the statute is of  an enduring  character and  has vested in the person, that right cannot be taken away because the statute by which it was  created has  expired. In  order to  see whether  the rights and  liabilities under  the repealed  ordinance  have been put an end to by the Act, ’the line of enquiry would be not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities under  the repealed  ordinance  but  whether  it manifests an  intention to  destroy them.  Another  line  of approach may  be to  see as  to  how  far  the  new  Act  is retrospective in operation. [691 F-G]      State  of  Punjab  v.  Mohar  Singh,  [1955]  SCR  893,      referred to      4. (i)  Sub-s. (2) of s. 31 of the Act was not intended to  preserve  abstract  rights  conferred  by  the  repealed ordinance. The  legislature had  the competence  to  so  re- structure the  ordinance as  to meet  the exigencies  of the situation obtaining  after the  taking over  of the contract carriage services. It could re-enact the ordinance according to its  original terms,  or amend  or alter  its provisions. [692 A]

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    (ii) When the ordinance came to be replaced by the Act, the Corporation  felt that  the number  of employees  of the erstwhile contract  carriage operators was too large for its requirements. The  legislature,  therefore  stepped  in  and reduced the scale of absorption in the proviso to sub-s. (3) of s. 19 from 7.9 per vehicle to 4.45 per vehicle. [694G]      5. The  object of  s. 31(2)(i)  is to preserve only the things done  and action  taken under  the repeated ordinance and not  the rights  and privileges  acquired and accrued on the one side, and the corresponding obligation or liability 686 incurred on  the other  side, so  that if  no right acquired under the  repealed ordinance  was preserved,  there  is  no question of  any liability  being enforced. It is unlike the usual saving  clauses  which  presented  unaffected  by  the repeal, not  only things  done under  the repealed enactment but also the rights acquired thereunder. [693 C, D]      6. (i)  Every person  eligible for  absorption  had  to fulfil three  conditions, viz.,  (1) he  had to be a workman within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; (2) he should  have been, immediately before the commencement of the ordinance,  exclusively employed  in connection with the acquired property,  and (3)  he had to come within the ratio provided in  the proviso to sub-cl. (3) to cl. 20. The whole object of  inserting sub-cl.  (3) to cl. 20 of the ordinance was to  obviate the  unemployment of  persons  suitable  for employment,  for   which  purpose,   the   Corporation   had necessarily to screen the applicants. [693 G]      (ii) It  was only  if the  employee was  willing to  be absorbed  in   the  service  of  the  Corporation  that  the Corporation could  absorb him in service, provided the other conditions  specified  in  sub-cl.  (3  )  to  cl.  20  were satisfied. [694 E]      (iii) Thus  it is  clear that  several steps  had to be taken by  the authorities before identifying and determining the persons  who could  be absorbed  in the  service of  the Corporation, in accordance with sub-cl. (3) to cl. 20 of the ordinance, which  indicates that automatic absorption of the employees of  the erstwhile  contract carriage operators was not legally permissible. [694 F]      7. The  distinction between  what is  and what is not a right presented  by the  provisions of  s. 6  of the General Clauses Act.  is  often  one  of  great  fineness.  What  is unaffected by the repeal of a statute is a right acquired or accrued under it and not a mere ’hope or expectation of’, or liberty to apply for acquiring a right. [692 G]      Director of  Public Works  v. Ho Po Sang, [1962] 2 All. ER 721 PC, referred to.      8. The Act substitutes a ’new’ proviso in sub-s. (3) of s. 19  in place  cf the old proviso to sub-cl. (3) to cl. 20 of the  ordinance, altering  the whole  basis of absorption. The new  proviso is  given a  retrospective effect,  and  it holds the  field from  the notified  date i.e.,  January 30, 1976. The  proviso in  subcl. (3)  to cl.  20 laying  down a particular ratio  of absorption,  is pro tanto avoided by an express enactment  of a ’new’ proviso to sub-s. (3) of s. 19 which is entirely inconsistent with it. When an ordinance is replaced by an Act which is made retrospective in operation, anything done  or any action taken under the ordinance stand wholly effected. [695 C]      9. (i)  The employees  of the  former contract carriage operators in  normal course  filled in  the pro forma giving their service  particulars and reported to duty. This was in the mere  ’hope or  expectation’ of  acquiring a  right. The submission of  these ’call reports’ by the employees did not

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subject  the   Corporation  to   a  corresponding  statutory obligation to absorb them in service. [692 C]      (ii) The  meeting  of  the  Committee  set  up  by  the Government for  laying down  the principles  for equation of posts and  for determination  of inter-sc  seniority, met on June 2, 1976. The Committee decided that even in the 687 case of helpers-cleaners, there should be a ’trade test’ and the staff  cleared by  the Committee for the posts of helper ’B’, helper  ’A’ and  assistant artisans  should be  on  the basis of  their technical  competence,  experience,  ability etc. The  Committee also decided that all other employees of contract  carriage   operators,  who   were   eligible   for absorption, should  be interviewed by that Committee for the purpose of  absorption on  the basis  of experience, ability duties and  responsibilities. These norms were not laid down till  June   2,  1976  Till  their  actual  absorption,  the employees of  the erstwhile  contract carriage operators had only an inchohate right. [692 E-F]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2411 of 1978.      Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and  order dated 26-7-1978 of the Karnataka High Court in Writ Petition No. 10203/ 77.                             And      ORIGINAL JURISDICTION:  Writ Petitions  Nos. 4473-4474, 4415, 4488, 4528, and 4539 of 1978.      (Under Article 32 of the Constitution). D      G. B. Rikar, K. R. Nagaraja and Mrs. Gayathri Balee for the Petitioner (In WP. 4473-4474, 4488, 4539/78).      R. B.  Datar and Navin Sinha for the Petitioner (In WP. 4415 and 4528 and for-Appellant in CA 2411/78).      V. A.  Sayield Mohammad  and N. Nettar for the State of Karnataka and  for Respondent No. 3 in WPs. 4473-4474, 4488, 4528 and 4539 and C.A. 2411/78.      L.  N.   Sinha,  Attorney  General,  K.  K.  Venugopal, Additional Solicitor  General, V.  A.  Sayied  Mohammad  and Vineet Kumar  for Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation (in All W.P.s & C.A.).      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      SEN, J:-This appeal, by special leave, directed against a judgment  of the  Karnataka High Court dated July 26, 1978 and  the   connected  petitions   under  Art.   32  of   the Constitution, raise  a common question. It would, therefore, be convenient to dispose them of by this common judgment.      The short  question involved in these cases is, whether the employees  of the  erstwhile contract carriage operators in the  State  of  Karnataka  acquired  a  vested  right  of absorption  in   service  with   the  Karnataka  State  Road Transport Corporation  under sub-cl.  (3) to   cl. 20 of the Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) ordinance 1976. 688      It will  be convenient  to refer  in the first place to the legislative  changes. On  January 30, 1976 the Karnataka Contract  Carriages   (Acquisition)  ordinance,   1976   was promulgated by  the Governor  of Karnataka  under cl. (1) of Art.  213  of  the  Constitution.  The  said  ordinance  was promulgated with  the object of acquiring contract carriages operating in  the State  and for  certain matters  connected therewith. On  the same  day, i.e.,  on January 30, 1976 the State Government issued a notification under cl. 4(1) of the

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ordinance vesting  every contract carriage owned or operated by such  contract carriage  operator, along  with permit, in the State  Government absolutely free from all encumbrances. On the  same day,  the State  Government made an order under sub-cl. (1)  to cl. 20 of the ordinance transferring all the contract carriages that vested in the State Government under the notification  issued under  sub-cl. (1)  to cl. 4 of the ordinance, to the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred  to as  ’the Corporation’). Sub-clause (3) to  cl. 20  of the  ordinance provided for absorption of certain  categories   of  employees   of  contract  carriage operators  in  the  service  of  the  Corporation.  It  also provided the  ratio for  absorption for different categories of employees  that were  entitled  to  be  absorbed  in  the service of the Corporation.      The  ordinance   was  subsequently   replaced  by   the Karnataka Contract  Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976, Which was  published  in  the  gazette  on  March  12,  1976.  The ordinance was  repealed by  the Act,  and it  re-enacted the provisions of  the repealed  ordinance, with a saving clause in sub-s. (2) of s. 31, for preservation of anything done or action taken.  The Act  was substantially  in similar  terms except for  the difference  that  the  ratio  prescribed  by proviso to  sub-cl. (3)  to cl.  20 of  the ordinance, which laid down the categories of persons who could be absorbed in the service  of the  Corporation, was  substantially altered and a new ratio was inserted in the proviso to sub-s. (3) of s. 19  of the Act. Otherwise, sub-s. (3) of s. 19 of the Act and sub-cl. (3) to cl. 20 of the ordinance were identical in every respect.  Under proviso  to sub-cl. (3) to cl. 20, the total strength  of the  employees of  the erstwhile contract carriage operators  allowable for  absorption  was  7.9  per vehicle, while  under proviso  to sub-s. (3) of s. 19 of the Act the  same works  out to 4.45 per vehicle. Further, while under the ordinance conductors were entitled to be absorbed, the ratio  provided under  the Act shows that conductors are not included  in  the  categories  of  persons  who  can  be absorbed in the service of the Corporation. 689      It appears  that  although  as  many  as  785  contract carriages were A notified for acquisition, only 601 vehicles were  actually   acquired.  The   change  in  the  ratio  of absorption from  7.9 per vehicle under sub-cl. (3) to cl. 20 of the  ordinance to 4.45 per vehicle under sub-s. (3) of s. 19 of the Act adversely affected a large number of employees of the erstwhile contract carriage operators. A large number of writ  petitions were,  therefore, filed in the High Court challenging the  vires of the proviso to sub-s. (3) of s. 19 of the  Act on  various grounds,  but by  the judgment under appeal the  High Court  has repelled  all  the  contentions. Thereafter, the remaining writ petitions were all withdrawn.      The appeal  is against  the judgment  of the High Court and the  employees have  also directly  approached the Court under Art. 32.      Before dealing  with the  contention  advanced  in  the appeal, it  is necessary to set out the relevant provisions. Sub-clause (3) to cl. 20 of the ordinance read as follows:           "20.(3) Every  person who  is a workman within the      meaning of  the Industrial  Disputes Act, 1947 (Central      Act 14  of 1947)  and has  been immediately  before the      commencement of  this ordinance exclusively employed in      connection with  the acquired  property, shall’, on and      from the  notified date,  become  an  employee  of  the      corporation on the same terms and conditions applicable      to the  employees holding  corresponding posts  in  the

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    corporation. Any  person not  willing to become such an      employee  of  the  corporation  shall  be  entitled  to      retrenchment compensation as provided in the Industrial      Disputes Act:           Provided that  the number  of workmen  that  shall      become employees  of the  corporation under  this  sub-      section shall  not  exceed  the  following  scale,  the      junior most being excluded:- - -----------------------------------------------------------                                      Scale per vehicle ------------------------------------------------------------ 1. Drivers . . . . . . . .                  1.5 2. Conductors . . . . . . .                 2.65 3. Supervision . . . . . .                  0.125 4. Higher Supervision staff and Managers .  0.075 5. Ministerial and Secretariat staff . . .  0.8 6. Technical staff including Foreman . . .  2.75 ------------------------------------------------------------ 690      Sub-section (3)  of s.  19 of  the Act,  which replaced sub-cl. (3) to cl. 20 of the ordinance, provides:           "19.(3) Every  person who  is a workman within the      meaning of  the Industrial  Disputes Act, 1947 (Central      Act 14  of 1947)  and has  been immediately  before the      commencement  of   this  Act  exclusively  employed  in      connection with  the acquired  property, shall,  on and      from the  notified date,  become  an  employee  of  the      corporation on the same terms and conditions applicable      to the  employees holding  corresponding posts  in  the      corporation. Any  person not willing to’ become such an      employee  of  the  Corporation  shall  be  entitled  to      retrenchment compensation as provided in the Industrial      Disputes Act.      Provided that  the number  of workmen that shall become employees of  the Corporation  under this  sub-section shall not exceed  the  following  scale,  the  junior  most  being excluded:- ----------------------------------------------------------                                        Scale per vehicle ---------------------------------------------------------- 1. Drivers . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . .      1.5 2. Supervision staff and managers . . . .      0.1 3. Ministerial and Secretariat Staff. . .      0.1 4. Technical staff including foreman. . .      2.75                                         ------------------                                                4.45" ----------------------------------------------------------      The saving clause to be found in sub-s. (2) of s. 31 of the Act, so far as material, runs thus:      "31 (2) Notwithstanding such repeal:-      (i) anything  done or  any action  taken under the said      ordinance, shall  be deemed  to have been done or taken      under the corresponding provisions of this Act."      It is  strenuously argued  that it  is clear  from  the language of  subcl. (3)  to cl.  (20) of  the ordinance that there was,  by operation of law, automatic absorption of the employees of  the erstwhile  contract carriage  operators to the extent  provided therein  with effect  from January  30, 1976, the  date on  which the  notification was issued under sub-cl. (1)  to cl.  4 and  the date on which the Government made an  order under  sub-cl. (1) to cl. 20. It is submitted that  the   words  "shall   become  an   employee   of   the Corporation", ill  sub-cl. (3)  to  cl.  20  are  clear  and unambiguous and they must result in the consequence that all persons employed in connection with the acquired

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691 contract carriages,  became employees of the Corporation. It is said  A that,  though the  process of absorption may take time, as  and when  the necessary steps were taken to fit in such employees  falling within  the categories  mentioned in the proviso  to sub-cl.  (3) to  cl.  20,  their  absorption relates back to the notified date, i.e. January 30, 1976. In other words,  the submission  was that  the legal  effect of absorption of such’ employees under sub-cl. (3) to cl. 20 of the ordinance  is automatic.  That being  so, their right of absorption could  not be  whittled down  by  the  subsequent enactment of  the new  proviso to sub-s. (3) of s. 19 of the Act, inasmuch  as  they  had  acquired  a  vested  right  to absorption in  the ratio  mentioned in sub-cl. (3) to cl. 20 of the ordinance. C      The  ordinance  promulgated  by  the  Governor  in  the instant case  was a  ’legislative act’ of the Governor under Art. 213(1) and, therefore, undoubtedly a temporary statute, and while it was still in force the Repealing Act was passed containing the saving clause in s. 31(2) (i) providing that, notwithstanding such  repeal, ’anything done’ or any ’action taken’ under  the repealed ordinance shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of the Act. The  enquiry is,  therefore, limited  to  the  question whether anything was done or action taken under the repealed ordinance. If  that be  so, a further question arises on the submission whether  the words ’things done’ in s. 31 (2) (i) reasonably interpreted  can mean  not only  things done  but also the legal consequences flowing therefrom.      In  considering  the  effect  of  an  expiration  of  a temporary Act, it would be unsafe to lay down any inflexible rule. It  certainly requires  very  clear  and  unmistakable language in a subsequent Act of the legislature to revive or re-create an  expired right.  If, however, the right created by the statute is of an enduring character and has vested in the person,  that right  cannot be  taken away  because  the statute by which it was created has expired. In order to see whether  the  rights  and  liabilities  under  the  repealed ordinance have  been put  an end to by the Act, ’the line of enquiry would  be not whether’, in the words of Mukherjea J. in State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh(1), ’the new Act expressly keeps alive  old rights  and liabilities  under the repealed ordinance but whether it manifests an intention to ’ destroy them’. Another  line of approach may be to see as to how far the new Act is retrospective in operation.      It is settled both on principle and authority, that the mere right  existing under  the repealed  ordinance, to take advantage of  the pro- 11 visions of the repealed ordinance, is not a right accrued. Sub-section 692 (2) of  s. 31  of the  Act  was  not  intended  to  preserve abstract right  conferred by  the repealed  (ordinance.  The legislature  has  the  competence  to  so  re-structure  the ordinance  as  to  meet  the  exigencies  of  the  situation obtaining after  the taking  over of  the contract  carriage services. It  could re-enact  the ordinance according to its original terms, or amend or alter its provisions.      What were the ’things done’ or ’action taken’ under the repealed ordinance  ? The  High Court  rightly observes that there was  neither  anything  done  nor  action  taken  and, therefore, the  petitioners did  not acquire  any  right  to absorption under sub-cl. (3) to cl. 20. The employees of the former contract  carriage operators  in normal course filled in  the  pro  form  giving  their  service  particulars  and reported to duty. This was in the mere ’hope or expectation’

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of acquiring a right. The submission of these ’call reports’ by the  employees did  not  subject  the  Corporation  to  a corresponding  statutory   obligation  to   absorb  them  in service. As  a matter  of fact,  nothing was  done while the ordinance was  in force.  The Act was published on March 12, 1976. on May 29, 1976, the Corporation sent up proposals for equation of  posts to  be filled  in by the employees of the former contract  carriage  operators.  The  meeting  of  the Committee set  up by  the Government  for  laying  down  the principles for  equation of  posts and  for determination of inter-se seniority,  met on  June  2,  1976.  The  Committee decided that  even in  the case  of helpers-cleaners,  there should be  a ’trade  test’ and’  the staff  cleared  by  the Committee for  the  posts  of  helper  ’B’  helper  ’A’  and assistant artisans should be on the basis of their technical competence, experience,  ability  etc.  The  Committee  also decided  that  all  other  employees  of  contract  carriage operators who  were,  eligible  for  absorption,  should  be interviewed  by   that  p   Committee  for  the  purpose  of absorption on  the basis  of experience, ability, duties and responsibilities. These  norms were  not laid down till June 2, 1976.  Till their actual absorption, the employees of the erstwhile contract  carriage operators  had only an incohate right.      The distinction  between what  is, and  what is  not  a right preserved  by the  provisions of  s. 6  of the General Clauses  Act  is  often  one  of  great  fineness.  What  is unaffected by the repeal of a statute is a right acquired or accrued under it and not a mere ’hope or expectation of’, or liberty to  apply for,  acquiring a  right. In  Director  of Public Works  v. Ho  Po Sang(’) Lord Morris speaking for the Privy Council observed:      "It  may   be,  therefore,  that  under  some  repealed      enactment, a right has been given, but that, in respect      of it, some 693      investigation or  legal proceeding  is  necessary.  The      right is  then unaffected  and preserved.  It  will  be      preserved  even  if  a  process  of  quantification  is      necessary. But there is a  manifest distinction between      an  investigation   in  respect   of  a  right  and  an      investigation which  is to  decide whether  so to right      should be  or should  not be  given. On  a  repeal  the      former is  preserved by  the  Interpretation  Act.  The      latter is not." (Emphasis supplied) It must  be mentioned  that the object of s. 31(2) (i) is to preserve only  the things  done and  action taken  under the repealed  Ordinance,  and  not  the  rights  and  privileges acquired and  accrued on the one side, and the corresponding obligation or  liability incurred on the other side, so that if no  right  acquired  under  the  repealed  ordinance  was preserved, there  is no  question  of  any  liability  being enforced.      Further, it  is significant  to notice  that the saving clause that  we are  considering in s. 31(2) (i) of the Act, saves things  done while the ordinance was in force; it does not purport  to preserve a right acquired under the repealed ordinance. It  is unlike  the  usual  saving  clauses  which preserve unaffected  by the  repeal, not  only  things  done under the  repealed enactment  but also  the rights acquired thereunder. It  is also  clear that even s. 6 of the General Clauses Act,  the applicability of which is excluded, is not intended to  preserve the  abstract rights  conferred by the repealed Ordinance. It only applies to specific rights given to an  individual upon  the happening of one or other of the

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events specified in the statute.      Employees in  excess of  the scale  prescribed for  the categories specified under proviso to sub-s. (3) of s. 19 of the Act are clearly not entitled for absorption. Though sub- cl. (3)  to cl.  20 of the ordinance provided for absorption of certain  classes of  employees in a particular ratio with effect from  January 30, 1976, it does not follow that there was an  automatic absorption  as from  that date. Every such person  eligible   for  absorption   had  to  fulfill  three conditions, viz.,  (1) he  had to  be a  workman within  the meaning of  the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; (2) he should have  been   immediately  before  the  commencement  of  the ordinance,  exclusively  employed  in  connection  with  the acquired property,  and (3)  he had to come within the ratio provided in  the proviso to sub-cl. (3) to cl. 20. The whole object of  inserting sub-cl.  (3) to cl. 20 of the ordinance was to  obviate the  unemployment of  persons  suitable  for employment. For this purpose the Corporation had necessarily to screen the applicants.      It is necessary to mention that cl. 5 of the Ordinance, which corresponds  to s.  5 of  the Act, provided that every contract carriage 8-625SCI/79 694 operator shall  within 15  days from  the notified  date  or within such  further time as the State Government may allow, furnish to the State Government or any officer authorised by it in  this behalf,  complete particulars  among  others  of persons who  were in their employment immediately before the notified date.  It  was  only  after  such  information  was received that  steps had  to be  taken for  the  purpose  of ascertaining as  to who  were entitled to be absorbed in the service of the Corporation in accordance with sub-cl. (3) to cl. 20  of the  ordinance. The  authorities after collecting the necessary  information had  to determine  not  only  the corresponding posts  to which the erstwhile employees of the contract carriage operators could be absorbed in the service of the  Corporation but  also their  relative seniority, for the purpose of excluding the employees who were in excess of the scale for the purpose of absorption.      As sub-cl.  (3) to cl. 20 itself provides that a person who is  not willing to become an employee of The Corporation is entitled  to retrenchment compensation as provided for in the Industrial  Disputes  Act,  the  authorities  were  also required to  ascertain as  to whether  the employee, who was entitled to be absorbed in service, was willing to become an employee of  the Corporation  or not.  It was  only  if  the employee was  willing to  be absorbed  in the service of the Corporation  that   the  Corporation  could  absorb  him  in service, provided  the other conditions specified in sub-cl. (3) to  cl. 20 were satisfied. Thus it is clear that several steps had  to be taken by the authorities before identifying and determining  the persons  who could  be absorbed  in the service of  the Corporation,  in accordance with sub-cl. (3) to cl. 20 of the ordinance.      The  very  fact  that  all  these  Various  steps  were necessary to  be taken,  which necessarily takes time, shows that automatic  absorption of the employees of the erstwhile contract carriage  operators was  not  legally  permissible. When the  ordinance came  to be  replaced by  the  Act,  the Corporation  felt  that  the  number  of  employees  of  the erstwhile contract  carriage operators was too large for its requirements. The  legislature, therefore,  stepped  in  and reduced the scale of absorption in the proviso to sub-s. (3) of s. 19 from 7.9 per vehicle to 4.45 per vehicle.      This  is,   in  our   judgment,  sufficient   for   the

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determination of  the appeal. But, as we have formed a clear opinion on  the other  aspect, we do not hesitate to express that opinion.  That contention  is of  this  nature.  It  is pointed out  that the  employees of  the erstwhile  contract carriage operators  acquired vested  right to  absorption in the service of 695 the Corporation  by virtue  of sub-cl.  (3) to cl. 20 of the repealed ordinance  with effect from January 30, 1976, which cannot be  taken away by the proviso to sub-s. (3) of s. 19. Even if-contrary  to the  decision reached  by us,  it  were possible to hold that they had some kind of such right, that right is  expressly  taken  away  by  the  legislature.  The contention does not take note of the fact that by sub-s. (1) of s.  1 the  Act was  brought into  force with  effect from January 30,  1976, i.e., the date on which the ordinance was promulgated. The  Act substitutes  a ’new’ proviso in sub-s. (3) of  s. 1  in place  of the old proviso to sub-cl. (3) to cl. 20  of  the  ordinance,  altering  the  whole  basis  of absorption. The new proviso is given a retrospective effect, and it  now holds  the field  from the  notified date  i.e., January a  30, 1976.  The proviso  in sub-cl.  (3) to cl. 20 laying down  a particular  ratio of absorption, is pro tanto avoided by an express enactment of a ’new’ proviso to sub-s. (3) of s. 19 which is entirely inconsistent with it. When an ordinance is  replaced by an Act which is made retrospective in operation,  anything done  or any  action taken under the ordinance stand wholly effected.      In the result, the appeal as well as the writ petitions must fail  and are  dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. N.V.K.                    Appeal and Petitions dismissed. 696