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PETITIONER: M/S SHENOY AND CO. REPRESENTED BY ITS PARTNER BELE SRINIVASA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE COMMERCIAL TAX OFFICER ,  CIRCLE 11 BANGALORE AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT10/04/1985

BENCH: KHALID, V. (J) BENCH: KHALID, V. (J) DESAI, D.A. ERADI, V. BALAKRISHNA (J)

CITATION:  1985 AIR  621            1985 SCR  (3) 659  1985 SCC  (2) 512        1985 SCALE  (1)779  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1986 SC1440  (13)  F          1988 SC1353  (17)

ACT:      Declarative Judgment  ,   effect ,   and binding nature of-construction of India ,  1950 ,  Article 141 scope.      Writ of  mandamus ,   meaning of-Several writ petitions filed by. traders challenging the Constitutional validity of an Act  was allowed  by the  High Court by a common judgment but the  said judgment was set aside by the Supreme Court in the  only   one  State  appeal  preferred-Whether  the  said judgment of  the Supreme  Court will not be binding upon the writ petitioners on the plea Or non-filing of appeals by the State against their writ petitions.

HEADNOTE:      That Constitutional  validity of  the Karnataka  Tax on Entry of  Goods into  Local Areas  for consumption ,  use or sale therein  Act ,   1979  ,   which came  into force  with effect from  1 6.1979  was challenged  in the Karnataka High Court by  a large  number of  traders though a batch of 1590 writ petitions  including writ  petition No. 7039/79 by M/s. Hansa corporation  Bangalore.A Division  Bench of the Court, by a  common judgment dated 24.8.79 reported in ILR 1980 (1) Karnataka 165  allowed all  the writ  petitions  and  issued writs of mandamus against the State Government forbearing it from taking  any proceedings  under the  Act. The State took the matter  in appeal  in this  Court. However  ,   only one appeal was  filed ,  numbered as  3049 of  1979 against writ petition No. 170 39 of 1979 filed by M/s Hansa Corporation , impleading this  Corporation alone as respondent. This Court by its  judgment dated 25.9.80 which is reported in 1981 (1) SCR 823  , allowed  the appeal  ,  set aside the judgment of the Karnataka High Court and upheld the validity of the Act.      During the  pendency of  the civil  appeal No-  3049 of 1979 Governor  of Karnataka  enacted the  Karnataka  Tax  on Entry of Goods into a Local Area 660 for Consumption  ,  use or sale therein (Act 21) ,  Act 1980 with  retrospective   effect  from   8.6.80   removing   the infirmities in  the 1979  Act. After  the  judgment  of  the

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Supreme Court  in the  Hansa Corporation’s case the Governor of Karnataka  promulgated another ordinance ,  Ordinance No. 11 of 1980 on 25.10.1980 repealing the Entry Tax Act ,  1980 from its  inception with  certain other directions regarding adjustment  of  tax  if  any  paid.  This  was  followed  by Karnataka Tax  on Entry  of Goods into Local Areas ,  Use or Sale therein  Act ,   of 1981 ,  and Karnataka Act No. 10 of 1981 ,   repealing  the 1980  Act. however ,  did not repeal ordinance No.  11 of  1980. In  the meantime  ,    Karnataka Ordinance No.  3 of  1981 came into force which was followed by Karnataka Act 12 of 1981 I which repealed Ordnance No. II of 1980.  As a result of the combined operation of ordinance No. 3 of 1981 and Act No 12 of 1981 ,  the 1979 Act was made to be Operative but only from 1.10.80 and not from 1.6.79 as originally enacted      After the  judgment of  the  Hansa  Corporation’s  case upholding the  validity of  the 1979  Act ,  the authorities appointed under  the Act  ,  issued notices under the Act to all the  dealers including those who had filed writ petition earlier ,   calling  upon them  to register themselves under the Act ,  to file returns and to pay the amounts of tax due by them  under the  original Act  of 1979.  Aggrieved by the said notices  ,   the original  writ petitioners again filed writ petitions before the High Court of Karnataka contending that the  notices issued  to them were bad in as much as the writ of mandamus issued in their favour by the High Court in the earlier  judgment survived  and was  effective since  no state appeals  were performed  against  them  and  that  the judgment of  the Supreme  Court could  rescue the State from taking proceedings  only against  the Hansa  Corporation and not against  them. The  Statement this  contention with  the plea that  the judgment  of the Supreme Court was binding on all and no one could escape from it. The writ petitions were dismissed by  a single  judge holding  among other  things , that section 3 of the Act No 10 of 1981 revived the 1979 Act and that  action taken  against the  petitioners in the writ petitions was  ,   therefore ,   valid.  Appeals were  filed against the  judgment and  a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court  dismissed the  appellants holding that section 3 of the  re pealing  Act of  1981 re-enacted the 1979 Act and that ,   therefore  ,  the appeals were not well founded i 1 their challenge against the action taken by the State. Hence the appeals  by special  leave and also writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution.      Dismissing the  appeals and  the writ  petition ,   the Court ^      HELD: 1.1  The judgment  of the  Supreme Court in Hansa Corporations’ case  reported in  [1981] 1 SCR 823 is binding on all  concerned whether  they were parties to the judgment or not  To contend  that the conclusion therein applies only to the  partly before  the Supreme  Court is  to destroy the efficacy and  integrity of  the judgment  and  to  make  the mandate of Article 141 illusory. By setting aside the common judgment of  the High  Court ,   the  mandamus issued by the High Court  is rendered ineffective not only in one case but in all cases.[675; 673-H]      1.2 In  the instant  case ,   though  a large number of writ petitions  were filed  challenging the Act ,  all those writ petitions were grouped together ,  heard 661 together and  were disposed of by the High Court by a common judgment. No  petitioner advanced any contention peculiar or individual to  his petition  ,   not common to others. To be precise ,   the  dispute in the cause or controversy between

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the State  and each petitioner had no personal or individual element in  it or  anything personal  or  peculiar  to  each petitioner. The  challenge to the Constitutional validity of 1979 Act  proceeded  on  identical  grounds  common  to  all petitioners. This  challenge was  accepted by the High Court by a  common judgment  that was the subject matter of appeal before Supreme  Court in  Hansa Corporations’ case. When the Supreme Court  repealed  the  challenge  and  held  the  Act constitutionally valid  it in  terms  disposed  of  not  the appeal  in  Hansa  Corporation’s  case  alone  ,    but  all petitioners in  which the  High Court issued mandamus on the non existent  ground that  the 1979 Act was constitutionally invalid. Therefore  ,   to contend that the law laid down by Supreme Court  in that  judgment would  bind only  the Hansa Corporation and  not the  other petitioners against whom the State of  Karnataka had not filed any appeal ,  is to ignore the binding  nature of  a judgment  of Supreme  Court  under Article 141 of the Constitution. [673B-C)      1.3 A  mere reading  of Article  141 bring  into  sharp focus its  expanse and  its all  pervasive nature.  In cases like this  ,   where numerous petitions are disposed of by a common judgment  and only one appeal is filed ,  the parties to the  common judgment could very well have and should have intervened and  could have  requested the court to hear them also. They  cannot be  heard to  say that  the decision  was taken by  the Supreme  Court behind  their back  or  profess ignorance of  the fact  that an appeal had been filed by the State against the common judgment.[673B-C]      2. There  is no  inconsistency in  the finding  of  the Supreme Court  in Joginder’s  case and Makhanlal Waza’s case the ratio  Is  the  same  and  the  appellants  cannot  take advantage of  certain decisions  made by  this Court  in the earlier case. Both the decisions in Joginder’s and Makhanlal Waza’s case  lay down  identical  principles  and  there  is nothing to distinguish between the two. in the earlier case, the Supreme  Court  ,    on  its  facts  ,    overruled  the preliminary objection  that absence  of appeals  against the three petitioners  let out.  would  not  render  the  appeal before the Supreme Court incompetent ,  holding thereby that the effect  of decision  in that  appeal would be binding on the appellant  therein. In  the latter  case ,   the Supreme Court in unmistakable terms laid down that the law laid down in the  earlier  case  ,    namely  ,    Triloknath’s  case, applied even  to those  who were  not parties  to the  case. These two  decisions were  given by two Constitution Benches of the  Supreme Court ,  the fact that Joginder Singh’s case was not  noted by  the Bench  that decided  Makhanlal Waza’s case does not create any difficulty. The two decisions ,  on the principles  laid down  by them  ,  speak the same voice, that is the law laid down by the Supreme Court is binding on all ,  notwithstanding the fact that it is against the State or a  private party and that it is binding on even those who were not parties before the court ,      State of  Punjab v. Joginder Singh. [1963] 2 Suppl. SCR 169- Makhanlal  Waza v.  J &  K. State.  [1971]  3  SCR  832 discussed and followed. 662          OBSERVATION:      In the  fitness of things ,  it would be desirable that the State Government also took out publication in such cases to alert  parties bound  by the judgment ,  of the fact that an appeal  had been  preferred before Supreme Court by them. Here the  State Government  cannot be  find fault  with  for having filed  only one  appeal. It  is ,   of  course ,   an economising  procedure. [673C-D]

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    3.1 A  writ or  an order  in the nature of mandamus has always been  understood to  mean a  command issuing from the Court ,   competent  to do  the same  ,  to a Public servant amongst others  ,   to perform which leads to the initiation of action.      3.2 In  this case  ,  the petitioners-appellants assert that the mandamus in their case was issued by the High Court commanding the authority to desist or forbear from enforcing the provisions  of an Act which was not validity enacted. In other words  ,   a writ  of mandamus was predicated upon the view that  the  High  Court  took  that  the  1979  Act  was constitutionally invalid.  Consequently the  Court  directed the authorities under the said Act to forbear from enforcing the provisions  of the  Act qua the petitioners; The Act was subsequently declared  constitutionally valid by the Supreme Court. The Act ,  therefore ,  was under an eclipse ,  for a short duration;  but with  the declaration of the law by the Supreme Court  ,   the temporary  shadow cast  on it  by the mandamus disappeared  and the  Act revived with its full the constitutional invalidity held by the High Court having been removed by  the judgment of the Supreme Court. If the law so declared invalid is held constitutionally valid ,  effective and binding  by the Supreme Court ,  the mandamus forbearing the authorities  from enforcing  its provisions would become ineffective and  the  authorities  cannot  be  compelled  to perform a  negative duty.  The declaration  of  the  law  is binding on everyone. And therefore ,  the mandamus would not survive in favour of those parties against whom appeals were not filed. [774B-E]      3.3 Further  ,  assuming that the mandamus in favour of the appellants  survived not  withstanding the  judgment  of this Court  ,   the normal procedure to enforce the mandamus is to  move the  court in  contempt when the parties against whom mandamus  is  issued  disrespect  it  and  if  contempt petitions are  filed and  notices are  issued to  the State, the States’  obvious answer  will be  a reference to Article 141 and  taking protection thereunder. No Court can punish a party for  contempt under these circumstances ,  because the mandamus issued  by the  High Court  becomes ineffective and unenforceable when  the basis  on which it has issued falls, by the  declaration by  the Supreme Court of the validity of 1979 Act. [674E; G-H]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 2263 to 2268 of 1984.      From the Judgment and Order dated 2nd April ,  1982, of the High Court of Karnatka in Writ Appeal Nos. 662 to 667 of 1982. 663      Writ Petition  Nos. 394-405  of 1984. (under Article 32 of the constitution).      K. Srinivasan  ,   Raghvendra Rao  ,   V. Kumar for the Appellants. in the C.A. Nos. 2263-68 of 1984.      R.P. Bhatt  ,   Swaraj Kaushal  for the  Respondents in C.A. Nos. 2263-68 of 1984. B      Krishnamani ,   Lalit  Kumar Gupta ,  Subash Dutt , K.K Pargal and  Pankaj Kalra  ,   for the Petitioner in W.P. No. 391-405/84.      K.L. Sharma  ,   S.L. Benadikar and M. Veerappa for the Respondents in W.P. No. 394-405/84. C      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by           KHALID , J. The above appeals ,  by special leave,

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are directed  against the  common  Judgment  rendered  by  a Division Bench  of the  Karnataka High  Court in writ appeal Nos. 662-668 of 1982. In the writ petitions ,  the prayer is to strike  down Section  7 of  Karnataka Act No. 13 of 1982, Sections 2  and 3  of Karnataka Act No. 10 of 1984 and for a writ of  mandamus to  restrain the  State of  Karnataka from enforcing the said provisions against the Petitioners in the writ petitions.  This Judgment  will dispose  of the appeals and the writ petitions.      2. The facts ,  in brief ,  necessary to understand the genesis of the cases are as follows:      Consequent upon the abolition of octroi by the State of Karnataka ,   which  was the  main source of revenue for the local bodies  ,  the said State enacted the Karnataka Tax on Entry of  Goods into  local areas  for Consumption ,  use or salt therein  Act ,   1979 (for short the 1979 Act) in order to augment  the resources of the local bodies. This Act came into force  with effect  from 1.6.1979  on which date it was gazetted.      3.A batch  of 1590  writ petitions  were field  in  the Karnataka  High   Court  by   a  large   number  of  traders challenging the  constitutional validity  of this  Act. Writ Petition No  ,   7039 of  1979 was  one of them which was by Messrs Hansa Corporation ,  Bangalore. These writ petitions, on reference  by a  learned Single  Judge ,  were heard by a Division Bench ,  which by a common 664 Judgment dated  24.8.1979(T) struck  down the Act ,  allowed the  writ petition  and issued writs of mandamus against the State Government  forbearing it  from taking  any proceeding under the  Act. The  State took the matter in appeal to this Court. However only one appeal was filed ,  numbered as 3049 of 1979  against writ  petition No.  7039 of  1979 filed  by Messrs Hansa  Corporation ,   in , pleading this Corporation alone as  respondent ,   This  Court by  its Judgment  dated 25.9.1980 allowed  the appeal  ,   set aside the Judgment of the Karnataka High Court and upheld the validity of the Act. This decision is reported in 1981 (1) S.C.R. 823.      4. While  Civil appeal  No. 3049  of 1979  was  pending before this  Court ,   the Governor of Karnataka promulgated the Karnataka  Tax on  Entry of  Goods into a Local Area for Consumption ,    use  or  Sale  therein  Ordinance  of  1980 (Karnataka Ordinance  No. 5  of 1980)  on 8.6.1980 providing for levy  of entry tax on registered dealers ,  removing the infirmities in  the 1979 Act ,  that were pointed out by the High Court in its Judgment while striking down the Act. This ordinance was  replaced by  Act No.  21 of  1980  giving  it retrospective effect  from 8-6.1980  ,    the  date  of  the ordinance .      5. After  this Court rendered its Judgment in the Hansa Corporation case  ,   the Governor  of Karnataka promulgated another ordinance  ,  Ordinance No. 11 of 1980 on 25.10.l980 re pealing  the Entry  Tax Act ,  1980 ,  from its inception with certain other directions regarding adjustment of tax if any paid.  This was  followed by  Karnataka Tax  on Entry of Goods into  Local Areas ,  Use or Sale therein (repeal) Act, of 1981 ,  and Karnataka Act No. 10 of 1981 ,  repealing the 1980 Act.  This Act  ,   however ,  did not repeal ordinance No. 11 of 1980. In the meantime ,  Karnataka Ordinance No. 3 of 1981  ,   came into force which was followed by Karnataka Act 12 of 1981 which repealed Ordinance No. 11 of 1980. As a result of  the combined operation of ordinance No. 3 of 1981 and Act  No. 12  of 1981.  the  1979  Act  was  made  to  be operative but  only from  1-10.1980 and  not from 1.6.1979 a originally enacted.

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            6 After the Judgment of this Court in the Hansa Corporation ease  ,  upholding the validity of the 1979 Act, the authorities  appointed under  the Act  ,  issued notices under the Act (1)- I.T.R. 1980 (1) Karnataka 165 665 to all  the dealers  including  those  who  had  filed  writ petitions  earlier   ,     calling  upon  them  to  register themselves under  the Act  ,  to file returns and to pay the amounts of  tax due  by them under the original Act of 1979. Aggrieved  by   the  said  notices  ,    the  original  writ petitioners again filed writ petitions before the High Court of Karnataka contending that the notices issued to them were bad inasmuch  as the writ of mandamus issued in their favour by the  High Court  in the earlier Judgment survived and Was effective since the State had not filed appeals against them ,   and that  the Judgment  of this  Court could  rescue the State  from   taking  proceedings  only  against  the  Hansa Corporation  and  not  against  them.  The  State  met  this contention with the plea that the Judgment of this Court was binding on  all and  no one  could escape  from it. The writ petitions were heard by a learned Single Judge. He dismissed them holding  ,  among other things ,  that Section 3 of the Act No.  10 of  1981 revived  the 1979  Act and  that action taken against  the petitioners  in the writ petitions ,  was therefore ,  valid.      7. Appeals  were filed against this Judgment.A Division Bench of  the Karnataka  High Court  dismissed  the  appeals holding that  Section 3  of the  repealing Act  of 1981  re- enacted the 1979 Act and that ,  therefore ,  the appellants were not  well founded in their challenge against the action taken by the State.      8. The  learned Single Judge and the Division Bench had to consider  the effect  of the  two decisions of this Court for deciding the questions argued before them. The decisions are the  State of  Punjab v. Joginder Sinnh(1) and Makhanlal Waza v.  J &  K’ State.(2) Strong reliance was placed by the petitioners on  Joginder Singh  , s  case and equally strong reliance by  the State  on  Makhanlal’s  case.  The  learned Single Judge and the Division Bench understood the principle enunciated in the two decisions differently. They were under the impression that the action taken by the State would have been invalid  ,   but for  the saving provision contained in the repealing  Act ,   notwithstanding the Judgment in Hansa Corporation’ case.      9. What  falls for  decision in  these appeals  is  the resolution of  the conflict between the approach made by the learned Single (l) [1963] 2 Suppl. S.C.R. 169. (2) [l971] 3 S.C.R. 832. 666 Judge and  the Division  Bench to  the two cases referred to above and to examine the ratio of the two decisions ,  since ,  in our opinion ,  these appeals can be disposed of on the short  ground   whether  the   Hansa  Corporation   Judgment validated the  action taken by the State We will now briefly set out the facts of the two cases:          In Juginder Singh’s case ,  four employees who were absorbed in  Government service  filed  four  separate  writ petitions  before  the  High  Court  of  Punjab  challenging certain executive  powers and  rules as  being violative  of Article 14  of the Constitution. All the four petitions were allowed by  the High  Court by  a common  order by which the rules challenged were struck down. The State of Punjab filed only one  appeal before this Court against this common order

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and that  against Joginder  Singh. At  the  hearing  of  the appeal ,   a  preliminary objection was raised on his behalf that the  appeal was  incompetent since  the State  had  not filed appeals  against the three other petitioners and that, therefore ,   any variation by this Court of the Judgment in the appeal would result in inconsistent decisions in respect of the same matter.      In Makhanlal’s  case ,  an order made by the Government of Jammu  and Kashmir providing for reservation of posts for certain communities  was challenged  before  this  Court  as violative of  Article 16  of the  Constitution.  This  Court accepted the  challenge and  invalidated the  promotions  of respondents 3  to 83  in that  case. By its Judgment ,  this Court directed  the State  Government  to  devise  a  scheme consistent with the constitutional guarantee for reservation of appointment  to posts and to pass appropriate orders. The State Government  instead of  complying with  the directions given by  this Court  ,  attempted to circumvent the same by continuing those whose promotions were invalidated ,  giving the posts a different name. The same petitioners again moved this Court  under Article 32 of the Constitution questioning the action  of the  State Government.  The State  Government justified its action contending that there were many persons who were  not parties  to the earlier writ petitions and who had been promoted prior to and/or subsequent to this Court’s decision and  that  they  were  not  bound  by  the  earlier Judgment. This contention was repelled by this Court. It was held that  the law declared by this Court was binding on the respondent State and its 667 Officers irrespective of the fact whether those who would be affected by its pronouncement were parties to the Judgment A or not.      10. Now  we will  see how  the learned Single Judge and the Division  Bench understood  the two  Judgments  of  this Court.      The  learned   Single  Judge   extracted  the  relevant portions from  Joginder Singh’s  case and  observed that the said Judgment  ,   according to  him ,    settled  two  firm propositions which in his words are as follows:      "(i) An appeal  filed against  only one  person, though      his writ petition was disposed of by common order along      with other  cases filed  by others  notwithstanding the      fact that  appeals arc  not filed  against some cases ,      would be competent: and      (ii) an order  made by  the Supreme  Court in such an a      appeal would  bind the  parties to appeal and would not      affect the  validity of  the order  made in  the  other      cases."      He ,   then  ,   distinguished that  case from the case before him by R stating thus:           "But that  is not the position in these cases. The      precise question that arises for determination in these      cases is  whether an  Act of Legislature struck down by      the High  Court on  certain grounds  is reversed by the      Supreme   Court    and   the   Act   declared   to   be      constitutionally valid  ,   thereafter a validation Act      is also passed rendering the Judgment of the High Court      in the  other cases  as ineffective ,  (sic). On that ,      the enunciation  made in Joginder Singh’s case does not      bear on the point and assist the Petitioner.. " ,      11. After  considering the  facts of  the Makhan  Lal’s case ,  the learned Single Judge observed thus           "This later enunciation by a larger Bench however,      without  noticing  the  earlier  decision  in  Joginder

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    Singh’s 668           case ,   in  unmistakable terms  ,  has ruled that      the declaration  made by it or enunciation made by it ,      is  binding  on  all  authorities  courts  and  persons      whether they are parties or not.           Shri Srinivasan  urged that  the above enunciation      in Makhanlal  Waza’s case was made by the Supreme Court      in  the   context  of  a  binding  order  made  against      Government and  not against  those who were not parties      to its  earlier order  and, therefore ,  the principles      stated in  that case  has no  principles stated in that      case has no application to the question that arises for      determination.           In my  view the attempt made by Shri Srinivasan to      distinguish the  enunciation made  in Makhanlal  Waza’s      case is without a d difference and has no merit at all.      The  enunciation   made  is   not  based  on  any  such      distinction and difference.           On the application of the principles enunciated in      Makhanlal Waza’s.  case it follows that the declaration      made by the Supreme Court in Messrs Hansa Carporation’s      case upholding  the validity  of the  Act is binding on      all Courts,  authorities and  persons in  the State  of      Karnataka notwithstanding  the fact  that the State had      filed only  one appeal and had not filed appeals in the      other cases.. "      From the  above discussion  ,  it would appear that the learned  Single   Judge  felt  that  Joginder  Singh’s  case indicated a different view.              12.  Now we  will see  how the  Division  Bench understood the  above propositions.  After  considering  the facts of  the case  and extracting  the relevant portions of this Court‘s  Judgments ,   the  Division Bench  observed as follows:           "In our  opinion ,   there  is no conflict between      the aforesaid  two decisions  of the  Supreme Court. As      rightly pointed  out by Shri Srinivasan ,  in Makhanlal      Waza’s case,  the decision. turned on the fact that the      direction in the earlier Judgment of the 669 Supreme Court  was made against the State Government and not against promotees  who were  not parties in the earlier writ petition. The  State Government  which was  a party  in  the earlier writ  petition ,   was  bound by the Judgment of the Supreme Court  therein and could not disregard the direction of the  Supreme Court  on the ground that the promotees were not parties  in the  earlier writ  petition.  Thus  ,    the decision of  the Supreme  Court in  Makhanlal Waza’s case is distinguishable on  facts. As  the  material  facts  of  the present cases are similar to those in Joginder Singh’s case, the law  laid down  by the  Supreme Court in that case ,  is squarely applicable to these cases."      From the  above conclusion  ,    it  appears  that  the Division Bench  felt that  the law  laid  down  in  Joginder Singh’s case  applied to  the appeals before it and that the decision of  the Supreme  Court in  Makhanlal  ’s  case  was distinguishable on  facts. As indicated above ,  the appeals were dismissed relying upon 1 Section 3 of the repealing Act of 1981.      13. We will now consider the submissions made before us with reference  to the above two decisions of this Court and examine the  correctness of  the  findings  entered  by  the learned Single  Judge and the Division Bench.      The main  thrust of  the submission made by the learned

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counsel for  appellants in these appeals is that the writ of mandamus issued  by the  High  Court  in  their  favour  was effective  since  the  Judgment  in  their  favour  was  not challenged by  filing  appeals  before  this  court.  It  is submitted that  the law  laid down by this Court would apply only against the Hansa Corporation ,  against whom alone the State had filed an appeal- In support of this contention the following passage  at page  177 in Joginder Singh’s case was relied upon:           "All the  four petitions  were delt  with together      and were  disposed of  by a  common  Judgment  so  that      relief according  to Joginder  Singh ,   the respondent      before us  ,   in Writ application No. 1559 of 1960 was      also granted  to the other three petitioners. The State      ,   however ,   has  preferred no  appeal  against  the      orders in the other three 670 petitions ,   and  Mr. Agarwal  ,   learned counsel  for the respondent ,   raises  the contention  that as the orders in the other  three petitions  have become  final ,   any order passed in this appeal at variance with the relief granted in the other  three petitions  would create inconsistent degree in respect  of the  same matter and so we should dismiss the present appeal  as incompetent.  We ,   however  ,  consider that this  would not be the legal effect of any order passed by this  Court in  this appeal and that there is no merit in this objection as a bar to the hearing of the appeal. In our opinion ,   the  true position  arising ,   if  the  present appeal by  the State  Government should  succeed ,  would be that the  finality of  the orders  passed in the other three writ petitions  by  the  Punjab  High  Court  would  not  be disturbed and  that those three successful petitioners would be entitled  to retain the advantages which they had secured by the  decisions in their favour ,  not being challenged by an appeal  being filed.  That however  ,  would not help the present respondent  ,   The respondent would be bound by our Judgment in this appeal and besides ,  so far as the general law is  concerned as  applicable to  everyone other than the three writ petitioners (who would be entitled to the benefit of the  decisions in their favour having attained finality), the law will be as laid down by this Court. We ,  therefore, overrule the preliminary objection. "      14. In  our opinion  ,  reliance on this passage by the appellants in  support of their contention is not justified. The only  question that  fell  to  be  decided  in  Joginder Singh’s case  was whether  the appeal filed by the State was competent in  the  adsence  of  appeals  against  the  other petitioners.  This   was  answered   by  the  Court  in  the affirmative as follows:           ".. We  ,  however ,  consider that this would not      be the legal effect of any order passed by the Court in      this  appeal  and  that  there  is  no  merit  in  this      objection as a bar to the hearing of the appeal."      It is this observation that disposes of the preliminary objec- 671 tion and  the finding  of the  Court on  this  objection  is contained in  the above passage. The sentences that followed ,   relating to  the effect of the orders passed by the High Court in  the other three writ petitions can only be treated as obiter  and  therefore  cannot  be  relied  upon  by  the appellants to  press a  case that  the law  declared by this Court in Hansa Corporation’s case did not bind them. B      15. The same principle is laid down in Makhanlal Waza’s case. In  that case  ,   the  State  of  Jammu  and  Kashmir

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attempted to  circumvent the  law declared  by this Court in Trilok Nath  and another  v.  State  of  Jammu  Kashmir  and others(1) by  which  the  State  policy  of  reservation  to certain communities  was declared bad by this Court with the plea that  the vice of that Judgment operated only so far as the parties  to the  Judgment was  concerned and not against those who  were not parties thereto. This Court repelled the contention and held as follows:           ".. As  regards the  other respondent teachers who      did not figure in the earlier petition ,  they were all      promoted to  the gazetted cadre prior and subsequent to      the previous  decision in  complete defiance of the law      laid down  by this Court. Such a course has been sought      to be  justified on  the tenuous  ground that they were      not parties  to the  previous  petition  and  therefore      their cases would not be governed by the decision given      in that  petition. It  may be observed immediately that      such a  position is  wholly untenable and misconceived.      The Judgment which was delivered did not merely declare      the  promotions  granted  to  the  respondents  in  the      petition   filed    at   the    previous    Stage    as      unconstitutional  but  also  laid  down  in  clear  and      unequivocal terms that the distribution of appointments      ,   posts or  promotions made  in implementation of the      communal policy  was  contrary  to  the  constitutional      guarantee of  Articie 16.  The law  so declared by this      Court was  binding on  the  respondent  State  and  its      officers and  they were  bound to  follow it  whether a      majority of the present respondents were parties or not      to the previous petition."              16.  In our opinion ,  both these decisions lay down identical (1) [1969] I S.C.R. 103. 672 principles and  there is  nothing to distinguish between the two. In  the earlier  case ,   this  Court ,  on its facts , overruled the  preliminary objection that absence of appeals against the  three petitioners  left out ,  would not render the appeal  before this Court incompetent ,  holding thereby that the  effect of  the decision  in that  appeal would  be binding on the appellant therein. In the latter case ,  this Court in unmistakable terms laid down that the law laid down in the  earlier case  ,   namely  ,    Triloknath’s  case  , applied even  to those  who were  not parties  to the  case. These two decision were given by two Constitution Benches of this Court. We find that Joginder Singh’s case was not noted by the  Bench that  decided Makhanlal Waza’s case. This does not create  any difficulty.  As we  have already held ,  the two decisions  ,   on the  principles laid  down by  them  , speak the  same voice  ,  i.e. that the law laid down by the Supreme Court  is binding on all ,  notwithstanding the fact that it  is against the State or a private party and that it is binding  on even  those who  were not  parties before the Court. Since  it is  necessary to  make the  position of law clear and  free from  ambiguity ,   we  would  set  out  our reasons for our conclusion clearly.      17. Though  a large number of writ petitions were filed challenging the Act ,  all those writ petitions were grouped together ,   heard together and were disposed of by the High Court by  a common  Judgment.  No  petitioner  advanced  any contention peculiar  or individual  to his  petition ,   not common to  others. To be precise ,  the dispute in the cause or controversy  between the State and each petitioner had no personal or individual element in it or anything personal on peculiar  to   each  petitioner.   The  challenge   to   the

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constitutional validity  of 1979  Act proceeded on identical grounds  common  to  all  petitioners.  This  challenge  was accepted by  the High  Court by a common Judgment and it was this common  Judgment that  was the subject matter of appeal before this  Court in  Hansa Corporation’s  case.  When  the Supreme Court  repelled  the  challenge  and  held  the  Act constitutionally valid  ,   it in  terms disposed of not the appeal  in  Hansa  Corporation’s  case  alone  ,    but  all petitions in  which the  High Court  issued mandamus  on the none existent  ground that the 1979 Act was constitutionally invalid. It  is ,  therefore ,  idle to contend that the law laid down by this Court in that Judgment would bind only the Hansa Corporation and not the other petitioners against whom the State of Karnataka had not filed any appeal. To do so is to ignore  the binding  nature of  a Judgment  of this Court under Article 141 of the Constitution. 673 Article 141 reads as follows: A           "The law  declared by  the Supreme  Court shall be      binding on all courts within the territory of India "      A mere  reading of this Article brings into sharp focus its expanse and its all pervasive nature. In cases like this ,   where numerous  petitions are  disposed of  by a  common Judgment and  only one appeal is filed ,  the parties to the common  Judgment  could  very  well  have  and  should  have intervened and  could have  requested the Court to hear them also. They  cannot be  heard to  say that  the decision  was taken by this Court behind their back or profess a ignorance of the  fact that  an appeal  had been  filed by  the  State against the common Judgment. We would like to observe that , in the  fitness of  things ,  it would be desirable that the State Government  also took out publication in such cases to alert parties  bound by  the Judgment ,  of the fact that an appeal had  been preferred  before this Court by them. We do not find  fault with  the State  for having  filed only  one appeal. It is ,  of course ,  an economizing procedure.      18. The Judgment in the Hansa Corporation case rendered by one of us (Desai , J.) concludes as follows           "As we  are not  able to  uphold l the contentions      which found favour with the High Court in striking down      the impugned Act and the notification issued thereunder      and as  we find no merit in other contentions canvassed      on behalf of the respondent for sustaining the Judgment      of  the  High  Court  ,    this  appeal  must  succeed.      Accordingly ,   this appeal is allowed and the Judgment      of the  High Court  is quashed  and set  aside and  the      petition filed  by the  respondent in the High Court is      dismissed with costs throughout."      To contend  that this  conclusion applies  only to  the party before  this Court  is to  destroy  the  efficacy  and integrity of the Judgment and to make the mandate of Article 141 illusory.  By setting  aside the  common Judgment of the High Court  ,   the mandamus  issued by  the High  Court  is rendered ineffective not only in one case but in all cases. 674          19.A writ or an order in the nature of mandamus has always been  understood to  mean a  command issuing from the Court ,   competent  to do  the same  ,  to a public servant amongst others  ,  to perform a duty attaching to the office ,   failure to  perform which  leads to  the  initiation  of action. In  this case  ,   the petitioners-appellants assert that the mandamus in their case was issued by the High Court commanding the authority to desist or forbear from enforcing the provisions  of an  Act which was not validly enacted. In other words  ,   a writ  of mandamus was predicated upon the

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view that  the  High  Court  took  that  the  1979  Act  was constitutionally invalid.  Consequently the  court  directed the authorities under the said Act to forbear from enforcing the provisions  of the  Act qua the petitioners. The Act was subsequently declared  constitutionally valid by this Court. The Act  ,  therefore ,  was under an eclipse ,  for a short duration; but  with the declaration of the law by this Court ,    the  temporary  shadow  cast  on  it  by  the  mandamus disappeared and  the Act revived with its full figure ,  the constitutional invalidity held by the High Court having been removed by  the Judgment  of  this  Court.  If  the  law  so declared invalid is held constitutionally valid ,  effective and binding by the Supreme Court ,  the mandamus for bearing the authorities  from enforcing  its provisions would become ineffective and  the  authorities  cannot  be  compelled  to perform a  negative duty.  The declaration  of  the  law  is binding on everyone and it is therefore ,  futile to contend that the  mandamus would  survive in favour of those parties against whom appeals were not filed.      20.  The   fallacy  of   the  argument  can  be  better illustrated by  looking  at  the  submissions  made  from  a slightly different angle. Assume for arguments sake that the mandamus   in    favour   of    the   appellants    survived notwithstanding the  Judgment of  this Court.  How  do  they enforce the  mandamus ?  The normal procedure is to move the Court in contempt when the parties against whom man damus is issued disrespect it. Supposing contempt petitions are filed and notices  are issued  to the State. The State’s answer to the Court  will be: "Can I be punished for disrespecting the mandamus ,   when  the law of the land has been laid down by the Supreme  Court against  the mandamus issued ,  which law is equally  binding on  me and  on you  ?". Which  Court can punish a  party for contempt under these circumstances ? The answer can  be only  in the  negative because  the  mandamus issued by the High Court becomes ineffective 675 and unenforceable  when the  basis on  which it  was  issued falls ,   by  the declaration by the Supreme Court ,  of the validity of 1979 Act.      21. In  view of  this conclusion  of ours  ,  we do not think it  necessary to  refer to  the other arguments raised before the  High Court and which the learned counsel for the appellants attempted  to raise  before us  also. The appeals can be  disposed of  on this  short point  stated above. The Judgment of  this Court  in the  Hansa Corporation’s case is binding on  all concerned  whether they  were parties to the Judgment or  not. We  would like to make it clear that there is no inconsistency in the finding of this Court in Joginder Singh’s case  and Makhanlal  Waza’s case.  The ratio  is the same and  the appellants  cannot take  advantage of  certain observations made by this Court in Joginder Singh’s case for the reasons indicated above.      22. In  the writ  petitions the  challenge  is  against Section 7  of Act  No. 10  of 1981  and they contain certain other prayers  also. We  do not  think it  necessary to deal with the  contentions raised  in them  since it  would be an unnecessary exercise ,  in view of the revival of the parent Act of 1979 by the Judgment of this Court.      23. In the result ,  the appeals and the writ petitions are dismissed  with costs;  cost quantified  at Rs. 2,000 in each case. S.R.                          Appeals & Petitions dismissed. 676

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