http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 5  

CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 89-90  of  1999

PETITIONER: RAJA RAM MAIZE PRODUCTS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: INDUSTRIAL COURT OF M.P. & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       21/03/2001

BENCH: S. Rajendra Babu & S.N. Variava

JUDGMENT:

L...I...T.......T.......T.......T.......T.......T.......T..J [With  C.A.Nos.92-93/99,  100-101/99,  94-95/99,  91/99, SLP(C) Nos.  14115/2000 & 14116/2000]

J U D G M E N T

RAJENDRA BABU, J. :

   Three  applications  under  Section   31(3)  read   with Sections  34  and  61  of   the  Madhya  Pradesh  Industrial Relations  Act, 1960 [hereinafter referred to as the  Act] were  filed either on 12.4.1988 or 21.6.1988 by the  workers as per the list enclosed to the applications.  It is pleaded therein  that the appellant is not allowing them to do their job and the same should be held to be illegal, mala fide and unjustified  and  direct the appellant to allow them  to  do their  job forthwith and pay their wages for the period they were  not allowed to do their duty.  In the applications, it was alleged that on 22.8.1986 the appellant had filed a case [No.35/MPIR/1986] before the Labour Court, Durg praying that the  strike  resorted  to by the workers  with  effect  from 12.2.1986  may be held to be illegal and the workers may  be directed  to  resume  their  duties.  By an  order  made  on 1.3.1986,  the  Labour Court directed the workmen, who  were applicants  in  the  applications, to resume  their  duties. However,  the  appellant was not allowing them to join  duty though  the workmen had reported for duty, and was also  not paying any wages.  It was alleged that the appellant had not issued  charge sheet nor passed any order of termination  of their  services.   Thus the action of the appellant  in  not allowing  the  workmen  to  resume their  duties  is  wholly illegal,  mala fide and unjustified, which amounts to unfair labour practice and the same is also in contravention of the Standing  Orders and the Act.  A written statement was filed in  which  preliminary objections were raised to the  effect that  the  applications filed by the workmen are  barred  by limitation.   It  was asserted that the cause of action  for the  dispute,  if  at all, had arisen on 1.3.1986  when  the Labour  Court  had directed the workmen not to continue  the strike  and  to  resume the work and the workmen  sought  to resume work but the same having been refused, an application is filed in the year 1988.  The said application having been

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 5  

filed  beyond  two years from 1.3.1986 is clearly barred  by limitation  and  deserves  to be dismissed  on  that  ground alone.  On merits also, several pleas were raised with which we are not concerned for the present.

   The appellant examined 10 witnesses to support its case. None  of  the workmen who were applicants before the  Labour Court  examined  themselves.   However, they  examined  only witness   WW-1  Bhimrao  Bagde   whose  services  had   been terminated  long  back.  Evidence of  non-applicant  witness No.3,  Shamboo  Dayal Gupta was taken note of by the  Labour Court  to  the  effect that it is correct to say  that  the workmen  standing  outside the factory were asking  to  take Dushyant  Kumar  who had been placed under  suspension  from duty  and only then they would come for work only along with Dushyant Kumar.  The said witness also stated that the said Dushyant Kumar was found sleeping in the Mill during working hours  and  after issuing a charge sheet was prevented  from coming  to  duty.  The Labour Court found that on  12.2.1986 charge  sheet was issued to Dushyant Kumar and was prevented from  joining  duty,  which was the cause of  dispute.   For about  a month from 12.2.1986, the workmen were coming daily to  the  factory  gate shouting slogans and  preventing  the other  workers from coming to duty.  The Labour Court  found that the cause of action for the dispute arose from the time a  show  cause  notice  has been issued on  12.2.1986  to  a workman,  namely,  Dushyant  Kumar, who was  prevented  from entering  the  factory under the oral orders of the  Factory Manager.   Thereafter, it was found that the workmen had the legal  status to come to the factory and demand allowing  of the  said Dushyant Kumar to enter the factory and not having permitted them the cause of action for this matter arose yet again.   From 12.2.1986 for about one month, the workmen had been  coming daily at the factory gate and shouting  slogans and  had been preventing the other workmen coming for  duty. Thus even as late as April, 1989 they were making efforts to come  back for duty and thus there was a recurring cause  of action  for  them  to resume duty and, therefore,  the  time prescribed  under the Act neither started and nor ended  and thus  the  application filed by the workmen was  within  the period  of limitation.  The Labour Court after consideration of  the  merits  of the matter, by a common  award  made  on 1.6.1995,  allowed  partly  the  application  filed  by  the workmen  and directed the appellant to allow 155 workmen  to be  allowed to resume duty or if the workmen do not want  to join  duty,  to  pay a compensation of Rs.17,500/-  to  each workman  besides  costs  @  Rs.500/-  per  workman  however, without back wages.

   Appeals  were  preferred to the Industrial Court by  the appellant  and  by  workmen to the extent  of  denying  back wages.   The Industrial Court took the view that though  the workmen used to come to the gate of the mill they were still not  willing to do the work.  The Industrial Court proceeded to hold that the cause of action had arisen on 1.3.1986, the date  on  which the Labour Court declared the strike  to  be illegal  vide  its  order in petition No.   35/MPIR/1986  on 1.3.1986, when the workmen had a duty to resume the work and taking  that  date  for filing the appeal,  it  was  clearly barred by limitation under Section 62 of the Act and on that basis,  the  Industrial Court allowed the appeal, set  aside the order of the Labour Court and dismissed the applications of workmen.

   The  matter was carried further to the High Court.   The

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 5  

High  Court  found that the workmen were insisting on  their right  to  work  and had resorted to strike  demanding  that although Dushyant Kumar had been served with a charge sheet, he  should  be allowed with the other workmen to  enter  the factory  premises, while the stand of the employer was  that but  for Dushyant Kumar all other employees would be allowed to  join  their  work and duties and the  strike  be  ended. Proceeding on that basis, the High Court is of the view that the  recurring  cause  of action arose because as  and  when employees  reported  for  duty   they  were  prevented  from entering  the  factory.  The High Court allowed  the  appeal filed  by  the workmen and set aside the order made  by  the Industrial  Court  and  restored that of the  Labour  Court. Hence these appeals by special leave.

   Two special leave petitions have been filed  one by the workmen  who have been appointed during the pendency of  the proceedings  before the courts and are fresh recruits  while there is another special leave petition filed by the workmen who  have been reinstated pursuant to the order made by  the Labour  Court since they have been appointed in the factory, they should be continued in service.

   Mr.   P.P.Rao, the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the  appellant in C.A.Nos.89-90/99, submitted that the  view taken  by  the High Court on the question of  limitation  is erroneous.   He  submitted  that   the  starting  point  for limitation  is when Labour Court allowed an application  and gave  interim directions holding that the strike to be prima facie illegal and asked the workmen to withdraw the same and report  for  duty.  The period within which the  application should have been filed at any rate would have been two years from that date as provided under Section 62 of the Act.  Dr. Rajiv  Dhawan, the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellant  in C.A.Nos.92-93/99 and C.A.Nos.100-101/99,  also supported him on this aspect of the matter and in particular pointed  out  that the concept of recurring cause of  action would not arise in a case where the cause is complete on the date  when  the  action is commenced in a court  as  in  the present  case.   When  the  employer  refused  work  to  the employees  the cause of action was complete and question  of workmen  going  on  demanding work again and again  did  not arise.   On that basis, he contended that the view taken  by the  Labour  Court  and the High Court  is  erroneous.   Mr. Yogeshwar  Prasad, the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the  respondents,  submitted  that in this case  the  Labour Court  and the High Court have correctly held that there  is no  bar  of limitation and the period of limitation had  not commenced  at  all  when the action was  instituted  by  the workmen  particularly when examined in the light of the fact that  there  was no order of termination of the services  of the  workmen  nor was there any abandonment of work  by  the workmen from any particular date.

   In  our view, the Labour Court, the Industrial Court and the High Court have proceeded on a misapprehension of facts. As  noticed  earlier, the whole case put forth on behalf  of the workmen before the courts below is that the appellant is not  taking  the  workmen  to duty  though  they  have  been reporting  for  duty.   The action of the appellant  in  not allowing  the workmen to resume their duty gives rise to the dispute  in  respect of which application before the  Labour Court is filed.  It is to redress this grievance the workmen had  approached  the Labour Court.  Even as noticed  by  the Labour Court, the dispute in this regard between the parties

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 5  

started  from  the time when the charge sheet was issued  on 12.2.1986  to  Dushyant  Kumar as to why he  should  not  be suspended  at  8  a.m.   and  from  12.2.1986  when  he  was prevented from entering the factory under the oral orders of the  Factory  Manager while the workmen asserted  that  they along with Dushyant Kumar should have been permitted to join duty.   This  aspect  was commented upon by  the  Industrial Court as not amounting to any willingness on the part of the workmen  to  do  their work.  There is some  dispute  as  to whether  the  order made by the Labour Court on 1.3.1986  is binding  on all the parties, as to that application only  29 persons  had been impleaded as parties though the words all other workmen were also added.  In the relief portion also, the  prayer  is confined only to 29 workmen.   However  that aspect  of  the  matter  need not  detain  us  because  even according  to the workmen, as indicated in their application filed by them, it is clear that they understood the order of the  Labour  Court  to  be one made in respect  of  all  the workmen.   It appears that thereafter they started demanding that  they should be given work.  Otherwise, the period when the workmen had been refused work goes back to the date when they  deemed  to  resume work with Dushyant  Kumar  who  was prevented  from  resuming work.  It is only thereafter  they were  also  not  allowed  to join duty.   When  the  workmen themselves  understood  the order of the Labour Court  dated 1.3.1986  as  directing  them  to resume  their  duties  and thereafter though they have reported for duty, they have not been  allowed  to join their duty, the application filed  in each  of  these  cases  is beyond the period  of  two  years mentioned in Section 62 of the Act from 1.3.1986.

   The aspects considered by the courts below whether there was abandonment of work by the workmen or termination of the services  of  the  workmen are not all germane to  the  main issue  at all.  The courts have unnecessarily travelled at a tangent missing the essence of the matter.

   Now  we  have  to see as to whether the case  put  forth before  the courts falls under which of the clauses provided under  Section  62  of  the  Act.   The  largest  period  of limitation  prescribed therein is two years and in cases  of termination  of services and other incidental matters lesser period  of limitation has been prescribed.  Therefore,  even taking  that  two years period from the date of the  dispute either  taking the date on which when they were refused work when  they  made a demand that they should be allowed to  do work  with  Dushyant Kumar or when they made a demand  after the order made by the Labour Court on an interim application directing them to resume work or calling off the strike, the applications  filed  are  beyond the  period  of  limitation prescribed under Section 62 of the Act.

   The  concept  of recurring cause of action arising in  a matter  of  this  nature  is difficult  to  comprehend.   In Balakrishna  Savalram  Pujari  Waghmare & Ors.   vs.   Shree Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan & Ors., AIR 1959 SC 798, it was noticed  that a cause of action which is complete cannot  be recurring  cause of action as in the present case.  When the workers  demanded that they should be allowed to resume work and  they  were  not allowed to resume work,  the  cause  of action  was  complete.  In such a case the workers going  on demanding  each  day to resume work would not arise at  all. The  question  of  demanding  to allow to do  work  even  on refusal does not stand to reason.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 5  

   In that view of the matter, we think that the High Court and  the  Labour Court fell into an error in  analyzing  and understanding  the matter.  In this view, we think the  view taken  by the Industrial Court to the extent that the  cause of  action had commenced at any rate on 1.3.1986 is correct. Reckoning  from  that date, the period of limitation of  two years had been over by the time the applications were filed.

   However,  Mr.   Yogeshwar Prasad sought to put forth  an argument  that under Section 61 of the Act the powers of the Labour  Court  are set out which enable the Labour Court  to deal  with aspects of the matter to give various reliefs  to the  parties  and one of them is to require any employee  to withdraw  a strike which is held to be illegal and for  that particular  relief  there  is no prescription of  period  of limitation.   He submitted that in fact the workers had gone on strike and they had to withdraw the same after holding it to  be  illegal and, therefore, they had a cause of  action. We  are afraid this submission is plainly misconceived.  The workmen  cannot  seek  for a relief against  themselves  for withdrawal  of strike by asking the Labour Court to hold  it to  be illegal and direction for resumption of duty.  On the other hand, the case clearly put forth by the workmen in the application is that the cause of action is that the employer is  not allowing the workmen to resume duty.  Thus we are of the view that this contention is untenable.

   Various  other  aspects  of the  matter  were  addressed before  us and several decisions were referred to in support of  their respective contentions, but in our view  reference to any one of them is unnecessary in the view we have taken.

   C.A.Nos.89-90/99,           C.A.No.92-93/99          and C.A.Nos.100-101/99,  therefore, stand allowed and the  order made  by  the  High  Court setting aside the  order  of  the Industrial  Court and restoring that of the Labour Court and the  application  filed  by the workmen  before  the  Labour Court,  shall  stand dismissed.   Consequentially,  C.A.Nos. 91/99  and 94- 99/99 shall stand dismissed and the  question of  entertaining  the special leave petitions or giving  any reliefs  in those cases will not arise in these proceedings. SLP (C) Nos.  14115/2000 and 14116/2000 shall stand disposed of as they have become unnecessary.  In the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs.