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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 11768  of  1996

PETITIONER: M/S.  PARK LEATHER INDUSTRY (P) LTD.  & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF U.P.  & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       14/02/2001

BENCH: V.N.Khare, S.N.Variava

JUDGMENT:

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     J U D G M E N T

     S.  N.  VARIAVA, J.

     This  Appeal  is against a judgment dated  10th  July, 1996.   By  this judgment a number of Writ  Petitions  filed before  the  Allahabad High Court have been dismissed.   The Petitioners  in  all  the  Writ  Petitions  were  doing  the business  of  preparing  tanned and finished  leather.   The question  involved  in  all the four Petitions  was  whether ’tanned leather’ can be subjected to Uttar Pradesh Mandi Fee payable  under the provisions of U.P.  Krishi Utapadan Mandi Adhiniyam,  1964  (hereinafter for the sake  of  convenience called the said Act).  For an understanding of this question it  is necessary to see Section 2 (a) of the said Act  which reads as follows :  "’Agricultural produce’ means such items of   produce  of   agriculture,  horticulture,  viticulture, apiculture,  sericulture, pisciculture, animal husbandry  or forest  as  are  specified  in the  Schedule,  and  includes admixture  of  two or more of such items, and also  includes any  such item in processed form, and further includes  Gur, Rab, Shakkar, Kandsari and jaggery".

     Schedule  G  of  the  said   Act  deals  with  "Animal Husbandry".   Serial No.  11 thereunder includes ’hides  and skins’.   The  question  which had been raised in  the  Writ Petitions  and  which  is raised here is  whether  the  term ’hides  and  skins’ includes ’tanned leather’.  Mr.   Sudhir Chandra  has  submitted  that admittedly  the  term  ’tanned leather’  has  not  been used either in the Act  or  in  the Schedule.   He admits that under Section 2(a), not just  the items  which have been specified in the Schedule but also an admixture of two or more such items or any of those items in a  processed  form,  would also be included.   He,  however, submits that tanned leather is not ’hide or skin’ and is not derived  by  processing ’hide’ or ’skin’.  He  submits  that ’tanned  leather’  is a manufactured commodity.  He  submits that  "tanned  leather" is an entirely  different  commodity

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from  ’hide’  or ’skin’.  In support of his contention  that ’tanned  leather’  is a different commodity from ’hide’  and ’skin’  he relies upon a Judgment of the Constitution  Bench of  this  Court  in the case of A Hajee  Abdul  Shakoor  and Company  v.   State  of Madras reported in 1964  (8)  S.C.R. 217.   In this case the Petitioners were dealers in skins in the  State of Madras.  They purchased raw skins from  places both  within  and outside the State of Madras, tanned  those skins  and  sold them through their agents in Madras.   They were  assessed  to  sales tax under the  provisions  of  the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939 and under rules 16(2)(ii) of  the  Madras General Sales Tax (Turnover and  Assessment) Rules.   They filed the Petition under Article 32 contending that  Section  2  of the Madras General Sales  Tax  (Special Provisions)  Act,  1963  was ultra vires  the  Constitution. That  challenge  was upheld on the ground that Section  2(1) discriminated  against  imported hides and skins  and  local hides  and  skins.  It was however held that Rule 16(1)  did not  become  invalid because Rule 16(2) had been held to  be invalid.   Under  the Rules tax was levied on sale of  hides and  skins in raw condition but no tax was levied on sale of hides  and skins in tanned condition.  Therefore, the  Rules themselves made a distinction between hides and skins in raw condition  and hides and skins in tanned condition.  It  was contended  that  hides and skins whether tanned or  untanned constituted  one commodity and, therefore, there could be no tax  on sales of hides and skins in raw condition when there was  no tax on sale of hides and skins in tanned  condition. It  was  held that they were two different  commodities  and constituted   two  separate  categories   for  purposes   of taxation.   It  was  so held because the  two  were  treated differently in the Rules.  Reliance was also placed upon the authority  in  the  case of TVL K.A.K.  Anwar And  Co.   vs. State of T.N.  reported in 1998 (1) S.C.C.  437.  This again was a case under the T.N.  General Sales Tax Act, 1959.  The question  here  was whether raw hides and skins and  dressed hides  and  skins  were different  commodities.   The  Court following  the  decision  in A.  Hajee Abdul Shukoor  &  Co. (Supra)  held  that dressed hides and skins  were  different goods from raw hides and skins.  It may be noted that it was so  held in the context of the definition as given in Item 7 of  the Second Schedule of the said Act, which provided both for  raw hides and skins as well as dressed hides and skins. Thus the Act itself made a distinction between raw hides and skins and dressed hides and skins.  It is on that basis that the  Court held that they were not the same commodity.   Mr. Sudhir Chandra also placed reliance in the case of Rajasthan Roller  Flour  Mills Association and another vs.   State  of Rajasthan  and  others reported in AIR 1994 S.C.  64.   This was  a case under the Central Sales Tax Act and the question for  consideration was whether the term "Wheat", within  the meaning  of Section 14(i)(iii) of that Act, included "flour, maida  and suji" which were derived from Wheat.  It was held that  flour, maida and suji are different and distinct goods from  wheat.  It was held that flour, maida or suji were not included  in the Act and they would not fall within the term "Wheat" as defined in the Act.  It must immediately be noted that  the Act only contained the term "Wheat".  That Act did not  cover "Wheat" in its processed form.  It is because the Act did not cover "Wheat in a processed form" that the Court held  that  flour, maida and suji were not wheat.   Reliance was  also placed upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Edward Keventer Pvt.  Ltd.  vs.  Bihar State Agricultural Marketing  Board and Ors.  reported in 2000 (6) S.C.C.  264. In  this case the question was whether fruit drinks "Frooti"

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and  "Appy" fell within the term agricultural produce  under the  Bihar  Agricultural  Produce Markets Act,  1960.   This Court  held that even though these "Frooti" and "Appy"  were manufactured  out  of mango pulp and apple  concentrate  but after  the mango pulp and apple concentrates were  processed and  beverages  were  manufactured,   the  products  becomes entirely  different  from the fruits that is the  mango  and apple.   It was held that even though the basic character of the  mango  pulp  and apple concentrate may  be  present  in beverages,  but the end products were not fruits which  were specified  in the Schedule.  On this basis it was held  that the  products  like "Frooti" and "Appy" were not covered  by the  Item Agricultural produce as defined in Section 2(i)(a) of  that Act.  Mr.  Sudhir Chandra also relied upon the case of  M/s.  Saraswati Sugar Mills vs.  Haryana State Board and others  reported in AIR (1992) S.C.  224 for the proposition that  there  is  a   difference  between  ’manufacture’  and ’processing’.   In  this  case the question was  whether  an industry  which  manufactures  sugar  from  sugar  cane  was covered  by Entry 15 of Schedule I to the Water  (Prevention and  Control  of  Pollution) Cess Act, 1977.   The  relevant Entry  under which the industry was sought to be brought  in was  item  15  of Schedule I which reads as  "processing  of animal or vegetable products industry".  This Court held, in para  13, that the term ’processing’ as normally  understood would  mean  that  even after processing the  product  would retain  its  character.   The Court held  that  ’processing’ essentially  effectuates a change in form, contour, physical appearance   or  chemical  combination   or   otherwise   by artificial  or  natural  means.   The   Court  held  that  a ’manufacture’ implies a change but that every change was not ’manufacture’.   The  Court  held   that  for  ’manufacture’ something  more  was  necessary  and that there  must  be  a transformation  and  a new and distinct article must  emerge having  a distinctive name, character or use.  Based on this authority  it  was  submitted  that  tanned  leather  was  a different  article  and  a distinctive  commodity  having  a distinctive  name, character and use and that tanned leather was  a manufactured item.  In our view the authority  would, if  anything  be  against the  Appellants.   Tanned  leather retains its basic character namely, it remains hide or skin, though there is some change in form and physical appearance. Lastly  reliance was placed upon the case of Union of  India and another, etc.  v.  I.  Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd.,  etc.   reported in AIR (1963) S.C.  791.  This was  a case under the Central Excises and Salt Act and the question was  whether  the  Raw  oils which  were  purified  but  not deodorised  in  the process of manufacture of Vanaspati  was covered by the expression "non- essential vegetable oils" in Item 12 of Schedule I of that Act.  In this case it was held that  processing  cannot be equated to manufacture.  It  was held  that the word "manufacture" is generally understood to mean  as "bringing into existence a new substance" and  does not mean merely "to produce some change in a substance".  In our  view this authority would also show that in fact  there is  no manufacture but mere processing of hides and skins to bring  them  into  a  tanned state.  Based  upon  the  above authorities  Mr.   Sudhir  Chandra  submitted  that  ’tanned leather’ was not an ’agricultural produce’ inasmuch as it is a  different item or commodity from hide and skin and it  is an item which is not a processed form of hide or skin but an item  which is manufactured.  He submits that for the  above reasons  the Judgment of the High Court cannot be  sustained and  requires to be set aside.  As against this Mr.  Pradeep Misra submitted that definitions and meanings given in other

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Acts  or  in  the  context  of  other  Acts  can  be  of  no assistance.   He  submits  that  one  has  to  look  at  the provisions  of  the said Act itself.  He submitted that  the term ’agricultural produce’ had been given a wide meaning in Section  2 (a) of the said Act.  He points out that it is  a definition  which is not an exhaustive definition but is  an inclusive  definition.  He submits that any item would be an ’agricultural produce’ if it is specified in the Schedule or if  it is an admixture of two or more items specified in the Schedule  or  if it is a processed form of any of the  items specified  in the Schedule.  He points out that in U.P.  all Acts  are enacted in Hindi even though an equivalent English version is printed.  He points out that in the Hindi version the  terms  used  are ’Khal Va Chamra’.  He submits  that  a dictionary  meaning  of  the term ’Chamra’  is  leather  and therefore  the Hindi version clearly shows that leather  was meant  to  be  included.   He admits that  if  there  was  a conflict  between  an Hindi version and an  English  version then  by virtue of Article 384 of the Constitution of  India the English version would prevail.  He submits that if there is  no conflict, then the Hindi version can be looked at  in order  to determine any ambiguity or to find out if any item is  included or not.  In support of his submission he relies upon  the case of Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Kanpur & Ors. vs.   Ganga  Dal Mill and Co.  and Ors., etc.   reported  in 1984  (4) S.C.C.  516.  This was a case under the said  Act. The  question was whether ’Dal’ of legume is an agricultural produce  and therefore eligible to market fee.  In that case it  had  been argued, as in the present case, that as  ’Dal’ has not been specified in the Schedule and it was a distinct commodity  no  market fee could be levied.  This Court  held that to resolve a controversy of this nature one has to seek light  from  the  definition   of  expression  ’agricultural produce’  as set out in Section 2(a) of the Act.  This Court held that no resort can be taken to decisions under entirely different  statutes, such as the sales tax laws, to find out whether  the  product  were  same   or  two  different   and independent  products  commercially so recognised.   It  was held  that it was an indisputable canon of construction that where  an expression is defined in the statute, unless there is  anything  repugnant  in  the  subject  or  context,  the expression  had  to be construed as having the same  meaning assigned  to it in the dictionary clause of the statute.  It was held that ’Dal’ was nothing else but a whole grain split into   two  folds  in  its   processed  form   acquired   by manufacturing process and that was therefore an agricultural produce.   After  so  holding this Court held as  follows  : "14.   This  very  conclusion can be reached by  a  slightly different   route.   As  is   well-known,  the   legislative enactments  in  the State of U.P.  are enacted primarily  in Hindi language and its official and authentic translation in English  is simultaneously published.  Bearing this in mind, we  turn to the notification dated April 11, 1978 specifying legumes therein enumerated as specified agricultural produce for  various Market Areas.  The heading under which  various legumes are enumerated is ’Dwi Daliya Utpadan’.  This tongue twister  was  explained to us to mean that legume itself  is Dwi  Daliya  Utpadan  i.e., the whole grain is made  of  two folds.   Ek daliya grain is without a fold.  Dwi Daliya is a grain  composed  of two folds and certainly not many  folds. Concise Oxford Dictionary specifies the meaning of legume to be "fruit, edible part, pod, of leguminous plant;  vegetable used  for  food,"  and  ’leguminous’ to mean  "like  of  the botanical  family of pulse".  And in common parlance ’pulse’ connotes  legume  and  denotes  dal  of  legume.   Reverting

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however,  to the heading under which legumes are  enumerated in  1978 notification, it must be confessed that it  clearly connotes  the  meaning  to be given to the whole  grain  and denotes  dal  i.e.   split folds as  specified  agricultural produce.   The  Hindi protagonists used the expression  ’Dwi Daliya  Utpadan’ meaning thereby double folded grain  called Gram, Peas, Arhar, Moong etc.  on a strict construction, the two  dals  i.e.  two parts forming the whole grain both  are comprehended  in  the  expression   ’Dwi  Daliya   Utpadan’. Therefore,  it  is  crystal  clear  that  while  enumerating legumes  in  the  Schedule  and   reproduced  in  the   1978 notification  to  make them specified agricultural  produce, the  framers  intended to include both the grain as a  whole and  its  split  parts the dal.  And when  the  agricultural produce  enumerated  in the Schedule such as Gram  including its  processed part is reproduced in the notification as Dwi Daliya  Utpadan,  the  dal of each of  the  legumes  therein mentioned became specified agricultural produce."

     It  is thus to be seen that the Court derived  support for  its  conclusion by looking at the Hindi version of  the said  Act  on the ground that it was well known that in  the State of U.P.  enanctments were in Hindi language.  Reliance was  also placed upon the case of Rathi Khandsari Udyog  and Ors.   vs.  State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.  reported in  1985 (2)  S.C.C.  485.  This was also a case under the said  Act. The  question before the Court was whether ’Khandsari sugar’ manufactured  by  an  open pan process was  an  agricultural produce  within  the meaning of the said Act.  In this  case also  based upon a Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1966 and  U.P. Khandsari  Sugar Manufacturer’s Licensing Order, 1967,  both of which define ’khandsari sugar’ it had been contended that ’khandsari  sugar’  was a distinct and a separate  commodity from  ’khandsari’ as defined in Section 2(a) of the said Act and  therefore  no market fee could be levied on  ’khandsari sugar’.   This contention was negatived and it was held that ’khandsari’  was a genus and ’khandsari sugar’ was a species and in the market both were merely known as ’khandsari’.  It was  held that the word ’khandsari’ was wide enough to cover ’khandsari’  produced  by  any  process  regardless  of  its quality or variety.  It may be mentioned that a challenge to Section  2 (a) on the ground that it was discriminatory  and violative  of  Article 14 was also repelled.   Reliance  was also  placed upon the case of Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti  & Anr.  vs.  M/s.  Shankar Industries & Ors.  reported in 1993 Supp  (3) S.C.C.  361(II).  This again was a case under  the said  Act.  The question was whether ’gur-lauta’,  ’raskat’, ’rab- galawat’ and ’rab-salawat’ were ’agricultural produce’ under  the  said  Act.   In  this case  it  was  noted  that sugarcane was an agricultural produce out of which juice was extracted.   The juice was then thickened by dehydration and when  it  reached a particular pigment it took the  form  of ’rab’  which  is a semi-solid form of the  sugarcane  juice. After  boiling this ’rab’ was put in a crystalliser where it was  allowed  to get cooled and crystals were  formed  which were then rotated in the crystalliser.  The crystallised rab was  then put into centrifugal machines in which through the process  of  infusion  of sulphur, the sugarcane  juice  was cleaned  and whitened.  The ’rab’ which was not put into the centrifugal  machine but which was dehydrated and allowed to be  hardened by the open pan process became ’gur’, which was sold  for home consumption.  The ’rab’ which was not allowed to  be hardened was also sold in semi-solid form but certain persons  who  wanted to make further profits put this  ’rab’ into  centrifugal machines and by the process of infusion of

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sulphur    they   obtained    ’khandsari’    in   the    dry powder/crystallised  form  and the waste of ’rab’ which  was obtained in the liquid form known as ’molasses’.  ’Molasses’ was  further utilised by many people by boiling in the  open pans  and  the same was again re-processed by  cleaning  and dehydrating  and  later by sulphitation was taken in  powder form.   This  then was also sold in the market  as  inferior quality  called ’rab-galawat’.  It was held that there was a further  inferior quality of rab called ’rab-salawat’.   The contention was that ’gur-lauta’, ’raskat’, ’rab-galawat’ and ’rab-salawat’  were all different commodities which were not the  same as ’gur’ or ’rab’ and that therefore no market fee could  be levied on those commodities.  This Court held that a wide interpretation had to be given to Section 2(a) of the said Act as the meaning was exhaustive and not restricted to the  items included in the Schedule.  It was held that items which came into being in a processed form would be included. It was held that these items were ’agricultural produce’ and market  fee  could be levied on these items.   Mr.   Pradeep Misra  then relied upon the case of State of Tamil Nadu etc. vs.   Mahi Traders & Ors.  etc.  reported in 1989 (1) S.C.C. 724.   He  clarified that this was a case under the  Central Sales  Tax  Act and that he was not saying that  this  would therefore  be an authority for considering the definition of the  term  "agricultural  produce" under the said  Act.   He submitted that in this case certain opinions of the Ministry of  Commerce  and  Industry  as well as  glossary  of  terms published  by  the  Council  of  Scientific  and  Industrial Research  had been reproduced.  He stated that he was merely bringing  those portions of the judgment to the attention of the  Court.   In  this  behalf he showed to  the  Court  the paragraphs 6, 9, 10, 11 and 13, which read as follows :  "6. Turning to coloured leather, we may, at the outset, refer to a   very   important  circumstance   referred  to   by   the respondents.   When the CST Act came into force on April  1, 1957,  a  question was raised regarding the meaning  of  the expression  ’hides  and  skins  in dressed  state’  used  in Section  14.   The  matter  was   referred  to  the  leather development  wing  of the Ministry of Commerce and  Industry which gave the following opinion :

     Hides  and skins are obtained from either  slaughtered or  dead animals.  The raw hides and skins thus obtained are known   to  be  in  the   Green  State.   These  are  easily putrescible;  if proper precautions are not taken they would easily  rot  and  decay.   Since tanneries  are  not  always located  very  near the source of raw hides and  skins,  the question of preserving them for a temporary period till they reach  a  tanning centre assumes importance.  Raw hides  and skins  are  ’cured’  by either wet salting, dry  salting  or drying.   In  the  ’cured state’ the raw  materials  can  be preserved  for  a temporary period.  In the third  stage  of temporary  preservation, the hides and skins are  ’pickled’. During  the  next stage they are tanned in which state  they can  be  preserved almost indefinitely.  These tanned  hides and  skins are processed further to yield Dressed Hides  and Skins  which  are  ready  for use.   ’Dressed’  or  finished material could also be preserved almost indefinitely.

     From  the  above, it will be seen that the  expressing ’Hides  and skins in the raw or dressed state’ refers at one end  to  the raw material obtained from the  slaughtered  or dead  animals  and at the other to the tanned  and  finished material;   the expression, therefore, seems to include  the other   intermediate  stages  indicated   in  the   previous

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paragraphs.    Dressing,  according  to  the   authoritative interpretations,  would mean the conversion of tanned  hides and  skins  by further suitable processing into leathers  of different   types   which   are    ready   for   use   (vide SBT/18(495)/14) of November 11, 1957).

     9.   Can it then be said that the view expressed above is  clearly  wrong?  We think not;  on the contrary,  it  is seen  to be quite correct.  The statutory expression  refers to  "hides  and skins in a dressed state".   The  guidelines issued  for identification of ’finished’ leather for exports by  the Indian Standards Institution (ISI) refer to as  many as  19 operations or processes undergone during  manufacture of  ’finished leather’ but ’dressing’ is not one of them.  A glossary  of  terms  relating to hides,  skins  and  leather published  by  the  ISI  in   1960  contains  the  following definitions:

     CRUSTS:   (Crust  Leather)  - Tanned hides  and  skins without any finish.

     CURRYING:    A  series  of   dressing  and   finishing processes  applied to leather after tanning in the course of which   appropriate   amounts  of   oils  and  greases   are incorporated  in  the leather to give it  increased  tensile strength, flexibility and water resisting properties.

     DRESSED  HIDES:   Tanned hides, curried  or  otherwise finished, for various purposes, such as belting, harness and saddlery, travel goods and for upholstery.

     DRESSING LEATHER:  Vegetable tanned hides which may be dressed  to suit the purpose for which they are to be  used, such as for harness, saddlery and other mechanical purposes.

     LEATHER:   The  skin  or hide of animals  prepared  by tanning,  which still retains its original fibrous structure more  or less intact, but from which hair or wool may or may not have been removed and which has been treated so as to be imputrescible even after treatment with water.

     10.   The earlier glossary of such terms published  by the  British  Standard Institution defines ’dressing’  as  a "general  term  for  the  series of  processes  employed  to convert  certain  rough tanned hides and skins and/or  crust leather  into  leather ready for use".  Also,  "Leather"  is defined  as  "a  general term for hide or skin  which  still retains  its original fibrous structure more or less intact, and  which  has been treated so as to be imputrescible  even after  treatment  with water".  The hair or wool may or  may not  have been removed.  Certain skins, similarly treated or dressed,  and  without the hair removed, are  termed  ’fur’. The  Dictionary  of  Leather Terminology  published  by  the Tanners’  Council of America, describes leather as "the hide and  skin  of any animal or any portion of such  skin,  when tanned, tawed or otherwise dressed for use".

     11.   The above definitions show that hides and  skins acquire  the name of ’leather’, even if the hair or wool has not  been  removed therefrom, as soon as they  receive  some treatment  which  prevents  them   from  putrefaction  after treatment  with water.  Dressing is a stage much later  than tanning.  Indeed, from the definitions quoted above, it will be  seen that it is practically the same as giving finishing

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touches  to  the  leather  and making it  suitable  for  the manufacture of particular types of goods.

     13.   The same conclusion is further borne out by  the literature  referred  to  before  us  by  Sri  Ramachandran. Volume  7  of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, under  the  word "dress",  explains  that the verb has  various  applications which  can be deduced from its original meaning and that "it is  thus used not only of the putting on of the clothing but of  the  preparing and finishing of leather ".  Volume  17, under  the  head  "leather" details  the  various  processes applied  in the treatment of hides and skins at all  stages, pre-tanning,  tanning and post-tanning.  Dyeing or colouring is  a process which follows tanning but precedes "finishing: (i.e.   dressing)  in  order  to make it  suitable  for  the purpose which it is required in commercial usage.  Part V of the  "Wealth  of  India", a publication of  the  Council  of Scientific  and  Industrial  Research (1966),  dealing  with leather under "Industrial Products" explains that "hides and skins  are  liable to putrefaction and loss unless  suitably treated  and  converted into leather".  Structurally,  hides and  skins have a thick middle layer called corium, which is converted to leather by tanning.  The operations involved in leather  manufacture  however fall into three groups.   Pre- tanning  operations  includes soaking, liming,  de-  liming, bating  and  pickling,  and   post-tanning  operations   are splitting  and  shaving,  neutralising,  bleaching,  dyeing, fat-liquoring  and  stuffing, setting out, samming,  drying, staking  and  finishing.   These   operations  bring   about Chemical  changes in the leather substance and influence the physical  characteristics  of  the  leather,  and  different varieties  of  commercial leather are obtained  by  suitably adjusting  the  manufacturing operations.   These  processes need not be gone into in detail but the passages relied upon clearly  show that hides and skins are termed ’leather’ even as  soon as the process of tanning is over and the danger of their  putrefaction is put an end to.  The entry in the  CST Act,  however,  includes  within its scope hides  and  skins until they are ’dressed’.  This, as we have seen, represents the  stage  when they undergo the process of  finishing  and assume  a  form  in which they can be readily  utilised  for manufacture  of various commercial articles.  In this  view, it is hardly material that coloured leather may be a form of leather  or  may  even  be said  to  represent  a  different commercial  commodity.  The statutory entry is comprehensive enough to include the products emerging from hides and skins until the process of dressing or finishing is done."

     Mr.  Pradeep Misra submitted that tanned leather would be  covered  by  the definition of  the  term  "Agricultural produce"  as  defined  in  Section  2(a)  of  the  Act.   He submitted  that it was merely a processed form of "hide  and skin".   He  submitted  that  cases   relied  upon  by   the Appellants  were of no help as all of them were under taxing statutes  and were merely interpreting terms in the  context of  the  definitions  given  in  those  statutes.   We  have considered  the arguments of both the parties.  In our  view it  is clear that the interpretation has to be on the  basis of  the  expression  ’Agricultural produce’ as  set  out  in Section  2(a) of the said Act.  In so determining  decisions based on different statutes such as Sales Tax Laws can be of no  assistance.   All the cases relied upon by  Mr.   Sudhir Chandra  are  cases  under  the taxing  statutes  where  the interpretation  has been given on the basis of the terms  as defined in those statutes.  A perusal of Section 2(a) of the

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said  Act makes it clear that an agricultural product  would be a product which is specified in the Schedule or one which is admixture of two or more items and would also include any such  item  in  a processed form.  In our view it  makes  no difference,  for  the  purposes of the said  Act,  that  the concerned  item is a different commodity from the one  which is  included in the Schedule.  It is possible that by virtue of  an  admixture  of  two or more items  or  by  virtue  of processing  a  different  commodity or item  may  come  into existence.   Even though a different commodity may come into existence,  it  would  still be an  ’Agricultural  produce’. This  is best illustrated by Sugarcane which is in  Schedule A,  Item VIII at Serial No.  14.  From Sugarcane, "rab"  and "gur"   are  manufactured.   They   are  already   different commodities  or  items.   Yet they are  all  included.   The specific  inclusion  of  items   like  "gur,  rab,  shakkar, khandsari  and  jaggery"  is to make it  clear  that  merely because  it becomes a different item or commodity it is  not excluded.   We  see  no  reason to go  into  the  difference between  ’manufacturing’  and ’processing’.  In  the  strict sense  of the terms there may be a difference.  However,  we are  not  required to go into these differences as,  in  our view,  it  is very clear, from what has been set out by  the Appellants  themselves in their affidavit that for hide  and skin to be converted into leather or tanned leather all that is  required  is  a process.  It is a process  of  cleaning, curing  and adding preservatives.  That it is a process  has been  held by this Court in the case of State of Tamil  Nadu vs.  Mahi Traders and Others, etc.  (Supra).  We are also of the  view  that the finished product i.e.  ’tanned  leather’ even  though  it may have changed in physical appearance  or chemical  combination and even though it may commercially be a  different  item still remains a ’hide’ or a ’skin’.   For this  reason  we  are  of  the  opinion  that  there  is  no illegality  or infirmity in the judgment of the High  Court. Even  otherwise  our  above view is supported by  the  Hindi version  of the definition.  As has been set out in the case of  Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti (Supra), it is well known in U.P.   all legislations are in Hindi.  Of course an  English version  simultaneously published.  Undoubtedly if there  is conflict  between  the  two than the English  version  would prevail.   However,  if  there is no conflict then  one  can always have assistance of the Hindi version in order to find out  whether the word used in English includes a  particular item  or  not.   In  the  Hindi version  the  word  used  is ’Chamra’.   There  can be no dispute that the term  ’Chamra’ would  include ’leather’ in all its forms.  In this view  of the  matter  the  Appeal   stands  dismissed.   There  will, however, be no order as to costs.