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PETITIONER: GOKAK PATEL VOLKART LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: DUNDAYYA GURUSHIDDAIAH HIREMATH AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT14/02/1991

BENCH: SAIKIA, K.N. (J) BENCH: SAIKIA, K.N. (J) PUNCHHI, M.M.

CITATION:  1991 SCR  (1) 396        1991 SCC  (2) 141  JT 1991 (1)   376        1991 SCALE  (1)193

ACT:      Companies  Act,  1956-Section  630-Continuing  offence- Construction of-Court’s duty-.Legislative intention.      Companies Act,1956-Section 630-"Officer" or "employee"- Includes past and present officer or employee.      Criminal  Procedure Code, 1972-Section  472-"Continuing offence"-Construction and nature of-Limitation computation.      Companies  Act, 1956-Section 630(l)(b)-Non-vacation  of quarters   even   after  retirement-Continuing  offence  for the   purpose   of limitation.

HEADNOTE:      Appellant-Company   filed  criminal  complaints   under Section  630(l)(b),   Companies  Act and  Section  406,  IPC against  its  employees  (the  first  respondent  of    each appeal)   as  they  did  not  vacate  the  company  quarters after  about  six  months  even  after   retirement.     The Judicial Magistrate, First Class dismissed the complaints as the same were not filed  within  the  period  of  limitation of   six   months  from  the  date   of  retirement  of  the Respondents-employees.      The  High Court,holding that the offence under  Section 630(1) was not a continuing offence, dismissed the Company’s revision petitions.      In  the appeal to this Court on  the question,  whether the offence under Section 630(l)(b)  of  the  Companies  Act is    a    continuing   offence   for   the    purpose    of limitation,   allowing  the  Appeals   of  the    Appellant- Company, this Court,      HELD: 1. The beneficent provision contained in s.  630, no   doubt  penal,  has  been  purposely  enacted   by   the legislature with the object of providing a summary procedure for  retrieving  the property of the company: (a)  where  an officer or employee of a company wrongfully obtains                                                        397 possession  of  property  of  the  company,  or  (b)   where having  been placed in  possession  of  any  such   property during  the  course of his employment,  wrongfully withholds possession   of  it  after  the    termination    of     his employment.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  court  to  place  a broad    and   liberal construction  on  the  provision   in furtherence   of   the   object    and    purpose  of    the

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legislation   which   would  suppress   the    mischief  and advance   the remedy. [406B-E]      2."Officer" or "employee" in s.630 of the Companies Act includes both present and past officers and employees.[405B- C]      3.  The   concept  of  continuing  offence   does   not wipe   out   the   original  guilt,   but   it   keeps   the contravention   alive   day  by   day.   The   courts   when confronted  with  provisions  which  lay  down  a  rule   of limitation   governing   prosecutions   should   give    due weight  and consideration to the provisions of s.473 of  the Code  which is in the nature of an overriding provision  and according  to which, notwithstanding anything  contained  in the   provisions   of   Chapter   XXXVI   of   the  Code  of Criminal    Procedure  any court may take cognizance  of  an offence  after  the  expiration of a period  of  limitation, if, inter alia, it is satisfied that it is necessary  to  do so in the interest of justice. [409D-G]      4.   The   expression  ‘continuing  offence’   has  not been   defined  in   the  Code.   The  question  whether   a particular   offence  is  a  ’continuing  offence’  or   not must,therefore,necessarily  depend upon   the   language  of the statute  which  creates  that  offence,  the  nature  of the  offence  and the purpose intended  to  be  achieved  by constituting the  particular  act  as an offence. [409F-H]      5.The offence under section 630 is not such as  can  be said    to    have  consummated  once  for   all.   Wrongful withholding,   or  wrongfully   obtaining   possession   and wrongful application of the   company’s   property, that is, for  purposes  other  than  those  expressed   or   directed in  the articles  of  the  company  and  authorised  by  the Companies    Act,   can   not be said to be terminated by  a single   act  or  fact  but would  subsist  for  the  Period until  the   property  in  the   offender’s  possession   is delivered  up  or refunded. It is an offence committed  over a  span  of  time  and  the  last  act  of the offence  will control the commencement of the  period  of  limitation  and need be  alleged.  The  offence  consists  of  a  course  of conduct   arising from a singleness  of   thought,   purpose of   refusal   to   deliver  up  or  refund  which   May  be deemed a single  impulse. Considered from   another   angle, it  consists of a  continuous series of acts  which  endures after  the  period of consummation on refusal to deliver  up or refund the property. It is                                                        398 not an instantaneous offence and limitation begins with  the cessation of the criminal act, i.e., with the delivering  up or  refund  of  the  property. It will  be  a  recurring  or continuing  offence until the wrongful possession,  wrongful withholding or wrongful application is vacated or put an end to.  The  offence continues until  the  property  wrongfully obtained  or wrongfully withheld or knowingly misapplied  is delivered up or refunded to the company.  For failure to  do so sub-section (2) prescribes the punishment. [409H-410E]      6.  The offence under section 630 of the Companies  Act is  not one time but a continuing offence and the period  of limitation  must be computed accordingly, and when so  done, the  complaints  could not be said to have  been  barred  by limitation. [410D-F]      W.M.I. Cranes Ltd. v. G.G. Advani & Anr., [1984] 1 Kar. Law  Cronicle 462 overruled; Bhagirath Kanoria and  Ors.  v. State of Madhya Pradesh with Bahadur Singh v. Provident Fund Inspector  and Ors., A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1688 referred;  Baldev Krishna Sahi v. Shipping Corporation of India Ltd. and Anr., [1987] 4 S.C.C. 361; Amrit Lal Chum v.  Devoprasad Dutta Roy

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and  Anr.  etc.,  [1988] 2 S.C.R. 783;  State  of  Bihar  v. Deokaran  Nenshi, [19731 1 S.C.R. 1004; Bhagirath Kanoria  & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., [1985] 1 S.C.R.  626 followed.      Black’s   Law  Dictionary,  Eighth  Edition,   (Special Deluxe); Salmond and Heuston on the Law of Torts, 19th  Edn. Page 50; Halsbury’s Laws of England. 4th Edn.  Vol 45,  Para 1389-referred to.

JUDGMENT:      CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal  Nos. 97, 98, 99 100 & 101 of 1991.      From   the  Judgment  and  Order  dated  2.12.1989   of the  Karnataka  High Court in Criminal R. P. No.  458,  459, 460, 461 and 462 of 1989.      A.S.  Bobde,  Attorney  General,  Vinod  Bobde  and  S. Sukumaran for the Appellant.      G. Ramaswamy, K.N. Nobin Singh and Ms. Lalitha  Kaushik for the Respondents. M.Veerappa for the State of Karnataka.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      K.N. SAIKIA, J. Special leaves granted.                                                        399      These five appeals are from as many similar  orders  of the   High Court  of  Karnataka  at   Bangalore   dismissing the    appellant   company’s  criminal  revision   petitions impugning  the  respective  orders  passed  by the  Judicial Magistrate   First   Class,   Gokak   holding    that    the appellants’ complaints  against  the  respondents   alleging offence  under   section 630(l)(b) of the Companies  Act  by not vacating the Company’s quarters as required by it   even more    than   six   months   after   retirement    of   the respondents,  were  barred  by  limitation  and   the   same could  not be taken into consideration.      The  first  respondent  in  each   of   these  criminal appeals    was    appointed    on    1.8.1942,    11.6.1945, 24.11.1939,  1.5.1939 and   23.1.1937, respectively. in  the service  of  the  appellant  company  and  they  retired  on 14.3.1984,     1.10.1983,    12.2.1984,    4.10.1983     and 27.1.1981,   respectively,  from the   appellant   company’s service,   whereafter  each of them was required  to  vacate his  company’s  quarter.  Each having declined to vacate the company’s   quarter   even  more  than   six   months  after retirement,  despite  legal notice,  the  appellant  company filed  a private  criminal  complaint  under  s.   630(l)(b) of  the  Companies   Act,   1956   and  s.406 I.P.C. against each of them, before the  Judicial  Magistrate  First Class, Gokak  and  in  each  case,  after  inquiry   framed charges for  offences under s.  406  I.P.C.  and  s.  630(l)(b)   of the    Companies    Act,  1956.   The    learned    Judicial Magistrate,    after    prosecution    had    examined   its witnesses, recorded the statements of all the accused  under s.   313  of the Cr. P.C.  and  despite  finding  that   the accused   in   each  case  was  allotted a  quarter  by  the company   for  his  use  and  occupation  and  each  had  no authority  to  retain  possession of the   same   after   he retired,   and that the cause of action in each case   arose when   the  accused  failed  to deliver  possession  of  the quarter   to   the   company,   held  that   the   documents produced   by,  the  company  did  not   disclose   anything regarding  the retirement of the accused from  the  service, but   at   the  same  time  he  recorded  that  during   the course   of  evidence  P.W.  1 had  deposed  that  each   of the   accused   retired   from   service   and   immediately

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after  the retirement  failed  to  redeliver  possession  of the    company’s   quarter which  attracted   s.   630(l)(b) of   the  Companies  Act and   which   was  punishable  only with fine  and  the  complaint,  therefore, ought  to   have been   filed   within   six  months   from   the   date   of retirement    of   the  accused, and as the  complaint   was filed   only  during  the year  1985  it was clearly  barred by   limitation,  wherefore,  ,the complaint  could  not  be taken into  consideration,  and  consequently,  the  accused was   to  be acquitted.  The  Company’s  revision   petition therefrom  was    dismissed by the High Court  holding  that the   view  taken  by  the  trial  Magistrate was  plausible and  reasonable   as  the  complaint  was  filed   in   each case                                                        400 beyond  six months from the date of the alleged offence  and that the question, of limitation was concluded by a decision of the same High Court in W.M.I Cranes Ltd. v. G.G. Advani & Anr.,  [19841]  Kar.  Law Cronicle 462 wherein it  was  held that  the offence under s. 30 (1) of the Companies  Act  was not a continuing offence and the decisions of this Court  in Bhagirath  Kanoria and Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh  with Bahadur  Singh v. Provident Fund Inspector & Ors.  and  Raja Bahadur Singh v. Provident Fund Inspector and Ors., AIR 1984 SC 1688 would not be of any assistance to the petitioner.      Mr.  A.S. Bobde, the learned counsel appearing for  the appellant  company,  submits  that  the  offence  under   s. 630(1)(b) of the Companies Act, 1956 is a continuing offence and  the  learned  courts  below erred  in  holding  to  the contrary  and  dismissing the company’s  complaints  on  the ground of limitation.      Mrs.  Lalitha Kaushik, the learned counsel for each  of the first respondent, submits that when the first respondent upon his retirement failed to vacate and deliver  possession of the company’s quarter to the company, the offence must be taken  to  have been complete, and  thereafter  right  could accrue  to the first respondent by adverse  possession;  and that  if this state of affairs continued till completion  of the  period  of  limitation the  company’s  right  would  be extinguished.   The trial court as well as the  High  Court, according to counsel, rightly held that the offence was  not a continuing one.      The  only  question  to be decided  in  these  appeals, therefore, is whether the offence under s. 630(l)(b) of  the Companies  Act  is a continuing offence for the  purpose  of limitation.      What  then  is a continuing offence? According  to  the Blacks’  Law  Dictionary, Fifth  Edition  (Special  Deluxe), ’Continuing means "enduring; not terminated by a single  act or  fact;  subsisting for a definite period or  intended  to cover   or  apply  to  successive  similar  obligations   or occurrences." Continuing offence means "type of crime  which is  committed over a span of time." As to period of  statute of  limitation in a continuing offence, the last act of  the offence  controls  for  commencement  of  the  period.    "A continuing  offence,  such that only the  last  act  thereof within  the  period of the statute of  limitations  need  be alleged  in the indictment or information, is one which  may consist  of separate acts or a course of conduct  but  which arises  from that singleness of thought, purpose  or  action which may be deemed a single impulse." So also a ’Continuous Crime’ means "one consisting                                                        401 of  a  continuous series of acts, which  endures  after  the period  of  consummation,  as,  the  offence  of    carrying

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concealed   weapons. In the  case  of instantaneous  crimes, the   statute   of  limitation  begins  to  run   with   the consummation, while in the case of continuous crimes it only begins with the cessation of the criminal conduct or act."      The corresponding concept  of  continuity  of  a  civil wrong   is  to  be found in the Law of Torts.  Trespass   to land   in   the   English  Law  of   Torts  (trespass  quare clausum  fregit)  consists  in  the  act  of  (1)   entering upon  land  in the possession of the   plaintiff,   or   (2) remaining    upon    such   land,  or   (3)    placing    or projecting   any  object  upon  it-in  each  case    without lawful Justification.      Trespass  by remaining on land, as we read  in  Salmond and  Heuston   on  the  Law  of  Torts,  19th   Edn.,   page 50:  "Even  a  person  who has  lawfully  entered  on   land in  the  possession  of  another   commits   a trespass   if he   remains   there   after  his   right   of   entry   has ceased.   To  refuse or  omit  to  leave   the   plaintiff’s land   or  vehicle  is  as  much  a trespass  as  to   enter originally   without   right.  Thus  any   person   who   is present  by the leave and licence  of  the   occupier   may, as  a  general  rule, when the licence  has  been   properly terminated,   be   sued  or  ejected  as  a  trespasser,  if after  request  and  after  the  lapse   of   a   reasonable time  he fails to leave the premises."      Trespass   in  Law  of  Torts  may  be   a   continuing one.    The    authors write: "That  trespass  by   way   of personal   entry   is  a  continuing   injury,  lasting   as long  as  the  personal  presence  of  the  wrongdoer,   and giving  rise to actions de die in diem so long as it  lasts, is  sufficiently obvious.  It is  well   settled,   however, that  the  same  characteristic  belongs  in   law even   to those   trespasses  which  consist   in    placing    things upon    the plaintiff’s land. Such  a   trespass   continues until   it   has   been  abated  by the   removal   of   the thing   which  is  thus  trespassing;   successive   actions will  lie  from  day  to  day  until  it  is   so   removed: and  in  each  action damages (unless  awarded  in  lieu  of an   injunction)  are  assessed  only  up to the   date   of the   action.  Whether  this  doctrine  is  either   logical or  convenient  may  be  a  question,  but   it   has   been repeatedly  decided  to  be the law."      Again    if    the   entry   was   lawful    but     is subsequently     abused     and   continued    after     the permission   is  determined  the  trespass   may    be    ab initio.   In  1610  six  carpenters  entered   the   Queen’s Head  Inn,   Cripplegate,  and  consumed  a  quart  of  wine (7d.)  and  some  bread   (1d.),   for which  they   refused to  pay.  The  question  for   the   court   was   whether                                                        402 their  non-payment made the entry tortious, so as to  enable them to be sued in trespass quare clausum fregit.  The court held that: "When entry, authority or licence is given to any one  by  the  law,  and he doth abuse  it,  he  shall  be  a trespasser  ab  initio," but that the  defendants  were  not liable  as their non-payment did not constitute a  trespass. The rule is that the authority, having been abused by  doing a   wrongful   act   under  cover  of   it,   is   cancelled retrospectively   so  that  the  exercise  of   it   becomes actionable as a trespass.      In  Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn.  Vol. 45  para 1389 it is said:                "If  a person enters on the land  of  another           under  an authority given him by law,  and,  while           there,  abuses  the  authority  by  an  act  which

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         amounts to a trespass, he becomes a trespasser  ab           initio,  and may be sued as if his original  entry           were  unlawful.  Instances of any entry under  the           authority  of the law are the entry of a  customer           into  a  common inn, of a reversioner  to  see  if           waste  has been done, or of a commoner to see  his           cattle.                To make a person a trespasser ab initio there           must   be  a  wrongful  act  committed;   a   mere           nonfeasance is not enough."      Against  the above background, we may now  examine  the relevant provision of law, keeping in mind that Some of  the Torts have counterparts in Criminal law in India.      Section  441 of the Indian Penal Code defines  Criminal trespass as follows:                "Whoever enters into or upon property in  the           possession  of  another with intent to  commit  an           offence  or  to intimidate, insult  or  annoy  any           person  in possession of such property, or  having           lawfully  entered  into  or  upon  such  property,           unlawfully  remains there with intent  thereby  to           intimidate,  insult or annoy any such  person,  or           with  intent  to  commit an offence,  is  said  to           commit ’criminal trespass’." House trespass is punishable under section 448 of the Indian Penal Code.  It is significant that when entry into or  upon property in possession of another is lawful then  unlawfully remaining upon such property                                                        403 with  the object  Of  intimidating,insulting   or   annoying the   person   in possession  of  the  property   would   be criminal   trespass.  The   offence would be  continuing  so long  as  the  trespass is not   lifted   or   vacated   and intimidation, insult or annoyance of the person  legally  in possession  of the property is not stopped. The authors   of the  Code  had  the  following words to say:           "We  have   given   the  name   of   trespass   to           every   usurpation,however  slight,  of   dominion           over    property.   We   do   not propose to  make           trespass,   as  such,  an  offence,  except   when           it is committed in order  to  the  commission   of           some    offence   injurious   to    some    person           interested   in  the    property    on  which  the           trespass  is committed, or for  the   purpose   of           causing  annoyance   to  such   a   person.   Even           then   we   propose   to visit  it  with  a  light           punishment,   unless   it   be    attended    with           aggravating circumstances.                These  aggravating circumstances are  of  two           sorts.  Criminal trespass may be aggravated by the           way  in  which it is committed.  It  may  also  be           aggravated by the end for which it is committed."      Section 630 of the Companies Act reads as under:           "Penalty for wrongful withholding of property.           (1)  If any officer or employee of a company-           (a)     wrongfully  obtains  possession   of   any           property of a company or           (b)   having any such property in his  possession,           wrongfully withholds it or knowingly applies it to           purposes other than those expressed or directed in           the articles and authorised by this Act;           he  shall, on the complaint of the company or  any           creditor  or contributory thereof,  be  punishable           with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees.           (2)   The Court trying the offence may also  order

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         such officer or employee to deliver up or  refund,           within  a time to be fixed by the Court, any  such           property wrongfully                                                        404           obtained  or  wrongfully  withheld  or   knowingly           misapplied,or  in default, to suffer  imprisonment           for a term which may extend to two year." Thus,  both wrongfully obtaining and wrongfully  withholding have been made offence punishable under sub-sec. (1).  Under sub-sec.   (2)  knowingly  misapplication  has   also   been envisaged.   The  offence  continues until  the  officer  or employee delivers up or refunds any such property if ordered by the court to do so within a time fixed by the Court,  and in default to suffer the prescribed imprisonment.  The  idea of a continuing offence is implied in sub-section (2).      Section  468 of the  Criminal  Procedure  Code says:           "Bar  to  taking  cognizance after  lapse  of  the           period of limitation-           (1)   Except  as otherwise provided  elsewhere  in           this Code, no Court shall take cognizance  of   an           offence   of   the   category  specified  in  sub-           section  (2),  after the expiry of the  period  of           limitation.           (2)  The period of limitation shall be-           (a) six months, if the offence is punishable  with           fine only;           (b)   one year, if the offence is punishable  with           imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year;           (c)   three  years, if the offence  is  punishable           with  imprisonment for a term exceeding  one  year           but not exceeding three years.           (3)  For the purposes of this section, the  period           of  limitation, in relation to offences which  may           be  tried  together,  shall  be  determined   with           reference to the offence which is punishable  with           the more severe punishment or, as the case may be,           the most severe punishment."      The parties have not disputed that this case  attracted s.  468(1)  and  (2)(a).  Regarding the fact  of  the  first respondent  having  retired from service  though  the  trial Magistrate  observed that the document did not  specifically state that the first respondent retired, when after                                                        405 referring  to  oral evidence the cause of  action  under  s. 630(l)(b)  was held to have arisen on the first respondent’s failure  to vacate and deliver possession of  the  company’s quarter  and  that the period of  limitation  ran  therefrom tantamounted  to  finding  that  the  first  respondent  did retire.      "Officer" or "employee" in s. 630 of the Companies  Act includes  both present and past officers and employees.   In Baldev  Krishna Sahi v. Shipping Corporation of  India  Ltd. and Anr., [1987] 4 SCC 361 at paragraph 8 of the report this Court said:                "Section  630  of  the  Companies  Act  which           makes  the wrongful withholding  of  any  property           of   a  company  by  an officer  or  employee   of           the   company  a  penal  offence,  is  typical  of           the    economy     of    language     which     is           characteristic of the draughtsman of the Act.  The           section   is  in  two  parts. Sub-section  (1)  by           clauses  (a) and  (b)  creates  two  distinct  and           separate  offences. First of  these  is  the   one           contemplated  by clause (a),  namely,   where   an           officer   or  employee of  a  company   wrongfully

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         obtains   possession   of  any   property  of  the           company  during  the  course  of  his  employment,           to which he is not entitled. Normally, it is  only           the   present officers  and  employees   who   can           secure  possession  of  any property of a company.           It  is  also  possible for  such  an   officer  or           employee  after  termination  of  his   employment           to   wrongfully take away possession of  any  such           property.   This  is  the function of  clause  (a)           and although it primarily refers to  the  existing           officers  and employees, it  may  also   take   in           roast  officers   and  employees.   In   contrast,           clause   (b)    contemplates  a  case   where   an           officer   or  employee  of  a  company having  any           property  of   a   company   in   his   possession           wrongfully  withholds it or knowingly applies   it           to   purposes   other than  those   expressed   or           directed  in   the   articles   and authorised  by           the Act. It  may  well  be  that  an  officer   or           employee     may    have     lawfully     obtained           possession   of   any such  property  during   the           course   of   his    employment    but  wrongfully           withholds   it  after  the  termination  of    his           employment.   That  appears  to  be  one  of   the           functions   of  clause  (b). It would  be  noticed           that clause (b) also makes  it  an  offence if any           officer  or  employee  of  a  company  having  any           property   of  the  company  in  his    possession           knowingly   applies   it to  purposes  other  than           those   expressed  or  directed  in  the  articles           and   authorised   by   the   Act.   That    would           primarily                                                        406           apply  to the present officers and  employees  and           may  also  include past  officers  and  employees.           There   is   therefore  no  warrant  to   give   a           restrictive  meaning  to  the  term  ’officer   or           employee’ appearing in sub-section ( 1) of section           630 of the Act.  It is quite evident that  clauses           (a)  and  (b) are separated by the word  ’or’  and           therefore are clearly disjunctive."      This  Court also observed at paragraph 7 of the  report that the beneficent provision contained in s. 630, no  doubt penal,  has been purposely enacted by the  legislature  with the  object of providing a summary procedure for  retrieving the property of the company (a) where an officer or employee of  a company wrongfully obtains possession of  property  of the  company, or (b) where having been placed in  possession of  any such property during the course of  his  employment, wrongfully withholds possession of it after the  termination of  his employment.  It is the duty of the court to place  a broad   and  liberal  construction  on  the   provision   in furtherence  of  the object and purpose of  the  legislation which  would suppress the mischief and advance  the  remedy. "It  is the duty of the court to place a broad  and  liberal construction  on the provision in furtherence of the  object and  purpose  of the legislation which  would  suppress  the mischief and advance the remedy.      As  was  reiterated  in Amrit Lal  Chum  v.  Devoprasad Dutta.  Roy and Anr. etc., reported in [1988] 2 SCR 783 that "s.  630  of  the Companies Act 1956  plainly  makes  it  an offence  if  an  officer or employee of a  company  who  was permitted  to  use the property of the  company  during  his employment,  wrongfully retains or occupies the  same  after the  termination  of  his employment.  It  is  the  wrongful

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withholding  of such property, meaning the property  of  the company after the termination of the employment, which is an offence under s. 630(1) of the Act." What then is the nature of  this  offence.   The question then is whether  it  is  a continuing  offence.   According to Black’s  Law  Dictionary Revised   Fourth   Edition,  continuing  offence   means   a transaction  or  a series of acts set on foot  by  a  single impulse, and operated by an unintermittent force, no  matter how  long  a  time  it may occupy.  In  State  of  Bihar  v. Deokaran Nenshi, [1973] 1 SCR 1004, the question was whether the failure to furnish returns on the part of the owner of a stone quarry under regulation 3 of the Indian Metalliferrous Mines  Regulations, 1926 even after warning from  the  Chief Inspector was a continuing offences Section 79 of the  Mines Act, 1952 which provided that no Court shall take cognizance of  an  offence under the Act unless a  complaint  was  made within six months from the date of the offence                                                        407 and  the  explanation to  the  section  provided   that   if the   offence   in question was a  continuing  offence,  the period  of limitation shall be computed wherefore  to  every part  of   the   time   during   which   the   said  offence continued Shelat, J. for the court observed:           "A   continuing   offence   is   one   which    is           susceptible       of    continuance     and     is           distinguishable    from   the   one    which    is           committed  once  and  for all.  It   is   one   of           those   offences which arises out of a failure  to           obey  or comply with  a  rule or  its  requirement           and which involves a penalty,  the  liability  for           which continues until the rule or its  requirement           is  obeyed  or complied with. On  every   occasion           that    such   disobedience   or    non-compliance           occurs   and   recurs,   there   is  the   offence           committed.  The distinction between the two  kinds           of  offences is between an act or  omission  which           constitutes an offence once and for all and an act           or   omission  which  continues   and   therefore,           constitutes a fresh offence every time or occasion           on   which  it  continues.  In  the  case   of   a           continuing offence, there is thus  the  ingredient           of  continuance of the offence which is absent  in           the   case  of  an offence which takes place  when           an  act  or  omission  is  committed once and  for           all."      Their  Lordships  referred  to English  cases  Best  v. Butler   and   Fitz-gibbon, [1932] 2  KB  108;   Verney   v. Mark  Fletcher  and  Sons  Ltd., [1909]  1  KB-444;  Rex  v. Yalore,  [1908]  2  KB-237  and  The   London County Council v.  Worley,  [1894]  2  QB  826.  In  Best  v.  Butler   and Fitzgibbon (supra) in England, the Trade Union Act, 1871  by s.  12  provided  that if any  officer,  member   or   other person  being  or  representing himself to be a member of  a trade   union,   by   false   representation  or  imposition obtained  possession  of  any  moneys,  books  etc.  of such trade  union,  or,  having  the  same  in   his   possession wilfully   withheld or fraudulently misapplied the  same,  a court  of  summary  jurisdiction would order such person  to be   imprisoned.   The  offence  of  withholding  the  money referred  to in this section was held to  be  a   continuing offence,  presumably because  every  day  that  the   moneys were   wilfully withheld an offence within the  meaning   of S.   12  was  committed. In Verney’s case  (supra)   Section 10(1)  of  the  Factory  and  Workshop Act, 1901 inter  alia provided   that  every  fly-wheel  directly  connected  with

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steam, water or other  mechanical  power  must  be  securely fenced.  Its  sub-section  (2) provided that  a  factory  in which   there   was  contravention of the section  would  be deemed   not   to  be  kept  in  conformity  with  the  Act. Section 135 provided penalty for an occupier  of  a  factory                                                        408 or workshop if he failed to keep the factory or workshop  in conformity   with  the  Act.  Section  146   provided   that information for he offence under s. 135 shall be laid within three months after the date at which the offence came to the knowledge of the inspector for the district within which the offence  was charged to have been committed. The  contention was  that in May 1905 and again in March 1908 the  fly-wheel was kept unfenced to the knowledge of the Inspector and  yet the  information  was  not laid until  July  22,  1908.  The information, however, stated that the fly-wheel was unfenced on  July 5, 1908, and that was the offence charged.  It  was held  that  the breach of s. 10 was a continuing  breach  on July  10, 1908, and therefore the information was  in  time. The  offence  under  s. 135 read with  s.  10  consisted  in failing  to  keep the factory in conformity  with  the  Act. Every  day that the flywheel remained unfenced, the  factory was kept not in conformity with the Act, and therefore,  the failure  continued  to  be an  offence.  Hence  the  offence defined in s. 10 was a continuing offence. In London  County Council (supra) s. 85 of the Metropolis Management Amendment Act, 1852 prohibited the erection of a building on the  side of  a  new street of less than fifty feet  in  width,  which shall  exceed in height his distance from the front  of  the building  on  the opposite side of the  street  without  the consent of the London County Council and imposed,  penalties for offences against the Act and a further penalty for every day  during which such offence should continue after  notice from  the County Council. The Court construed s. 85 to  have laid down two offences; (1) building to a prohibited height, and  (2)  continuing such a structure  already  built  after receiving  a  notice  from the County  Council.  The  latter offence was a continuing offence applying to any one who was guilty  of continuing the building at the prohibited  height after notice from the County Council.      State   of  Bihar  v.  Deokaran  Nenshi,  (supra)   was explained by this Court in Bhagirath Kanoria & Ors. v. State of  Madhya  Pradesh & Ors., [1985] 1 SCR 626.  Therein,  the Provident  Fund  Inspector  filed  complaints  against   the Directors,  the Factory Manager and the  respondent  company charging  them with non-payment of  employer’s  contribution under the Employees’ Provident Fund and Family Pension  Fund Act,  19  of 1952, from February 1970 to June 1971.  At  the trial  the  accused  contended  that  since  the  limitation prescribed by s. 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 had  expired before the filing of the complaints, the  Court had  no jurisdiction to take cognizance of  the  complaints. The  Trial Court having held that the offences of which  the accused   were   charged  were  continuing   offences   and, therefore,  no question of limitation could arise, and  that order having been upheld                                                        409 by  the High Court in revision, the Directors in  appeal  to this Court contended that the  offence  of  non-payment   of the   employer’s  contribution could be committed  once  and for  all on the expiry of 15 days after the close  of  every month and,  therefore,  prosecution  for  the offence should have  been   launched  within  the  period   of   limitation provided in s. 468 of the Code. Rejecting the contention  it was  held  by this Court that the offence   of   which   the

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appellants    were   charged  namely,  non-payment  of   the employer’s  contribution  to  the  Provident Fund before the due  date, was a ’continuing offence’  and,  therefore,  the period of limitation prescribed by s. 468 of the Code  could not  have  any application and it would be governed  by   s. 472   of  the  Code, according to which, a fresh  period  of limitation  began to run at every moment of the time  during which  the offence continued. It was accordingly  held  that each day the accused failed to comply with the obligation to pay  their  contribution to the fund, they  committed  fresh offence. Section 472 of the Code of Criminal Procedure deals with  continuing offence and says:           "In  the  case of a continuing  offence,  a  fresh          period  of limitation shall begin to run  at  every          moment  of  the  time  during  which  the   offence          continues."      The concept of continuing offence does not wipe out the original guilt, but it keeps the contravention alive day  by day.   It  may  also  be  observed  that  the  courts   when confronted   with   provisions  which  lay down  a  rule  of limitation  governing  prosecutions,  in   cases   of   this nature,  should  give due weight and  consideration  to  the provisions  of S. 473 of the Code which is in the nature  of an   overriding   provision   and   according   to    which, notwithstanding anything  contained  in  the  provisions  of Chapter XXXVI of the Code of Criminal  Procedure  any  court may take cognizance of an offence after the expiration of  a period of limitation if, inter alia, it is satisfied that it is necessary to do so in the interest of justice.      The  expression  ’continuing  offence’  has  not   been defined  in  the Code. The question  whether  a   particular offence  is  a  ’continuing offence’ or not must, therefore, necessarily depend upon  the  language of the statute  which creates  that  offence, the nature of the  offence  and  the purpose   intended  to  be  achieved  by  constituting   the particular act as an offence.      Applying the law enunciated above to the provisions  of Section  630 of the Companies Act, we are of the  view  that the offence under                                                        410 this section is not such as can be said to have  consummated once for all. Wrongful withholding, or wrongfully  obtaining possession   and  wrongful  application  of  the   company’s property,  that is, for purposes other than those  expressed or directed in the articles of the company and authorised by the  Companies  Act, cannot be said to be  terminated  by  a single  act or fact but would subsist for the  period  until the property in the offender’s possession is delivered up or refunded. It is an offence committed over a span of time and the last act of the offence will control the commencement of the  period of limitation and need be alleged.  The  offence consists of a course of conduct arising from a singleness of thought,  purpose of refusal to deliver up or  refund  which may  be  deemed a single impulse.  Considered  from  another angle,  it  consists of a continuous series  of  acts  which endures  after  the  period of consummation  on  refusal  to deliver   up   or  refund  the  property.  It  is   not   an instantaneous   offence  and  limitation  begins  with   the cessation  of the criminal act, i.e. with the delivering  up or  refund  of  the  property It  will  be  a  recurring  or continuing  offence until the wrongful possession,  wrongful withholding or wrongful application is vacated or put an end to.  The  offence continues until  the  property  wrongfully obtained or wrongfully withheld or knowingly mis-applied  is delivered  up or refunded to the company. For failure to  do

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so  sub-section (2) prescribes the punishment. This, in  our view,  is  sufficient ground for holding  that  the  offence under section 630 of the Companies Act is not one time but a continuing  offence and the period  of  limitation  must  be computed   accordingly,  and  when  so  done,  the   instant complaints  could  not  be  said  to  have  been  barred  by limitation.  The submission that when the  first  respondent upon his retirement failed to vacate and deliver  possession of the company’s quarter to the company the offence must  be taken to have been complete, has, therefore, to be rejected.      These appeals accordingly succeed. The impugned  orders are set aside and the cases are remanded to the Trial  Court for  disposal  in  accordance  with  law  in  light  of  the observations made herein above. V.P.R.                                    Appeals   allowed.                                                        411