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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  3703 of 2003

PETITIONER: M/s. Girnar Traders

RESPONDENT: State of Maharashtra & Ors

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 27/08/2007

BENCH: B.N. Agrawal & P.K. Balasubramanyan & P.P. NAOLEKAR

JUDGMENT: J  U D G M E N T WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3922 of 2007 [arising out of S.L.P.(C) No. 11446 of 2005]

M/s. S.P. Building Corporation & Anr.            \005\005 Appellants                                               Versus

State of Maharashtra & Ors.                         \005\005Respondents P.P. Naolekar, J.

1.              We have had the benefit of perusing the judgment  prepared by learned brother P.K. Balasubramanyan, J. in Civil  Appeal No.3703 of 2003 titled M/s. Girnar Traders  v.  State of  Maharashtra and Others, wherein learned brother has taken  into  consideration  various    decisions  of  this Court,   including   decisions delivered by  3-Judge Benches, and  various aspects considered therein, and thought it proper to  refer the question regarding interpretation and applicability of  Section 11A introduced into the Land Acquisition Act, 1894  (for short \023the LA Act\024) by Amendment Act 68 of 1984  to the  Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (for short  \023the MRTP Act\024) for consideration by a larger Bench.   A 3- Judge Bench of this Court in  Nagpur Improvement Trust    v.  Vasantrao and Others, (2002) 7 SCC 657 and U.P. Avas  Evam Vikas Parishad  v.  Jainul Islam and Another,  (1998) 2 SCC 467, on interpretation of the provisions of the   Acts under challenge,  has  held that the LA Act was  incorporated in those statutes, that is, they were cases of    legislation by incorporation and, therefore, the amendment  brought about subsequently in the LA Act would not apply to  the statutes in question.  However, beneficial amendment of  payment of compensation under the amended provisions of  the LA Act was made applicable and the owner of the land was  held to be entitled to the beneficial payment of compensation.   It appears, it was so held to save the Acts from the vice of  arbitrary and hostile discrimination.  There does not appear to  be any justifiable reason for not applying  this principle so far  as it relates to the acquisition of  land.  If the land is not  acquired within the stipulated time, then the whole  proceedings in acquisition comes to an end, and thereby the  owner of the land would be entitled to retain his land which  appears to  be  the   superior  right  than  the  owner\022s  right   to  get  the  compensation for  acquisition of his land.   A 2- Judge Bench of this Court in State of Maharashtra and     Another   v.  Sant Joginder Singh Kishan Singh and

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Others, 1995 Supp. (2) SCC 475 has held that Section 11A of  the LA Act is a procedural provision and does not stand on the  same footing as Section 23 of the LA Act.  We find it difficult to  subscribe to the view taken.  Procedure is a mode in which the  successive steps in litigation are taken.  Section 11A not only  provides a period in which the land acquisition proceedings  are to be completed but also provides for consequences,  namely, that if no award is made within the time stipulated,  the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall  lapse.  Lapsing of the acquisition of the land results in owner  of the land retaining ownership right in the property and  according to us it is a substantive right accrued to the owner  of the land, and that in view thereof we feel Section 11A of the  LA Act is part of the law which creates and defines right, not  adjective law which defines method of enforcing rights.  It is a  law that creates, defines and regulates the right and powers of  the party. For this and the other reasons assigned by our  learned brother, we are in agreement with him that the  question involved requires consideration by a larger Bench  and, accordingly, we agree with the reasons recorded by my  learned brother for referring the question to a larger Bench.   However, on consideration of the erudite judgment prepared  by our esteemed & learned brother Balasubramanyan, J.,  regretfully we are unable to persuade ourselves to agree to the  decision arrived at by him on interpretation of Section 127 of  the MRTP Act and also reference of the case to a larger Bench.    Section 127 of the MRTP Act is a special provision and would  be attracted in the peculiar facts and circumstances  mentioned in the Section itself.  The Section provides a  procedure for the land owner to get his land de-reserved if  steps are not taken by the State Government within the  stipulated period and the relief which the owner of the land is  entitled to is also provided therein.  The steps to be taken for  acquisition of land as provided under Section 127 of the MRTP  Act have to be taken into consideration keeping in mind the  time lag between the period the land is brought under  reservation and inaction on the part of the State to acquire it.   Section 127 of the MRTP Act is a unique provision providing  remedial measure to the owner of the land whose land is  under the planning scheme for a long period of time, which  would be interpreted in the facts and circumstances of each  individual case.  It does not have any universal application  and, therefore, the applicability thereof would depend on the  facts of each case.  S.L.P.(C) No.11446 of 2005  titled M/s. S.P.  Building Corporation and Anr.  v.  State of Maharashtra and  Others, is required to be decided  by  this Bench only and,  therefore,  we propose to decide it as follows: 2.              Leave granted.

3.              The brief facts necessary for deciding the questions  raised in this appeal are that appellant No.1  is a partnership  firm registered under the Indian  Partnership  Act,  1932 and  is the owner of an immovable property, i.e. a piece of land,  bearing City Survey No.18/738, admeasuring about 5387.35  sq.yds. situated at Carmichael Road, Malabar Hill Division,  Mumbai-400026. 4.              On 7.7.1958, Bombay Municipal Corporation had  issued a declaration under Section 4(1) of the Bombay Town  Planning Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as \023the Act of  1954\024), expressing its intention to prepare a development plan  for the area under its jurisdiction and published a  development plan in accordance with the provisions of the said  Act on 9.1.1964.  The plan was submitted by the Corporation  to the Government of Maharashtra for sanction on 8.7.1964  and on 6.1.1967 the Government of Maharashtra accorded

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sanction to the development plan which pertained to \021D\022 Ward  of the Corporation area and the plan came into force on  7.2.1967.  The land of the appellant was notified for  development as \021Open Space and Children\022s Park\022.  On  11.1.1967, the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act,   1966 (hereinafter referred to as \023the MRTP Act\024) repealed the  Act of 1954 saving the proceedings already initiated under the  Act of 1954. 5.           Proceedings were taken up for acquisition of the land.   Since no award was made as per Section 11A of the Land  Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 which came into force on  24.9.1984, the acquisition proceedings were declared by the  Land Acquisition Officer to have lapsed.  Later on a revised  development plan sanctioned by the State Government on  6.7.1991  came into effect on 16.9.1991.  On 3.2.1998 the  appellants served notice through their advocates under  Section 127 of the MRTP Act asking for re-notifying the  property or to release the said property from reservation and  accord sanction/approval to develop the property by the  owner.  In reply, the Municipal Corporation, Greater Mumbai  informed the appellants that purchase notice issued by their  advocates was invalid as ten years had not expired since the  sanction of the revised development plan, came into force on  16.9.1991.  On 18.10.2000, the appellants again served  purchase notice under Section 127 of the MRTP Act.  Again  the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai informed the  appellants that the notice was invalid as the period of ten  years had not lapsed from the date of the revised plan. 6.              On 15.3.2002, the appellants addressed yet another  notice to the Municipal Corporation, Greater Mumbai under  Section 127 of the MRTP Act stating therein that ten years\022  period had lapsed on 16.9.2001 and since no proceedings for  acquisition of the land as contemplated under Section 127(1)  of the MRTP Act or under the Land Acquisition Act , 1894  (hereinafter referred to as \023the LA Act\024) having been  commenced nor has any award been made or compensation  paid, the property should be de-reserved.  The purchase notice  was served on the Municipal Commissioner, Greater Mumbai  on 19.3.2002.  7.              The counsel for respondent-Municipal Corporation  has submitted certain documents before us at the time of  hearing.  In pursuance of the purchase notice served on the  Municipal Corporation, Greater Mumbai, a meeting of the  Improvement Committee was called.  On 9.9.2002 (document  no.1), the Improvement Committee passed Resolution No.183  recommending the Municipal Corporation to initiate the  acquisition proceedings under the provisions of Section 126(2)  and (4) of the MRTP Act read with Section 6 of the LA Act,  as  amended upto date, or in the alternative to recommend  acquisition as provided under Section 126(1) of the MRTP Act.   The rates for acquisition under the LA Act and that under the  provisions of Section 126(1) of the MRTP Act  were also  provided for.  On 13.9.2002 (document no.2) without there  being any resolution sanctioning acquisition or taking steps  for acquisition, an application was sent by the Chief Engineer  (Development Plan) to the State Government for initiating  acquisition proceedings under Section 126 of the MRTP Act as  amended upto date read with Section 6 of the LA Act.   Thereafter, on 16.9.2002 (document no.3) the Corporation  passed Resolution No.956 whereby  sanction was given to  initiate the acquisition proceedings of the land and the  Municipal Commissioner  was authorised to make an  application to the State Government under the provisions of   Section 126(2) & (4) of the MRTP Act read with Section 6 of the  LA Act, as amended upto date; and / or, initiate proceedings

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under Section 90(1) & (3) of the Bombay Municipal  Corporation Act, 1888 as amended upto date, for the land  being purchased by the Commissioner on behalf of the  Corporation.  After the Resolution was passed, on 17.9.2002  (document no.4) a letter was written by the Chief Engineer  (Development Plan) to the Secretary, Urban Development  Department, Government of Maharashtra informing that the  Corporation have accorded sanction to initiate acquisition  proceedings and for the said purpose authorized the Municipal  Commissioner to make an application to the State Government  as per the provisions of Section 126(1) of the MRTP Act as  amended upto date to issue orders for acquisition of the  property  under the MRTP Act read with Section 6 of the LA  Act.  The letter dated 17.9.2002 is reproduced herein:-      \023To,      The Secretary,      Urban Development Dept.,      Govt. of Maharashtra,      Mantralaya,      Mumbai-400032       Sub: Acquisition of land bearing C.S.No.18738 of  Malabar Hill division reserved for Children Park.            Ref:       i) TPB-4302/572/UD-11 dtd.27.3.02         ii) CHE/ACQ/C/962 dtd. 13.9.2002            Sir,             With reference to above, it is to be mentioned  here that Corporation by their Resolution No. 956 of  16.9.2002 (copy enclosed) have accorded sanction to  initiate the acquisition proceedings for the above  mentioned land reserved for Children\022s Park adm.  approximately 4504.52 sq.mt. and also authorized  the Municipal Commissioner to make application to  State Govt. as per provision of 126(1) of the  M.R.&T.P. Act 1966 as amended upto date to issue  order for the acquisition of property under reference  as provided under the provisions of sec. 126(2) (3)  and (4) of the M.R.&T.P. Act 1966 as amended upto  date read with section 6 of L.A. Act 1894.  The  application to State Govt. along with the required  information in the usual proforma in triplicate & three  copies of plans have already been submitted vide  this office letter issued u/no. CHE/ACQ/C/962 dtd.  13.9.2002 (copy enclosed).  This is for information  and further necessary action.            Yours faithfully,            Sd/-      CHIEF ENGINEER      (DEVELOPMENT PLAN)\024       

Later on the State Government on 20.11.2002 issued a  notification exercising the power conferred by sub-section (4)  read with sub-section (2) of Section 126 of the MRTP Act  read  with Section 6 of the LA Act.   8.              Having aggrieved by the action of the respondents,  the appellants filed a writ petition in the High Court of  Judicature at Bombay which was registered as Writ Petition  No.353 of 2005 (M/s. S.P. Building Corporation & Anr.  vs.   State of Maharashtra and Ors.) challenging the proceedings  initiated by the respondents.  It was contended by the

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appellants that under Section 127 of the MRTP Act, no steps  having been taken within the period prescribed, the reservation  is deemed to have lapsed; and secondly, the acquisition  proceedings initiated under the MRTP Act, are deemed to have  lapsed  in view of  Section 11A of the LA Act, the award having  not been admittedly made within two years from the date of  publication of the declaration.  The Division Bench of the  Bombay High Court dismissed the petition on both counts.  It  was held by the Bombay High Court that the resolution of the  Improvement Committee passed on 9.9.2002 and the letter  written by the Chief Engineer dated 13.9.2002 would constitute  a ‘step\022 taken by the Municipal Corporation as provided under  Section 127 of the MRTP Act.  The Division Bench relying on a  judgment of this Court in the case of State of Maharashtra  and Another  v.  Sant Joginder Singh Kishan Singh and  Others,  1995 Supp. (2) SCC 475, has held that Section 11A of  the LA Act as amended is not applicable to the proceedings for  acquisition initiated under the MRTP Act and dismissed the writ  petition. 9.              The appellants filed this appeal by way of S.L.P. (C)  No. 11446 of 2005 challenging the order of the Division Bench  of the Bombay High Court.  This Court by an order dated  11.7.2005, issued notice and tagged the case along with C.A.  No. 3703 of 2003 wherein a 2-Judge Bench of this Court had  doubted the correctness of the decision rendered by this Court  in Sant Joginder Singh Case (supra) on which the Bombay  High Court has relied, in regard to the applicability of the  newly inserted provision of Section 11A of the LA Act, to the  acquisition under Chapter VII of the MRTP Act.  Thus, the  matter has been heard along with C.A. No.3703 of 2003  wherein the only question raised is in regard to the  applicability of the new provision of Section 11A of the LA Act  to the acquisition made under the MRTP Act;  whereas, apart  from the said question, in this case we are also required to  decide the scope and ambit of Section 127 read with Section  126 of the MRTP Act for the purposes of de-reservation of the  land reserved under a development plan.  10.             The question that requires consideration and  answer in the present case is : Whether the reservation has  lapsed due to the failure of the planning authority to take  steps within the period of six months from the date of service  of the notice of purchase as stipulated by Section 127 of the  MRTP Act; and also  the question as regards applicability of  new Section 11A of the LA Act to the acquisition of land under  the MRTP Act. 11.             Under Section 2(19) of the MRTP Act, the planning  authority means a local authority and includes other  authorities provided in clauses (a) and (b).  The local authority  is defined in Section 2(15) which for the purposes of this case  would be the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai  constituted under the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act.          12.             Chapter VII of the MRTP Act deals with land  acquisition.  Sections 125 to 129 fall in Chapter VII.   Section  125 provides that any land required, reserved or designated in  a regional plan, development plan or town planning scheme  for a public purpose or purposes including plans for any area  of comprehensive development or for any new town shall be  deemed to be land needed for a public purpose within the  meaning of the LA Act.   Section 126 provides three modes of  acquisition of the land included in the town planning scheme  for the public purpose.  Section 127 provides for lapsing of  reservation if the land reserved, allotted or designated is not  acquired by agreement within 10 years from the date on which  a final regional plan or final development plan comes into force  or if proceedings for acquisition of land under the MRTP Act or

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under the LA Act are not commenced within such period, then  the owner or any person interested in the land may serve a  notice.  If within six months from the date of service of such  notice, the land is not acquired or no steps as aforesaid are  commenced for its acquisition, the reservation, allotment or  designation shall be deemed to have lapsed and the land shall  be deemed to be released from such reservation.  Section  128(1) confers the power on the State Government to acquire  the land needed for a public purpose different from any public  purpose under the scheme, or purpose of  the planning  authority or development authority or appropriate authority;  the State Government may, notwithstanding anything  contained in the MRTP Act, acquire the land under the  provisions of the LA Act.  Section 129(1) empowers the  Collector after the publication of the declaration under Section  126(2) to enter on and take possession of the land under  acquisition after giving a notice of 15 days.  13.     Section 127 falling in Chapter VII requires  interpretation in the present case.  However, the same cannot  be understood without reference to Section 126 which has an  important bearing while interpreting the words used in Section  127, namely, \023the land is not acquired or no steps as aforesaid  are commenced for its acquisition\024. Therefore, the relevant  provisions to be considered are Sections 126 and 127 of the  MRTP Act.   Section 126 of the MRTP Act reads as follows:

\023126. Acquisition of land required for public  purposes specified in plans.- (1) When after the  publication of a draft Regional Plan, a Development  or any other plan or Town Planning Scheme, any  land is required or reserved for any of the public  purposes specified in any plan or scheme under this  Act at any time the Planning Authority,  Development Authority, or as the case may be, any  Appropriate Authority may, except as otherwise  provided in section 113A, acquire the land, \026  

(a) by agreement by paying an amount agreed  to, or

(b) in lieu of any such amount, by granting the  land-owner or the lessee, subject, however, to  the lessee paying the lessor or depositing with  the Planning Authority, Development Authority  or Appropriate Authority, as the case may be,  for payment to the lessor, an amount  equivalent to the value of the lessor’s interest  to  be determined by any of the said  Authorities concerned on the basis of the  principles laid down in the Land Acquisition  Act, 1894, Floor Space Index (FSI) or   Transferable Development Rights (TDR)  against the area of land surrendered free of  cost and free from all encumbrances, and also  further additional Floor Space  Index or  Transferable Development Rights against the  development or construction of  the amenity  on the surrendered land at his cost, as the  Final Development Control Regulations  prepared in this behalf provide, or

(c) by making an application to the State   Government for acquiring such land under the  Land Acquisition Act, 1894,

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and the land (together with the amenity, if any, so  developed or constructed) so acquired by agreement  or by grant of Floor Space Index or additional Floor  Space Index or Transferable  Development Rights  under this section or under the Land Acquisition  Act, 1894, as the case may be, shall vest absolutely  free from all encumbrances in the Planning  Authority, Development Authority, or as the case  may be, any Appropriate Authority.

(2) On receipt of such application, if the State  Government is  satisfied that the land specified in  the application is needed for the public purpose   therein specified, or if the State Government (except  in cases falling under section 49 and except as  provided in section 113A)  itself is of opinion that  any land included in any such plan is needed for  any public purpose, it may make a declaration to  that effect in the Official Gazette, in the manner  provided in section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act,  1894, in respect of the said land. The declaration so  published shall, notwithstanding anything  contained in the said Act, be deemed to be a  declaration duly made under the said section:

Provided that, subject to the provisions of sub- section (4), no such declaration shall be made after  the expiry of one year from the date of publication of  the draft Regional Plan, Development Plan or any  other Plan, or Scheme, as the case may be.

(3) On publication of a declaration under the said  section 6, the Collector shall proceed to take order  for the acquisition of the land under the said Act;  and the provisions of that Act shall apply to the  acquisition of the said land, with the modification  that the market value of the land shall be, --

(i) where the land is to be acquired for the  purposes of a new town, the market value  prevailing on the date of publication of the  notification constituting or declaring the  Development Authority for such town;

(ii) where the land is acquired for the purposes  of a Special Planning Authority, the market  value prevailing on the date of publication of  the notification of the area as an undeveloped  area; and

(iii) in any other case the market value on the  date of publication of the interim development  plan, the draft development plan or the plan  for the area or areas for comprehensive  development, whichever is earlier, or as the  case may be, the date or publication  of the  draft town planning scheme :

Provided that, nothing in this sub-section shall  affect the date for the purpose of determining the  market value of land in respect of which  proceedings for acquisition commenced before the  commencement of the Maharashtra Regional and  Town Planning (Second Amendment) Act, 1972:

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Provided further that, for the purpose of clause (ii)  of this sub-section, the market value in respect of  land included in any undeveloped area notified  under sub-section (1) of section 40 prior to the  commencement of the Maharashtra Regional and  Town Planning (Second Amendment) Act, 1972,  shall be the market value prevailing on the date of  such commencement.

(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the  proviso to sub-section (2) and sub-section (3), if a  declaration is not made within the period referred to  in sub-section (2) (or having been made, the  aforesaid period expired on the commencement of  the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning  (Amendment) Act, 1993), the State Government may  make a fresh declaration for acquiring the land  under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, in the  manner provided by sub-sections (2) and (3) of this  section, subject to the modification that the market  value of the land shall be the market value at the  date of declaration in the Official Gazette made for  acquiring the land afresh.\024

Under sub-section (1) of Section 126, after publication of the  draft regional plan, a development or any other plan or town  planning scheme, any land required or reserved for any of the  public purposes specified in any plan or scheme under the  MRTP Act, may be acquired (a) by agreement between the  parties by  paying an amount agreed to; or (b) by granting the  land owner or the lessee, Floor Space Index (FSI) or  Transferable Development Rights (TDR) against the area of  land surrendered free of cost and free from all encumbrances  and also further additional Floor Space Index or Transferable  Development Rights against the development or construction  of the amenity on the surrendered land at his cost, as the  Final Development Control Regulations prepared in this behalf  provide; or (c) by making an application to the State  Government for acquiring such land under the LA Act.  Sub- section (2) provides that on receipt of such application or on  its own motion, the State Government would satisfy itself that  the land specified in the application, is needed for a public  purpose and, if it is so found, would make a declaration by  issuing a notification in the Official Gazette in the manner  provided in Section 6 of the LA Act.  Proviso is added to sub- section (2) whereunder a declaration under Section 6 of the LA  Act in the Official Gazette has to be made within one year from  the date of publication of the draft regional plan, development  plan or any other plan or scheme, as the case may be.   Sub- section (3) postulates that on publication of a declaration in  the Official Gazette under Section 6 of the LA Act, the Collector  shall proceed to take orders for the acquisition of the land  under the LA Act and the provisions of that Act shall apply to  the acquisition of the said land with certain modifications as  provided in clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of sub-section (3) for  determination of the market value on the basis of  different  dates.  Sub-section (3) makes it abundantly clear that after   publication of the declaration in the Official Gazette under  Section 6 of the LA Act, the entire procedure which shall be  followed will be as provided under the LA Act, that is to say,  from Section 8 onwards upto Section 28 of the LA Act which  deal with acquisition of land under the LA Act. 14.             Sub-section (2) of Section 126 provides for one  year\022s limitation  for publication of the declaration from the  date of publication of the draft plan or scheme.  Sub-section

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(4), however, empowers the State Government to make a fresh  declaration under Section 6 of the LA Act even if the  prescribed period of one year has expired.  This declaration is  to be issued by the State Government for acquisition of the  land without there being any application moved by the  planning/local authority under clause (c) of Section 126(1).   Sub-section (4) of Section 126 authorizes the State  Government to make a declaration for acquisition of the land  under Section 6 of the LA Act without any steps taken by the  planning authority, i.e., Bombay Municipal Corporation.   Under sub-section (4) of Section 126, the State Government  can make a fresh declaration if the declaration under sub- section (2) of Section 126 was not made within the time  stipulated for acquisition of the land, if it is satisfied that the  land is required for a public purpose, subject to the  modification that the market value of the land shall be the  market value at the date on which the declaration in the  Official Gazette is made for acquisition of the land afresh.   Sub-section (4) is the provision whereunder only the State  Government is authorized and empowered to issue fresh  declaration for acquiring the land under the LA Act.    15.             Section 127 of the MRTP Act which requires  consideration in the present case is a provision which  provides, as is clear from its heading itself, for lapsing of  reservation of the lands included in the development plan.   The development authority for utilization of the land for the  purpose for which it is included in the plan has to take steps  and do things within the period stipulated in a particular span  of time, the land having been reserved curtailing the right of  the owner of its user.  Section 127 reads as under: \023127.  Lapsing of reservations.- If any land  reserved, allotted or designated for any purpose  specified in any plan under this Act is not acquired  by agreement within ten years from the date on  which a final Regional Plan, or final Development  Plan comes into force or if proceedings for the  acquisition of such land under this Act or under the  Land Acquisition Act, 1894, are not commenced  within such period, the owner or any person  interested in the land may serve notice on the  Planning Authority, Development Authority or as  the case may be, Appropriate Authority to that  effect; and if within six months from the date of the  service of such notice, the land is not acquired or no  steps as aforesaid are commenced for its  acquisition, the reservation, allotment or  designation shall be deemed to have lapsed, and  thereupon the land shall be deemed to be released   from such reservation, allotment or designation and  shall become available to the owner  for the purpose  of development as otherwise permissible in the case  of adjacent  land under the  relevant plan.\024         Section 127 prescribes two time periods.  First, a period of 10  years within which the acquisition of the land reserved,  allotted or designated has to be completed by agreement from  the date on which a regional plan or development plan comes  into force,  or the proceedings for acquisition of such land  under the MRTP Act or under the LA Act are commenced.   Secondly, if the first part of Section 127 is not complied with  or no steps are taken, then the second part of Section 127 will  come into operation, under which a period of six months is  provided from the date on which the notice has been served by  the owner within which the land has to be acquired or the  steps as aforesaid are to be commenced for its acquisition.    

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The six-month period shall commence from the date the owner  or any person interested in the land serves a notice on the  planning authority, development authority or appropriate  authority expressing his intent claiming de-reservation of the  land. If neither of the things is done, the reservation shall  lapse.  If there is no notice by the owner or any person  interested, there is no question of lapsing reservation,  allotment or designation of the land under the development  plan.  Second part of Section 127 stipulates that the   reservation of the land under a development scheme shall  lapse if the land is not acquired or no steps are taken for  acquisition of the land within the  period of six months from  the date of service of the purchase notice.  The word ‘aforesaid\022  in the collocation of the words \023no steps as aforesaid are  commenced for its acquisition\024 obviously refers to the steps  contemplated by Section 126 of the MRTP Act.   16.             If no proceedings as provided under Section 127 are  taken and as a result thereof the reservation of the land  lapses, the land shall be released from reservation, allotment  or designation and shall be available to the owner for the  purpose of development.  The availability of the land to the  owner for the development would only be for the purpose  which is permissible in the case of adjacent land under the  relevant plan.  Thus, even after the release, the owner cannot  utilize the land in whatever manner he deems fit and proper,  but its utilisation has to be in conformity with the relevant  plan for which the adjacent lands are permitted to be utilized.  17.             It is an admitted position that on 16.9.1991 the  revised development plan was sanctioned and 10 years have  expired on 15.9.2001 without there being any acquisition or  steps being taken for acquisition of the land in question.  On  15.3.2002, the purchase notice under Section 127 was given  by the appellants which was received by the authorities on  19.3.2002.  Under the second part of Section 127, the land  was either required to be acquired or steps in that regard have  to be commenced by 18.9.2002.  For the first time after the  service of purchase notice, on 9.9.2002 a proposal was made  by the Improvement Committee recommending the Municipal  Corporation for sanction to initiate the acquisition  proceedings.  On 13.9.2002 without there being any resolution  by the Municipal Corporation, the Chief Engineer  (Development Plan) sent an application to the State  Government for initiating the acquisition proceedings.  For the  first time on 16.9.2002, a resolution was passed by the  Municipal Corporation whereby sanction was given to initiate  the acquisition proceedings of land and the Municipal  Commissioner was authorised to make an application to the  State Government and on 17.9.2002 a letter was sent by the  Chief Engineer (Development Plan) to the Secretary, Urban  Development Department, Government of Maharashtra for  initiating acquisition proceedings.   Admittedly, in the present  case, the land was neither acquired nor were the steps taken  within 10 years from the date on which the final regional plan  or final development plan came into force.     18.             Shri Shekhar Naphade, Senior Advocate appearing  for the State and Shri Bhim Rao Naik, Senior Advocate  appearing for the Municipal Corporation contended that the  steps were taken on 17.9.2002 when in pursuance of the  resolution passed by the Municipal Corporation of Greater  Mumbai, the Chief Engineer (Development Plan) sent a letter  to the State of Maharashtra enclosing therewith a copy of  Resolution No. 956 dated 16.9.2002, requesting that the steps  be taken for acquisition of the land and this step taken by the  respondents would constitute ‘steps\022 for the acquisition of the  land under clause (c) of Section 126(1) of the MRTP Act, the

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same having been taken on 17.9.2002 when the period of six  months had not expired, the same to be expired on 18.9.2002  and, therefore, the provision of de-reservation under Section  127 would not apply.  19.             It is contended by Shri Soli J. Sorabjee and Shri  U.U. Lalit, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants,  that the intent and purpose of Section 127 of the MRTP Act is  the acquisition of land within six months or the steps are  taken for acquisition of the land within six months, which  could only be when a declaration under Section 6 of the LA Act  is published in the Official Gazette.  It is submitted by the  learned senior counsel that the words \023if within six months  from the date of the service of such notice, the land is not  acquired or no steps as aforesaid are commenced for its  acquisition\024 are not susceptible of a literal construction and  the words have to be given a meaning which safeguards a  citizen against arbitrary and irrational executive action which,  in fact, may not result in acquisition of the land for a long  period to come.    It cannot be doubted that the period of 10  years is a long period where the land of the owner is kept in  reservation.  Section 127 gives an opportunity to the owner for  de-reservation of the land if no steps are taken for acquisition  by the authorities within a period of six months in spite of  service of notice for de-reservation after the period of 10 years  has expired.   20.             While interpreting the purpose of Section 127, this  Court in the matter of Municipal Corporation of Greater  Bombay v. Dr. Hakimwadi Tenants\022 Association and  Others, 1988 (Supp.) SCC 55, has said :  \02311.   \005 It cannot be doubted that a period of 10  years is long enough.  The Development or the  Planning Authority must take recourse to   acquisition with some amount of promptitude in  order that the compensation paid to the  expropriated owner bears a just relation to the real  value of the land as otherwise, the compensation  paid for the acquisition would be wholly illusory.   Such fetter on statutory powers is in the interest of  the general public and the conditions subject to  which they can be exercised must be strictly  followed.\024  

 The Court also said:  \023While the contention of learned counsel appearing  for the appellant that the words ‘six months from  the date of service of such notice\022 in Section 127 of  the Act were not susceptible of a literal  construction, must be accepted, it must be borne in  mind that the period of six months provided by  Section 127 upon the expiry of which the  reservation of the land under a Development Plan  lapses, is a valuable safeguard to the citizen against  arbitrary and irrational executive action.  Section  127 of the Act is a fetter upon the power of eminent  domain.\024

21.             Giving a plain meaning to the words used in the  statute would not be resorted to when there is a sense of  possible injustice.  In such a case, the simple application of  the words in their primary and unqualified sense is not always  sufficient and will sometimes fail to carry out the manifest  intention of law-giver as collected from the statute itself and  the nature of subject-matter and the mischiefs to be remedied.  

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If the plain words lead apparently to do some injustice or  absurdity and at variance with, or not required by, the scope  and object of the legislation, it would be necessary to examine  further and to test, by certain settled rules of interpretation,  what was the real and true intention of the legislature and  thereafter apply the words if they are capable of  being so  applied so as to give effect to that intention. Where the plain  literal interpretation of statutory provision were to manifestly  result in injustice never intended by the legislature, the court  is entitled to modify the language used by the legislature so as  to achieve the intention of the legislature and to produce a  rational construction.  22.             Where the legislature has used words in an Act  which if generally construed, must lead to palpable injustice  and consequences revolting to the mind of any reasonable  man, the court will always endeavour to place on such words a  reasonable limitation, on the ground that the legislature could  not have intended such consequence to ensue, unless the  express language in the Act or binding authority prevents  such limitation being interpolated into the Act.  In construing  an Act, a construction ought not be put that would work  injustice, or even hardship or inconvenience, unless it is clear  that such was the intention of the legislature.  It is also settled  that where the language of the legislature admits of two  constructions and if construction in one way would lead to  obvious injustice, the courts act upon the view that such a  result could not have been intended, unless the intention had  been manifested in express words.  Out of the two  interpretations, that language of the statute should be  preferred to that interpretation which  would frustrate it.  It is  a cardinal rule governing the interpretation of the statutes that  when the language of the legislature admits of two  constructions, the court should not adopt the construction  which would lead to an absurdity or obvious injustice.  It is  equally well settled that within two constructions that  alternative is to be chosen which would be consistent with the  smooth working of the system which the statute purported to  be regulating and that alternative is to be rejected which will  introduce uncertainty, friction or confusion with the working  of the system.  [See Collector of Customs  v. Digvijaysinhji  Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. (1962) 1 SCR 896, at page  899 and His Holiness Kesvananda Bharati  v.  State of  Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461]. 23.             The court must always lean to the interpretation  which is a reasonable one, and discard the literal  interpretation which does not fit in with the scheme of the Act  under consideration. 24.             In series of judgments of this Court, these  exceptional situations have been provided for. In  Narashimaha Murthy  v.  Susheelabai, (1996) 3 SCC 644  (at page 647), it was held that:       \023\005The purpose of law is to prevent  brooding  sense of injustice. It is not the words of the law but  the spirit and eternal sense of it that makes the law  meaningful\005.\024        In the case of American Home Products Corporation v.  Mac Laboratories Pvt. Ltd. and Another, AIR 1986 SC  137 (at page 166, para 66), it was held that:        \023 .. It is a well-known principle of  interpretation of statutes that a construction should  not be put upon a statutory provision which would  lead to manifest absurdity or futility, palpable  injustice, or absurd inconvenience or anomaly. \005\024       

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Further, in the case of State of Punjab v. Sat Ram Das,  AIR 1959 Punj. 497,  the Punjab High Court held that:       \023To avoid absurdity or incongruity,  grammatical and ordinary sense of the words can,  in certain circumstances, be avoided.\024       25.             Many a times, it becomes necessary to look into the  true intention of the legislature in order to give a proper effect  to the statutory provisions and in order to achieve the actual  intended goal behind the legislation. In the case of Tirath  Singh  v.  Bachittar Singh and others, AIR 1955 SC 830 (at  page 833, para 7), it was held by the Court that:       \023\005Where the language of a statute, in its  ordinary meaning and grammatical construction,  leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent  purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience  or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not  intended, a construction may be put upon it which  modifies the meaning of the words and even the  structure of the sentence\024.        The same has been upheld by the Supreme Court in  Commissioner of Income Tax, Bangalore  v.  J.H. Gotla,  AIR 1985 SC 1698 and in Andhra Cotton Mills Ltd.  v.   Lakshmi Ganesh Cotton Mill, (1996) 1 ALT 537 (AP).  Similarly, in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Leela Jain  and Others, AIR 1965 SC 1296 (at page 1299, para 11), it was  held that:  \023\005Unless the words are unmeaning or absurd, it  would not be in accord with any sound principle of  construction to refuse to give effect to the provisions  of a statute on the very elusive ground that to give  them their ordinary meaning leads to consequences  which are not in accord with the notions of  propriety or justice\005\024

26.             Learned senior counsel appearing on both sides  have strongly relied on the decision of this Court in Municipal  Corporation of Greater Bombay  v.  Dr. Hakimwadi  Tenants\022 Association and Others, 1988 (Supp.) SCC 55.  It  is contended by the learned senior counsel for the appellants  that the decision squarely covers the proposition of law  wherein it has been held that the development or the planning  authority must take recourse to acquisition with some amount  of promptitude in order that the compensation paid to the  expropriated owner bears a just relation to the real value of  the land; and that the period of six months provided by  Section 127 upon the expiry of which the reservation of the  land under a development plan lapses, is a valuable safeguard  to the citizens against the arbitrary and irrational executive  action.  Section 127 of the Act is a fetter upon the power of  eminent domain.  On the other hand, the learned senior  counsel for the State submits that if we read para 11 of the  above judgment, it is clearly held that the steps for  commencement of the acquisition obviously refer to the steps  contemplated by Section 126(1) which means the step taken of  making an application under clause (c) of Section 126(1) of the  MRTP Act and has contended  that this Court had already  observed that after the service of notice from the owner or any  person interested in the land as provided under Section 127 of  the MRTP Act, the steps taken within  six months of such  service,  included any step taken by the appropriate authority  for the acquisition of land as contemplated under the  provisions of Section 126 (1) of the MRTP Act. It has been  further contended that such observation of this Court is

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binding as precedent. 27.             At this juncture, it will be appropriate for us to refer  some of the judicial pronouncements to illustrate what  constitutes the binding precedent. This Court in Additional  District Magistrate, Jabalpur   v.  Shivakant Shukla,  (1976) 2 SCC 521 has observed:

\023394. \005The Earl of Halsbury, L.C. said in Quinn v.  Leathem, 1901 AC 495, 506 that the generality of  the expressions which may be found in a judgment  are not intended to be expositions of the whole law  but are governed and qualified by the particular  facts of the case in which such expressions are to  be found. This Court in the State of Orissa v.  Sudhansu Sekhar Misra, (1968) 2 SCR 154, 163,  uttered the caution that it is not a profitable task to  extract a sentence here and there from a judgment  and to build upon it because the essence of the  decision is its ratio and not every observation found  therein\005\024   474. \005when we are considering the observations of  a high judicial authority like this Court, the greatest  possible care must be taken to relate the  observations of a judge to the precise issues before  him and to confine such observations, even though  expressed in broad terms, in the general compass of  the question before him, unless he makes it clear  that he intended his remarks to have a wider ambit.  It is not possible for judges always to express their  judgments so as to exclude entirely the risk that in  some subsequent case their language may be  misapplied and any attempt at such perfection of  expression can only lead to the opposite result of  uncertainty and even obscurity as regards the case  in hand...\024  

In Union of India and Others    v.    Dhanwanti Devi and  Others, (1996) 6 SCC 44, a three-Judge Bench of this Court  has observed as follows:

\0239. \005It is not everything said by a Judge while  giving judgment that constitutes a precedent. The  only thing in a judges\022 decision binding a party is  the principle upon which the case is decided and for  this reason it is important to analyse a decision and  isolate from it the ratio decidendi. According to the  well-settled theory of precedents, every decision  contains three basic postulates - (i) findings of  material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential  finding of facts is the inference which the Judge  draws from the direct, or perceptible facts; (ii)  statements of the principles of law applicable to the  legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii)  judgment based on the combined effect of the  above. A decision is only an authority for what it  actually decides. What is of the essence in a  decision is its ratio and not every observation found  therein nor what logically follows from the various  observations made in the judgment. Every judgment  must be read as applicable to the particular facts  proved, or assumed to be proved, since the  generality of the expressions which may be found  there is not intended to be exposition of the whole  law, but governed and qualified by the particular

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facts of the case in which such expressions are to  be found. It would, therefore, be not profitable to  extract a sentence here and there from the  judgment and to build upon it because the essence  of the decision is its ratio and not every observation  found therein. The enunciation of the reason or  principle on which a question before a court has  been decided is alone binding as a precedent. The  concrete decision alone is binding between the  parties to it, but it is the abstract ratio decidendi,  ascertained on a consideration of the judgment in  relation to the subject matter of the decision, which  alone has the force of law and which, when it is  clear what it was, is binding. It is only the principle  laid down in the judgment that is binding law under  Article 141 of the Constitution. A deliberate judicial  decision arrived at after hearing an argument on a  question which arises in the case or is put in issue  may constitute a precedent, no matter for what  reason, and the precedent by long recognition may  mature into rule of stare decisis. It is the rule  deductible from the application of law to the facts  and circumstances of the case which constitutes its  ratio decidendi.

10. Therefore, in order to understand and  appreciate the binding force of a decision it is  always necessary to see what were the facts in the  case in which the decision was given and what was  the point which had to be decided. No judgment can  be read as if it is a statute. A word or a clause or a  sentence in the judgment cannot be regarded as a  full exposition of law. Law cannot afford to be static  and therefore, Judges are to employ an intelligent  technique in the use of precedents\005\024

Similarly, in Director of Settlements, A.P. and Others      v.     M.R. Apparao and Another, (2002) 4 SCC 638, a Bench  comprising of three Judges, has observed: \0237. \005But what is binding is the ratio of the decision  and not any finding of facts. It is the principle found  out upon a reading of a judgment as a whole, in the  light of the questions before the Court that forms  the ratio and not any particular word or  sentence\005A judgment of the Court has to be read in  the context of questions which arose for  consideration in the case in which the judgment  was delivered. An \023obiter dictum\024 as distinguished  from a ratio decidendi is an observation by the  Court on a legal question suggested in a case before  it but not arising in such manner as to require a  decision...\024  

This Court in Shin-Etsu Chemical Co. Ltd v. Aksh Optifibre  Ltd. and Another, (2005) 7 SCC 234 has observed: \02369. \005if the court thinks that an issue does not  arise, then any observation made with regard to  such an issue would be purely obiter dictum. It is a  well-settled proposition that the ratio decidendi of a  case is the principle of law that decided the dispute  in the facts of the case and, therefore, a decision  cannot be relied upon in support of a proposition  that it did not decide.  [See also: Mittal Engg.  Works (P) Ltd. v. CCE, (1997) 1 SCC 203 at p. 207  (para. 8); Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana, (1997)

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6 SCC 538 at p. 560 (para. 17); Divisional  Controller, KSRTC v. Mahadeva Shetty, (2003) 7  SCC 197 at p. 206 (para. 23).]\005\024

28.             We  will now analyse that whether the observations  of the Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay  Case (supra) as extracted from paragraph 11 of that Judgment  (supra) constituted binding or authoritative precedent with  respect to the question of law arising in the present case. In  Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay Case (supra), the  planning authority had published a draft Development Plan in  which land of a trust property was reserved for a recreation  ground. The Development Plan was finalised and sanctioned  by the State Government on 6.1.1967. The final development  scheme came into effect from 7.2.1967. Since no action had  been taken for acquisition of the land until 1.1.1977, the  owners thereof, i.e., the trustees, served a purchase notice  dated 1.7.1977 on Corporation either to acquire the same or  release it from acquisition, and the same was received on  4.7.1977.  On 28.7.1977 the Corporation\022s Executive Engineer  wrote a letter to the trustees asking information regarding the  ownership of the land and the particulars of the tenants  thereof.  It was also stated that the relevant date under  Section 127 of the MRTP Act would be the date upon which  such information was received. The trustees, by their lawyer\022s  letter dated 3.8.1977, conveyed that the date of six months  stipulated by Section 127 had to be computed from the date of  the receipt from them of the information required and that  Corporation could not make an inquiry at that stage without  taking a decision on the material question. The Executive  Engineer once again wrote to trustees stating that the period  of six months allowed by Section 127 would commence on  4.8.1977, i.e., the date when the requisite information was  furnished. The Corporation passed a resolution dated  10.1.1978 for the acquisition of the land and made an  application to the State Government which on being satisfied  that the land was required for a public purpose issued the  requisite notification dated 7.4.1978 under Section 6 of the LA  Act for acquisition of the land. A petition was filed before the  High Court to quash the aforementioned notification, which  was allowed by the Single Judge and subsequently maintained  by the Division Bench. The contention of the appellant  Corporation before this Court was that the period of six  months after the notice by the owner or any person interested  in the land as specified under section 127, would start from  date when such person had provided the requisite information  to the Corporation. 29.             In light of the above-mentioned factual matrix, the  question of law involved in the Municipal Corporation of  Greater Bombay Case (supra) was as follows:

\0232. The short point involved in this appeal by  special leave from a judgment of a Division Bench of  the Bombay High Court dated June 18, 1986, is  whether the period of six months specified in  Section 127 of the Act is to be reckoned from the  date of service of the purchase notice dated July 1,  1977 by the owner on the Planning Authority i.e.  the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay here,  or the date on which the requisite information of  particulars is furnished by the owner.\024       The Court has answered the above question as follows: \0237. According to the plain reading of Section 127 of  the Act, it is manifest that the question whether the

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reservation has lapsed due to the failure of the  Planning Authority to take any steps within a period  of six months of the date of service of the notice of  purchase as stipulated by Section 127, is a mixed  question of fact and law. It would therefore be  difficult, if not well nigh impossible, to lay down a  rule of universal application. It cannot be posited  that the period of six months would necessarily  begin to run from the date of service of a purchase  notice under Section 127 of the Act. The condition  pre-requisite for the running of time under Section  127 is the service of a valid purchase notice. It is  needless to stress that the Corporation must prima  facie be satisfied that the notice served was by the  owner of the affected land or any person interested  in the land. But, at the same time, Section 127 of  the Act does not contemplate an investigation into  title by the officers of the Planning Authority, nor  can the officers prevent the running of time if there  is a valid notice\005\024       30.              Thus, after perusing the judgment in Municipal  Corporation of Greater Bombay Case (supra),  we have  found that the question for consideration before the Court in  the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay Case (supra)  has reference to first step required to be taken by the owner  after lapse of 10 years\022 period without any step taken by the  authority for acquisition of land, whereby the owners of the  land served the notice for dereservation of the land. The Court  was not called upon to decide the case on the substantial step,  namely, the step taken by the authority within six months of  service of notice by the owners for dereservation of their land  which is second step required to be taken by the authority  after service of notice. The observations of this Court regarding  the linking of word \021aforesaid\022 from the wordings \021no steps as  aforesaid are commenced for its acquisition\022 of Section 127 with  the steps taken by the competent authority for acquisition of  land as provided under Section 126(1) of the MRTP Act, had  no direct or substantial nexus either with the factual matrix or  any of the legal issues raised before it. It is apparent that no  legal issues, either with respect to interpretation of words \021no  steps as aforesaid are commenced for its acquisition\022 as  stipulated under the provisions of Section 127 or any link of  these words with steps to be taken on service of notice, were  contended before the Court. Thus, observations of the Court  did not relate to any of the legal questions arising in the case  and, accordingly, cannot be considered as the part of ratio  decidendi.  Hence, in light of the aforementioned judicial  pronouncements, which have well settled the proposition that  only the ratio decidendi can act as the binding or authoritative  precedent, it is clear that the reliance placed on mere general  observations or casual expressions of the Court, is not of  much avail to the respondents. 31.             When we conjointly read Sections 126 and 127 of  the MRTP Act, it is apparent that the legislative intent is to  expeditiously acquire the land reserved under the Town  Planning Scheme and, therefore, various periods have been  prescribed for acquisition of the owner\022s property.  The intent  and purpose of the provisions of Sections 126 and 127 has  been well explained in Municipal Corporation of Greater  Bombay Case (supra).  If the acquisition is left for a time  immemorial in the hands of the concerned authority by simply  making an application to the State Government for acquiring  such land under the LA Act, 1894, then the authority will  simply move such an application and if no such notification is

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issued by the State Government for one year of the publication  of the draft regional plan under Section 126(2) read with  Section 6 of the LA Act, wait for the notification to be issued by  the State Government by exercising suo motu power under  sub-section (4) of Section 126; and till then no declaration  could be made under Section 127 as regards lapsing of  reservation and contemplated declaration of land being  released and available for the land owner for his utilization as  permitted under Section 127.  Section 127 permitted inaction  on the part of the acquisition authorities for a period of 10  years for de-reservation of the land.  Not only that, it gives a  further time for either to acquire the land or to take steps for  acquisition of the land within a period of six months from the  date of service of notice by the land owner for de-reservation.   The steps towards commencement of the acquisition in such a  situation would necessarily be the steps for acquisition and  not a step which may not result into acquisition and merely  for the purpose of seeking time so that Section 127 does not  come into operation.  Providing the period of six months after  the service of notice clearly indicates the intention of the  legislature of an urgency where nothing has been done in  regard to the land reserved under the plan for a period of 10  years and the owner is deprived of the utilization of his land as  per the user permissible under the plan.  When mandate is  given in a Section requiring compliance within a particular  period, the strict compliance is required thereof as  introduction of this Section is with legislative intent to balance  the power of the State of \023eminent domain\024.  The State  possessed the power to take or control the property of the  owner for the benefit of public cause, but when the State so  acted, it was obliged to compensate the injured upon making  just compensation.  Compensation provided to the owner is  the release of the land for keeping the land under reservation  for 10 years without taking any steps for acquisition of the  same.  The underlying principle envisaged in Section 127 of  the MRTP Act is either to utilize the land for the purpose it is  reserved in the plan in a given time or let the owner utilize the  land for the purpose it is permissible under the Town Planning  Scheme.  The step taken under the Section within the time  stipulated should be towards acquisition of land.  It is a step  of acquisition of land and not step for acquisition of land.  It is  trite that failure of authorities to take steps which result in  actual commencement of acquisition of land cannot be  permitted to defeat the purpose and object of the scheme of  acquisition under the MRTPAct by merely moving an  application requesting the Government to acquire the land,  which Government may or may not accept.  Any step which  may or may not culminate in the step for acquisition cannot  be said to be a step towards acquisition. 32.             It may also be noted that the legislature while  enacting Section 127 has deliberately used the word ‘steps\022 (in  plural and not in singular) which are required to be taken for  acquisition of the land.   On construction of Section 126 which  provides for acquisition of the land under the MRTP Act, it is  apparent that the steps for acquisition of the land would be  issuance of the declaration under Section 6 of the LA Act.   Clause (c) of Section 126(1) merely provides for a mode by  which the State Government can be requested for the  acquisition of the land under Section 6 of the LA Act.  The  making of an application to the State Government for  acquisition of the land would not be a step for acquisition of  the land under reservation.  Sub-section (2) of Section 126  leaves it open to the State Government either to permit the  acquisition or not to permit, considering the public purpose for  which the acquisition is sought for by the authorities.  Thus,

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the steps towards acquisition would really commence when  the State Government permits the acquisition and as a result  thereof publishes the declaration under Section 6 of the LA  Act.  33.             The MRTP Act does not contain any reference to  Section 4 or Section 5A of the LA Act.  The MRTP Act  contains  the provisions relating to preparation of regional plan, the  development plan, plans for comprehensive developments,  town planning schemes and in such plans and in the  schemes, the land is reserved for public purpose.  The  reservation of land for a particular purpose under the MRTP  Act is done through a complex exercise which begins with land  use map, survey, population studies and several other  complex factors.  This process replaces the provisions of  Section 4 of the LA Act and the inquiry contemplated under  Section 5A of the LA Act.  These provisions are purposely  excluded for the purposes of acquisition under the MRTP Act.     The acquisition commences with the publication of   declaration under Section 6 of the LA Act.  The publication of  the declaration under sub-sections (2) and (4) of Section 126  read with Section 6 of the LA Act is a sine qua non for the  commencement of any proceedings for acquisition under the  MRTP Act.  It is Section 6 declaration which would commence  the acquisition proceedings under the MRTP Act and would  culminate into passing of an award as provided in sub-section  (3) of Section 126 of the MRTP Act.  Thus, unless and until  Section 6 declaration is issued, it cannot be said that the steps  for acquisition are commenced. 34.             There is another aspect of the matter.  If we read  Section 126 of the MRTP Act and the words used therein are  given the verbatim meaning,  then the steps commenced for  acquisition of the land would not include making of an  application under Section 126(1)(c) or the declaration which is  to be made by the State Government under sub-section (2) of  Section 126 of the MRTP Act. 35.             On a conjoint reading of sub-sections (1), (2) and (4)  of Section 126, we notice that Section 126 provides for  different steps which are to be taken by the authorities for   acquisition of the land in different eventualities and within a  particular time span.  Steps taken for acquisition of the land  by the authorities under clause (c) of Section 126(1) have to be  culminated into Section 6 declaration under the LA Act for  acquisition of the land in the Official Gazette, within a period  of one year under the proviso to sub-section (2)  of Section  126.  If no such declaration is made within the time  prescribed, no declaration under Section 6 of the LA Act could  be issued under the proviso to sub-section (2) and no further  steps for acquisition of the land could be taken in pursuance  of the application moved to the State Government  by the  planning authority or other authority.  Proviso to sub-section  (2) of Section 126 prohibits publication of the declaration after  the expiry of one year from the date of publication of draft  regional plan, development plan or any other plan or scheme.   Thus, from the date of publication of the draft regional plan,  within one year an application has to be moved under clause  (c) of Section 126(1) which should culminate into a declaration  under Section 6 of the LA Act.  As per the proviso to sub- section (2) of Section 126, the maximum period permitted  between the publication of a draft regional plan and  declaration by the Government in the Official Gazette under  Section 126(2) is one year.   In other words, during one year of  the publication of the draft regional plan, two steps need to be  completed, namely, (i) application by the appropriate authority  to the State Government under Section 126(1)(c); and (ii)  declaration by the State Government on receipt of the

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application mentioned in clause (c) of Section 126(1) on  satisfaction of the conditions specified under Section 126(2).   The only exception to this provision has been given under  Section 126(4).  In the present case, the amended regional  plan was published in the year 1991.  Thereafter, the steps by  making an application under clause (c) of sub-section (1) of  Section 126 for issuance of the declaration of acquisition and  the declaration itself has to be made within the period of one  year from the date of the publication of  regional plan, that is,  within the period of one year from 1991.  The application  under Section 126(1)(c) could be said to be a step taken for  acquisition of the land if such application is moved within the  period of one year from the date of publication of regional  plan.  The application moved after the expiry of one year could  not result in the publication of declaration in the manner  provided under Section 6 of the LA Act, under sub-section (2)  of Section 126 of the MRTP Act, there being a prohibition  under the proviso to issue such declaration after one year.  Therefore, by no stretch of imagination, the step taken by the  Municipal Corporation under Section 126(1)(c) of making an  application could be said to be a step for the commencement  of acquisition of the land.  After the expiry of one year, it is left  to the Government concerned under sub-section (4) of Section  126 to issue declaration under Section 6 of the LA Act for the  purposes of acquisition for which no application is required  under Section 126(1)(c).  Sub-section (4) of Section 126 of the  MRTP Act would come into operation if the State Government  is of the view that the land is required to be acquired for any  public purpose. 36.               The High Court has committed an apparent error  when it held that the steps taken by the respondent- Corporation on 9.9.2002 and 13.9.2002 would constitute  steps as required under Section 126(1)(c) of the MRTP Act.   What is required under Section 126(1)(c) is that the  application is to be moved to the State Government for  acquiring the land under the LA Act by the planning/local  authority.  Passing of a resolution by the Improvement  Committee recommending that the steps be taken under  Section 126(1)(c) or making an application by the Chief  Engineer without there being any authority or resolution  passed by the Municipal Corporation, could not be taken to be  steps taken of moving an application before the State  Government for acquiring the land under the LA Act.  The  High Court has committed an apparent error in relying on  these two documents for reaching the conclusion that the  steps for acquisition had been commenced by the Municipal  Corporation before the expiry of period of six months which  was to expire on 18.9.2002.  Further, if we look at the letter  dated 17.9.2002 which, as per the counsel for the respondent- Corporation, is a request made by the Municipal Corporation  to the State Government under clause (c) of Section 126(1), we  cannot agree with the submissions of the respondents.  The  letter itself shows that the resolution was passed by the  Municipal Corporation on 16.9.2002 whereby it was informed  that the sanction had been accorded to initiate the acquisition  proceedings for the land in question.  The letter also  mentioned that the authorization had been given to the  Municipal Commissioner to make an application to the State  Government as per the provisions of Section 126(1) of the  MRTP Act.   Under Section 2(19) read with Section 2(15)  with  Section 126(1)  of the MRTP Act, the application to the State  Government under clause (c) of Section 126(1) has to be made  by the planning/local authority, i.e. the  Municipal  Corporation of Greater Mumbai constituted under the Bombay  Municipal Corporation Act.   The Municipal Corporation had

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passed a resolution delegating authority to Municipal  Commissioner for making an application to the State  Government, but the application/letter either dated 13.9.2002  or 17.9.2002 were made to the State Government by the Chief  Engineer (Development Plan).  The authority was given by the  Municipal Corporation to the Municipal Commissioner to  make an application to the State Government.  No such  application or letter moved by the Municipal Commissioner  has been produced before us.  On being asked by this Court,  as many as six documents have been produced before us by  the counsel for the Municipal Corporation who has stated  before us that these documents were also placed before the  Division Bench of the Bombay High Court.  Therefore, we have  permitted production of these documents before us.  On a  minute and careful scrutiny of the documents produced before  us, we do not find that the application under clause (c) of  Section 126(1) was moved by the officer authorized by the  Municipal Corporation, i.e. the Municipal Commissioner, to  the State Government for acquisition of the land, so that it  could be said that steps as contemplated were taken for the  commencement of acquisition proceedings. 37.             In view of our decision on the interpretation and  applicability of Section 127 of the MRTP Act to the facts of the  present case, the appellants are entitled to the relief claimed,  and the other question argued on the applicability of the newly  inserted Section 11A of the LA Act to the acquisition of land  made under the MRTP Act need not require to be considered  by us in this case.   38.             For the aforesaid reasons, the impugned judgment  and order dated 18.3.2005 passed by the Division Bench of  the Bombay High Court is set aside and this appeal is allowed.   As no steps have been taken by the Municipal Corporation for  acquisition of the land within the time period, there is deemed  de-reservation of the land in question and the appellants are  permitted to utilise the land as permissible under Section 127  of the MRTP Act.