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PETITIONER: M/S. CHETAK CONSTRUCTION LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: OM PRAKASH & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       20/04/1998

BENCH: A.S. ANAND, K. VENKATASWAMI

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                             AND In the  matter of  reference of  Hon’ble Single Judge of the High Court  of Madhya  Pradesh, Bench  at Indore  dated 16th May, 1997 submitted in Misc. Appln. No. 1437/1994).                       J U D G M E N T DR. ANAND, J.,      Special leave granted.      This judgment will dispose of the appeal arising out of S.L.P. (C)  NO. 13190  of 1997  and an  ‘order’  made  by  a learned single  Judge (Mr.  Justice R.D.  Vyas) of  the High Court of  Madhya Pradesh  (Indore  Bench)  in  Miscellaneous Appeal 143  of 1994 directing the appeal to "be referred to" this Court  for deciding  it "finally"  since  both  matters arise out of the same order.      Notice of  some salient facts is necessary for disposal of the matter before us.      Dispute between  the parties  relates to  land  bearing No.8/1  and   8/2,  M.G.  Road,  Indore.  According  to  the appellant, the suit land belongs to various members of Hindu Undivided Family,  who had entered into an agreement with it to  sell   that  land.   An  agreement   containing  various stipulations is  stated to  have been  executed between  the parties. According  to the  appellant, it  had paid  certain amounts, out  of the total sale price and had got registered a sale  deed executed  for 13 out of 28 portions of the suit land the  execution of  sale deeds,  in respect of remaining portions  of  the  suit  land,  however,  remained  pending. According to  the appellant,  there was interference, by the respondents, with  the appellant’s  possession of  the  suit land and  it therefore  filed a  suit  for  declaration  and permanent injunction  in  the  Trial  Court.  The  suit  was resisted by  the contesting  respondents on  various rounds. Initially, the  Trial, Court  granted an  ex parte temporary injunction to  the appellant but the same came to be vacated after hearing  both  sides  by  an  order  dated  15.3.1994. Against, the  order of  the Trial Court dated 15.3.1994, the appellant filed  Misc. Appeal  No. 143  of 1994. That appeal was decided  by a  learned single  Judge (Mr.  Justice  R.D. Vyas) on  20.2.1995.  Against,  the  order  of  the  learned single, Judge,  Civil Appeal  No.7460 of 1995 arising out of

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S.L.P. (C)  No.8590 of  1995 was  filed in  this Court.  The order of  the learned  single Judge  dated 20.2.95  was  set aside  on  21.8.1995  and  Misc.  Appeal  No.  143/1994  was remanded for  it fresh  disposal. After the order of remand, the appeal  was again listed before the learned single Judge (Mr. Justice  R.D.Vyas). It  appears that due to the absence of Shri  Andhayarujina,  Senior  Advocate,  who  had  partly argued the  appeal on behalf of the appellants but could not appear to  continue with  the arguments  as his  wife had to undergo some  urgent  surgery,  the  part-heard  appeal  was dismissed on 25.6.1996. (We are refraining from dealing with various proceedings  which took  place  before  the  learned single Judge  after order  of remand  dated 21.8.1995 or the merits of  the order  dismissing the  appeal on 25.6.1996 as the same  are not  relevant for  the purpose of this order). Aggrieved, by  the order  of the  learned single Judge dated 25.6.1996, dismissing  Misc. Appeal  No. 143  of 1994, after remand, the  appellant once  again approached  this Court by filing SLP  (C) No. 15262 of 1996. It was inter alia pleaded that failure  of Shri  Andhyarujina  to  continue  with  the arguments, on  account of  the  illness  of  his  wife,  was bonafide and  that instead  of dismissing  the  appeal,  the learned single  Judge could  have adjourned it. Civil Appeal No. 13201/96 arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 15262 of 1996 was allowed by this Court on 11th October, 1996, on a concession made by learned counsel for the respondents and the case was once again  remanded to the learned single Judge for hearing arguments of  the parties and deciding the appeal on merits. While disposing  of C.A.  No.13201/96, this court inter alia observed:-      "In view of the concession  made by      learned counsel for the respondents      the Order dated 25.6.96 in M.A. No.      143 of  1994 is  hereby set  aside.      The case is remanded to the learned      Judge counsel  for the appellant is      directed  to   appear  before   the      learned Judge of the High Court who      was hearing  the arguments  and who      made  the  impugned  order,  either      personally or  through his counsel,      on 4th of November 1996. We request      the learned  Judge to  take up  the      matter on  that date  and  if  that      date  is   not  convenient  to  the      Bench, to  fix some  other date for      continuation of  the arguments. The      appellant  shall   not   seek   any      further   adjournment   while   the      arguments are  being heard  on  the      date fixed  by the  learned  Judge.      The  learned   Judge  shall   after      hearing the  arguments make a fresh      order in accordance with law."      After remand  the appeal was listed for continuation of arguments before the learned single Judge.      It transpires  from the  record  that  on  2.11.96,  an affidavit  was   filed  by  the  company  Secretary  of  the appellant, before the learned single Judge (Mr. Justice R.D. Vyas) stating therein that respondent No.3 in the appeal had been residing  in flat  No. 101 of Nikita Apts. and that the appellant had  now learnt  that said flat had been purchased by the  learned single  Judge and had been let out by him to The  State   Bank  of   Indore.  It  was  stated  that  this information was not available with the appellant earlier and

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had not  been  disclosed  by  respondent  No.3  either.  The learned single  Judge was,  therefore, requested  to take an appropriate decision  whether to  hear the appeal or not. To the  said   affidavit,  Respondent   No.3  filed  a  counter affidavit on  4.11.1996 stating  therein that he had shifted from the flat in question. It was, however, not disclosed in the counter  affidavit as  to in  which capacity  Respondent No.3 had been living in the flat which had been purchased by the learned single Judge. In the counter filed by respondent No.3, there  was also no denial of the fact that the flat in question had  in fact  been purchased  by the learned single Judge, during the pendency of the appeal. Proceedings of the court reveal  that after the counter was filed by respondent No.3, the  appeal was, adjourned by the court "to enable the parties to  reach at  some settlement".  On the  next  date, however, it  was reported  to the  court that  no settlement could take  place and  the learned  single  Judge  thereupon directed the hearing of the appeal on merits.      On 30.11.1996,  the company  secretary of the appellant filed an  application, I,A,  No. 6079/96 in Misc. Appeal No. 143/94.      In paragraph 1 of the application it was averred:           "That  on  the  last  date  of      hearing  i.e.   on  4.11.1996   the      present appellant  had respectfully      drawn    your    Lordship’s    kind      attention to the fact that the flat      No.101,    situated    in    Nikita      apartments,  at   3,   R.K.   Puram      Colony, near  Amaltas Hotel on A.B.      Road, Indore,  was occupied  by the      respondent    No.3    Shri    Vijay      Khandelwal and  appear to have been      purchased by your Lordship and that      this  transaction   had  not   been      disclosed by the respondent No.3 at      any time during the pendency of the      present  appeal.   On   this   date      appellant   had    requested   your      Lordship to decide appropriately in      the matter  whether  your  Lordship      would hear  the  matter.  With  the      said application  the appellant had      also  submitted   a  copy   of  the      documents  evidencing   service  of      summons of  the suit  in the  trial      court on  the  respondent  No.3  on      24.4.1993 at  the flat in question.      The appellant  had also submitted a      copy of the voters list showing the      respondent No.3  to be the resident      of the said building. The appellant      had  also  submitted  copy  of  the      letter written  by your Lordship to      the State  Bank of  India  offering      this flat on rent and the appellant      had mentioned that Shri A.N.Borkar,      an officer of the Bank was residing      in this  flat  as  your  Lordship’s      tenant."      In paragraph 5 of the application, it was stated:-           "That   on    22.11.1996   the      appellant has  obtained a certified      copy of the sale deed by which your      Lordship has  purchased this  flat.

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    The sale was made by an attorney in      favour of  your Lordship giving the      purchaser’s  address   as  5,  High      Court Judges  Bungalows, Vastrapur,      Ahmedabad, Gujarat.  Para 2  page 4      of the  sale deed  states that  the      apartment  was   in  a   incomplete      condition having  been  constructed      only  upon  the  stage  of  column,      beam, and  roof slab  and that  all      the balance  construction  work  of      the flat  was yet  to be  done. The      sale consideration  as mentioned in      para 3  is Rs.  1,93,009/-, out  of      which Rs.  10,000/-  is  stated  to      have been  received cash  while Rs.      1,83,009/- is  stated to  have been      received  on   various   dates   by      various modes.  It  is  significant      that it  is not  stated whether the      aggregate amount  of Rs. 1,83,009-/      was paid  by cheque/cash. Para 4 of      the sale  deed also  mentions  that      the possession of the Flat had been      handed over  to your  Lordship  on"      ___________ 1994".      In paragraph  7 of  the application  it was stated that receipt of  consideration mentioned  in the  sale  deed  was "vague" and  that though  the total  sale consideration  was stated to  be Rs.  1,93 lakhs,  the learned single Judge had "obtained a  loan of  Rs.3.25 lakhs  on this  flat from  the Housing Development Finance Corporation Limited, Indore."      In paragraph 8 it was stated:-           "That the  sale deed  mentions      that the possession of the flat was      delivered to your Lordship in 1994.      Hence, the payment of Rs.1,83 lakhs      must have  been  made  before  this      date. On  the other hand it appears      from the record that the respondent      No.3 was  living in  this flat upto      two months prior to 4.9.1995."      It was thus, implied that respondent No.3 was living in the flat in question even after the flat was purchased by the learned single Judge and possession delivered to him.      The application ended with the following prayer:           "In view  of the  above  facts      and  circumstances,  the  appellant      humbly requests  your  Lordship  to      reuse  or   relieve  yourself  from      hearing this  case  and  to  direct      that  the   matter  may  be  listed      before any  other Hon’ble  Judge of      this Court for hearing."      Ms.  Indira   Jaisingh,  senior  advocate  argued  this application and  drew the  attention of  the learned  single Judge to  the facts contained therein. Copy of the sale deed evidencing purchase of Flat No.101, Nikita Apartments, at 3, R.K. Puram  Colony, by the learned single Judge along with a copy of  the letter  written by  the learned single Judge to the state Bank of Indore, offering that flat on rent as well as report  of the  process server  with regard to service of summons in  the suit on respondent no. 3 on 24.4.1993 at the address of  the flat in question and certain other documents were relied upon and referred to in the court with a view to

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support the  averments contained  in  the  application.  Ms. Jaisingh,  learned   senior  advocate   for  the   appellant therefore, requested  the learned  single  Judge  to  recuse himself from  the appeal and let the appeal be heard by some other Judge "in the interest of Justice". The learned single Judge, seems  to have  taken an  exception to the request of the learned  counsel, the  existence  of  various  documents etc., notwithstanding. It was at this stage that the learned single Judge (Vyas, J.), made the order, impugned in SLP (c) No. 13190 of 1997.      In the course of the impugned order, the learned single Judge observed in paragraph 9:-           "Certain things  were tried to      be argued  in the said application,      which  has  no  concern  with  this      case, only  to twist the matter and      malign me  & proceedings. But I did      not  make   that  as  an  issue  of      prestige,  since   I   am   in   no      obligation  to   the  appellant  to      clarify his  misrepresentations.  I      have pointed  out to  Miss Jaisingh      that  no  reasonable  person  would      have  any  apprehension  much  less      great or genuine apprehension about      my purchase  of the  flat after  my      clarification in  the open court as      aforesaid, she  would still persist      on  my   recusing  the  matter  and      direct it  to be placed before some      other judge.      Again in  paragraph 12  of the  impugned order  it  was observed:-           "Prior  to   the   filing   of      affidavit  dated  1.11.96  by  Shri      Sharad Kabra for the appellant, and      around that  time, now  I  am  sure      that it  must be  on behalf  of the      appellant alone that I was tried to      be influenced in the name of lawyer      from Ahmedabad,  one H.D.  Vasavada      on S.T.D.  Phone. Since I declined,      perhaps   the    application    for      recusing  the  matter  came  to  be      filed by  the appellant. It is only      after       this        application      I.A.No.6079/96 has  been  filed.  I      feel that the S.T.D. call must have      been   at   the   behest   of   the      appellant."      Paragraphs 14 of the order reads:-           "14. However,  looking to  the      controversy as  it has developed as      also from  the fact  that in Indore      and  elsewhere  there  is  a  group      persons  (including  possibly  some      lawyers  since  there  are  genuine      reasons  for   me  and   my   other      brothers Judges to feel so) who are      out  to   malign  or  browbeat  the      judges to act to their tune. Few of      the Pamphlets  were circulated with      respect to  some of  the  Honorable      Judges  including   of  the  Judges      sitting in  the apex  court,  which

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    are kept  in file to appreciate the      whole position.  It is  in the wake      of such  circumstances, I felt that      time has come that the courts put a      very heavy  foot on  those who  are      indulging in  the dirty  tricks  by      trying    to     manipulate     the      proceedings, choosing  or  avoiding      the forums,  through  the  lawyers,      who cannot  argue,  but  for  their      active interest  indulgence in such      activities.      In paragraph 15 of the order, it is observed:           15. In  some of  the instances      in M.P.  & Other  High Courts,  the      High Courts  had  to  sentence  the      Advocates   and    litigants    for      contempt  of   the  court  in  such      circumstances  and  the  orders  of      sentence  are   confirmed  by   the      Honorable the Supreme Court. I feel      that this  is the  fittest case  to      refer  to  the  Supreme  Court  for      taking     appropriate      actions      including   contempt    of    court      proceedings and demarcate the lines      for conduct  by the lawyers and the      litigants in the courts."      Dealing with  the conduct  of lawyers  and litigants in the court,  this Court  in Jaswant  Singh Vs. Virender Singh (1995 (supp.1) SCC 384), observed:      "It  is  most  unbefitting  for  an      advocate   to    make   imputations      against the  Judge only  because he      does not  get the  expected result,      which according  to him is the fair      and reasonable  result available to      him. Judges  cannot be  intimidated      to  seek  favourable  orders.  Only      because a lawyer appears as a party      in person he does not get a licence      thereby to  commit contempt  of the      court by  intimidating the Judge or      scandalising the  courts. He cannot      use   language,   either   in   the      pleadings  or   during   arguments,      which  is   either  intemperate  or      unparliamentary.  These  safeguards      are not  for the  protection of any      Judge    individually    but    are      essential   for   maintaining   the      dignity and  decorum of  the courts      and  for   touchy   to   fair   and      reasonable   criticism   of   their      judgments. Fair  comments, even if,      outspoken,  but  made  without  any      malice or  attempting to impair the      administration of  justice and made      in good  faith, in proper language,      do not  attract any  punishment for      contempt of  court.  However,  when      from  the   criticism   deliberate,      motivated and calculated attempt is      discernible to bring down the image      of judiciary  in the  estimation of

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    the  public   or  to   impair   the      administration of  justice or  tend      to  bring   the  administration  of      justice into  disrepute the  courts      must bestir  themselves  to  uphold      their dignity  and the  majesty  of      law.    The     appellant,     has,      undoubtedly committed  contempt  of      court by  the use  of objectionable      and intemperate language. No system      of  justice   can   tolerate   such      unbridled licence  on the part of a      person, be  he a  lawyer, to permit      himself the liberty of scandalising      a  court  by  casting  unwarranted,      uncalled   for    and   unjustified      aspersions   on    the   integrity,      ability, impartiality  or  fairness      of a  Judge in the discharge of his      judicial functions as it amounts to      an interference with the due course      of administration of justice."      Indeed, no  lawyer or litigant can be permitted to brow beat the  court or malign the presiding officers with a view to get  a favourable  order. Judges  shall not  be  able  to perform their duties freely and fairly if such activities of justice would  become a  casualty  and  Rule  of  Law  would receive a  set back.  The Judges are obliged to decide cases impartially and  without any  fear or  favour.  Lawyers  and litigants cannot,  be allowed to "terrorize" or "intimidate" judges with  a view to "secure" orders which they want. This is  basic   and  fundamental  and  no  civilised  system  of administration of  justice  can  permit  it.  We  certainly, cannot approve of any attempt on the part of any litigant to go "forum shopping". A litigant cannot be permitted ‘choice’ of the ‘forum’ and every attempt at "forum shopping" must be crushed with a heavy hand.      At the  same  time,  it  is  of  utmost  importance  to remember that  Judges must  act as  impartial  referees  and decide cases  objectively, uninfluenced by any personal bias or prejudice. A Judge should not allow his judicial position to be  compromised  at  any  cost.  This  is  essential  for maintaining the  integrity of  the  institution  and  public confidence in  it. The credibility of this institution rests on the  fairness and  impartiality  of  the  Judges  at  all levels. It  is the  principle of highest importance, for the proper administration  of justice, that judicial powers must be exercised  impartially and  within  the  bounds  of  law. Public confidence  in the  judiciary rests  on legitimacy of judicial  process.   Sources  of   legitimacy  are   in  the impersonal application  by the Judge of recognised objective principles  which   owe  their  existence  to  a  system  as distinguished from subjective moods, predilections, emotions and prejudices.  Judges must  always ensure that they do not allow the  credibility of  the institution  to be eroded. We must always  remember that justice must not only be done but it must also be seen to be done.      In the  instant case,  the learned single Judge, having been apprised  of the  facts and  circumstances of the case, rightly did  not continue to hear the appeal and in doing so he acted  in a  manner expected of the Judge. However, while technically recusing  himself, the  learned Judge appears to have given  vent to his feelings and made comments, which we say with respect to the learned Judge, were uncalled for and unwarranted - those betray objective consideration and to an

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extent  demonstrates   subjective   predilections.   It   is subversive of  judicial sobriety.  The order  of the learned single Judge radiates more heat than light.      We are  unable to  appreciate or fathom the reasons for the ‘general’  observations made  by the  learned  Judge  in paragraphs  14   and  15  of  the  impugned  order  (supra). Generalisations are  best avoided.  We  are  at  a  loss  to understand the  necessity to  refer to  certain "pamphlets", unconnected with the case and to make one of those pamphlets concerning a  sitting Judge  of this Court (since retired) a part of  the judicial record when it had no relevance to the instant case.  In doing  so, there  appears to  be something more than  what meets the eye. Reference made is totally out of context  what some lawyer had been doing in the past, was hardly of  any consequence  for deciding  the merits  of the application - IA No. 6079/96 - which was being heared by the learned single  Judge and  was disposed  of by  the impugned order. The only question before the learned single Judge was : whether  on the facts, as disclosed in the application and supported by  documentary evidence, the learned single Judge should have continued to hear the appeal or recused himself?      We have  also not been able to appreciate the object of the "disclosure"  made in paragraph 12 of the order (supra). Did the  learned Judge  verify the correct position? Was the appellant put  on notice  or  taken  to  task,  if  what  is attributed to  the appellant  is correct?  Was any record of the STD call maintained? Why all of a sudden this disclosure was made  and that too with the emphasis that "now I am sure that it  (telephone call) must be on behalf of the appellant alone, that  I was tried to be influenced in the name of the lawyer from  Ahmedabad" and  again "I feel that the STD call must have  been at the bejest of the applicant". Without any other material  on the  record, the  submission  of  learned counsel  for   the  appellant   that  the  observations  are conjectural in  nature and  are not  backed by  any proof of factual accuracy cannot be dismissed as wholly untenable. It was open  to the  learned Judge  to have  enquired into  the matter and take appropriate action. He did not do so. He let the matter rest. Why then was it suddenly made a part of the impugned order?  Paragraph 12  of the  order in  our opinion conceals more  than what it reveals. We do not wish to carry this aspect any further and say nomore.      The learned  single Judge  completely faultered when he "referred" this  appeal (Misc.  Appeal No. 143/1994) to this Court for ‘final hearing’. The "unusual" direction contained in paragraph 17 of the order reads:      "It is  therefore directed that the      appeal No.  143/94 be  referred  to      Honorable   Supreme    Court    for      deciding it  with a suggestion that      rather than  remand to  me  or  any      other judges  of any  High Court to      save judiciary  from that maligning      and malignant  activities; the same      be decided there only finally."                     (emphasis ours)      We are,  to say the least, surprised at this direction. It  is   without  any   jurisdictional  authority  or  legal sanction. The learned Judge innovated a procedure unknown to law. It  is improper  for a  Judge  of  the  High  Court  to "direct" that an appeal pending before him be decided by the Supreme Court  itself "finally"  and to further suggest that this court  should not  "remand the  appeal" to  the learned single Judge  or to  any other  Judge of any High Court". We are unable  to find  the existence of any authority or power

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in a single Judge of the High Court to make such an order of "remand" to  the Supreme Court ! ! The direction, to say the least, is  subversive  of  proper  judicial  discipline.  By asking this  court to "finally" decide the appeal and not to "remand" it  to any Judge in the country, the learned single Judge appears  to have arrogated to himself a power which he does not  possess. The  learned single Judge should have, in the facts and circumstances of the case, referred the appeal to the  Chief Justice  of the  High Court  with a request to assign the  same to any other Judge in that High Court. That would have  been the proper course to follow. If the learned single  Judge   by  making   the  "direction"   (supra)  was exhibiting his  annoyance over the two earlier remand orders made by  different benches  of this Court in the same appeal setting aside  the orders  made by  the learned single Judge against the  same appellant,  it was  wholly unjustified and uncalled for.  Much ink  and paper  has been  used,  besides spending judicial time, to make the order impugned before us when it  was otherwise  a simple matter. The facts contained in the application (I.A. No. 6079/96) to which reference has been made  above supported  by documentary  evidence, should have made  the learned Judge to himself, decline to hear the appeal by  a  simple  order  irrespective  of  the  question whether the  disclosed facts  could have made any difference in the  ultimate order  to be  made by him in the appeal. It would bear repetition to emphasis that justice must not only be done  but also  be seen  to be  done. In  the established facts and  circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that the request  of the appellant to the learned single Judge to recuse himself  from hearing  the appeal  on  merits  was  a wholly unjustified  request. Even  if it  be assumed  and we have no  reason no  to so  assume, that  there was  no  such connection between  respondent No.3  and the  learned single Judge as  to influence  his ultimate  judgment in the appeal pending before  him but  when certain  facts were brought to his notice,  which could  give rise  to a reasonable and not fanciful apprehension  that the  trial may  not be fair, the learned single  Judge should  have recused  himself from the appeal  in  keeping  with  the  highest  traditions  of  the judiciary. Discretion,  after all,  is better part of valor. We find  the reference/  ‘direction’ untenable and the order devoid of  any legal sanctity. We, accordingly set aside the same.      In the  course of  the impugned "reference" the learned single Judge has also suggested that contempt proceedings be initiated against  some of  the lawyers  who appeared before him besides  the appellant.  On the  basis of  what we  have noticed above,  we find  no cause  to have  been made out to institute contempt  proceedings, as suggested. We may notice here that  even on  an earlier  occasion, the learned single Judge (Vyas,  J.) had  in the  same appeal (Misc. Appeal No. 143 of  1994) made  a reference  to this  court  for  taking action  against   Shri  Girish   Desai,   senior   advocate, representing the  appellant besides  his instruction counsel and  the  company  secretary  of  the  appellant  under  the Contempt of  Courts Act.  On 12.2.96, this court declined to proceed against  them for  contempt of  court.  Contempt  of court jurisdiction  is a  special jurisdiction. It has to be used cautiously  and exercised sparingly. It must be used to uphold the  dignity of the courts and the majesty of law and to keep  the administration of justice unpolluted, where the facts and circumstances so justify. "the corner stone of the contempt law  is the  accommodation  of  two  constitutional values  -  the  right  of  free  speech  and  the  right  to independent justice.  The ignition of contempt action should

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be -  substantial and  malafide interference  with  fearless judicial action,  not fair comment or trivial reflections on the judicial process and personnel," (See 1974 (1) SCC 374). Long long  ago in  Queen Vs.  Grey (1900 2 Q.B. 36 at 40) it was said that ‘judges and courts are alike open to criticism and if  reasonable argument  is offered against any judicial act as contrary to law or to the public good, no court could or would  treat  it  as  contempt  of    court.’  Therefore, contempt jurisdiction  has to  be exercised  with scrupulous care and  caution, restraint and circumspection. Recourse to this jurisdiction,  must be  had whenever  it is  found that something  has   been  done   which  tends   to  effect  the administration of  justice or  which  tends  to  impede  its course or tends to shake public confidence in the majesty of law and  to preserve  and maintain  the dignity of the court and the  like situations.  ‘The respect  for judiciary  must rest on  a more  surer foundation  than recourse to contempt jurisdiction.’ We  have given  our careful  consideration to the  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case  but  are  not persuaded to  initiate contempt  proceeding as  suggested by the learned  single Judge  either against the lawyers or the appellant for this "action" in making request to the learned Judge to  reuse himself from the case. The reference to that extent is also declined.      On the  basis of  what we have said above, we set aside the impugned order/direction/reference.      Misc. Appeal  No. 143 of 1994 has already been remanded by us  twice to the High Court for its disposal on merits in accordance with  law. After  the second remand order made in C.A. No.  13201 of  1996, the  appeal has not been heard and the case  has been  "sent back"  to this  court for  ‘final’ ‘hearing’. In  the facts  and circumstances of this case, we consider it appropriate, to once against remand Misc. Appeal No. 143  of 1994 to the High Court for its fresh disposal in accordance with law. The record of the case shall be sent to the High  Court for  being placed  before the  learned Chief Justice of  the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur. We request the  learned Chief  Justice of  the  High  Court  to assign the  appeal to  a learned  Judge sitting  at Jabalpur (not at  Indore or  Gwalior) for  its disposal in accordance with law expeditiously.      The learned Judge at Jabalpur, to whom the appeal shall be assigned  by the  learned Chief Justice, shall decide the appeal on  its own  merits uninfluenced  by any observations made by  the learned single Judge (Mr. Justice R.D. Vyas) in the impugned order.      Nothing said hereinabove shall also be construed as any expression of opinion on the merits of the appeal.      The appeal  and the  reference are  disposed of  in the terms indicated above with no orders as to cost.