REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL  NO. 7211 OF 2005

M/s Cable Corpn. of India Ltd. … Appellant

Versus

Additional Commnr. of Labour and Ors. …Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division

Bench  of  the  Bombay  High  Court  upholding  the  view  of  a

learned Single Judge that once the review application in terms

of  Section  25-N(6)  of  the  Industrial  Disputes  Act,  1947  (in

short  the  ‘Act’)  is  rejected,  the  appropriate

Government/specified authority is not precluded from making

a reference  for adjudication under the said provision.  

2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

The appellant company was established in 1957 for the

manufacture  of  high  voltage  electric  cables  and  wires.  The

company has manufacturing units at Borivli and Nasik. In the

present  case  we are  concerned with the Company’s  unit  at

Borivli. The company made an application in terms of Section

25-N(2)  to the Specified  Authority  on 16.1.2003 to retrench

280 workmen out of 509 workmen working at its Borivli Unit.

The Specified Authority, after giving an opportunity of being

heard to the company, workmen and other interested persons,

including workers unions and after conducting an inquiry, by

a  reasoned  order  dated  29.4.2003  partly  allowed  the

application preferred by the company by granting permission

to retrench 276 workmen out of 509 workmen on conditions

mentioned in the order. The correctness of that decision was

put in issue by the workers unions, the respondent Nos. 2 and

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3 herein by filing applications under Section 25-N(6) of the Act

for  review  of  the  decision  or  to  refer  the  matter  for

adjudication.  By  an  order  dated  9.7.2003  the  applications

preferred by the Unions were rejected on the ground that such

applications could be preferred only by workmen whereas the

same have been made by the Unions. Besides, it was observed

that no new point was raised in the review proceedings which

warranted  fresh  examination.  Accordingly,  both  the

applications for review/reference came to be rejected.

The  aforesaid  order  of  the  Specified  Authority  was

challenged through Writ Petition No. 1947 of 2003 by the 2nd

respondent-union,  which  came  to  be  partly  allowed  by  the

learned Single Judge, vide order dated 2.8.2004. The learned

Single Judge held that finding of the Specified Authority that

unions had no locus as all the aggrieved workmen were not

made parties to the application was contrary to law laid down

by  this  Court  in  Mumbai  Kamgar  Sabha,  Bombay v.  M/s

Abdulbhai  Faizullabhai  and  Ors.  (AIR  1976  SC  1455).  The

learned Single Judge further held that the right of review is

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possible only on limited grounds and since no new points have

been raised by the unions, the prayer for review was rightly

rejected. The learned Single Judge relying upon the judgment

of a Division Bench of Gujarat High Court in  Rajya General

Kamgar Mandal and Ors. v. Vice President, Packart Press Div.

Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises, Baroda and Ors. (1995 II CLR

613)  further held  that merely  because  review application  is

rejected, reference cannot be said to be barred under Section

25-N(6)  of  the  Act  and,  accordingly,  directed  the  specified

authority to refer the matter for adjudication to the Industrial

Tribunal in accordance with Section 25-N(6) of the Act.

Stand  of  the  appellant  both  before  the  learned  Single

Judge  and  the  Division  Bench  was  that  once  the  review

application is disposed of, there is no scope for further making

a reference in view of the clear language of Section 25-N(6)

which provides for the alternatives and does not empower a

reference  after  the  review  petition  is  rejected.  Both  learned

Single Judge and the Division Bench held to the contrary.

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3. Learned counsel  for the  appellant  submitted  that both

learned Single Judge and the Division Bench lost sight of the

fact that the language of the provision is very clear and the

determinative expression used is “or”. It  is submitted that if

the view of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench is

accepted it would mean substitution of the word ‘and’ for ‘or’.  

4. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand

submitted  that the  position is  no longer  res  integra  and in

view of the decision of this Court in Orissa Textile & Steel Ltd.

v. State of Orissa and Ors. (2002 (2) SCC 578), it is submitted,

the view of learned Single Judge and the Division Bench does

not suffer from any infirmity. The reference is intended as an

additional  protection.  Considering  the  fact  that  though  the

scope for review is limited, which is evident from the fact that

unlike other reference a period of 30 days is provided.  This

indicates the urgency.  

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5. The factual position need not be referred to in detail in

view  of  the  fact  that  fate  of  this  case  depends  upon

interpretation of Section 25-N(6).

6. Section 25-N(6) of the Act reads as follows:

“The appropriate government or the specified authority may, either on its own motion or on the application made by the employer or any workman, review its order granting or refusing to  grant permission under  sub-section (3)  or refer the matter or, as the case may be, cause it to be referred, to a Tribunal for adjudication.

Provided that where a reference has been made to a Tribunal under this sub-section, it shall pass an award within a period of thirty days from the date of such reference.”

(Underlined for emphasis)

7. In  Excel Wear v.  Union of India and Ors. (1978 (4) SCC

224)  this Court considered the legality  of Section 25-O and

25-R as it stood then. It was held that those provisions were

violative of Section 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India, 1950

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(in  short  the  ‘Constitution’).  It  was  held  that  steps  under

Section 25-N as it stood then cannot be read into Section 25-

O.  

8. In  Workmen  of  Meenakshi  Mills  Ltd.  And  Ors.  v.

Meenakshi Mills Ltd. And Anr. (1992 (3) SCC 336) the scope

and  ambit  of  Section  25-N  as  it  stood  then  prior  to  its

substitution  by  Industrial  Disputes  (Amendment)  Act,  1984

was  considered.   Section  25-O was  recast  with  effect  from

21.8.1984 by Act 46 of 1982. Similarly, changes were brought

in Section 25-N by Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. 18.8.1984.  Under

Section 25-N(5) finality is given subject to sub-section (6). A

plain  reading  of  the  provision  shows  that  two  options  are

available i.e. to decide itself or refer to the Tribunal. It cannot

be said that the Tribunal is an additional forum for fresh look

at the matter.  

9. In Orissa Textile and Steel case (supra) the constitutional

validity of Section 25-O of the Act was under consideration.

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10. Learned  counsel  for  the  respondents  has  placed  great

reliance  on  paragraphs  16,  17  and  18  of  the  judgment  to

contend that this Court had accepted the interpretation given

by the High Court.  

11. On a close reading of the judgment it is clear that in the

said case the issues presently under consideration did not fall

for  consideration.  What was stated in essence  was that the

provisions  for  amended  Section  25-O relates  to  review  and

reference would be in addition to judicial review under Article

226 or Article  32 of  the  Constitution.  The  Court  was really

considering the question as to whether provisions for review

and reference were in addition to judicial review.  It never said

that they are cumulative and not alternative.      

12. The  word  ‘or’  is  normally  disjunctive  and  ‘and’  is

normally conjunctive. But at times they are read as vice versa

to give effect to the manifest  intention of the Legislature as

disclosed from the context. As stated by Scrutton, L.J.: “You

do sometimes read ‘or’ as ‘and’ in a statute. But you do not do

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it unless you are obliged because ‘or’ does not generally mean

‘and’ and ‘and’ does not generally mean ‘or’. And as pointed

out by Lord Halsbury the reading of ‘or’ as ‘and’ is not to be

resorted to, “unless some other part of the same statute   or

the clear intention of it required that to be done”. But if the

literal  reading  of  the  words  produces  an  unintelligible  or

absurd result ‘and’ may be read for ‘or’ and ‘or’ for ‘and’ even

though the result  of so modifying the words is less favourable

to the subject provided that the intention of the Legislature is

otherwise  quite  clear.  Conversely  if  reading  of  ‘and’  as  ‘or’

produces grammatical distortion and makes no sense of the

portion following ‘and’, ‘or’ cannot be read in placed ‘and’. The

alternatives  joined  by  ‘or’  need  not  always  be  mutually

exclusive.  

13. In Fakir Mohd. (dead) by Lrs. V Sita Ram (2002 (1) SCC

741) it was held that the word ‘or’ is normally disjunctive. The

use of the word ‘or’ in a statute manifests the legislative intent

of the alternatives prescribed under law.  

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14. Had the Legislature intended that the reference could be

made after the Government or the Specified Authority deals

with the review power,  it  would have said so specifically by

specific words. It  could have provided for a direct reference.

The parameters of review are different from a reference.  

15. A plain reading of the provision makes the position clear

that  two  courses  are  open.  Power  is  conferred  on  the

appropriate Government to either on its own motion or on an

application made, review its order or refer the matter to the

Tribunal.  Whether one or the other of the courses could be

adopted depends on the fact of  each case,  the surrounding

circumstances and several other relevant factors.  

16. Under sub-section (6) of Section 25-N  it is open to the

appropriate Government or the Specified Authority to review

its order granting or refusing to grant permission under sub-

section (3).  

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17. When  the  words  of  a  statute  are  clear,  plain  or

unambiguous, i.e. they are reasonably susceptible to only one

meaning,  Courts  are  bound  to  give  effect  to  that  meaning

irrespective  of  consequences.   [See:  State  of  Jharkhand v.

Govind Singh (AIR 2005 SC 294),  Nathi Devi v.  Radha Devi

Gupta (2005 (2) SCC 271)].

18. In Sussex Peerage case (1844) 11 CI&F 85, at page 143

Tindal C.J. observed as follows:

“If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense.  The words themselves  do  alone  in  such  cases  best declare the intent of the lawgiver.”

19. When a language is plain and unambiguous and admits

of only one meaning no question of construction of a statute

arises, for the Act speaks for itself.

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20. As  observed  in  Nathi  Devi’s case  (supra)  if  the  words

used are capable  of one construction, then it  would not be

open  to  the  Courts  to  adopt  any  other  hypothetical

construction on the ground that such construction is more

consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act.  The

spirit of the law may well be an elusive and unsafe guide and

the  supposed  spirit  can  certainly  be  not  given  effect  to  in

opposition to the plain language of the sections of the Act.

21. In view of analysis made above, the inevitable result is

that the appeal deserves to be allowed which we direct.  

…………………………..J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

………………………….J. (P. SATHASIVAM)

New Delhi, May 16, 2008                

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