http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 7  

CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  22 of 2007

PETITIONER: M/s Associated Indem Mechanical Pvt. Ltd.

RESPONDENT: West Bengal Small Scale Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. & Ors.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/01/2007

BENCH: G.P. Mathur & A.K. Mathur

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.2863 of 2006)

G. P. MATHUR, J.

1.      Leave granted.

2.      This appeal, by special leave, has been preferred against the  judgment and order 13.12.2005 of a Division Bench of the Calcutta  High Court by which the letters patent appeal filed by the appellant  was dismissed, affirming the judgment and order dated 16.8.2004  of a learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petitions filed by the  appellant wherein challenge was laid to the cancellation of lease  deed which had been executed in its favour.    

3.      The facts leading to the filing of the writ petition by the  appellant herein may be noticed in brief.   The West Bengal Small  Scale Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. (for short  "Corporation") by three different indentures of lease each for a  period of 99 years demised in favour of the appellant M/s  Associated Indem Mechanical Pvt. Ltd., three separate industrial  sheds bearing nos.Y-76, Y-73 and Y-72 at Baltikuri Industrial  Estate, Howrah on 9.2.1970, 26.5.1972 and 31.8.1977 respectively.    Clauses 2(f)1, 2(j) and 3(B) of the lease deed which are relevant  for the controversy in hand are being reproduced below :- "2(f)1. To use the demised premises as a place  for carrying on manufacturing business and/or  purposes connected with any manufacturing process  including processing, manufacture or assembling of  machine, tools, implements, instruments, furnaces,  heaters, ovens, scientific apparatus, inventions and  other industrial products.  

2(j)    To start manufacture and production as per Sub- Clauses (f)(1) of this Clause 2, (if not already started)  within six months from the date of these presents or  within any extended period which may be granted by  Government under exceptional circumstances.  

3(B).    If the rent hereby reserved or any part thereof  shall remain unpaid for six months after becoming  payable or if any convents on the part of the Lessee  herein contained shall not be performed/observed or if  the demised premises be not used by the Lessee for  purposes mentioned in Clause 2(f) hereof for a

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 7  

continuous period of six months then and in any such  event, it shall be lawful for the lessor or the  Government at any time thereafter to determine the  Lease and to re-enter upon the demised premises or  any part thereof in the name of the whole and  thereupon this demise shall absolutely determine  without prejudice to the rights of the Lessor or the  Government in respect of breach of the Lessee’s  covenants herein contained.   

       All the three lease deeds contain identical clauses.   The  Prescribed Authority sent a notice under Section 3(1) of the West  Bengal Government Premises (Tenancy Regulation) Act, 1976 (for  short "the Act") to the appellant on 15.3.1999 as it failed to  commence production and/or manufacturing activity, but the notice  was returned with the postal endorsement "abolished".   After  about six months, the Prescribed Authority issued another notice  on 13.9.1999 by which the lease deed was terminated and the  appellant was asked to hand over possession of the industrial  sheds. The notice was returned with the remarks "not known". The  Corporation, thereafter, took over possession of the plots on  25.2.2000.  However, on the representation made by the appellant  and on furnishing undertaking to commence manufacturing  activity and tendering rent, the possession was handed over back to  it on 17.5.2000. Even thereafter the appellant did not commence  any manufacturing activity and consequently two notices under  Section 3(1) of the Act were issued by the Prescribed Authority on  29.5.2002 calling upon the appellant to hand over possession of the  industrial sheds.  The appellant filed two writ petitions before the  Calcutta High Court which were disposed of by a learned Single  Judge by separate orders.  In view of the prayer made on behalf of  the appellant, a direction was issued to the Chairman of the  Corporation to give oral hearing to the appellant.   The Chairman  of the Corporation after affording an opportunity of hearing to the  appellant passed a detailed order on 11.9.2002 holding that the  appellant was liable to be evicted from the demised premises.  The  appellant then filed a writ petition before the Calcutta High Court  challenging the aforesaid order dated 11.9.2002 of the Chairman of  the Corporation.   The writ petition was dismissed by a learned  Single Judge on 16.8.2004 and the said order was affirmed in  appeal by the Division Bench on 13.12.2005.  It is these orders  which are subject matter of challenge in the present appeal.   

4.      Before we examine the contentions raised by learned counsel  for the parties, it is necessary to refer to certain provisions of the  West Bengal Government Premises (Tenancy Regulation) Act,  1976.  Sections 2(a), (b), (c), (f),  3(1)(2), 4 and 12 of the Act are  reproduced below :- 2(a)    "Government premises" means any premises which is  owned by the State Government or by a Government  undertaking but does not include the official residence of  any person authorized to occupy any premises in  consideration of the office which he holds under the State  Government or a Government undertaking for the time  being;

(b)     "Government undertaking" means a body corporate  constituted by or under a Central or State Act which is under  the administrative control of the State Government or in  which the State Government has exclusive proprietary  interest;

(c)     "premises" means any building or hut and includes  part of a building or hut and a seat in a room, let separately,  and also includes -  

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 7  

(i)     the gardens, grounds and out-houses, if any,  appurtenant thereto,

(ii)    any furniture supplied or any fittings or fixtures  affixed for the use of the tenant in such building, hut or seat  in a room, as the case may be;

(f)     "tenant" means any person by whom the rent of any  premises is, or but for a special contract would be, payable  and includes in the event of such person’s death, such of his  heirs as were ordinarily residing with him at the time of his  death.

3.      Termination of tenancy \026 (1) Every tenancy held by  a tenant in respect of a Government premises shall stand  terminated upon the expiry of the period referred to in a  notice to quit served upon such tenant in the prescribed  manner,

(2)     A tenancy in respect of a Government premises shall  stand automatically terminated without any notice to quit  where the tenant has, -

(i)     violated the terms of the lease, or  

(1a)    subsequently built a house or acquired (by purchase,  gift, inheritance, lease, exchange or otherwise) a house or an  apartment, either in his own name or in the name of any  member of his family, within a reasonable distance from  such Government premises.  

Explanation - ................................. (omitted as not relevant)          Provided \005\005\005\005\005\005\005 (omitted as not relevant)          Provided \005\005\005\005\005\005\005 (omitted as not relevant)         Provided further\005\005\005\005. (omitted as not relevant)          4.      Restoration of possession \026 (1) Upon termination of  a tenancy under any of the provisions of section 3 or upon a  tenancy being void under section 3A, the tenant shall  forthwith restore vacant possession of the premises occupied  by him in favour of the prescribed authority.  

(2)     If the tenant fails to restore possession of the premises  under sub-section (1), the prescribed authority or any officer  authorized by him in this behalf may take such steps or use  force as may be necessary to take possession of the premises  and may also enter into such premises for the aforesaid  purpose.

12.     Act to override other laws \026 (1) The provisions of  this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything  contained in any other law for the time being in force, or in  any contract, express or implied, or in any custom or usage  to the contrary.

(2)     In particular and without prejudice to the generality of  the foregoing provisions, the West Bengal Public Land  (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1962 shall not  be applicable to any premises to which this Act applies.  

        The three provisos which are appended to sub-section (2) of  Section 3 of the Act deal with default in payment of rent, renewal  of tenancy upon deposit of all arrears of rent together with interest

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 7  

etc. and recovery of arrears of rent, but they are not relevant for the  decision of the controversy.  Section 13 lays down that no civil  court shall have jurisdiction to decide or deal with any question  which is by or under the Act required to be decided or dealt with  under the provisions of the Act.    

5.      Shri Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel for the appellants  has submitted that the Government Premises (Tenancy Regulation)  Act, 1976, is applicable only to residential premises and not to  industrial sheds which are commercial in nature and the demised  premises Y-76, Y-73 and Y-72 being industrial sheds and not  residential premises, the provisions of the Act under which the  notice for eviction was issued by the Prescribed Authority and  possession was sought to be taken over by the Corporation can  have no application.   In support of his contention, learned counsel  has referred to the definition of "premises" and "tenant" as given  in Section 2(c) and (f) of the Act and also to the provisions  contained in Section 3(2)(ia) of the Act and has submitted that the  whole Scheme of the Act shows that the same can apply to  residential premises only and can have no application to an  industrial shed.   Learned counsel has elaborated his argument by  submitting that while defining the word "premises" in sub-section  (c) of Section 2 of the Act, the words "building or hut and includes  part of a building or hut" have been used.  Similarly, while  defining "tenant" under sub-section (f) of Section 2, the words "in  the event of such person’s death, such of his heirs as were  ordinarily residing with him" have been used, which show that  what is contemplated within the purview of the Act is a residential  building and not a commercial  building or an industrial shed.  It  has been urged that the use of the words "house or an apartment"  in clause (1a) of sub-section (2) of Section 3 unequivocally shows  that the Act was intended to apply only to residential buildings and  not to a commercial building or an industrial shed which has been  leased out for carrying on manufacturing activity.    

6.      Shri Bhaskar P. Gupta, learned senior counsel for the  respondent Corporation, has submitted that the intention of the  legislature is not to be gathered by merely looking at few  provisions of the Act but has to be gathered from reading the entire  Act which clearly shows that the Act was intended to cover every  kind of tenancy, whether it was for a residential purpose or a  commercial purpose or an industrial purpose. He has further  submitted that different provisions of the Act, reference to which  has been made by learned counsel for the appellant, have been  included in order to make the Act more comprehensive and   elaborate and they take within their sweep all kinds of situations.   

7.      We have given our anxious consideration to the submissions  made by learned counsel for the parties. In our opinion, the  contention raised by learned counsel for the appellant that the Act  is intended to apply only to residential premises cannot be  accepted.   

8.      The Preamble of the Act says that it is an Act to provide for  the regulation of certain incidents of tenancy in relation to  Government premises in West Bengal.   The Preamble does not say  that the Act is meant for regulation of residential tenancies alone.    The definition of "Government premises" in Section 2(a) is very  wide.   It means any premises which is owned by the State  Government or by a Government undertaking except the official  residence of any person authorized to occupy any premises in  consideration of the office which he holds under the State  Government or a Government undertaking.   Therefore, all kinds of  premises whether commercial, industrial or residential, if owned  by the State Government or by a Government undertaking would

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 7  

be covered by the definition.   But, it specifically excludes the  official residence of any person authorized to occupy any premises  in consideration of the office which he holds under the State  Government or a Government undertaking for the time being.   

9.      It may be mentioned here that the legislature has enacted  another Act viz., the West Bengal Government Premises  (Regulation of Occupancy) Act, 1984 and here the definition of the  word "premises" as given in Section 2(i) of the Act reads as  under:- 2(i)  "premises" means any building, shed or hut, used or  intended to be used for residential purposes, and includes  part of a building, shed or hut and a room or a seat in a room  allotted separately, and also includes -   

(i)     the gardens, grounds, outhouses, garages and  godowns, if any, appurtenant thereto, and  

(ii)    any furniture supplied or any fittings or fixtures  affixed for the use of the occupant of such building, garage,  godown, shed, hut, room or seat in a room, as the case may  be.

       Though the definition of "premises" in the Act under  consideration (Act No.19 of 1976) and in Act No.21 of 1984 is  almost the same, but in the substantive part the expression "used or  intended to be used for residential purposes" has been added in the  later Act.   The use of the expression "used or intended to be used  for residential purposes" clearly evinces the intention of the  legislature that the 1984 Act shall apply only to residential  buildings in contradistinction to the Act under consideration viz.,  Act No.19 of 1976.    Therefore, it is not possible to accept the  contention of learned counsel for the appellant that the Act under  consideration i.e. 1976 Act can have application only to residential  buildings or that the same shall not apply to non-residential  buildings like industrial sheds or commercial buildings.   

10.     As the language shows, the definition of the word  "premises" as given in Section 2(c) of the Act is a very  comprehensive one and it not only means any building or hut or  part of a building or hut and a seat in a room, let separately but also  includes godowns, gardens and out-houses appurtenant thereto and  also any furniture supplied or any fittings or fixtures affixed for the  use of the tenant in such building, hut or seat in a room, as the case  may be.  A "seat in a room" or "gardens" or "godowns" by  themselves do not qualify to be called a residential building.   A  residence ordinarily means \026 a place where one resides; the act or  fact of abiding or dwelling in a place for some time; an act of  making one’s home in a place.   "Residential" ordinarily means -  used, serving or designed as a residence or for occupation by  residents; relating to or connected with residence.   Gardens or  grounds or any furniture supplied or fittings or fixtures affixed in a  building or seat in a room can by no stretch of imagination be  called or said to be a residential building, but they are included in  the definition of premises.  This shows that the legislature intended  to give a very wide and all comprehensive definition of premises  and did not intend to give it a restricted meaning. The opening part  of the definition of the word "premises" in Section 2(c) employs  the word "any".   Any is a word of very wide meaning and prime  facie the use of it excludes limitation.  (See Angurbala Mullick v.  Debabrata Mullick AIR 1951 SC 293 at 297).  The definition of  premises in Section 2(c) uses the word "includes" at two places.  It  is well settled that the word "include" is generally used in  interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of the words  or phrases occurring in the body of the statute; and when it is so

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 7  

used those words or phrases must be construed as comprehending,  not only such things, as they signify according to their natural  import, but also those things which the interpretation clause  declares that they shall include. (See Dadaji v. Sukhdeobabu AIR  1980 SC 150; Reserve Bank of India v. Pearless General Finance  and Investment Co. Ltd. AIR 1987 SC 1023 and Mahalakshmi Oil  Mills v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1989 SC 335).  The inclusive  definition of "district judge" in Article 236(a) of the Constitution  has been very widely construed to include hierarchy of specialized  Civil Courts viz. Labour Courts and Industrial Courts which are  not expressly included in the definition. (See State of Maharashtra  v. Labour Law Practitioners’ Association AIR 1998 SC 1233).    Therefore, there is no warrant or justification for restricting the  applicability of the Act to residential buildings alone merely on the  ground that in the opening part of the definition of the word  "premises", the words "building or hut" have been used.  

11.     The argument based on clause (1a) of sub-section (2) of  Section 3 of the Act has hardly any substance.  It is important to  note that the aforesaid clause was introduced in Section 3 of the  Act by an amendment made by West Bengal Act No.46 of 1980.    Section 3 of the Act provides for automatic termination of tenancy  in respect of a Government premises on the happening of certain  contingencies.  Clause (i) contemplates the situation where the  lessee has violated the terms of the lease.  This is couched in very  wide terms and no inference can be drawn therefrom that it  contemplates only a residential lease.   In whatever way this clause  is interpreted it cannot be restricted only to a residential lease but  would cover all kinds of leases including a commercial or  industrial lease.  Clause (1a) has been introduced to squarely cover  a situation where the lessee has built a house or has acquired an  apartment either in his own name or in the name of any member of  his family within a reasonable distance from Government premises  under his tenancy.  A sub-clause of a section introduced to cover a  particular type of contingency cannot cut down the scope or  content of other clauses of the same section or the main provisions  of the Act nor can the addition of the said sub-clause by way of a  subsequent amendment whittle down or restrict the applicability or  reach of the whole enactment. Therefore, clause (1a) of sub-section  (2) of Section 3 of the Act cannot lead to an inference that the Act  under consideration can have application to residential buildings  alone and not to any other type of building or land or gardens or  grounds etc. where commercial or industrial activity is carried on.   

12.     Learned counsel for the appellant has next submitted that in  Blue Print & 13 Ors. v. The Great Eastern Hotels Authority & Ors.  (2000) 1 Calcutta Law Times 450, a Division Bench of the  Calcutta High Court had held that the Act applied only to  residential premises and, therefore, it was not open to learned  Single Judge and also the Division Bench in the appeal filed by the  appellant to take a contrary view, namely, that the Act is applicable  to residential as well as non-residential premises including  industrial sheds.   It is necessary to state here that the decision in  the case of Blue Print & 13 others was challenged by the State of  West Bengal by filing an appeal in this Court and the judgment is  reported in (2002) 4 SCC 134 (State of West Bengal & ors. v.  Vishnunarayan & Associates (P) Ltd. & Anr.).  Though the appeal  was dismissed but the question as to whether the Act would apply  only to residential premises was not decided and was left open, as  will be evident from para 23 of the reports.   As we have examined  the controversy and have come to the conclusion that the Act is  applicable to non-residential and commercial premises as well, the  contention raised is purely academic in nature and can have no  bearing on the fate of the appeal.  

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 7  

13.     It may be mentioned here that the Chairman of the  Corporation, in pursuance of the order passed by the learned Single  Judge in the writ petitions which were filed by the appellant at the  earlier stage, after considering the contemporaneous documents  and the report of the concerned sub-Assistant Engineer, incharge of  Baltikuri Industrial Estate, has recorded a clear finding that the unit  is non-functioning one and was lying closed over a long period.    The report of the West Bengal State Electricity Board showed that  the commercial line and the industrial line had been disconnected  in 1994-96 and the total dues of the appellant for the two service  connections were Rs.2,78,415/-.  The fact that electricity  connection had been disconnected several years back fully  corroborates the stand of the respondent that the unit is lying  closed for a long period and no manufacturing activity was being  carried on.  Thus, there was a clear violation of the terms of the  lease and the tenancy of the appellant stood automatically  terminated under Section 3(2)(i) of the Act.   

14.     Learned counsel has also submitted that the appellant was  entitled to ownership of two sheds after expiry of a period of 30  years as provided in clause VI(b) of the lease deed.  The opening  part of Clause VI of the lease deed says \026 "Subject to the  covenants hereinbefore contained" and thereafter there are two  sub-clauses (a) and (b).   Therefore, sub-clause (b) of clause VI is  not in absolute terms but is subject to the covenants enumerated in  the earlier part of the lease deed.   Since it has been found as a fact  that the appellant has contravened the provisions of clauses 2(f)1  and B of the lease deed, it cannot claim any right under clause  VI(b).  Therefore, the appellant is not entitled to exercise the  option to acquire ownership of the demised industrial sheds and his  claim in that regard is wholly baseless.   15.     For the reasons discussed above, we find no merit in the  appeal, which is hereby dismissed with costs.   The interim order  granted by this Court on 17.2.2006 is vacated.