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PETITIONER: M.R. PATIL & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE MEMBER, INDUSTRIAL COURT & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       01/04/1997

BENCH: M.K. MUKHERJEE, B.N. KIRPAL

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T M.K. MUKHERJEE, J.      Leave granted.      This appeal  is directed against the judgment and order dated April 26, 1996 of the Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench) in W.P.  (Crl.) No. 167 of 1995 whereby it rejected the writ petition filed  by  the  two  appellants  before  us.  Facts leading to  this appeal and relevant for its disposal are as under.      At all  material times  the appellant  No.1, who  is an Officer of  the Indian  Administrative Service,  was holding the post  of  the  Vice  Chairman-cum-Managing  Director  of Maharashtra State  Road Transport Corporation (’Corporation’ for short) on deputation and appellant No. 2 was the Manager of its  Nagpur  retion.  On  or  about  April  1,  1992  two recognised Workers’  Unions of  the Corporation gave a joint notice  terminating   their  earlier   settlement  with  the Corporation and submitted their fresh charter of demands. On the failure  of the  management of the Corporation to attend to their  demands the Unions served a notice upon the former intimating that  the workers  would go  on strike  from  the midnight of  April 12/13,  1993. A  similar notice  was also given by  The Maharashtra  S.T. Chalak  Wahak Sanghatna, the respondent No.  2 herein,  (hereinafter referred  to as  the ’Union’).  In  view  of  the  threatened  strike  the  Chief Minister of  Maharashtra intervened  into the matter; and on April 9, 1993 declared an interim relief of Rs. 25 crores to the workers  and asked  the  Corporation  to  work  out  the modalities of its payment. Accordingly, the Corporation held discussions with recognised Unions and decided upon the mode of payment  of the interim relief, pending final settlement. After obtaining approval of the State Government to the same the Corporation  issued a  circular on  June  25,  1993  and started making payments in terms thereof.      Assailing the above circular on the ground that payment in terms  thereof would  be unjust and more favorable to the workers affiliated  to the  other Unions,  the Union filed a complaint  before  the  Industrial  Court,  Amaravati  nuder Section 28(1) of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention  of Unfair  Labour Practices Act, 1971 (’Act’

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for short)  and, along  with it,  filed a  petition  seeking temporary relief. On that complaint, which was registered as ULP Case  No. 397/93  and the petition, the Industrial Court passed the following order on June 29, 1993 :      "In view  of the  facts pleaded  in      the   main   complaint   and   this      petition   the    effect   of   the      operation of  the impugned circular      No. 3679  dated June  25,  1993  is      hereby stayed until July 15, 1993.      Issue notice  to the respondents to      file their reply accordingly by the      said date."      Thereafter, on  July 22,  1993, the  Union, through its General Secretary  Shri N.M. Verma, filed a complaint before the Labour  Court, Akola  under Section  48(1)  of  the  Act alleging that  even after service of the above stay order on the day  it was  made,  that  is,  on  June  29,  1993,  the Secretary  of   State  Transport   Authority,  and  the  who appellants had  made payments  in terms  of the circular and sought the following reliefs :      "The  Hon’ble   Labour  Court   may      please declare  that the accused 1,      2 &  3 have  wilfully disobeyed the      order  of  the  Hon’ble  Industrial      Court interim order dated 29.6.1993      in the U.L.P. case No. 397/93.      2.   The Hon’ble  Court may  please      order against  the accused No. 1, 2      & 3  to issue processs u/s 48(1) of      MRTU  and   PULP    Act  and  award      punishment under the Act.      3.   Any suitable  order which  the      Court may deem fit be passed in the      interest of justice."      On receipt  of the complaint, the Labour Court issued a notice  directing  the  three  accused,  including  the  two appellants, to show cause why processes should not be issued against them.  In showing  cause the appellants did not give any specific  reply to  the allegations made against them in the complaint  but raised  a preliminary abjection as to its maintainability on  the ground that without a sanction under Section 197  Cr.P.C. they could not be prosecuted. The other accused however  contended that  he was wrongly arraigned in the proceeding.  After hearing  the parties the Labour Court passed an  order on February 11, 1994, whereby it discharged the Secretary  with a  finding that  there  was  nothing  on record to  show that  he was  in  any  way  responsible  for willful disobedience  of the  order of  the Industrial Court but, issued  processes against  the  two  appellants,  after rejecting their contention based on 197 Cr.P.C..      In the  mean time,  the Industrial  Court had,  by  its order dated  August 14,  1993, vacated  the ex-parte interim stay granted  by it  on June  29,  1993  and  dismissed  the petition filed by the Union for temporary relief.      The appellants  then filed  two applications before the Labor Court praying for their discharge on the grounds, that they were not party to the proceedings before the Industrial Court and  hence its  order dated  June  29,  1993  was  not binding upon  them and that the interim stay granted thereby had since been vacated. By its order dated December 17, 1994 the Labour  Court rejected  those applications and aggrieved thereby Court  rejected  those  applications  and  aggrieved thereby the  appellants preferred a revision petition before the Industrial  Court (Amravati  Bench) under  Section 44 of

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the Act  which was dismissed. Thereafter they moved the High Court in  its writ  jurisdiction but  without success. Hence this appeal.      To answer  the questions  raised in this appeal it will be pertinent to refer, at the outset, to the preamble of the Act and  its material provisions. The Act was brought on the statute book      "to provide  for the recognition of      trade   Unions   for   facilitating      collective bargaining  for  certain      undertakings, to state their rights      and obligations;  to confer certain      powers on  unrecognised unions;  to      provided  for   declaring   certain      strikers and  lock-outs as  illegal      strikes and  lock-outs;  to  define      and provide  for the  prevention of      certain unfair labour practices; to      constitute courts  (as  independent      machinery)  for  carrying  out  the      purposes of  according  recognition      to trade  unions for  enforcing the      provisions   relating   to   unfair      practices;  and   to  provide   for      matters connected with the purposes      aforesaid."      ’Recognised Union’  is defined  by sub-section  (13) of Section 3 of the Act to mean a Union which has been issued a certificate of  recognition under  Chapter III  thereof  and ’unfair labour  practices’ by  sub-section (16)  thereof  to mean unfair  labour practices  as  defined  in  Section  26. Chapter II  specifies Industrial  Courts, Labour  Courts and Investigating Officers  as the authorities under the Act and in its  various as  the authorities under the Act and in its various sections details the modes of their constitution and appointments, and  their duties.  Chapter III deals with the recognition of  Unions  and,  while  Section  11(1)  thereof specifies the  conditions to  be complied with by a Union to gain recognition  under the  Act, Section  12(3) empowers an Industrial  Court   to  grant   recognition  and   issue   a certificate of  such recognition  in  the  prescribed  form. Unfair labour  practices are  dealt with  by Chapter  VI and Section 26  defines them  to mean  the practices  listed  in Schedules II, III and IV. Section 27 debars employers, Umons and employees  from engaging  in any  unfair labour practice and Section  28 of  the said  Chapter sets out the procedure the Industrial  Court or the Labour Court, has to follow for dealing with complaints relating to unfair labour practices. According to  the procedure  laid down  in Section  28,  any Union or  any employee  or any employer or any Investigating Officer may  file a  complaint  against  a  person  who  has engaged in  or is  engaging in  any unfair  labour  practice before the  Court competent  to  deal  with  such  complaint either under Section 5, or as the case may be, under Section 7. On  such complaint  the Court  may, of  its  own  take  a decision, which  would by  in the form pf an order; or if it so considers  necessary, may  first cause  an  investigation into the  said complaint  to be  made by  the  Investigating Officer and  direct that  a report  be submitted  by him  to enable it  to take  such a  decision. Sub-section (7) of the above Section  forbids the  civil  or  criminal  court  from quashing the  order so made. In view of Section 29 the above order of  the Court  shall be  binding on,  inter alia,  all parties to  the complaint  and those  summoned to  appear in Court. Section 30 of the Act formulates the nature of orders

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the Industrial  Court and  Labour Court can pass pursuant to their decisions  and so  far  as  it  is  relevant  for  our purposes it reads as under :      "(1) Where a Court decides that any      person named  in the  complaint has      engaged in,  or is engaging in, any      unfair labour  practice, it  may in      its order -      XXX     XXX             XXX      (b)  direct  all  such  persons  to      cease and  desist from  such unfair      labour  practice,   and  take  such      affirmative    action    (including      payment of  reasonable compensation      to  the   employee   or   employees      afected  by   the   unfair   labour      practice, or  reinstatement of  the      employee  or   employees  with   or      without backwages,  or the  payment      of reasonable compensation), as may      in the  opinion  of  the  Court  be      necessary to  effectuate the policy      of the Act;      XXX          XXX              XXX      (2)  In any  proceeding  before  it      under this  Act, the Court may pass      such interim  order (including  any      temporary  relief   or  restraining      order) as  it deems just and proper      (including directions to the person      to   withdraw    temporarily    the      practice complained of, which is an      issue in  such proceeding), pending      final decision:      Provided that, the Court may, on an      application in  that behalf, review      any interim order passed by it.      Section 48  (1) of the Act, with which we are primarily concerned in this appeal, provides that any person who fails to comply  with any order of the Court in clause (b) of sub- section (1)  or sub-section  (2) of  section 30  of the  Act shall, on  conviction, be  punished with  imprisonment which may extend  to three months or with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees.      Chapter VIII  of the  Act  relates  to  the  powers  of Industrial Court  and Labour Court to try offences under the Act and  Section 38  specifically empowers a Labour Court to try offences  punishable under  the Act within the limits of whose jurisdiction  it is  committed. Section  39 relates to cognizance of  the offences  committed under  the Act and it reads as under:      "No   Labour   Court   shall   take      cognizance of any offence except on      a complaint  of facts  constituting      such offence  made  by  the  person      affected thereby  or  a  recognised      union or  on report  in writing  by      the Investigating Officer."      The powers  of and  procedure to  be  followed  by  the Labour Court  for trial  of such  offences is  laid down  in Section 40, which is extracted below:      "In respect  of offences punishable      under  this  Act,  a  Labour  Court      shall have all the powers under the      Code of Criminal procedure, 1898, V

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    of 1898, of a Presidency Magistrate      in Greater  Bombay and a Magistrate      of the  First Class  elsewhere, and      in the trial of every such offence,      shall  follow  the  procedure  laid      down for  in Chapter  XXII  of  the      said Code of summary trial in which      an appeal lies; and the rest of the      provisions of the code shall so far      as may be, apply to such trial."      Section  42   provides  that  notwithstanding  anything contained in  Section  40,  and  appeal  shall  lie  to  the Industrial Court against an order of conviction or acquittal recorded by  the Labour  Court as  also for  enhancement  of sentences awarded  by the Labour Court. The other section to which reference  is required to be made is Section 44, which empowers the  Industrial Court  to exercise  superintendence over all Labour Courts.      From a  conspectus of  the provisions  of the Act it is manifest that  if on  a complaint  filed in  accordance with Section 28, the Labour Court or the Industrial Court, as the case may be, arrives at a decision that a person has engaged in or is engaging in any unfair labour practice it may issue a direction  in terms  of clause  (b) of  sub-section (1) of Section 30  and pending  final decision grant interim relief in terms  of sub-section (2) thereof. Failure on the part of a person, who is bound by such order or direction, to comply with it  amounts to  an offence for which he is liable to be convicted and  sentenced as envisaged under Section 48(1) by a Labour  Court. Cognizance  of such  offence, besides other offences under  the Act,  cannot however  be  taken  by  the Labour   Court   unless   a   complaint   disclosing   facts constituting the  offence is  filed by  the person  affected thereby or  a recognised Union. (emphasis supplied) The only other mode  left open  to the  Labour  Court  to  take  such cognizance is  on the  basis of  a report  in writing by the Investigating Officer.  Once cognizance  of the  offence  is taken on  such complaint  or report, as the case may be, the Labour Court would have to follow the procedure laid down by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (which now replaces the Code of Criminal procedure, 1898).      That brings  us to the merits of the appeal. Mr. Salve, the learned  Counsel appearing  for the appellant, contended that the  impugned prosecution  was void  ab initio  as  the Union was not a ’recognised Union’ within the meaning of the Act and  hence,  was  not  legally  competent  to  file  the complaint before  the Industrial  Court under  Section 28 of the Act  which ultimately  gave rise to the complaint before the Labour Court under Section 48(1). According to Mr. Salve the scheme  of the  Act and  its various  provisions clearly envisage that  complaints under  Section 28 regarding unfair labour practices  can be made only by recognised Unions - or by an employee individually if he is solely affected thereby - and  since, admittedly,  the Union  was not  a  recognised Union it  could not  invoke the provisions of Section 28. In support of  his contention  he drew our attention to Section 21 of  the Act  and relied on the judgments of this Court in Crescent Dyes Chemicals Ltd. vs. Ramnaresh Tripathi (1993) 2 SCC 115  and Sharamik Uttarsh Sabha vs. Raymond Woolen Mills Ltd. (1995) 3 SCC 78. In repelling the above contention Shri N.M. Verma,  General Secretary  of the Union, who argued the case himself  submitted  that  question  whether  Union  was recognised or  not was  not material  in view of the limited scope of Section 21 and of right of ’any Union’ as appearing in  section  28  to  lodge  a  complaint  of  unfair  labour

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practice. to  buttress his  submission Mr.  Verma  drew  our attention to  the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Akhil Maharashtra Kamgar  Union vs.  Warden and  Co. Ltd. (1996) 1 CLR 212  which has  distinghished the judgment of this Court in Shramik  Uttarsh Sabha (supra). We need not however delve into this  aspect of  the  matter  as  in  our  opinion  the prosecution launched  against the appellants is liable to be quashed for  the simple  reason that  the cognizance  of the offence  under  Section  48(1)  allgedly  committed  by  the appellants was  taken by the Labour court in utter breach of Section 39 of the Act.      As  discussed   earlier  cognizance   of   an   offence punishable under  the Act  can be  taken on a ’complaint’ of facts constituting  such offence  only if  it is  made by  a person affected  thereby or  a recognised Union. Admittedly, the complaint  in the  instant case  was filed. by a Union - and not by an individual with the interim direction/order of the Industrial Court. Undisputedly again, the Union is not a recognised Union  within the  meaning of the Act. Indeed, in the counter  affidavit filed  by it  before this  Court, the Union has  not denied  the specific  averment  made  by  the appellants in  the Special  Leave Petition, out of which the present appeal  arises, that  the Union was not a recognised Union as  per the  Act {Paragraph  4(b)} and  its only reply thereto was  that allegation  was mentioned  to support  its various contentions  and repel  those of  the appellants, it has not  produced any  document -  much less  a  certificate issued under  Section 12  - to  indicate that it was granted recogntion under  the Act  to entitle it to file a complaint of facts  constituting the  offence under Section 48(1) and, for  that   matter,  to  enable  to  Labour  Court  to  take cognizance thereupon  under Section 39. Since the provisions of this  Section are  mandatory and  the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to  take cognizance  of  any  of  the  offences mentioned in  the Act  unless there is a complaint/report in terms theref  the cognizance  in the  instant  case  on  the complaint  of   the  Union   must  be  said  to  be  without jurisdiction.      As the  above discussion of ours is sufficient to quash the impugned  prosecution we  need  not  discuss  the  other patent infirmities  relating to the procedure adopted by the Labour Court  in dealing  with  the  complaint  and  to  the rejection of the indefensible contention raised on behalf of the  appellant   No.1  about   the  maintainability  of  the prosecution in view of Section 197 Cr.P.C.      On the  conclusion as  above, we  allow this appeal and quash the impugned prosecution.