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PETITIONER: M. PENTIAH AND OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: MUDDALA VEERAMALLAPPA AND OTHERS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/11/1960

BENCH: SUBBARAO, K. BENCH: SUBBARAO, K. GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. SARKAR, A.K. WANCHOO, K.N. MUDHOLKAR, J.R.

CITATION:  1961 AIR 1107            1961 SCR  (2) 295  CITATOR INFO :  R          1977 SC 536  (16)  RF         1977 SC2328  (11)  RF         1978 SC 548  (3)  R          1982 SC 149  (223)  R          1986 SC 137  (66)  RF         1988 SC1060  (12)  F          1990 SC 933  (14)  F          1991 SC 101  (30)  RF         1992 SC   1  (60)  RF         1992 SC 573  (33)

ACT: Municipality--Committee constituted under old Act  continued by repealing Act--Term of office--Power--If can effect  sale of  municipal  land--Interpretation  of  statute--Power   of Court--Hyderabad  District  Municipalities Act,  1956  (Hyd. XVIII  of 1956), ss. 16, 17, 18, 20, 32, 34, 35, 76, 77  and 320.

HEADNOTE: The respondents were the elected members of the Vicarabad 296 Municipal Committee, constituted in 1953, under the  Hydera- bad  Municipal  and Town Committees Act, 1951 That  Act  was repealed by s. 320 of the Hyderabad District  Municipalities Act,  1956,  which came into force in  1956.   That  section provided  that the committee constituted under the  repealed enactment  was to be deemed to have been  constituted  under the Act and the members thereof should hold office till  the first meeting of the committee was called under S. 35 of the Act.   No  election  was held under the  new  Act;  the  old committee, which continued to function, after duly passing a resolution  and  obtaining the necessary sanction  from  the Government,  sold certain municipal lands to third  parties. The   appellants,   who  were  rate-payers   of   the   said Municipality,  moved the High Court for-the issue of a  writ of quo warranto challenging the said sales under Art. 226 of the  Constitution.  The High Court dismissed  the  petition. The contention of the appellants in this Court was that  the

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members of the said committee were functus officio on expiry of three years from the commencement of the Act for s. 34 of the  Act prescribed a term of three years and S. 320 of  the Act  did not provide any definite term for them.  But if  S. 34  was  held to be inapplicable, neither  could  the  first general  election under the Act, for which s. 16 of the  Act was the only provision, be held, nor could the first meeting of  the  committee  called under s. 35 of the  Act  and  the result  would  be  that the  old  committee  would  continue indefinitely. Held, that the contention must be negatived. The  word  ’committee’ in s. 320 of the  Hyderabad  District Municipalities  Act, 1956, did not mean a committee  elected under  the Act and the term of three years prescribed by  s. 34 of the Act could not, therefore, apply to it. Construed  in  the light of  well-recognised  principles  of interpretation  of statutes and the scheme as  envisaged  by ss.  16, 17, 18, 20, 32, 34, and 320 of the Act, s.  320  of the Act could be no more than a transitory provision and  it would be unreasonable to suggest that the Legislature  which repealed  the  earlier  Act with the  express  intention  of constituting    committees   on    broad-based    democratic principles,   intended   to   perpetuate   old    committees constituted under the repealed Act. Section  16(1) of the Act, properly construed,  was  clearly inapplicable to the first general election under the Act and could  apply  only to subsequent elections.  So far  as  the first  general election under the Act was concerned, ss.  17 and  20 of the Act provided a self-contained and  integrated machinery therefor independent of s. 16(1) of the Act. Canada  Sugar Refining Co. v. R., [1898] A.C. 735,  referred to. The Legislature in enacting the new Act assumed and expected that  the Government would, within a reasonable  time  issue notifications  for holding the first general election  under S.   17  of  the  Act  and its failure to  do  so  and  thus implement the                             297 Act,  and not any inherent inconsistency in the Act  itself, prolonged the life of the old committee. Since  S. 77 of the Act expressly authorised  the  Municipal Committee   to  sell  municipal  property  subject  to   the conditions  specified  therein,  no  prohibition  could   be implied  from  the  provisions of s 76 of the  Act  and  the impugned  sales, effected in conformity with the  conditions precedent  laid down by s. 77 of the Act, could not be  said to be ultra vires the powers of the committee. Elizabeth Dowager Baroness Wenlock v. The River Dee Company, (1885)  10 A.C. 354 and Attorney-General v. Fulhan  Corpora- tion, (1921) 1 Ch.  D. 440, considered. Per Sarkar, J.-It is well settled that where the language of a  statute leads to manifest contradiction of  the  apparent purpose  of the enactment, as the language of s. 16(i)  does in  the present case, the Court has the power so to read  it as to carry out the obvious intention of the Legislature. The  intention  of the Legislature in enacting the  new  Act clearly  was  that elections should be held  and  committees constituted under it. Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher, [1949] 2 All E.R.  155, referred to. Section  16(1)  is  the  only  section  of  the  Act   which authorises the holding of a general election but, since  the requirements  as  to time in s. 16(i) of the Act  could  not apply  to the first general election, that section  must  be read  to carry out the obvious intention of the  Legislature

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as if there was no such requirement in the case of the first general  election  under the Act.  Although this  would  not indicate  when  that election was to be  held,  the  obvious implication  would  be  that  it  must  be  held  within   a reasonable time of the commencement of the Act.  Section  20 of  the  Act  does not authorise the holding  of  a  general election. Salmon v. Duncombe, (1886) 11 App.  Cas. 627, referred to.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 387 of 1960. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated February 12, 1960, of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, in Writ Petition No. 5 of 1960. P.   A. Choudhuri and K. R. Choudhuri, for the appellants. P.   Ram Reddy, for respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 6 to 11. 1960.   November  7. The Judgment of  Gajendragadkar,  Subha Rao, Wanchoo and,.  Mudholkar, JJ., 38 298 was  delivered  by  Subba Rao, J. Sarkar,  J.,  delivered  a separate judgment. SUBBA  RAO  J.-This  appeal by  special  leave  is  directed against  the  judgment of the High Court  of  Judicature  at Hyderabad  dismissing the petition filed by  the  appellants under  Art. 226 of the Constitution to issue a writ  of  quo warranto  against  respondents  1 to 10  directing  them  to exhibit an information as to the authority under which  they are  functioning  as  members  of  the  Vicarabad  Municipal Committee and to restrain them from selling certain plots of land belonging to the Municipality to third parties.   Vica- rabad  was  originally  situate  in  the  Part  B  State  of Hyderabad  and is now in the State of Andhra  Pradesh.   The Municipal  Committee of Vicarabad was constituted under  the Hyderabad Municipal and Town Committees Act (XXVII of 1951). In the year 1953 respondents 1 to 10 were elected, and  five others,  who are not parties before us, were  nominated,  to that Committee.  On November 27, 1953, the Rajpramukh of the State  of  Hyderabad  published  a  notification  under  the relevant   Acts   in  the   Hyderabad   Government   Gazette Extraordinary notifying the above persons as members of  the said  Committee.  Presumably with a view to democratize  the local institutions in that part of the country and to  bring them  on  a par with those prevailing  in  the  neighbouring States,  the  Hyderabad District  Municipalities  Act,  1956 (XVIII  of 1956), (hereinafter referred to as the Act),  was passed  by the Hyderabad _ Legislature and it  received  the assent of the President on August 9, 1956.  Under s. 320  of the  Act  the Hyderabad Municipal and Town  Committees  Act, 1951 (XXVII of 1951) and other connected Acts were repealed. As  a  transitory  measure,  under  the  same  section   any Committee  constituted under the enactment so  repealed  was deemed  to  have  been constituted under  the  Act  and  the members  of  the  said Committee were to  continue  to  hold office  till the first meeting of the Committee  was  called under s. 35 of the Act.  Under that provision respondents  1 to  10 and the five nominated members continued to  function as members                             299 of  the Municipal Committee.  In or about the year 1958  the said  Committee  acquired land measuring acres  15-7  guntas described as " Varad Raja Omar Bagh " for Rs. 18,000 for the purpose  of  establishing a grain market  (gunj).   For  one

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reason  or  other,  the Municipal Committee  was  not  in  a position   to  construct  the  grain  market  and   run   it departmentally.  The Committee, therefore, after taking  the permission  of  the  Government,  resolved  by  a  requisite majority  to  sell  the said land to third  parties  with  a condition  that  the vendee or vendees  should  construct  a building  or buildings for running a grain  market.   There- after  the  Committee sold the land in  different  plots  to third parties ; but the sale deeds were not executed in view of  the interim order made in the writ petition by the  High Court and subsequently in the appeal by this Court. In  the writ petition the appellants contended, inter  alia, that  the respondents ceased to be members of the  Municipal Committee on the expiry of three years from the date the new Act  came into force and that, therefore, they had no  right to  sell the land, and that, in any view, the sale  made  by the  Committee of the property acquired for the  purpose  of constructing a market was ultra vires the provisions of  the Act.   The  respondents contested the  petition  on  various grounds.  The learned Judges of the High Court dismissed the petition with costs for the following reasons: 1.   The old Committee will continue to function till a    new Committee comes into existence. 2.   "  Section 76 contemplates that property vested  in  it under  s.  72(f), 73 and 74 should be  transferred  only  to Government.   Here,  the transfer is not in  favour  of  the Government.   That  apart  we are told that  in  this case sanction of the Government was obtained at every stage.   It cannot  be  predicated  that  the  purpose  for  which   the properties  are  being  disposed of is  not  for  a,  public purpose.   It is not disputed that the properties are  being sold only to persons who are required to build grain  market ". 3.   The act now opposed is not in any way in conflict  with the provisions of ss. 244, 245 and 247. 300 4.   "  It  looks to us that the petitioners  lack  in  bona fides  and  that  this  petition is  not  conceived  in  the interests of the public ". The present appeal, as aforesaid, was filed by special leave granted by this Court. Mr.  P.  A. Chowdury, learned counsel  for  the  appellants, canvassed the correctness of the findings of the High Court. His  first argument may be summarized thus: Under s. 320  of the  Act  any  Committee  constituted  under  the   repealed enactment shall be deemed to have been constituted under the Act and the members of the said Committee shall continue  to hold  office  till  the first meeting of  the  Committee  is called under s. 35 of the Act.  Under s. 35 of the Act,  the first  meeting of the Committee shall not be held on a  date prior to the date on which the term of the outgoing  members expires  under s. 34.  Section 34 of the Act  provides  that the  members  shall hold office for a term of  three  years. Therefore,  the term of the members of the Committee  deemed to  have been constituted under s. 320 is three  years  from the  date  on which the Act came into force.   If  the  term fixed Under s. 34 does not apply to the members of the  said Committee,  the  result will be that the said  members  will continue to hold office indefinitely, for the first  meeting of the Committee could not be legally convened under the Act as s. 16 which enables the Collector to do so imposes a duty on him to hold a general election within three months before the  expiry  of  the term of office of the  members  of  the Committee  as specified in s. 34, and, as no  definite  term has  been prescribed for the members of the Committee  under

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s.  320, the election machinery fails, with the result  that the members of the " deemed " Committee would continue to be members of the said Committee indefinitely.  On this  inter- pretation learned counsel contends that the section would be void for the following reasons: (1) s. 320(1)(a) of the  Act would  be  ultra vires the powers of the  State  Legislature under Art. 246 of the Constitution, read with entry 5,  List II,  VII  Schedule;  (2)  the  said  section  deprives   the appellants  of the right to equality and protection  of  the laws guaranteed under Art. 14 301 of  the  Constitution;  (3) s. 320 would  be  void  also  as inconsistent with the entire scheme of the provisions of the Act. Let us first test the validity of the construction of s. 320 of  the Act suggested by the learned counsel.  The  material part of s. 320 reads: " (1) The Hyderabad Municipal and Town Committees Act, 1951, (XXVII of 1951)........................ (is) hereby repealed ; provided that:- (a)  any Committee constituted under the enactment so  repealed (hereinafter referred to in this section as  the        said Committee)  shall be deemed to have been  constituted  under this Act, and Members of the said Committee shall  continue to  hold office till the first meeting of the  Committee  is called under section 35;". The terms of the section are clear and do not lend any scope for argument.  The section makes a distinction between the " said"  Committee and the Committee elected under  the.   Act and says, " Members of the said Committee shall continue  to hold  office  till  the first meeting of  the  Committee  is called  under  s.  35 ". Though the  word  "  Committee"  is defined  in  s. 2(5) to mean a Municipal or  Town  Committee established or deemed to be established under the Act,  that definition  must give way if there is anything repugnant  in the  subject  or  context.  As the  section  makes  a  clear distinction between the " said " Committee and the Committee elected  under the Act, in the context, the Committee in  s. 320  cannot mean the Committee elected under the  Act.   The term  fixed  for the members of  the  Committee  constituted under  the Act cannot apply to the members of the  Committee deemed  to have been constituted under the Act.  Section  32 which  provides for the culminating stage of the process  of election  under the Act says that the names of  all  members finally   elected  to  any  Committee  shall  be   forthwith published  in the official Gazette.  Section  34  prescribes the  term of office of the members so elected.  Under it,  " except  as is otherwise provided in this Act, members  shall hold  office for a term of three years."  Section  320(1)(a) provides a different term for the 302 members  of  the Committee deemed to have  been  constituted under  the  Act.  Thereunder, the term is fixed not  by  any number  of  years  but by the happening of  an  event.   The Committee  constituted under s. 320 clearly falls under  the exception.   But it is suggested that the  exception  refers only to s. 28 whereunder a member of a, Committee ceases  to be  one  by a supervening disqualification.   Firstly,  this section   does   not  fix  a  term  but   only   imposes   a disqualification  on the basis of a term fixed under s.  34; secondly, assuming that the said section also fixes a  term, the exception may as well cover both the deviations from the normal  rule.  That apart, sub-s. (2) of s. 34  dispels  any doubt that may arise on the construction of sub-section  (1) of  the  section.  Under sub-s. (2), the term of  office  of

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such members shall be deemed to commence on the date of  the first meeting called by the Collector under s. 35.   Section 35  directs the Collector to call a meeting after giving  at least  five  clear days notice within thirty days  from  the date of the publication of the names of members under s. 32. This  provision  clearly indicates that the members  of  the Committee  mentioned in s. 34 are only the  members  elected under  the Act and not members of tile Committee  deemed  to have  been elected under the Act, for, in the case  of  the latter Committee, no publication under s. 32 is provided for and therefore the provisions of s. 35 cannot apply to  them. It is, therefore, manifest that the term prescribed in s. 34 cannot apply to a member of the deemed " Committee. Let us now see whether this interpretation would necessarily lead us to hold that the members of the " deemed " Committee under s. 320(1)(a) would have an indefinite duration.   This result,   it  is  suggested,  would  flow  from  a   correct interpretation  of the relevant provisions of s. 16  of  the Act.  The judgment of the High Court does not disclose  that any argument was addressed before that Court on the basis of s.  16  of the Act.  But we allowed the learned  counsel  to raise the point as in effect it is only a link in the  chain of his argument to persuade us to hold in his favour on  the construction of s. 320.                             303 Before we consider this argument in some detail, it will  be convenient  at  this  stage  to  notice  some  of  the  well established  rules  of Construction which would help  us  to steer  clear  of  the  complications  created  by  the  Act. Maxwell  "  On the Interpretation of Statutes",  10th  Edn., says at p. 7 thus: "..............   if  the  choice  is  between  two   inter- pretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve  the manifest  purpose  of  the legislation, we  should  avoid  a construction which would reduce the legislation to  futility and  should rather accept the bolder construction  based  on the  view  that  Parliament would  legislate  only  for  the purpose of bringing about an effective result." It is said in Craies on Statute Law, 5th Edn., at p. 82-- Manifest  absurdity  or  futility,  palpable  injustice,  or absurd inconvenience or anomaly to be avoided.’) Lord  Davey  in  Canada Sugar Refining Co.  v.  R.  provides another  useful  guide  of correct  perspective  to  such  a problem in the following words: "  Every  clause  of  a statute  should  be  construed  with reference  to the context and the other clauses of the  Act, so as, so far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of the  whole  statute or series of statutes  relating  to  the subject-matter." To appreciate the problem presented and to give an  adequate answer to the same, it would be necessary and convenient  to notice  the scheme of the Act as reflected in  the  relevant sections,  namely, ss. 16, 17, 18, 20, 32, 34 and 320.   The said  scheme of the Act may be stated thus: Under  the  Act, there   are  general  elections  and  elections  to   casual vacancies.   The general elections may be in regard  to  the first  election  after  the Act came into force  or  to  the subsequent  elections  under the Act.  Section 5  imposes  a duty  on the Government to constitute a Municipal  Committee for  each town and notify the date when it shall  come  into existence.  Section 17 enjoins on the Government to issue  a notification  calling upon all the constituencies  to  elect members in accordance (1)  [1898] A.C. 735. 304

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with  the provisions of the, Act on or before such  date  or dates as may be specified in the said notification.  Section 16  imposes  a  duty upon the Collector to  hold  a  general election in the manner prescribed within three months before the  expiry  of  the term of office of the  members  of  the Committee as specified in s. 34 of the Act.  Sub-section (2) of  s.  16 provides for a bye-election for filling up  of  a casual  vacancy.  Section 18 enables the Collector with  the approval  of  the  Government to  designate  or  nominate  a Returning  Officer.  Section 19 imposes a duty upon such  an officer  to do all such acts and things as may be  necessary for  effectually  conducting  the  election  in  the  manner provided by the Act and the rules made there under.  Section 20  authorizes the Collector to issue a notification in  the Official   Gazette   appointing   the   dates   for   making nominations,  for  the  scrutiny  of  nominations,  for  the withdrawal of candidatures and for the holding of the  poll. After  the elections are held in the manner prescribed,  the names  of all the members finally elected to  any  Committee shall  be  published  in the Official  Gazette.   Except  as other,wise provided in the Act, s. 34 prescribes the term of three  years  for  a member so  elected.   As  a  transitory provision  till such an election is held, s. 320  says  that the members of the previous Committee constituted under  the earlier Act shall be deemed to be constituted under the  Act and  the  members thereof shall hold office till  the  first meeting of the Committee is called under s. 35 of the Act. It   is  clear  from  the  aforesaid  provisions  that   the Government   notifies  the  dates  calling  upon   all   the constituencies  to  elect the members before  such  date  or dates prescribed; the Collector holds the election and fixes the dates for the various stages of the process of  election ; the Returning Officer appointed by the Collector does  all acts  and  things necessary for effectually  conducting  the election. On  the  general scheme of the Act we do not see  any  legal objection to the Collector holding the first elections under the Act.  The legal obstacle for such a course is sought  to be raised on the wording of s. 16(1). 305 Every general election requisite for the purpose of this Act shall  be  held by the Collector in  the  manner  prescribed within three months before the expiry of the term of  office of the members of the Committee as specified in section 34." The argument is that the Collector’s power to hold a general election is confined to s. 16(1) and, as in the case of  the members  of  the Committee deemed to have  been  constituted under  the Act the second limb of the section  cannot  apply and  as the Collector’s power is limited by the second  limb of the section, the Collector has no power to hold the first general  election under the Act.  If this interpretation  be accepted, the Act would become a dead-letter and-the obvious intention  of  the Legislature would be  defeated.   Such  a construction cannot be accepted except in cases of  absolute intractability of the language used. While  the  Legislature  repealed the earlier  Act  with  an express  intention  to constitute new  Committees  on  broad based  democratic  principles, by  this  interpretation  the Committee under the old Act perpetuates itself indefinitely. In  our  view,  s.  16(1) does not  have  any  such  effect. Section  16(1)  may be read along with the  aforesaid  other relevant  provisions  of the Act.  If so read, it  would  be clear  that it could not apply to the first  election  after the  Act  came  into  force,  but  should  be  confined   to subsequent elections.  So far as the first general  election

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is  concerned,  there  is a  self-contained  and  integrated machinery  for  holding  the election  without  in  any  way calling  in  aid  the provisions of s.  16(1).   Section  17 applies  to all elections, that is, general as well as  bye- elections.  It applies to the first general election as well as  subsequent  general  elections.   The  proviso  to  that section says that for the purpose of holding elections under sub-s. (1) of s. 16 no such notification shall be issued  at any  time earlier than four months before the expiry of  the term of office of the members of the Committee as  specified in  s.  34.  The proviso can be given full meaning,  for  it provides  only  for a case covered by s. 16(1) and,  as  the first general election is outside the scope of s. 16(1), 39 306 it  also  falls outside the scope of the proviso to  S.  17. Under  s. 17, therefore, the Government, in respect  of  the first general election, calls upon all the constituencies to elect  members before the date or dates fixed by it.   Under s. 20, the Collector fixes the dates for the various  stages of  the election.  The Returning Officer does all  the  acts and  things necessary for conducting the election  and  when the election process is completed, the names of the  members elected  are  published.   All these  can  be  done  without reference  to s. 16(1), for the Collector is also  empowered under  s.  20 to hold the elections.  In  this  view,  there cannot  be  any legal difficulty for  conducting  the  first election, after the Act came into force.  If so, the term of the  members  of the Committee deemed to have  been  elected would come to an end when the first meeting of the Committee was called under s. 35.  The Legislature in enacting the law not only assumed but also expected that the Government would issue  the  requisite notification under s. 17  of  the  Act within  a  reasonable time from the date when the  Act  came into force.  The scheme of the Act should be judged on  that basis;  if  so judged, the sections disclose  an  integrated scheme giving s. 320 a transitory character. It  is conceded by learned counsel that if s.  320(1)(a)  is constructed   in  the  manner  we  do,  the   other   points particularised above do not arise for consideration. Before  leaving this part of the case we must  observe  that the  difficulty is created not by the provisions of the  Act but by the fact of the Government not proceeding under s. 17 of  the Act within a reasonable time from the date on  which the  Act  came into force.  This is a typical  case  of  the legislative  intention being obstructed or deflected by  the inaction of the executive. Mr.  Ram Reddy, learned counsel for the respondents,  states that there are many good reasons why the Government did  not implement the Act.  There may be many such reasons, but when the  Legislature  made  an  Act in  1956,  with  a  view  to democratize  municipal  administration in that part  of  the country  so as to bring it on a par with that  obtaining  in other                             307 States, it is no answer to say that the Government had  good reasons for not implementing the Act.  If the Government had any  such reasons, that might be an occasion for moving  the Legislature  to  repeal  the Act or to  amend  it.   If  the affected parties had filed a writ of mandamus in time,  this situation could have been avoided ; but it was not done.  We hope  and  trust that the Government  would  take  immediate steps  to hold elections to the Municipal Committee so  that the body constituted as early as 1953, under a different Act could be replaced by an elected body under the Act.

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Even  so, learned counsel for the appellants  contends  that the  Municipal  Committee  had no power  to  sell  the  land acquired  by  it for constructing a market.   To  appreciate this  contention  it  would  be  convenient  to  notice  the relevant provisions of the Act.  Under s. 72(f) all land  or other   property  transferred  to  the  Committee   by   the Government  or  the  District Board  or  acquired  by  gift, purchase, or otherwise for local purposes shall vest in  and be  under the control of the Committee.  Section 73  enables the  Government,  in  consultation with  the  Committee,  to direct  that  any property, movable or immovable,  which  is vested  in  it, shall vest in such  Committee.   Section  74 empowers  the Government on the request of the Committee  to acquire any land for the purposes of the Act.  Under s.  76, the  Committee  may, with the sanction  of  the  Government, transfer  to  the  Government any  property  vested  in  the Committee  under  ss.  72(f), 73 and 74, but not  so  as  to affect  any  trust  or public right  subject  to  which  the property  is  held.  Learned counsel contends that,  as  the land was acquired by the Committee for the construction of a market, the Committee has power to transfer the same to  the Government  only subject to the conditions laid down  in  s. 76,  and  that  it has no power to sell the  land  to  third parties.  This argument ignores the express intention of  s. 77 of the Act.  Section 77 says: "  Subject  to  such exceptions as  the  Government  may  by general or special order direct, no Committee shall transfer any  immovable property except in pursuance of a  resolution passed at a meeting by a 308 majority  of not less than two-third of the whole number  of members  and in accordance with rules made under  this  Act, and no Committee shall transfer any property which has  been vested  in it by the Government except with the sanction  of the Government: Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to  leases of  immovable property for a term not exceeding three  years ". This  section  confers  on the Committee  an  express  power couched  in  a negative form.  Negative  words  are  clearly prohibitory and are ordinarily used as a legislative  device to  make a statute imperative.  If the section is recast  in an  affirmative  form,  it  reads to  the  effect  that  the Committee  shall  have  power  to  transfer  any   immovable property, if the conditions laid down under the section  are complied  with.   The conditions laid down  are:  (1)  there shall  be a resolution passed at a meeting by a majority  of not  less than two-third of the whole number of  members  of the Committee; (2) it shall be in accordance with the  rules made under the Act; (3) in the case of a property vested  in it by the Government, the transfer can be made only with the sanction of the Government; and (4) the sale is not exempted by  the  Government, by general or special order,  from  the operation of s. 77 of the Act.  It is not disputed that  the relevant  conditions have been complied with in the  present case.   If  so, the power of the Committee to  alienate  the property cannot be questioned. Learned counsel contends that the provisions of s. 76 govern the  situation and that s. 77 may apply only to  a  property vested in the Committee under provisions other than those of ss.  72(f),  73  and  74,  and  that  further,  if  a  wider interpretation  was  given to s. 77, while under s.  76  the transfer  in favour of the Government would be subject to  a trust or public right, under s. 77 it would be free from  it if  it  was  transferred  to a  private  party.   The  first

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objection has no force, as there are no sections other  than ss.  72, 73 and 74 whereunder the Government vests  property in  a Committee.  The second objection also has  no  merits, for the trust or public right-mentioned in s. 76                             309 does  not  appear  to relate to the purpose  for  which  the property  is  purchased  but to the trust  or  public  right existing  over the property so alienated by  the  Committee. Further the proviso to s. 77, which says, " nothing in  this section  shall apply to leases of immovable property  for  a term  not exceeding three years ", indicates that  the  main section applies also to the property vested in the Committee under  the  previous  section,  for  it  exempts  from   the operation  of the operative part of s. 77 leases for a  term not  exceeding three years in respect of properties  covered by   the  preceding  section  and  other   sections.    This interpretation  need not cause any apprehension that a  Com- mittee  may squander away the municipal property, for s.  77 is  hedged in by four conditions and the  conditions  afford sufficient   guarantee  against  improper  and   improvident alienations. In  this context learned counsel for the appellants  invoked the   doctrine  of  law  that  an  action  of  a   statutory corporation  may  be ultra vires its  powers  without  being illegal  and also the principle that when a statute  confers an  express power, a power inconsistent with that  expressly given  cannot be implied.  It is not necessary  to  consider all  the  decisions  cited,  as  learned  counsel  for   the respondents  does  not canvass the correctness of  the  said principles.   It would, therefore, be sufficient  to  notice two  of  the decisions cited at the Bar.   The  decision  in Elizabeth Dowager Baroness Wenlock v. The River Dee  Company (1) is relied upon in support of the proposition that when a corporation  is authorised to do an act subject  to  certain conditions, it must be deemed to have been prohibited to  do the  said  act except in accordance with the  provisions  of that Act which confers the authority on it.  Where by Act 14 & 15 Viet. a company was empowered to borrow at interest for the  purposes  of  the concerned Acts,  subject  to  certain conditions,  it was held that the company was prohibited  by the  said Act from borrowing except in accordance  with  the provisions  of that Act.  Strong reliance is placed  on  the decision in Attorney-General v. Fulham Corporation (1) (1885) 10 A.C. 354. (2) (1921) 1 Ch.D. 440. 310 There,  in exercise of the powers conferred under the  Baths and  Wash-houses  Acts the Metropolitan  Borough  of  Fulham propounded  a  scheme  in substitution  of  an  earlier  one whereunder  it  installed  a  wash-house  to  which  persons resorted  for washing their clothes bringing their own  wash materials  and  utilised  the  facilities  offered  by   the municipality on payment of the prescribed charges.  Sarjant, J.,  held that the object of the legislation was to  provide for persons who became customers facilities for doing  their own  washing,  but the scheme provided for  washing  by  the municipality itself and that, therefore, it was ultra  vires the  statute.   In  coming to that  conclusion  the  learned Judge, after considering an earlier decision on the subject, applied  the  following principle to the facts of  the  case before him : " That recognises that in every case it is for a corporation of this kind to show that it has affirmatively an  authority to do particular acts; but that in applying that  principle, the  rule  is  not  to be  applied  too  narrowly,  and  the

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corporation  is  entitled  to  do not  only  that  which  is expressly authorised but that which is reasonably incidental to or consequential upon that which is in terms authorized." The principle so stated is unobjectionable. The  correctness  of  these  principles  also  need  not  be canvassed,  for  the  construction we  have  placed  on  the provisions  of the Act does not run counter to any of  these principles.   We  have held that s. 77  confers  an  express power on the Municipal Committee to sell property subject to the  conditions mentioned therein.  Therefore, the  impugned sales  are not ultra vires the powers of the Committee.   In view  of  the  said express power,  no  prohibition  can  be implied from the provisions of s. 76. Learned  counsel further contends that the  statutory  power can  be  exercised only for the purposes sanctioned  by  the statute,  that  the sales of the acquired  land  to  private persons  were  not  for  one of  such  purposes,  and  that, therefore,  they were void.  The principle that a  statutory body    can   only   function   within   the   statute    is unexcecutionable;  but the                             311 Legislature can confer a power on a statutory corporation to sell  its  land is equally uncontestable.  In this  case  we have  held  that the statute conferred such a power  on  the Municipal Committee, subject to stringent limitations.  Many situations  can  be  visualized when such a  sale  would  be necessary  and would be to the benefit of  the  corporation. of  course  the  price fetched by such  sales  can  only  be utilised for the purposes sanctioned by the Act. The last point raised is that the learned Judges of the High Court were not justified in holding on the materials  placed before  them that the appellants lacked bona fides and  that the  petition  filed  by  them  was  not  conceived  in  the interests of the public.  We do not find any material on the record  to  sustain  this  finding.   Indeed,  but  for  the petitioner-appellants the extraordinary situation created by the inaction of the Government in the matter of implementing the  Act, affecting thereby the municipal administration  of all  the  districts in Telangana area, might not  have  been brought  to  light.  We cannot describe the  action  of  the appellants either mala fide or frivolous. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed but, in the circumstances, without costs. SARKAR,  J.-The  first  question is whether  the  first  ten respondents are still members of the Municipal Committee  of Vicarabad.  These persons had been elected to the  Committee in   the  elections  held  in  1953  under   the   Hyderabad Municipal  and  Town Commit tees Act,  1951  (Hyderabad  Act XXVII of 1951), hereafter called the repealed Act.  That Act was  repealed by the Hyderabad District  Municipalities  Act (Hyderabad Act XVIII of 1956), hereafter called the new Act, which  came into force in August 1956.  The appellants,  who are  rate-payers  of  the Municipality, contend  that  on  a proper  reading of the new Act, it must be held  that  these ten respondents have ceased to be members of the  Committee, and   they  seek  a  writ  of  quo  warranto   against   the respondents. Section  320  of  the new Act provides  that  any  Committee constituted  under the repealed Act shall be deemed to  have been constituted under the new Act 312 and its members shall continue to hold office till the first meeting  of the Committee is called under s. 35 of  the  new Act.   The  ten respondents contend that as  admittedly  the meeting  under  s.  35 has not been called,  their  term  of

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office has not yet expired. Now  s. 35, so far as is material, provides that  the  first meeting  of the Committee shall be called by  the  Collector within  thirty days of the date of publication of the  names of members under s. 32.  Section 32 states that the names of members finally elected to any Committee shall be  forthwith published  in  the  official Gazette.  It  is  quite  clear, therefore, that the Committee mentioned in this section,  is a  Committee constituted by an election held under  the  new Act.  It would follow that the meeting contemplated in s. 35 is a meeting of a Committee constituted by an election  held under the new Act.  The provisions of that section put  this beyond doubt. In  order,  therefore,  that  a  meeting  of  the  Committee contemplated in s. 35 may be held, there has first to be  an election under the new Act to constitute the Committee.   No such  election  has  yet been held.   It  is  the  provision concerning  election in the new Act that has given  rise  to the difficulty that arises in this case.  Section 16, sub-s. (1),  gives the power to hold the general elections.  It  is in these words: Every general election requisite for the purpose of this Act shall  be  held by the Collector in  the  manner  prescribed within three months before the expiry of the term of  office of  the members of the Committee as specified in section  34 ". Section  34 in substance states that except as  other.  wise provided  members of the Committee shall hold office  for  a term of three years and that term of office shall be  deemed to commence on the date of the first meeting called under s. 35.   It would therefore appear that the members whose  term of  office  is sought to be specified by s. 34  are  members elected under the new Act, for their term is to commence  on the  date  that they first meet under s. 35 and  as  earlier stated,  the  meeting under s. 35 is a  meeting  of  members elected under the new Act.                             313 The  contention  for  the appellants is that  if  a.  34  is construed  in  the way mentioned above,  the  first  general election  under the new Act cannot be held under s. 16,  for an election can be held under that section only within three months  before the expiry of the term of office  of  members elected under the new Act and in the case of first  election there are ex hypothesi, no such members.  It is said that as there  is  no other provision in the new Act for  holding  a general election, the Act would then become unworkable,  for if  the first general election cannot be held no  subsequent election  can be held either., The result, it is  contended, is  that the Committee elected under the repealed Act  would continue for ever by virtue of s. 320.  Such a situation, it is said, could not have been intended by the new Act.  It is therefore  suggested  that  s. 34  should  be  construed  as specifying  a  term  of  office  of  three  years  from  the commencement  of the new Act for members elected  under  the repealed  Act who are under s. 320, to be deemed to  form  a Committee  constituted  under the new Act.  If s. 34  is  so construed, then the first general election under the new Act can properly be held under s. 16.  It is on this basis  that the  appellants  contend that the ten respondents’  term  of office  expired in August, 1959, and they are in  possession of the office now without any warrant. There  is no doubt that the Act raises some difficulty.   It was  certainly not intended that the members elected to  the Committee under the repealed Act should be given a permanent tenure of office nor that there would be no elections  under

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the  new Act.  Yet such a result would appear to  follow  if the  language used in the new Act is strictly and  literally interpreted.   It is however well established that  "  Where the  language  of  a statute, in its  ordinary  meaning  and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest  contradiction of  the  apparent  purpose  of the  enactment,  or  to  some inconvenience   or  absurdity,  hardship  or   in   justice, presumably  not intended, a construction may be put upon  it which  modifies  the  meaning of the  words,  and  even  the structure of the sentence.................. 40 314 Where the main object and intention of a statute are  clear, it  must  not  be reduced to a nullity  by  the  draftsman’s unskilfulness  or ignorance of the law, except in a case  of necessity,  or the absolute intractability of  the  language used.   Nevertheless,  the  courts  are  very  reluctant  to substitute words in a Statute, or to add words to it, and it has  been  said that they will only do so where there  is  a repugnancy  to good Bense.": see Maxwell on  Statutes  (10th ed.)  p. 229.  In Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v.  Asher  (1), Denning, L. J., said, " when a defect appears a judge cannot simply fold his hands and  blame  the  draftsman.   He must set  to  work  on  the constructive    task   of   finding   the    intention    of Parliament..............  and  then he must  supplement  the written  word  so  as  to give " force and  life  "  to  the intention  of the legislature............... A judge  should ask  himself the question how, if the makers of the Act  had themselves come across this ruck in the texture of it,  they would  have straightened it out ?  He must then do  as  they would  have  done.  A judge must not alter the  material  of which  the Act is woven, but he can and should iron out  the creases." I  conceive it my duty, therefore, so to read the  new  Act, unless I am prevented by the intractability of the  language used,  as to make it carry out the obvious intention of  the legislature.   Now there does not seem to be  the  slightest doubt  that the intention of the makers of the new  Act  was that  there should be elections held under it and  that  the Municipal Committees should be constituted by such elections to  run  the  administration  of  the  municipalities.   The sections  to  which  I have so far referred  and  the  other provisions  of the new Act make this perfectly plain.   Thus s. 5 provides for the establishment of municipal  committees and  s.  8  states that the committees shall  consist  of  a certain number of elected members.  The other sections  show that the Committees shall have charge of the  administration of the municipalities for the benefit of the dwellers within them.  It is plain (1) [1949] 2 All E.R. 155 ,164. 351 that  the  entire  object of the new Act would  fail  if  no general election could be held under it. The  question then is, How should the Act be read so  as  to make  it  possible to hold general elections under  it  ?  I agree with the learned advocate for the appellants that  the only section in the new Act providing for general  elections being  held,  is  s.  16(1).  In my view,  s.  20  does  not authorise  the  holding  of any general  election;  it  only provides  for a notification of the date on which  the  poll shall, if necessary, be taken.  There is no doubt that under s. 16(1) the second and all subsequent general elections can be held ; in regard to such general elections, no difficulty is  created  by the language of the section.   It  would  be

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curious  if s. 20 also provided for general  elections,  for then  there would be two provisions in the  Act  authorising general elections other than the first.  Then I find hat all the  sections referring to general elections refer  to  such elections  being  held under s. 16(1) and not under  s.  20. Thus s. 31 provides that if at a general election held under s. 16, no member is elected, a fresh election shall be held. It would follow that if in an election under s. 20, assuming that  that  section  authorises an election,  no  member  is elected,  no fresh election can be held.  There would be  no reason to make this distinction between elections held under s. 16 and under s. 20.  Again the proviso to s. 17  requires a certain notification to be issued within a prescribed time for holding elections under s. 16(1).  If an election can be held  under s. 20, no such notification need be  issued  for there  is  no provision requiring it.  This could  not  have been intended.  For all these reasons it seems to me that s. 20 does not confer any power to hold any election. I  have earlier said that the suggestion for the  appellants is that the best way out of the difficulty is to read s.  34 as  specifying  a term of office of three  years  commencing from  the coming into force of the new Act, for the  members elected under the repealed Act who are to be deemed under s. 320  to  be a committee constituted under the new  Act.   It seems  to  me  that this is not a correct  solution  of  the problem.  First, 316 the  object  of  continuing the members  elected  under  the repealed  Act  in  office is clearly to have,  what  may  be called  a  caretaker  committee  to  do  the  work  of   the Municipality  till  a committee is constituted  by  election under the new Act.  It could not have been intended that the committee  of  the members elected under  the  repealed  Act would  function for three years after the new Act  has  come into  operation  nor that such members would have  the  same term  of  office  as  members elected  under  the  new  Act. Secondly,  I  do  not  find  the  language  used  in  s.  34 sufficiently tractable to cover by any alteration, a  member elected  under the repealed Act.  To meet the suggestion  of the  appellants,  a new provision would have really  to   be enacted  and  added  to s. 34 and this I  do  not  think  is permissible.  It would be necessary to add to the section  a provision that in the case of members elected under the  old Act  the term of office of three years would  start  running from  the commencement of the new Act, a provision which  is wholly absent in the section as it stands.  Lastly, so read, s.  34 would come into conflict with s. 320 which  expressly provides  that  the term of office of  the  members  elected under the repealed Act would continue till the first meeting of the committee constituted under the new Act is held under s.  35.  This portion of s. 320 would have to be  completely struck out. It seems to me that the real solution of the difficulty lies in construing s. 16(1) so as to authorise the holding of the first general election under it and remove the absurdity  of there  being  no  provision  directing  the  first   general election  to  be held.  Now that section applies  to  ,every general election requisite for the purpose of this Act."  It therefore  applies  to  the  first  and  all  other  general elections.   The  clear intention hence is  that  the  first general  election  will also be held under  this  provision. But  such election cannot be held within the time  mentioned therein  for that time has to be calculated from the  expiry of the term of office of the Committee elected under the Act and in the case of the first general election under the  new

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Act, there is no such Committee.  The requirement 317 as to time cannot apply to the first general election.   The section  has  therefore to be read as if there was  no  such requirement  in the case of the first general election.   It will  have  to  be read with the addition  of  the  words  " provided  that  every general election excepting  the  first general  election  shall  be  held "  between  the  words  " prescribed  "  and  " within ". That would  ’carry  out  the intention  of the legislature and do the least  violence  to the  language  used.  So read, there would  be  clear  power under  the  Act to hold the first  general  meeting.   There would  of  course  then be no indication  as  to  when  this election is to be held but that would only mean that it  has to  be held within a reasonable time of the commencement  of the new Act. The  course  suggested by me is not without the  support  of precedents.   Thus in Salmon v. Duncombe (1),  the  Judicial Committee in construing a statute omitted from it the  words "  as  if  such natural born subject resided  in  England  " because  the retention of those words would  have  prevented the person contemplated getting full power to dispose of his immovable property by his will which it was held, the object of the statute was, he should get. With  regard  to  the other point argued  in  this  .appeal, namely,  whether  the Municipal Committee even  if  properly constituted,  has  power to sell the land mentioned  in  the petition, I agree, for the reasons mentioned in the judgment delivered by the majority of the members of the bench,  that it has such power and have nothing to add. The appeal therefore fails.                           Appeal dismissed. (1) (1886) 11  App.  Cas. 627. 318