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PETITIONER: M.   N. SANKARAYARAYANAN NAIR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: P.   V. BALAKRISHNAN & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT26/11/1971

BENCH: REDDY, P. JAGANMOHAN BENCH: REDDY, P. JAGANMOHAN PALEKAR, D.G.

CITATION:  1972 AIR  496            1972 SCR  (2) 599  1972 SCC  (1) 318  CITATOR INFO :  R          1976 SC 370  (4)  F          1977 SC 903  (5)  R          1980 SC 423  (7)  RF         1980 SC1510  (10)  R          1983 SC 194  (14,17,55,79,84)  R          1987 SC 188  (2)  R          1987 SC 877  (22,23,28,32,75,76)  F          1992 SC 248  (44)

ACT: Code of Criminal Procedure (Act 5 of 1898), s. 494--Grant of permission   to   Public   Prosecutor   to   withdraw   from prosecution---Criteria.

HEADNOTE: The respondents were committed to trial before the  Sessions Court   for  offences  of  forgery,  cheating,  etc.    They challenged the committal order but the High Court held  that there  was a prima facie case.  Thereafter, the trial  judge split  up the charges and this was again questioned but  the High  Court held that there was no illegality.   The  Public Prosecutor  then  applied  under s. 494,  Cr.   P.C.,  under instructions from the Government, for permission to withdraw from  the prosecution, on the grounds, that the  transaction relating to the offence arose out of a contract and was of a civil  nature,  that  there  had  been  enormous  delay   in proceeding  with  the  trial,  and  that  the  securing  the evidence  of witnesses would involve heavy expense  for  the State  as the witnesses were in far off  places.   ’Material judge gave the permission and the order was confirmed by the High Court. Allowing the appeal to this Court, HELD  : (1) Section 494 of the Code is not in  pari  materia with  s.  333 under which the Advocate General may  enter  a nolle prosequi at any stage of a trial.  It only gives power to  the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from  the  prosecution subject to the consent of the Court.  Though the section  is in general terms and does not circumscribe the powers of the Public  Prosecutor  the  essential  consideration  which  is implicit  in  the grant of the power is that  it  should  be exercised  in the interests of justice which may be,  either that  it may not be possible to produce sufficient  evidence

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to sustain the charge, or that subsequent information before the  prosecuting agency falsifies the prosecution  evidence, or  other similar circumstances depending on the  facts  and circumstances  of  each case.  The power is subject  to  the permission  of the Court and it is the duty of the Court  to see that the permission is not sought on grounds  extraneous to  the  interests of justice or that offences  against  the State do not go unpunished merely because the Government  as a  matter of general policy or expediency  unconnected  with its duty to prosecute offenders directs a Public  Prosecutor to  withdraw from the Prosecution and the Public  Prosecutor merely does so at its behest.  The court, while  considering the  request  to  grant permission, should not do  so  as  a formality for the mere a-.king. it may grant permission only if  it is satisfied on the materials placed before  it  that the grant of it subserves the administration of justice  and that the permission was not sought covertly with an ulterior purpose unconnected with the vindication of the law. [603 E- H; 604 A-D; 606 E] State  of  Bihar v. Ram Naresh Pandey,  [1957]  S.C.R.  279, followed. Devendra  Kumar  Roy  v. Syed Yar  Bakht  Chaudhury  &  Ors. A.I.R.  1939 Cul. 220, The King v. Parmanand & Ors.,  A.I.R. 1949 Pat. 222 and Dy.  Accountant General (Admn.) Office  of Accountant  General, Kerala Trivandrum v. State of Kerala  & Ors., A.I.R. 1970 Kerala 158, referred to. (2)  In the present case none of the grounds alleged or even their  cumulative effect would justify, the withdrawal  from the prosecution. [906 G] 600 (a)  It  may  be that the acts of the respondents  may  make them  both  liable under the civil as well as  the  criminal laws.   But that does not justify either the seeking of  the permission to withdraw from the prosecution or the  granting of  it unless the matter before the criminal court is  of  a purely civil nature.  The committal order and the  judgments of  the High Court at the prior two stages show  that  there was  a prima facie case against the accused with respect  to the charges framed against them. [906 G-H; 907 G-H] (b)  Neither  the  ground  of  delay  nor  the  question  of expenditure involved by themselves, could be a proper ground for  granting  permission  to  the  Public  Prosecutor   for withdrawing from the case [608 B-C, F-G]

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 12  of 1969. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated June 25, 1968 of the Kerala High Court in Criminal M.P. Nos. 175, 177 and 179 of 1968. A. Sreedharan Nambyar, for the appellant. Lily Thomas, for respondent No. 2. A. G. Pudissery, for respondent No. 3. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by P.   Jaganmohan Reddy, J. Respondent 1 and Respondent 2 were committed on 15th June 1965 by the Second Class  Magistrate, Cannanore  to  stand  trial before  the  Assistant  Sessions Judge,  Tellichery, the former for offences  under  Sections 467,  478 and 420 read with Section 109 of the Indian  Penal Code while the latter under Sections 467 read with 109,  471 and  420.  While the case was pending before  the  Assistant Sessions Judge, the Public Prosecutor of Tellicherry filed a Memo  on 30-11-67 under Sec. 494 of the  Criminal  Procedure

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Code  for permission to withdraw from the prosecution  which permission  was accorded by the Assistant Sessions Judge  on 2-12-67.   The  Appellant who was the  Managing  Partner  of Shree  Narayana Transport Company, Calicut filed a  Criminal Miscellaneous  Petition  on  19-2-68 in the  High  Court  of Kerala  against  the order of the Assistant  Sessions  Judge according   permission   to  the   Public   Prosecutor   for withdrawing from the prosecution.  The High Court held  that the Public Prosecutor was justified when he applied for  the withdrawal  of  the  case  and  accordingly  dismissed   the petition  against  which this appeal comes up before  us  by Special Leave. The 1st Respondent was the Agent of Shree Narayana Transport Company of one of its Branches namely at Baliapattom and  in that capacity it was one of his duties to accept goods  from the  Public  for transporting them by lorry service  of  the Company  and issue Way Bills.  These Way Bills contained  an undertaking   that  in  the  event  of  any  of  the   Banks discounting them and if goods are  601 lost  or  damaged during transport,, the  Transport  Company will be responsible to the Bank.  It is alleged that the 1st Respondent  issued  nine  Way Bills on  different  dates  in favour of the 2nd Respondent, as if the goods were  received but  in fact no such goods were accepted for  transport  nor were any such goods dispatched.  These Way Bills_ were  duly discounted by the second Respondent the consigner who  drew about  Rs. 84,000 against, them from his Bank-.  This  fraud was detected on a check made by the General Manager of Shree Narayana  Transport Co., Kozhikode and it appears  that  the 1st accused (1st Respondent) executed an agreement in favour of  the Transport Company undertaking to make good the  loss suffered by it, after which he was suspended on 10-4-63.  On the same day a complaint was filed before Baliapattom Police and a case was accordingly registered against both Accused 1 and  Accused  2. After _investigation the  Sub-Inspector  of Police, Baliapattom filed a charge-sheet.  The Magistrate on the  materials  disclosed  in  the  report  under  Sec.  173 committed  the accused to stand trial before  the  Assistant Sessions Court on 15-6-65 against which a Revision was filed in  the  High Court of Kerala on 9-7-65.  It  was  contended before  the High Court that the committal was illegal as  no evidence  had been adduced in the case, as such it would  be premature  at that stage to say whether any and if so,  what offence  could  be disclosed The High Court  dismissed  this Revision  Petition  on 20-10-66 holding that  the  procedure adopted in the committal proceedings instituted on a  Police report is prescribed in Sec. 207-A of the Criminal Procedure Code under which the Magistrate had the power to commit even without  recording  the evidences of  witnesses.   The  High Court  drew support for this conclusion from a  decision  of this   Court  in  Ramanarayan  Mor  &  Anr.,  v.  State   of Maharashtra (1) where it was held that though normally in  a criminal trial, the Court can proceed on documents which are duly  proved,  or by the rules of evidence  made  admissible without formal proof, the Legislature had under the  amended code  in  Sec.  207-A prescribed  a  special  procedure  for commitment  of  the  accused.  The  record  under  the  said provision consists of the oral evidence recorded under-sub-& (4)  of Sec. 173, and it would be difficult to  regard  only those   documents  which  are  duly  proved  or  which   are admissible without proof as "evidence’ within the meaning of Cl. (6) and not the rest.  On this view it was observed that there  was no legal impediment in the Magistrate  using  the case  diary for the purpose of deciding whether there was  a

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case  for committal and accordingly dismissed  the  Revision Petition.  After this Revision was disposed of the Assistant Sessions Judge to whom the case stood committed ordered  the splitting  up  the charges into 8 cases  against  which  the second  respondent filed a Revision in the High Court  under Sec. 561-A Criminal Procedure Code where it (1)  [1964] (5) S. C.R. 1064. 602 was  contended  that  .-It the 8 charges  should  have  been consolidated  into  one case as otherwise there would  be  8 distinct  offences leading to multiplicity of  trials.   The High  Court  by  its Judgment dated  30-10-67,  following  a decision  of this Court in Ranachhodlal V. State  of  Madhya Pradesh(1), said that the order of the Magistrate  splitting up the charge into 8 cases was proper and while it does  not call  for  any  interference,  it  left  it  open  for   the prosecution  as provided under Sec.  240’Criminal  Procedure Code  to  withdraw the other charges if one  of  the  trials should end in a conviction. After  this petition was dismissed the Respondents  seem  to have moved the State Government to withdraw the  prosecution and accordingly, as would appear from the Memo. filed by the Public  Prosecutor  on 30-11-67, the  Government  passed  an order  G.O.  Rt.   No.  1589/67  Home  (B)  dated   22-11-67 directing  the withdrawal of the case with the  sanction  of the Court, in the interest of public policy as also  because there  was  no  likelihood of the case being  pursued  to  a successful  issue.  It was stated in the Memo. filed by  the Public Prosecutor that the alleged offences charged  against the  accused arose out of a contract agreed to  between  the accused  and  the  defacing complainant  viz.,  the  General Manager,  Shree Narayana Transport; that the subject  matter of  the  case had been decided by  the  Subordinate  Judge’s Court, Calicut in a Civil suit; that the case was registered as  early as 1963 and the trial has not yet begun; that  the witnesses  from far off places such as Bombay  and  Calcutta are  cited and the securing of their evidence would  involve heavy  expenses  for the State and that the case is  one  of Civil nature. It  is  contended  before us that under  Sec.  494  Criminal Procedure  Code it is the Public Prosecutor and  the  Public Prosecutor  alone  who should make up his mind  to  withdraw from  the  prosecution without any reference  to  the  State Government, that it was the State Government which  directed the Public Prosecutor to seek permission as such the  Public Prosecutor has not adverted his mind nor did he exercise his independent judgment in deciding whether the case is one  in which   permission  of  the  Court  to  withdraw  from   the prosecution ought to have been asked for.  In any case it is submitted on the grounds disclosed in the Memo filed by  the Public  Prosecutor  that no permission ought  to  have  been given  as  even prior to the filing of the said  Memo.  the High  Court had said that there was a prima facie  case  for the trial to go on and therefore the present order directing the  Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the  prosecution  is manifestly contrary to the views earlier expressed by it. The Appellants Advocate later during the course of the argu- ment  conceded  that there is no force in the first  of  his contentions (1)  [1965](2) S.C.R. 283.  603 namely that the Public Prosecutor cannot either be asked  by the State Govt., to consider the filing of a petition  under Sec.  494  nor would it be proper for him if he was  of  the opinion that the prosecution ought not to proceed to get the

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consent of the Government to the filing of a petition  under that  Section  for  obtaining permission  of  the  Court  to withdraw from the prosecution. , Sec. 494 which empowers the Public Prosecutor with the consent of the Court to  withdraw from the prosecution is as follows:               "Any Public Prosecutor may, with the  consent               of  the Court, in cases tried by  jury  before               the return of the verdict, and in other  cases               before  the judgment is  pronounced,  withdraw               from  the  prosecution of  any  person  either               generally or in respect of any one or more  of               the offences for which he is tried; and,  upon               such withdrawal-               (a)   if  it is made before a charge has  been               framed,  the  accused shall be  discharged  in               respect of such offence or offences;               (b)   if  it is made after a charge  has  been               framed,  or when under this Code no charge  is               required, he shall be acquitted in respect  of               such offence or offences". The power contained in the Section gives a general executive direction  to withdraw from the prosecution subject  to  the consent  of  the  Court  which may  be  determined  on  many possible  grounds and is therefore wide and uncontrolled  by any  other provision in the Code nor is it  in  pari-materia with  Sec.  333 which enables the Advocate  General  at  any stage in a Trial by the High Court and before the return  of the  verdict to inform the Court if he thinks fit on  behalf of  the  Government that he will not further  prosecute  the Defendant  upon  the charge and on  such  information  being given  the case against the accused comes to an  end.   This power  of  entering  a  noble  prosecution  under  Sec.  333 Criminal Procedure Code is not dependent upon any permission of  the Court.  A reading of Sec. 494 would show that it  is the Public Prosecutor who is incharge of the case that  must ask  for  permission  of  the Court  to  withdraw  from  the prosecution of any person either generally or in respect  of one  or  more of the offences for which he is  tried.   This permission  can be sought by him at any stage either  during the  enquiry or after committal or even before the  Judgment is pronounced.  The section does not, however, indicate  the reasons  which  should weigh with the Public  Prosecutor  to move  the Court for permission nor the grounds on which  the Court  will grant or refuse permission.  Though the  Section is in general terms and does not circumscribe the powers 604 of the Public Prosecutor to seek permission to withdraw from the   prosecution  the  essential  consideration  which   is implicit  in the grant of the power is that it should be  in the  interest  of  administration of justice  which  may  be either  that  it  will not be  able  to  produce  sufficient evidence   to   sustain  the  charge  or   that   subsequent information  before  prosecuting agency  would  falsify  the prosecution  evidence  or any  other  similar  circumstances which  it  is difficult to predicate as they  are  dependent entirely  on  the  facts and  circumstances  of  each  case. Nonetheless  it  is  the duty of the Court also  to  see  in furtherance of justice that the permission is not sought  on grounds  extraneous  to  the interest  of  justice  or  that offences which are offences against the State go  unpunished merely because the Government as a matter of general  policy or  expediency  unconnected  with  its  duty  to   prosecute offenders  under the law, directs the public  prosecutor  to withdraw  from  the prosecution and  the  Public  Prosecutor merely does so at its behest.  A large number of cases have,

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been  referred  to but it is unnecessary to  consider  them, except  for a few as typifying the approach in  cases  where permission  to withdraw from the prosecution was  sought  on grounds extraneous to and not germane to the maintenance and enforcement of the law and which permission though given  by the Trial Court was quashed by the High Court. A Special Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Devendra Kumar Roy v. Syed Yar Bakht Chaudhury & Ors. (1), was  considering the validity of the permission granted by the Magistrate  to the Government Pleader to withdraw from the prosecution in a case where the accused were charged with offences under Sec- tions  193, 467, 477, 109 and 120-A of the Penal Code.   The prosecution  had  been started and after some  evidence  had been recorded, the record of the case was called for by  the Government  which having kept it for six months returned  it to   the  Government  Pleader  who  filed  a  petition   for withdrawal  from  the prosecution under  Sec.  494  Criminal Procedure Code on certain grounds which were not substantial namely that the original complainant had withdrawn from  the prosecution;  that  on  an independent  examination  of  the records  of  the Provincial Government considered  that  the evidence was insufficient to warrant further proceeding with the  case; and that the Provincial Government would  not  in view  of  the uncertainty of a  successful  ’prosecution  be justified  in  incurring heavy expenses. in  the  fees,  the travelling  allowances  of  the handwriting  expert  and  in lawyers’  expenses.  The Magistrate though considering  that these  grounds  are not sufficient for  not  committing  the accused  persons but on the other hand was of the view  that there  was ample substantial evidence to show  that  serious offences were actually committed, (1)  AIR 1939 Calcutta 220.  605 nonetheless granted permission to the Government Pleader  to withdraw  from  the prosecution.  It was held  by  the  High Court  that  the consent of the Trying  Magistrate  for  the discharge had not been properly given and therefore  quashed the proceedings.  It also appeared that some of the  accused in  the case were related to one of the Minister’s as  found proved by the High Court and the action of the Government in calling for the record of the case from the Magistrate while it was still proceeding and retaining it for six months  was quite  illegal  and utterly improper.  A Full Bench  of  the Patna  High  Court in The King v. Parmanand &  Ors.(1)  also hold  that there was no justification whatever for the  view that  the Prime Minister or any other Minister or  executive officer has the power to usurp the functions of the Court or to take the case out of the sensing of the Magistrate before whom  it  is  pending for trial and that  where  the  Trying Magistrate  makes no attempt to exercise his discretion  at. all and permits the withdrawal of the prosecution merely  in consequence  of the order of the Government the  High  Court will  interfere.  At the same time it was observed that  the High  Court would be reluctant to direct the prosecution  of persons against whom Government does not desire to  proceed, unless   there   is   evidence   which   requires   judicial consideration.  The permission granted by the Magistrate  in that  case was held to be wrong, so also was the  action  of the Government in a case which is subjudice irrespective  of the  question  whether the prosecution is likely to  end  in conviction as interfering with the even and ordinary  course of-  justice,  by  usurping the function of  the  Court  and taking it out of its seisin. In a recent case the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court  in Deputy  Accountant  General  (Admn.)  Office  of  Accountant

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General,  Kerala Trivandrum v. State of Kerala and  Ors.(2), was considering the application for withdrawal filed by  the Public Prosecutor under the directions of the Government  to withdraw  from  the  prosecution against  the  strikers  for offences  under  Sections 4 & 5 of  the  Essential  Services Maintenance  Ordinance,  1968, and other laws  such  as  the Penal  Code  and Telegraph Act mentioning as  a  ground  the withdrawal order of the State Government which stated,  that consistent with.the Policy of the Government in relation  to mass  agitation and strike it has been decided  to  withdraw with  the  leave  of  the Court,  the  cases  registered  in connection  with the Central Government Employees strike  on the 19th September, 1968 except those involving serious per- sonal violence or destruction of property.  It was held that the policy set out therein being a policy opposed to the law could not be taken into consideration.  Apart from the order being in (1) AIR 1949 Patna 222. (2) AIR 1970 Kerala 153. 606 disregard  of the duty and the responsibility of  the  State Government  to  enforce the law, the Full Bench  said  there could  be  no question of the executive policy in  a  region covered by the law.  In that view it quashed the  permission granted  by the Trial Court.  In the State of Bihar  v.  Ram Narash  Pandey(1),  it was pointed out by  this  Court  that though  the Section does not give any indication as  to  the ground   on  which  the  Public  Prosecutor  may   make   an application  on the consideration of which the Court  is  to grant  its consent, it must nonetheless satisfy itself  that the executive function of the Public Prosecutor has not been improperly  exercised  and  that it is  not  an  attempt  to interfere with the normal course of justice for illegitimate reasons or purposes. It appears to us that the wide and general powers which  are conferred  under  Sec.  494  on  the  Public  Prosecutor  to withdraw from the prosecution though they are subject to the permission  of  the  Court have to be exercised  by  him  in relation  to  the facts and circumstances of  that  case  in furtherance of, rather than as a hindrance to the object  of the  law  and justified on the material in  the  case  which substantiate the grounds alleged, not necessarily from those gathered by the judicial method but on other materials which may  not be strictly on legal or admissible  evidence.   The Court also while considering the request to grant permission under  the  said  Section should not do so  as  a  necessary formality the grant of it for the mere asking.  It may do so only  if it is satisfied on the materials placed  before  it that the grant of it subserves the administration of justice and  that permission was not being sought covertly  with  an ulterior purpose unconnected with the vindication of the law which the executive organs are in duty bound to further  and maintain. What then are the circumstances in which the permission  has been sought in this case and the considerations that weighed with  the  Courts in granting that permission.   The  Public Prosecutor as we have seen thought that the matter was of  a civil nature, that the subject matter of the case before the Magistrate had been decided in a Civil suit, that  witnesses are from far off places and their evidence will incur  huge expenses  for  the State; that the case  was  registered  as early as 1963 and the trial has not yet begun.  It is  clear that  prima  facie  none  of  these  grounds  or  even   the cumulative  effect  of all these grounds would  justify  the withdrawal from the prosecution.  It may be that the acts of

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the Respondent may make them both liable under the Civil law as  well as under the Criminal law but it does  not  justify either  the seeking of the permission to withdraw  from  the prosecution  or granting of it unless the matter before  the Criminal Court is of a purely civil nature.  The accused  in this case have been (1)  [1957] S.C.R. 279.  607 charged  with  offences  of  cheating,  of  the  forgery  of valuable  securities with the intention that  the  documents forged  shall  be used for the purpose of  cheating,  and/or also  for  using  them as genuine which they  know  or  have reason  to believe to be forged documents.  The case of  the Respondents was that all this was done with the knowledge of the  complainant  with  a  view  to  further  the   practice prevailing to popularise the transport business.  It appears that  after  the  complaint was filed and  the  police  took cognizance of the offence and investigated it but before the charge-sheet  was filed the Public Prosecutor seems to  have expressed  the view on 8-6-63 that a successful  prosecution may  not  be  possible under Sec. 467 and  420  because  the matter  for which the Respondents were sought to be  charged related to a practice which seems to have prevailed in  that Transport Company and in other Companies as well and in  the light  of that practice mens rea may not be established  but this opinion did not prevail as he’ was directed to file the charge sheet and accordingly the case proceeded. A  perusal of the committal order will make this  conclusion of ours clear.  Before the Magistrate, the learned  Advocate had  contended  that there was a normal  practice  that  the Company used to issue way bills without obtaining the  goods from the party for the sake of popularising the Company  and that in the circumstances Respondent 1 while issuing the way bill  had  no intention to cause damage or  to  cheat.   The Magistrate  negatived this contention and said that  he  was not  able to believe that the Company will resort  to  these practices  for the sake of such popularity and that  it  was the  way bills that were issued in Accused 2’s name  and  it was  Accused  2  who  obtained  the  money  from  the  Bank. Therefore, there was prima facie evidence to show that goods were  not  produced  at the time of  issuing  way  bills  by Respondent 1 to Respondent 2 and that Respondent 2 was  well aware of it when he drew the money on the way bills from the Bank  for  the  goods he had  never  produced  for  booking. Knowing that these receipts were forged one Respondent 2 had got  them  discounted.  It also appears from  the  committal order that the prosecution had produced a letter alleged  to have  been  written  by Respondent  2  to Respondent   1 requesting  him  to issue the way oil mills,  a  reading  of which the Magistrate said shows that it was a letter written with  the  intention  of obtaining them.  In  this  view  he thought  that  there  was a prima  facie  case  against  the accused and accordingly he framed the charges. The High Court ignoring the view taken by it in its previous two Revisions referred to earlier that there was prima facia case  and that there was no illegality in  the  prosecution, thought that the Public Prosecutor was right when he applied to the Court for 608 sanction  to withdraw the prosecution on the ground that  it might  not result in a conviction to which it further  added that  there  was  a long delay of five years  and  that  the witnesses were not in the locality and have to be brought to Court  from different places.  Though it thought  that  this latter  reason  may  not  justify  the  abandonment  of  the

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prosecution but nevertheless it is said that in view of  the practice prevailing in this Transport Company as well as  in other   Transport  Companies  the  chances   of   successful prosecution  were  remote.   It  further  thought  that  the question  of expenses would also become relevant.  We  think that  these  grounds  are  flimsy and  do  not  justify  the granting of permission to withdraw from the prosecution.  In the  first  place  there is nothing to  indicate  what  that practice was, how it was resorted to and what elements  were definition   to  constitute  the  offences  for  which   the Respondents  were entitled to be charged and in  the  second place nothing had happened since the committal order  except that  the several revisions filed by Respondent 1  and  Res- pondent 2 had delayed the trial which delay by itself cannot be  made  a ground for according permission.  On  the  other consideration  which  weighed  with the High  Court  that  a prosecution  would  involve a huge expenditure there  is  no material  to show what amount would be involved if the  case was  prosecuted nor how many witnesses would be required  to be  called from Calcutta and Bombay.  On the other hand  the case  appears  to be mostly hinged on the issue of  the  Way Bills  to Respondent 2 bay Respondent 1 without  receipt  of goods from Respondent 2 which the Respondents say was due to the  practice followed by the complainant to popularise  its transport  business.   The  execution of the  Way  Bills  by Respondent  1,  their issue by him without  receipt  of  the goods  and the obtaining of money by the  second  Respondent from  the Bank by discounting them with it are some  of  the elements and except perhaps for the non-receipt of the goods by the people to whom they were alleged to have been booked, are  all  dependent  on local witnesses.  In  any  case  the expenditure involved is not the sole criterion for  granting permission. In  the  view  we have taken this  appeal  is  allowed,  the permission  granted by the Trial Court and confirmed by  the High  Court in Revision is set aside and we direct that  the trial do proceed in accordance with law. V.P.S. Appeal allowed. 609