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PETITIONER: M.C. MEHTA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       20/11/1997

BENCH: B.N. KIRPAL, V.N. KHARE

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                THE 20TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 1997 Present:                  Hon’ble the Chief Justice                  Hon’ble Mr. Justice B.N. Kirpal                  Hon’ble Mr.Justice V.N.Khare M.S.Usgaonkar, Additional  Solicitor General,  Harish Salve, Sr.Adv.  (A.C.)   Dr.Rajiv  Dhawan,   Arun  Jaitley,  Swaraj Kaushal, Sr.Adv.,  Mukul Mudgal, (M.C. Mehta) Adv.-In-person (NP), Ms.Seema  Midha, Wasim  A.Qadri, A.D.N.Rao,  Niranjana Singh, S.N. Sikka, Ms. Indra Sewhney, Ms.Anubha Jain, Arvind Kumar Sharma, Rajiv Nanda, Hardeep Singh Anand, R.K. Kapoor, P.Verma, S.K.  Srivastava, B.R.Kapur,  Anis Ahmed Khan, Shri Narain, Sandeep  Narian, D.K.  Garg,  Sanjeev  Pabby,  Vijay Panjwani, R.K.  Maheshwari, Ms.Manju Bharti, Ranjit Kumar, R Sasiprabhu, Manish  Garg,  Ashok  /Mathur,  D.M.  Nargolkar, Pradeep Misra,  Ms. Niti  Dikshit, Mrs.  Anil  Katiyar,  Ms. Sushma Suri, D.S. Mehra, Saharya & Co., Advs., Ejaz Maqbool, R.P. Gupta,  K.K.Gupta, C.V.S.Rao, L.K.Pandey, S.B.Upadhyay, S.R.Setia, Sanjay  Parikh, Satish  Aggarwal, Advs. with them for the appearing parties.                          O R D E R      The following order of the court was delivered:      One of  the  aspects  covered  by  this  writ  petition relates to  proper management  and control of the traffic in the national  capital Region  (NCR) and the National Capital Territory  (NCT),  Delhi  to  ensure  the  maximum  possible safequards  which  are  necessary  for  public  safety.  The problem is  too obvious  to require elaboration and the need for  urgent   measures  to  prevent  any  further  delay  in enforcement at  least of  the existing  provisions of law is imperative. The  need is  accentuated by he alarming rise in the number  of road  accidents and  the resulting deaths and bodily injuries  caused thereby.  The most recent tragedy in which a  school bus  broke the  parapet of a bridge and fell into the  river a  couple of a days back does not permit any further delay  in taking urgent measures in this behalf. For this reason,  in addition  to the  assistance we  have  been given by the learned amicus curiae, the Additional Solicitor General and the Bar in general, We considered it appropriate to also require the presence of the Chief Secretary Mr. P.V.

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Jaikishan, the  police commissioner  mr. T.R.  Akkar and the Commissioner (Traffic)  Ms. Kiran  Dhingra. to  examine  the matter at some length.      Having heard  all of them and after taking into account the  various  suggestions  which  have  been  given  at  the hearing, We  find that  there are adequate provisions in the existing law which, if properly enforced. would take care of the immediate  problem and  to a  great extent eliminate the reasons which  are the cause of the road accidents in NCR an NCT, Delhi.  In view  of the  fact that  the above  officers expressed some  doubt about  the extent  of  powers  of  the concerned authorities to take adequate and suitable measures for speedy  enforcement of these provisions and the remedial steps needed  to curb the growing menace of un-regulated and disorderly traffic on the roads. We consider it expedient to clarify that  position in  this order  with reference to the relevant provisions  of the existing law. it is obvious that it  is  primarily  for  the  Executive  to  devise  suitable measures and  provide the machinery for rigid enforcement of those measures to curb this menace. However, the inaction in this behalf  of the Executive in spite of the fact that this writ petition  is pending  since 1985 and the menace instead of being  controlled continues  to grow  in perpetuation  of this hazard  to public  safety, it  has become necessary for this Court  to  also  issue  certain  directions  which  are required to  be promptly  implemented to achieve the desired result. It  is needless  to add that these directions are to remain effective  till such time as necessary action in this behalf is  taken by  the concerned  Executive authorities so that the  continuance thereafter of these directions may not be necessary.  In our  opinion. the  provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act.  1988 In  addition to  the provisions  in  the existing laws,  for example.  the police Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure confer ample powers on the authorities to take the  necessary steps  to control  and regulate the road traffic and  to suspend/cancel the registration or permit of a motor  vehicle if  it poses  threat or  hazard  to  public safety. It  need hardly be added that the claim of any right by an  individual or  even a few persons cannot override and must be  subordinate to  the larger public interest and this is how  all provisions  conferring any individual right have to be  construed. We may now refer to some provisions of the Motor Vehicles  Act. 1988  (for short  "the Act")  which are relevant for the purpose.      Section 2(47)  defines "transport  vehicle"  o  mean  a public service  vehicle ,  a goods  carriage, an educational institution bus  or a  private service  vehicle. Each one of these vehicles  are separately defined in other Sub-sections of Section  2. Sub-section  (28) defines "motor vehicle". In short, the  definitions contained  in Section  2 of  the Act cover all  kinds of  Vehicles which ply on the roads so that they are all governed by the provisions of the Act.      Chapter II  relates to  licensing of  drivers of  motor vehicles wherein  Section 129 confers power on the licensing authority to  disqualify any  person from  holding a driving licence or  revoke such  licence. a  few of  the grounds  on which this  power can  be exercise.  are :  when  the  motor vehicle is  used  or  has  been  used  in  commission  of  a cognizable offence: When the previous conduct as driver of a motor vehicle  has shown  that his  driving is  likely to be attended with danger to the public: or when he has committed any such  act which is likely to cause nuisance or danger to the public,  etc. These general grounds alone are sufficient to indicate  that any  person who  poses any  threat  or  is likely to  cause nuisance  or danger  to the  public can  be

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disqualified and his licence revoked.      Chapter   IV  deals  with  the  registration  of  motor vehicles wherein  Section 39  prescribes the  necessity  for registration. it  says that unless the vehicle is registered in accordance  with the  provisions of the Act. it cannot be driven in  any public  place. The  responsibility to  ensure that such  a vehicle  is not driven not merely on the person driving the  vehicle but  also on  the owner of the Vehicle. section 45 permits refusal of registration or renewal of the certificate of  registration inter  alia on  the ground that the vehicle  is mechanically  defective or  fails to  comply with  the   requirements  of  the  Act  or  the  rules  made thereunder.  It   is  obvious   that  the  vehicle  must  be roadworthy in  the sense  that there is no mechanical defect therein to  permit it  being used  as a  motor vehicle.  The pocessity of  complying with  all the  requirements makes it clear that  any requirement which is specified under the Act or by  the rules,  has to  be fully complied with and such a requirement would  include the  requirement of  a  specified category  of   motor  vehicles   beings  fitted  with  speed governors or such other devices as may be prescribed by law. Section  53   permits  suspension  of  registration  by  the registering authority  or other  prescribed authority  if it has reason  to believe  that any  motor vehicle is in such a condition that  its use in a public place would constitute a danger to  the public  or that  it fails  to comply with the requirements of this Act or of the Rules made thereunder. it is significant  that this  power to suspend the registration is available  to the  authority even if the condition of the motor vehicle  is found  to be such that its use in a public place would  constitute a  danger to the public irrespective of whether  that is a specific requirement of the Act or the rules. The  conferment of  this power  is  for  the  obvious reason that a motor vehicle which is considered to be unsafe or which  poses a danger to the public in a public place. if driven should  not be  permitted to  ply at  a public  place since the paramount need is public safety. It is, therefore, clear that  even if speed governors are not prescribed for a particular class of motor vehicles by any requirement of the Act or  the rules made thereunder. it is permissible for the concerned authority  to require  the fitting  of  the  speed governors in such motor vehicles for the purpose of ensuring that there  is no  danger to the public by the use of such a motor vehicle  in a public place. the power under Section 53 to this  extent is  wider. Section  53 read  with Section 45 leaves  no  doubt  about  the  amplitude  of  power  of  the concerned authorities  whose  duty  it  is  to  control  and regulate the  traffic in public places. The basic test to be applied by  them for  exercise of  this power is the need to ensure that  there is  no danger to the public by use of any motor vehicle in a public place.      It is  indisputable that  heavy and  medium vehicles as well as  light goods vehicle are in a class by themselves in so far  as their  potential  to  imperil  public  safety  is concerned. There  is,  therefore,  immediate  need  to  take measures such  as installation  of speed control devices and ensuring  that   such  vehicles  are  driven  by  authorised persons. Such  measures, designed  to further public safety, would  undoubtedly   be  covered   by   the   aforementioned provisions.      Chapter V  relates to  control of  transport  vehicles. Section 66  prescribes the  necessity of  a  permit  without which the  vehicle cannot  be  used  in  any  public  place. Section 84  deals with  general conditions  attaching to all permits. These  conditions are  deemed to be incorporated in

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every permit  and do  not require  any additional or further mention thereof  in each  permit. some  of  the  significant general conditions  are that  the vehicle is at all times to be so  maintained as  to comply with the requirements of the Act and  the rules  made thereunder; and that the vehicle is not driven at a speed exceeding the permitted speed. Section 86 provides  for cancellation and suspension of permits. The authorities are empowered to cancel or suspend the permit on the breach  of any  of the  general conditions  specified in Section 84  or any  other condition  when contained  in  the permit. Both these provisions are to be read with Section 56 which provides  for  certificate  of  fitness  of  transport vehicles. We may also refer to sub-section (4) of Section 86 which permits  exercise of  the power  of  cancellation  and suspension of  permit by  the  transport  authority  or  any authority or  person to whom such powers are duly delegated.      The provision  to enable  delegation of these powers is obviously to  make it  workable in  case the jurisdiction of the transport  authority is  so large, as in the case of NCR and  NCT. Delhi,  so that  the need is of several persons to exercise this authority.      Chapter VIII deals with the control of traffic. Section 112 pertains  to limits  of speed and prohibits driving of a motor vehicle or it being allowed to be driven in any public place at a speed exceeding the maximum permissible speed.      Chapter  XIII   relates  to   offences,  penalties  and procedure. Section  177 contains  the general provisions for punishment of  offences which is available in the absence of any specific provision of punishment applicable in a given a case. The punishment  is a maximum fine of Rs. 100/- for the first offence  and for  the subsequent  offence is  only Rs. 300/- Section  183 provides the punishment for contravention of the  speed limits referred in section 112 and Section 184 provides for  punishment for  dangerous driving. The maximum punishment provided  in all  these three Sections has ceased to have any efficacy in the present case and has, therefore, hardly any  deterrent effect. We are informed that some time back  Transport  Commissioner,  Delhi  had  recommended  the raising of  the maximum punishment but even the proposal for increase in  the amount  of maximum fine did not find favour with the  Central Government. We have no doubt that the very thoughtful proposal  made by  the Transport Commissioner did not receive  the attention  it deserved  at the level of the Central Government.  Taking into  account the  realities and the Chaotic  state of road traffic in NCR and NCT, Delhi, We are surprised  that any  one sitting in Delhi and seeing for himself these  conditions, thought  it fit not to accept the recommendations made  by the  Transport Commissioner when in fact  the  need  for  increase  of  the  maximum  punishment required in the existing circumstances is even more.      One of the aspects which was considered at length by us was the need to find some stringent and effective measure to at least  bring to  a halt the danger posed to the public by the continued use of a motor vehicle which is not roadworthy or was  being used/driven  dangerously. We find that Section 207 takes  care of that situation by conferring power on any police officer  or other person authorised in this behalf to seize and  detain the  vehicle if  he has  reason to believe that the  same has  been or is a being used in contravention of the  specified provisions o s as to pose a serious threat to the  public. The  object of  enacting  such  a  provision clearly is  that such  a vehicle  cannot be continued to ply once it is found that it poses danger to the public because, in  addition   to  punishing   the  guilty  person  for  the contraventions committed  earlier, it  is also important and

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necessary to  prevent any  further danger  to the  public by letting the vehicle continue to ply on a public place.      In our  opinion, the  existing provisions  in  the  Act alone are  sufficient to  clothe the  members of  the police force and  the transport  authorities with  ample powers  to control and regulate the traffic in an appropriate manner so that no  vehicle being  used in  a public  place  poses  any danger to  the  public  in  any  form.  The  requirement  of maintaining the  motor vehicles in the manner prescribed and its use  if roadworthy  in a  manner which does not endanger public has  to be ensured by the authorities and this is the aim of  these provisions  enacted in  the  Act.  As  earlier stated ,  We reach this conclusion even without reference to the general  powers available  to the  police officers under the police Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure.      It is  also to  be noted that to overcome the situation when the  strength of  the police force is not adequate in a given area  and the  utilisation of more men is required for strict enforcement  of these  salutary provisions.  that law confers power  of  delegation  of  the  authority  to  other persons. we are conscious of the fact that the inadequacy of personnel and  other infrastructure  may be constraint which has impeded  strict enforcement  of these provisions so far. We have  no doubt  that after this clarification made buy us in this  order, the concerned authorities would mobilize the needed support  by  delegation  of  these  powers  to  other authorities/officers and  if need  be  even  to  responsible members of  the  public  so  that  the  resource  crunch  or inadequacy  of   infrastructure  is  not  an  impediment  in enforcement of  the law  and the  directions given  today to obtain  the  desired  results.  No  doubt,  it  is  for  the Government to make a realistic assessment of the strength of police force and Transport Department force to meet the felt need in this behalf but we consider it expedient to add that to overcome  that deficiency/inaction,  this order  is to be construed as empowering the existing authorities to delegate their authority  wherever  permissible  under  the  law,  to responsible persons  in the  manner they  deem  fit  in  the circumstances. In  view of  the urgency of implementation of these measures,  We also  make it clear that for the purpose of such  delegation to  responsible persons chosen even from the public,  these authorities  would not  suffer  from  any constraint and  this order is sufficient empowerment to them in this  behalf notwithstanding  any  administrative  orders imposing any impediment or constraint on them, if any.      It is  needless for  us to add that the entire scope of this matter and particularly this aspect to which this order relates, namely,  the control  and regulation  of traffic in NCR and  NCT. Delhi.  is a matter of paramount public safety and, therefore,  is evidently within the ambit of Article 21 of t  he Constitution.  That being  so, the  making of  this order has  become necessary  and can  no longer  be  delayed because of  the obligation of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution  which is  invoked with  the aid of Article 142 to give the necessary directions given today separately.