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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  3303 of 2007

PETITIONER: Municipal Corporation of Delhi

RESPONDENT: Qimat Rai Gupta & Ors

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 27/07/2007

BENCH: S.B. Sinha & Harjit Singh Bedi

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T  

CIVIL APPEAL NO.    3303              OF 2007 [Arising out of  SLP (Civil) No. 3553 of 2005]

S.B. SINHA, J :          1.      Leave granted.

2.      The meaning of the word ’made’ occurring in sub-section (4) of  Section 126 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (hereinafter  called and referred to,  for the sake of brevity,  as ’the Act’), is in question in  this appeal which arises out of a judgment and order dated 25.08.2004  passed by a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in L.P.A. No. 162 of  2003, reversing the judgment and order dated 21.10.2002 passed by a  learned Single Judge of the said court.

3.      Before adverting to the question involved in this appeal, we may  notice the basic fact of the matter.   

4.      Respondents herein are the owners of a property bearing No.1/2 of 1  (1&3) Part, Ram Kishore Road, Civil Lines, Delhi, which was proposed to  be assessed for property taxes by the competent authority of Municipal  Corporation of Delhi, a notice wherefor was issued in March 1997 purported  to be under Section 126 of the Act to fix the rateable value thereof at  Rs.50,00,000/- with effect from 01.04.1996.  Respondents herein objected to  the said proposal.  They filed various documents in support of their case  stating that  the property in question had jointly been purchased by Anil  Gupta, Qimat Rai Gupta and Vinod Gupta by four separate deeds of sale for  a total consideration of Rs.32,00,000/-.  The market value of the land was  assessed by the assessee at  Rs. 89,93,100/- comprising of the value of the  land at Rs.42,19,000/- and cost of construction at Rs.51,00,000/-.  The said  market value disclosed by the assessee was not accepted by the assessing  authority.  The assessing officer upon hearing the respondents assessed the  value at Rs.1,40,90,100/- and determined the rateable value therefor at Rs.  11,97,660/- with effect from 01.04.1996.  Aggrieved by and dissatisfied with  the said order of assessment, Respondents preferred an appeal in the Court  of Additional District Judge, Delhi, in terms of Section 169 of the Act, inter  alia, on the ground that the order of assessment was barred by limitation.   By reason of an order dated 14.12.2000, the appellate authority opined that  no amendment in terms of sub-section (1) of Section 126 of the Act could be  made after lapse of period of three years from the end of the year in which  the notice was given and as the notice in the case had been issued in the  period ending 31.03.1997,  the order of assessment could be made only upto  31.03.2000.   

       It was further held :

       "Now coming to the questions what is meaning of

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word ’made’ whether it has to be taken as a date of  passing the order or the date when it was communicated  to the party concerned.  The dictionary meaning of  word ’made’ is built or formed.  This is discussed in  AIR 1956 Madras 79 wherein it has been held that term  ’made’ has to be liberally construed as the date on  which the order is communicated to the concerned  parties and reaches them.  Taking the same into  consideration, the present order cannot be said to have  been communicated to the assessee/appellants within  three years which is illegal.  Accordingly, I set aside the  impugned order dated 31.3.2000 being time barred.   The property be assessed on the RV already in  existence prior to the passing of order dated 31.3.2000.   No order as to cost.  File be consigned to R/R."       

5.      Appellant herein being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said  order dated 14.12.2000 filed a writ petition before the Delhi High Court,  which was marked as Writ Petition No. 3227 of 2002.  A  learned Single  Judge of the said Court allowed the said writ petition remanding the matter  to the appellate authority directing it to determine the question on merits and  in accordance with law.   

6.     Respondents field an intra-court appeal thereagainst.  By reason of the  impugned judgment and order dated 25.08.2004, a Division Bench of the  High Court reversed the said decision of the learned Single Judge opining  that the date of the order ’made’ in terms of Section 126(4) of the Act   should be taken to be the date when the same was communicated to the  assessee and not the one when it was signed.

7.      Before embarking on the question involved in this appeal, we may  place on record that the order of assessment was signed on 15.03.1999 and  the same was diarized in the despatch register on 31.03.1999.

8.      The said Act was enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to  the Municipal Government of Delhi.  Chapter VIII of the said Act provides  for taxation.  Levy of property taxes is envisaged under sub-section (1) of  Section 113 of the Act.  Section 114 provides for the components of  property tax.  Section 114A provides for building tax. Section 114C provides  for vacant land tax.  Section 123A provides for submission of returns.  Section 123B provides for self-assessment and submission of return.   

9.      Appellant has, thus, a statutory power to impose property tax.    Section 124 of the Act provided for assessment list, sub-section (1) whereof  reads as under :

"(1) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the  Corporation shall cause an assessment list of all lands  and buildings in Delhi to be prepared in such form and  manner and containing such particulars with respect to  each land and building as may be prescribed by bye- laws."

        10.     Section 126 of the Act empowers the Commissioner to amend the  assessment list in terms of  one or the other modes provided for therein.   Sub-section (2) thereof provids for giving an opportunity to the assessee of  being heard before an order of amendment is made. Sub-section (3) of  Section 126 obligats the Commissioner to consider the objections which  may be made by such persons.  Clause (b) of sub-section (4) of Section 126  reads as under :

"(4)    No amendment under sub-section (1) shall  be made in the assessment list in relation to \026

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xxx                     xxx                     xxx

(b)     the year commencing on the 1st day of April,  1988 or any other year thereafter, after the expiry of three  years from the end of the year in which the notice is  given under sub-section (2) or sub-section (3), as the case  may be."                          

11.     Mr. Amarendra Sharan, learned Additional Solicitor General of India  appearing on behalf of the appellant,  submitted that the Division Bench of  the High Court committed a manifest error in reversing the judgment of the  learned Single Judge insofar as it proceeded on the premise that the  expression ’made’ occurring in sub-section (4) of Section 126 of the Act  would necessitate communication of the order.   

12.     It was urged that a distinction must be made between   ’communication’ of the order  and making thereof inasmuch as whereas  ’communication’ may be necessary so as to enable an assessee to prefer an  appeal against the order of assessment but only signing of the order would  subserve the purpose of saving the period of limitation prescribed therein  and in that view of the matter the period of three years prescribed under sub- section (4) of Section 126 being the period of limitation,  the expressions ’no  amendment under sub-section (1) shall be made’ should be given a liberal  interpretation.  Strong reliance in this behalf has been placed on Collector of  Central Excise, Madras v. M/s M.M. Rubber and Co., Tamil Nadu  [1992  Supp. (1) SCC 471].

13.     Mr. P. Narasimha, learned counsel appearing on  behalf of the  respondents, on the other hand, contended that the said Act  having been  enacted for the purpose of controlling the abuse of power on the part of the  Commissioner, the same should be given a purposive meaning so as to fulfil  the purport and object of the legislation.  Reliance in this behalf has been  placed on Surendra Singh and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh [AIR 1954  SC 194], Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. The Deputy Land Acquisition  Officer and Another [AIR 1961 SC 1500] and K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran  Vaidhyan Balan and Another [(1999) 7 SCC 510].   

14.     Commissioner in terms of the provisions of the said Act exercises a  statutory power.  A proceeding initiated for the purpose of amending the  assessment list is a quasi judicial one. Commissioner of the Municipal  Corporation is a statutory authority. The terms and conditions of his  appointment are governed by Section 54 of the Act.  He can be appointed  only by the Central Government.  The power of amendment can be exercised  at any time, as would appear from sub-section (1) of Section 126 of the Act;   the only limitation therefor being that a fresh order would not relate back to  the end of the financial year in which the notice is issued.   

15.     Indisputably, the Parliament did not intend to confer unbriddled power  on the Commissioner to amend the assessment list.  For that purpose only a  period within which the jurisdiction is to be exercised was contemplated,  namely, before the expiry of three years from the end of the year in which  the notice is given, but the same would not mean that the restriction imposed  should be given a restricted meaning so as to narrow down the scope thereof  any further.    

16.     In interpreting a provision dealing with limitation, a liberal  interpretation in a situation of this nature should be given.  Although an  order passed after expiry of the period of limitation fixed under the statute  would be a nullity, the same would not mean that a principle of  interpretation applied thereto should not be such so as to mean that not only  an order is required to be made but the same is also required to be  communicated.

17.     When an order is passed by a high ranking authority appointed by the

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Central Government, the law presumes that he would act bona fide.  Misuse  of power in a  situation of this nature, in our opinion, should not be readily  inferred.  It is difficult to comprehend that while fixing a period of  limitation, the Parliament did not visualise the possibility of abuse of power  on the  part of the statutory authority.  It advisedly chose the word ’made’  and not ’communicated’.  They, in ordinary parlance, carry different  meanings.

18.     Even if a statute requires strict interpretation, words thereto would not  be added.   

19.     The word ’made’ is past and past participle of the word ’make’ which  means "cause to exist or come about; bring about or perform"  [See Concise  Oxford English Dictionary, 10th Edition].  

20.    In P. Ramanatha Aiyar’s Advanced Law Lexicon, 3rd edition, page  2822, it is stated:

"Made. A receiving order or other order of Court is  "made" on the day it is pronounced, not when it is  drawn up. [In re Manning (1885) 30 Ch D 480. See  also 4 All 278: 2 AWN 26.

***                     ***                     *** The word ’made’ in this rule might refer to the  proclamation of sale as well as the announcement  of the sale, as it says that it shall be made and  published in the manner provided by the Rule  54(1).  The word ’made’ cannot be taken to  include the preparation of proclamation of sale.   Seshatiri Aiyar v. Valambal Ammal, AIR 1952  Mad 377, 381 [O. XXI, R. 54(1). C.P.C. (5 of  1908)] ***                     ***                     *** An order by a Chancery judge in Chambers is  "made" not when it is pronounced, but when it is  signed and entered, or otherwise perfected  (Heatley v. Newton, 19 Ch. D. 326)"

21.     The meaning of a word, it is trite, would depend upon its text and  context.  It will also depend upon the purport and object it seeks to achieve.   With a view to understand the proper meaning of the said word, we may  notice the decisions cited at the Bar.   

22.     In Surendra Singh (supra), a three-Judge Bench of this Court while  considering the provisions of Section 369 of the Code of Criminal  Procedure, 1898 opining that a judgment being a declaration of the mind of  the court as it is at the time of pronouncement,  made a distinction between a  civil case and a criminal case, stating :

"10. In our opinion, a judgment within the  meaning of these sections is the final decision of the  court intimated to the parties and to the world at large by  formal "pronouncement" or "delivery" in open court. It is  a judicial act which must be performed in a judicial way.  Small irregularities in the manner of pronouncement or  the mode of delivery do not matter but the substance of  the thing must be there : that can neither be blurred nor  left to inference and conjecture nor can it be vague. All  the rest - the manner in which it is to be recorded, the  way in which it is to be authenticated, the signing and the  sealing, all the rules designed to secure certainty about its  content and matter - can be cured; but not the hard core,  namely the formal intimation of the decision and its  contents formally declared in a judicial way in open

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court. The exact way in which this is done does not  matter. In some courts the judgment is delivered orally or  read out, in some only the operative portion is  pronounced, in some the judgment is merely signed after  giving notice to the parties and laying the draft on the  table for a given number of days for inspection."          23.     In view of the fact that in that case one of the judges expired before  signing of the judgment prepared by the brother Judge, it was held  therein  that the same did not constitute a judgment of the Division Bench.

24.     In Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra), the award of a Collector  made under the Land Acquisition Act was treated to be fructified when the  same was communicated on the premise opining that an award was an  ’offer’ made by the Collector on behalf of the Government  to the owner of  the property and, thus, the date of the award cannot be determined solely by  reference to the time when the award was signed by the Collector or  delivered by him in his office, it must involve the consideration of the  question as to when it was known to the party concerned either actually or  constructively.          25.     In K. Bhaskaran (supra), a notice required to be given in terms of  Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was construed  liberally, stating :         "19. In Black’s Law Dictionary, ’giving of notice’  is distinguished from ’receiving of the notice.’ (vide page  621) "A person notifies or gives notice to another by  taking such steps as may be reasonably required to  inform the other in the ordinary course, whether or not  such other actually comes to know of it." A person  ’receives’ a notice when it is duly delivered to him or at  the place of his business.         20. If a strict interpretation is given that the drawer  should have actually received the notice for the period of  15 days to start running no matter that the payee sent the  notice on the correct address, a trickster cheque drawer  would get the premium to avoid receiving the notice by  different strategies and he could escape from the legal  consequences of Section 138 of the Act. It must be borne  in mind that the Court should not adopt an interpretation  which helps a dishonest evader and clips an honest payee  as that would defeat the very legislative measure.         21. In Maxwell’s ’Interpretation of Statues’ the  learned author has emphasized that "provisions relating  to giving of notice often receive liberal interpretation,"  (vide page 99 of the 12th edn.) The context envisaged in  Section 138 of the Act invites a liberal interpretation for  the person who has the statutory obligation to give notice  because he is presumed to be the loser in the transaction  and it is for his interest the very provision is made by the  legislature. The words in Clause (b) of the proviso to  Section 138 of the Act show that payee has the statutory  obligation to ’make a demand’ by giving notice. The  thrust in the clause is on the need to ’make a demand’. It  is only the mode for making such demand which the  legislature has prescribed. A payee can send the notice  for doing his part for giving the notice. Once it is  despatched his part is over and the next depends on what  the sendee does." [See C.C. Alavi Haji v. Palapetty Muhammed & Anr. 2007 (7) SCALE 380] 26.     The question, however, in our opinion, stands concluded by a three- Judge Bench of this Court in M/s M.M. Rubber and Co., Tamil Nadu  (supra), wherein Ramaswami, J. speaking for the Bench succinctly stated the  law thus :

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       "12. It may be seen therefore, that, if an authority  is authorised to exercise a power or do an act affecting  the rights of parties, he shall exercise that power within  the period of limitation prescribed therefor. The order or  decision of such authority comes into force or, becomes  operative or becomes an effective order or decision on  and from the date when it is signed by him. The date of  such order or decision is the date on which the order or  decision was passed or made: that is to say when he  ceases to have any authority to tear it off and draft a  different order and when he ceases to have any  locuspaetentiae. Normally that happens when the order or  decision is made public or notified in some form or when  it can be said to have left his hand. The date of  communication of the order to the party whose rights are  affected is not the relevant date for purposes of  determining whether the power has been exercised within  the prescribed time     ."

It was further held :

       "18. Thus if the intention or design of the statutory  provision was to protect the interest of the person  adversely affected, by providing a remedy against the  order or decision any period of limitation prescribed with  reference to invoking such remedy shall be read as  commencing from the date of communication of the  order. But if it is a limitation for a competent authority to  make an order the date of exercise of that power and in  the case of exercise of suo moto power over the  subordinate authorities’ orders, the date on which such  power was exercised by making an order are the relevant  dates for determining the limitation. The ratio of this  distinction may also be founded on the principle that the  Government is bound by the proceedings of its officers  but persons affected are not concluded by the decision."

27.     A distinction, thus, exists in the construction of the word ’made’  depending upon the question as to whether the power was required to be  exercised within the period of limitation prescribed therefor or in order to  provide  the person aggrieved to avail remedies if he is aggrieved thereby or  dissatisfied therewith.  Ordinarily, the words ’given’ and ’made’ carries the  same meaning.  

28.     An order passed by a competent authority dismissing a Government  servant from services requires communication thereof as has been held in  [See State of Punjab v. Amar Singh Harika  - AIR 1966 SC 1313], but an  order placing a Government servant on suspension does not require  communication of that order.  [See State of Punjab v. Khemi Ram -  AIR  1970 SC 214].  What is, therefore, necessary to be borne in mind is the  knowledge leading to the making of the order.  An order ordinarily would be  presumed to have been made when it is signed.  Once it is signed and an  entry in that regard is made in the requisite register kept and maintained in  terms of the provisions of a statute, the same cannot be changed or altered.   It, subject to the other provisions contained in the Act, attains finality.  Where, however, communication of an order is a necessary ingredient for  bringing an end-result to a status or to provide a person an opportunity to  take recourse of law if he is aggrieved thereby; the order is required to be  communicated.   

29.     The Division Bench of the High Court, in our opinion, proceeded on a  wrong premise insofar as it misconstrued and misinterpreted the word  ’made’ in the context of sub-section (4) of Section 126 of the Act opining  that the power can be misused by the Commissioner.  The Division Bench,

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with respect,  failed to notice that there exists a presumption that the official  act is presumed to have been done in regular course of business.  There also  exists a presumption that a statutory functionary  would act honestly and  bona fide.

30.     We are, therefore, are not in a position to persuade ourselves to follow  the line of reasoning adopted by the Division Bench of the High Court that  unless the order is communicated, it should be deemed to have not been  made.   

31.     For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be  sustained, which is set aside accordingly and that of the learned Single Judge  is restored.  The appeal is allowed.  No costs.