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PETITIONER: M.B. MAJUMDAR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA

DATE OF JUDGMENT22/08/1990

BENCH: VERMA, JAGDISH SARAN (J) BENCH: VERMA, JAGDISH SARAN (J) PUNCHHI, M.M. REDDY, K. JAYACHANDRA (J)

CITATION:  1990 AIR 2263            1990 SCR  (3) 946  1990 SCC  (4) 501        JT 1990 (3)   655  1990 SCALE  (2)345

ACT:     Administrative Tribunals Act 1985/Central Administrative Tribunal (Salaries and Allowances and Conditions of  Service of Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Members) Rules 1985.     Sections 4, 7, 14, 17, 35/Rule 3--Central Administrative Tribunals-Members-Not  equated with High  Court  Judges/Vice Chairman of Tribunal for purposes of pay and  superannuation whether valid and legal.

HEADNOTE:     The  petitioner  is  a Judicial Member  of  the  Central Administrative  Tribunal.  In this writ petition  he  claims equality of the Members of the Administrative Tribunal  with the  Judges of the High Court, or even the Vice-Chairman  of the  Tribunal, in the matter of pay, and age of  superannua- tion.     The Central Administrative Tribunal (Salaries and Allow- ances  and Conditions of Service of Chairman,  Vice-Chairman and  Members)  Rules, 1985 were framed in  exercise  of  the powers  conferred by section 35(2)(c) of the  Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. Rule 3 of the Rules specifies  Rs.8,000 p.m.  as the pay of the Vice-Chairman and the pay  scale  of Rs.7300-100-7600  p.m. for a Member. Rule 8  prescribes  the age of superannuation for the Chairman and Vice Chairman  at 65, and for any other Member 62 years.     It  was  contended on behalf of the petitioner  that  an arbitrary  distinction  had been made in the  conditions  of service, particularly in regard to pay and age of superannu- ation,  between the Vice-Chairman and the Members; that  the judicial  functions discharged by the Vice Chairman and  the Members of the Central Administrative Tribunal were the same and, therefore, the principle of "equal pay for equal  work" applied, and on that basis Article 14 had been violated; and that the Administrative Tribunal being a substitute for  the High  Court  for adjudicating disputes relating  to  service matters, the Members of the Tribunal should be equated  with the High Court Judges for all purposes 947 including their pay and age of Superannuation. S.P.  Sampath  Kumar v. Union of India, [1987]  1  SCC  124,

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relied upon.     On  behalf of the respondent it was contended  that  all the functions of the Vice-Chairman and the Members were  not the  same  in as much as the Vice-Chairman, in  addition  to filling  the casual vacancy in the office of  the  Chairman, also  discharged certain administrative functions  entrusted to him by the Chairman. Dismissing the writ petition, this Court,     HELD: (1) It is the law enacted by Parliament constitut- ing  the Administrative Tribunal which has to be first  seen for  the purpose of ascertaining the real nature and  status of the Tribunal and the persons constituting it. [1953 E]   (2) It is not possible for the Administrative Tribunal  to shed  off or abandon its heritage and substitute  its  genes with those of its choice of a different heritage. [956G]     (3)  There  is  no ambiguity in the  provisions  of  the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, and the exact status and service  conditions of the Chairman, Vice-Chairman and  Mem- bers of the Administrative Tribunal together with the quali- fications for appointment to these offices have been clearly spelt out in the Act. [953F]     (4)  From  the scheme of the Act and  the  rules  flamed thereunder it is quite clear that their enactment is in  the manner laid down in Article 323-A of the Constitution.  From the  scheme it is evident that the  Chairman,  Vice-Chairman and Members are not treated as one class for this purpose by the  very enactment which provides for the establishment  of the Tribunals. Such elaborate provisions were unnecessary if the Tribunal was to be equated with the High Courts and  its members with High Court Judges. 1953D; 954C]     (5)  Article 323-A and 323-B themselves require the  law constituting  these  Tribunals to provide for  the  pay  and other  conditions of service of its Members and,  therefore, the  same would he governed in the case of each Tribunal  by the provisions of the statute giving birth to the  Tribunal. These  statutes being different, the provisions  therein  in this  behalf can also be different, which has been  left  to the legislative wisdom to decide. [955G-H] 948     (6)  Equation  of the Tribunal with the High  Court  was only  as the forum for adjudication of disputes relating  to service  matters  and not for all purposes such as  the  one arising for decision in the present case. [956C]     S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India, [1987] 1 SCC  124, distinguished & explained.     (7)  The  foundation of initial equality  on  which  the argument  of discrimination is based, is  non-existent.  The parent statute itself shows that they were not born  equals. [956E]

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 960 of 1987. (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).     G.L. Sanghi, B.A. Masodkar, Sunil Dogra and P.H.  Parekh for the Petitioner.     V.C.  Mahajan,  K. Swami and Ms. A. Subhashini  for  the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     VERMA,  J.  This writ petition under Article 32  of  the Constitution by a Judicial Member of the Central Administra- tive Tribunal purports to be a sequal of this Court’s  deci- sion  in  S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of  India,  and  Ors.,

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[1987] 1 SCC 124. The petitioner contends that the  decision in Sampath Kumar’s case (supra) equates the Central Adminis- trative  Tribunal  with the High Court  and  therefore,  its Chairman has to be equated with the Chief Justice of a  High Court and the Vice-Chairman and Members must be equated with the sitting Judges of the High Court in all respects. It  is contended  that  while the Vice-Chairman have  been  equated with sitting Judges of the High Court, the Members have  not been  so equated in their pay and other conditions of  serv- ice.  It  is further contended that a distinction  has  been made in the conditions of service, particularly the pay  and age  of  superannuation between the  Vice-Chairmen  and  the Members, which is arbitrary and therefore, the Members  also should be given the same pay as the Vice-Chairmen and  their age of superannuation should also be the same i.e. 65  years as that of the Vice-Chairmen. It is urged that the  judicial functions discharged by the Vice-Chairmen and the 949 Members of the Central Administrative Tribunal are the  same and  therefore, the principle of "equal pay for equal  work" applies.  Violation  of Article 14 of  the  Constitution  is alleged on this basis.     Part  XIV-A  containing Articles 323-A  and  323-B  were inserted  in the Constitution of India by  the  Constitution (Forty-second  Amendment) Act, 1976 enabling the setting  up of Administrative Tribunals and Tribunals for other  matters by legislative enactments.     The Central Administrative Tribunal has been constituted under  Section 4 of the Administrative Tribunals  Act,  1985 (hereinafter  referred  to as ’the Act’)  with  a  Chairman, Vice-Chairmen  and Members-judicial and administrative.  The qualifications for appointment of Chairman, Vice-Chairmen or other  Members are prescribed by Section 6 of the Act.  Sec- tion  7 provides that the Vice-Chairman or, as the case  may be such one of the Vice-Chairman as the appropriate  Govern- ment  may, by notification, authorise in this behalf,  shall act  as  the  Chairman in the event of any  vacancy  in  the office  of the Chairman for any reason whatsoever,  or  when the  Chairman is unable to discharge his functions  for  any reason.  Section  8  prescribes the term of  office  of  the Chairman, Vice-Chairman or other Members as five years  from the date on which he enters upon his office with eligibility for  re-appointment for another term of five years  provided that  no  Chairman or Vice-Chairman shall  hold  the  office after  he  has attained the age of 65 years  and  any  other Member, the age of 62 years. Section 10 of the Act  provides for  the salaries and allowances and other terms and  condi- tions  of service of Chairman, Vice-Chairman and other  Mem- bers to be such as may be prescribed by the Central  Govern- ment. Section 17 confers on the Tribunal the same  jurisdic- tion, powers and authority in respect of contempt of  itself as a High Court has under the Contempt of Courts Act,  1971. But for this specific provision, the Tribunal would not have the  power  of  the High Court in this  behalf.  Section  18 provides for distribution of business amongst the Benches of the Tribunal. Section 28 excludes the jurisdiction of courts except the Supreme Court or any Industrial Tribunal,  Labour Court  or other authority, constituted under the  Industrial Disputes  Act, 1947 or any other corresponding law  for  the time  being in force in relation to matters over  which  the Tribunal  has been conferred jurisdiction. Section  35  con- tains the rule-making power of the Central Government  while Section 36 gives power to the appropriate Government to make rules to carry out the provisions of the Act and particular- ly,  for the matters specified therein. The  specified  pur-

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poses for which the Central Government can make rules speci- fied in Section 35(2)(c) include 950 the salaries and allowances payable to, and the other  terms and  conditions  of the Chairman,  Vice-Chairmen  and  other Members.  The  rules  framed under the Act are  to  be  laid before  the Parliament. It is not necessary to give  further details  of  the  Administrative Tribunals  Act,  1985,  the provisions  of  which were considered at length  in  Sampath Kumar’s  case  (supra) and now stand amended  in  accordance with the observations of this Court in that decision.     The Central Administrative Tribunal (Salaries and Allow- ances  and Conditions of Service of Chairman,  Vice-Chairmen and  Members) Rules, 1985 (hereinafter referred to  as  ’the rules’)  were framed in exercise of the powers conferred  by Section 35(2)(c) of the Administrative Tribunals Act,  1985. Rule 3 therein, as it now exists, specifies Rs.9,000 p.m. as the  pay  of the Chairman; Rs.8,000 p.m. as the pay  of  the Vice-Chairman;  and  the pay scale of  Rs.7300-100-7600  per mensem for a Member. As earlier indicated, the age of super- annuation prescribed in Section 8 of the Act for the  Chair- man and Vice Chairman is 65 years and for any other  Member, 62 years. The petitioner’s grievance is that the pay of  any other  Member of the Tribunal and his age of  superannuation should be Rs. 8,000 p.m. and 65 years respectively as in the case  of Vice-Chairmen, since the Members and  Vice-Chairmen discharge  identical  judicial functions. The  question  is: Whether the principle of "equal pay for equal work",  relied on  by  the petitioner, is applicable to this  situation  or there  is any hostile discrimination against the Members  of the  Central  Administrative  Tribunal, as  alleged  by  the petitioner. If the petitioner’s contention be correct,  then would arise the question of relief which can be granted. The prayer  made in this petition is to direct an  amendment  in the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 and the rules  framed thereunder, to prescribe the same pay and age of superannua- tion for the Members as in the case of the Vice-Chairman.     The argument of Shri B.A. Masodkar and Shri G.L.  Sanghi in  support  of  the petition is that the  Members  and  the Vice-Chairman of the Central Administrative Tribunal  belong to  the same class since they discharge  identical  judicial functions and there is no rational nexus of the  classifica- tion  made  between  them  with  the  object  sought  to  be achieved.  It is urged that the Tribunal is one entity  com- prising of the Chairman, Vice-Chairmen and Members which has been substituted for the High Court in respect of the juris- diction conferred on the Tribunal and therefore, there is no justification for discriminating between them in the  matter of pay and other conditions of service. 951     In the counter-affidavit of the respondent, it has  been stated  that all the functions of the Vice-Chairman and  the Members  are not the same inasmuch as the Vice-Chairman,  in addition to filling the casual vacancy in the office of  the Chairman,  also discharges certain administrative  functions entrusted  to him by the Chairman while no such  administra- tive function is discharged by any Member. It is stated that the office of the Vice-Chairman and any other Member cannot, therefore, be treated as the same or in one class. Shri V.C. Mahajan,  learned counsel for the respondent contended  that Sampath  Kumar’s case (supra) does not lend any  support  to the petitioner’s contention and in this context the observa- tions made therein actually negative the petitioner’s stand. It was also urged that the relief claimed for a direction to amend  the  aforesaid Act and the  rules  framed  thereunder

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cannot be granted, which alone is the relief claimed in  the writ petition.      was  rightly  not disputed by learned counsel  for  the petitioner  that  the  relief specifically  claimed  in  the petition  of a direction to amend the Administrative  Tribu- nals Act, 1985 and the rules flamed thereunder to equate the Members of the Tribunal with the Vice Chairman in the matter of pay and age of superannuation cannot be granted- For this reason,  it was urged on behalf of the petitioner  that  the relief may be suitably moulded to grant the same benefit for the  Members  of the Tribunal if the allegation  of  hostile discrimination  is accepted. it is not necessary for  us  to deal  further with this aspect since we have no  doubt  that the  plea  of violation of Article 14 of  the  Constitution, raised by the petitioner, is untenable and must fail.     The sheet-anchor of petitioner’s case is the decision of this Court in Sampath Kumar’s case (supra). We will present- ly  show that the decision in Sampath Kumar’s  case  (supra) does not support the petitioner’s claim in this petition. It is  significant  to note that the age of  superannuation  of High Court Judges is 62 years while that of the Chairman and Vice-Chairman  of the Tribunal is 65 years and of any  other Member  is 62 years. No attempt has been made on  behalf  of the petitioner to justify the fixation of age of superannua- tion  of the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman as 65  years  if they  are to be equated with the Chief Justice  and  sitting judges  of the High Court who retire at the age of 62  years only.  In respect of the age of superannuation, the  Members of  the Tribunal are at par with the Chief Justice  and  the Judges  of the High Court. Obviously, it is for this  reason that  an  attempt was made to claim the  equality  with  the Vice-Chairman of the Tribunal who gets Rs.8,000 p.m. as  pay like a High Court Judge but retires at the higher age of  65 years. This disparity itself indicates that 952 the Chairman, Vice-Chairmen and Members of the Tribunal  are not  equated with the Chief Justice and Judges of  the  High Court  for all purposes which, in substance, is the  founda- tion of the petition.     The  contention of Shri D .A. Masodkar, learned  counsel for  the  petitioner, is that  the  Administrative  Tribunal being  a  substitute  for the High  Court  for  adjudicating disputes  relating  to service matters the  Members  of  the Tribunal  should be equated with the High Court  Judges  for all purposes including their pay and age of  superannuation. He contends that the lower pay and age of superannuation  of the  Members of the Tribunal is discriminatory and  violates Article  14  of the Constitution. His argument is  that  the Members  should  be equated in this behalf  with  the  Vice- Chairman whose pay is equal to that of a puisne Judge of the High Court. However, no attempt was made to justify on  this reasoning the higher age of superannuation of the ViceChair- man  being 65 years against 62 years of a High Court  Judge. Shri  G.L. Sanghi supported the petition and contended  that the  Tribunal  being one body, the persons  constituting  it cannot  be bifurcated into separate categories and  the  pay and age of superannuation of all of them should be the same. He  adds that the Members and the ViceChairman  should  have the  same pay and age of superannuation while  the  slightly higher  pay of the Chairman was justified as in the case  of the  Chief  Justce vis-a-vis the puisne Judges of  the  High Courts.     In  substance,  the contention of Shri Masodkar  is  for equating  the Members of the Tribunal with puisne Judges  of the High Courts in the matter of pay on the assumption  that

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the  Tribunal  is equated with the High Court and  with  the Vice-Chairman of the Tribunal in the matter of age of super- annuation on the basis of equal work. The contention of Shri G.L. Sanghi is slightly different. He argues that the Tribu- nal being one entity there is no reason to treat its Members differently  when  all  of them perform  the  same  judicial function,  the only difference being that the  Chairman  has additional administrative functions to discharge.     Part  XIV-A  of  the Constitution  of  India  containing Articles  323-A and 323-B provides for the  constitution  of administrative and other tribunals for the purpose of  adju- dication or trial by these tribunals of disputes relating to matters specified therein. Article 323-A deals with adminis- trative  tribunals  to be constituted  for  adjudication  of disputes  with  respect  to recruitment  and  conditions  of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State  or of any local or other specified 953 authority.  The  law  enacted by. the  Parliament  for  this purpose may provide for all matters relating to the  consti- tution and functions of the Administrative Tribunals as well as  for exclusion of jurisdiction of all courts, except  the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of India, with respect  to the matters required to be adjudicated by the Administrative Tribunal.  It  is for this purpose that  the  Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 has been enacted and Section 28  therein excludes  the jurisdiction of all courts except the  Supreme Court  or  any Industrial Tribunal, Labour  Court  or  other authority  constituted  under the Industrial  Disputes  Act, 1947  or any other corresponding law for the time  being  in force in relation to matters which the Administrative Tribu- nal  is empowered to adjudicate. The Act also  provides  for transfer  of all pending cases as provided in Section 29  of the Act.     In  the first place, the assumption in the  argument  on behalf  of the petitioner that the Tribunal is equated  with the  High  Court is fallacious. It is not only  the  service matters  required  earlier to the adjudicated  by  the  High Court but also those by the subordinate courts which are now to  be  adjudicated by the  Administrative  Tribunals.  That apart,  Article 323-A itself clearly contemplates  that  the Administrative Tribunals constituted thereunder are distinct from  the High Courts and it is the law enacted by the  Par- liament  providing  for establishment of  an  Administrative Tribunal which is to provide for all matters relating to the jurisdiction, powers, procedure and all supplemental,  inci- dental and consequential matters relating to the Administra- tive  Tribunal.  It is, therefore, the law  enacted  by  the Parliament  constituting the Administrative  Tribunal  which has  to  be first seen for the purpose of  ascertaining  the real  nature  and  status of the Tribunal  and  the  persons constituting it. There is no ambiguity in the provisions  of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 and the exact  status and  service conditions of the Chairman,  Vice-Chairman  and Members  of  the Administrative Tribunal together  with  the qualifications  for appointment to these offices  have  been clearly  spelt out in the Act. This Act  provides  expressly for  the term of office of the Chairman,  Vice-Chairman  and Members in Section 8 and for the salaries and allowances and other  terms  and conditions of service by Section  10  read with  Section 35(2)(c) and the rules framed thereunder.  The Central Administrative Tribunal (Salaries and allowances and Conditions  of Service of Chairman, Vice-Chairmen  and  Mem- bers) Rules, 1985 have been framed in exercise of the powers

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conferred  by Section 35(2)(c) to provide for  the  salaries and  allowances  etc. The scheme of the Act  and  the  rules framed  thereunder is quite clear and their enactment is  in the manner laid down in Article 324-A of the Constitution. 954 The  term of office and the age of superannuation,  pay  and allowances  and  other service conditions of  the  Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Members are specifically provided in  this manner and from the scheme it is evident that the  Chairman, Vice-Chairman  and Members are not treated as one class  for this  purpose by the very enactment which provides  for  the establishment  of the Tribunals. Such  elaborate  provisions were  unnecessary if the Tribunal was equated with the  High Courts and its Members with High Court Judges. Similarly,  a higher age of superannuation could not have been  prescribed for the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Tribunal.  Article 323-A of the Constitution itself envisages different  provi- sions  in this behalf and not the same as. that of the  High Courts  which  is the assumption made  in  the  petitioner’s contention. In fact, the provisions of the Act indicate that there is no intention of equating the Chairman,  Vice-Chair- man  and Members of the Tribunal with the Chief Justice  and Judges  of  the High Courts for purposes  other  than  those expressly  provided in respect of jurisdiction,  power  etc. Section  17 of the Act is a significant indication. By  Sec- tion 17, the Tribunal has been given the power to punish for contempt of itself and it is provided that for this  purpose the  Tribunal shall have, and exercise, the  same  jurisdic- tion, powers and authority as the High Court and the  refer- ences  in the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, tO a High  Court shall  be construed as including a reference to such  Tribu- nal. It is obvious that the need for enacting such a  provi- sion  arose only because in the absence of such a  provision conferring  on the Tribunal the jurisdiction and power of  a High Court for the purpose of the provisions of the Contempt of  Courts Act, 197 1, the Tribunal would not have the  same jurisdiction or power while adjudicating those very  matters which  earlier  were to be adjudicated by  the  High  Court. Similarly, Section 30 of the Act provides that all  proceed- ings  before a Tribunal shall be deemed to be judicial  pro- ceedings within the meaning of Sections 193, 219 and 228  of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. This provision also is unneces- sary  if  the  petitioner is right in  contending  that  the Tribunal is equated with the High Court for all purposes and must be treated as a deemed High Court with all the, logical consequences.     It  is, therefore, not possible for  the  Administrative Tribunal to shed off or abandon its heritage and  substitute its genes with those of its choice of a different  heritage. In  our opinion, this alone is sufficient to  indicate  that the petitioner’s assumption is fallacious and his attempt to be treated as a deemed High Court Judge cannot be  accepted. Apart from the obvious fallacy already indicated, the  peti- tioner’s claim, if accepted, would result in appointment  of some 955 deemed  High Court Judges contrary to the express  provision made  in  the  Constitution for appointment  of  High  Court Judges.     During  the course of heating, it was pointed  out  that mere substitution of a different forum for adjudication of a dispute  does not result in conferring on the new forum  the status of the substituted forum for purposes other than  the jurisdiction  and  power to adjudicate that  dispute  unless their status be otherwise equal. To illustrate, Section  115

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CPC by amendment in some states empowers the District Courts instead  of the High Court to decide  revisions  thereunder, but  that does not equate the District Court with  the  High Court.  No attempt was made on behalf of the  petitioner  to answer this.     The slightly modified argument of Shri G .L. Sanghi  for achieving the same purpose also does not bear close  scruti- ny.  The Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, itself makes  a distinction between the Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Members. The age of superannuation of the Chairman and  Vice-Chairman is 65 years while that of the Members is 62 years.  Similar- ly,  there  is difference in their salaries.  They  are  not treated  to  be  in one class for this purpose  by  the  Act itself.  It  cannot,  therefore, be said that  all  of  them constitute one class since the Tribunal is one. The case  of the  Chairman  was distinguished by learned counsel  on  the basis  that his position was akin to that of the Chief  Jus- tice  of the High Court. However, the age of  superannuation of the Chief Justice and the puisne Judges of the High Court is  the same which pattern is not maintained in the  Act.  A provision is made in the Act for discharge of certain admin- istrative functions of the Chairman by the Vice-Chairman and not  by the Members and similarly, there is  provision  only for the Vice-Chairman to fill a casual vacancy. The  founda- tion of initial equality on which the argument of  discrimi- nation is based, is non-existent. The parent statute  itself shows that they were not born equals.     There is also no merit in the casual argument that there is  a proposal for higher pay and age of superannuation  for Members  of Tribunals for other matters constituted  in  ac- cordance  with Article 323-B of the Constitution. The  basic fact  to  be  remembered is that Articles  323-A  and  323-B themselves  require the law constituting these Tribunals  to provide  for the pay and other conditions of service of  its Members  and, therefore, the same would be governed  in  the case  of  each  Tribunal by the provisions  of  the  statute giving  birth to the Tribunal. These statutes being  differ- ent,  the  provisions  therein in this behalf  can  also  be different  which has been left to the legislative wisdom  to decide. 956     Considerable  emphasis was laid on behalf of  the  peti- tioner on S.P. Sam path Kumar’s case (supra) to contend that the  Tribunals  constituted under Article  323-A  have  been equated  with the High Courts. It is sufficient to say  that in  Sam  path Kumar (supra), the question before us  in  the present  petition  did not arise for consideration  and  the observation  therin  cannot be torn out of context.  On  the contrary,  certain observations in para 22 of that  judgment indicate that the retiring age of 62 years or 65 years,  for the Members, Chairman and Vice Chairman was treated to be in accord  with the pattern of the enactment on the basis  that the Members and Chairman or Vice-Chairman were in  different categories.  Equation  of the Tribunal with the  High  Court therein  was only as the forum for adjudication of  disputes relating to service matters and not for all purposes such as the  one  arising for decision in the present case.  We  are unable  to  accept that the decision of this Court  in  S.P. Sampath  Kumar (supra) supports the contention before us  in this petition.     As  a  result of the aforesaid discussion,  we  have  no hesitation  in  holding  that the equality  claimed  by  the Members  of the Administrative Tribunal with the  Judges  of the High Courts or even the Vice Chairman of the Tribunal in the  matter of pay and age of superannuation does not  exist

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being  contrary  to  the pattern and scheme  of  the  parent statute  establishing the Tribunal and, therefore, the  very foundation  for  the argument of discrimination  being  non- existent, the petition must fail.     Consequently, the petition is dismissed. In the  circum- stances of the case, the parties will bear their own costs. R.S.S.                               Petition dismissed. 957