26 March 2008
Supreme Court
Download

M.A. SATTAR Vs STATE OF A.P.

Case number: Crl.A. No.-001227-001228 / 2003
Diary number: 4234 / 2003
Advocates: ROHIT MINOCHA Vs D. BHARATHI REDDY


1

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 3  

CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.)  1227-1228 of 2003

PETITIONER: M.A. Sattar & Ors.

RESPONDENT: State of A.P.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 26/03/2008

BENCH: S. B. SINHA & HARJIT SINGH BEDI

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

HARJIT SINGH BEDI,J.

1.      These appeals arise from the following facts:  2.     The deceased, Y. Penchal Reddy and accused No.1. P.  Yellaiah along with several other persons had occupied some  government land in Bhagat Singh Nagar and were residing in  tenements that had been raised by them.  A dispute had  however arisen between the group represented by the  deceased and  that by P. Yellaiah with regard to the sale of  plots.  In the elections to the association, the deceased was  elected as President and the group represented by P. Yellaiah  was defeated.  It appears that on account of the bitter  relations between the two groups, one Mallaiah belonging to  the group of the accused was killed in 1993 wherein the  deceased was named as the main accused.  He was however  acquitted by the trial court.  A few days prior to the present  incident some violence had taken place and a meeting being  held by the deceased was disturbed by the members belonging  to the accused party.  On 18th March, 1997 at 10.00 A.M., PW  1 Mohd. Hussain accompanied by the deceased was going to  Chinthal and when they reached near Omkar Rice Mill, a  group of four persons aged about 25 years  came from the  opposite direction and after putting chilly powder in the eyes  of the deceased and PW 1, inflicted multiple stab injuries on  the deceased.  Mohd. Hussain PW 1 rushed the injured to the  C.D.R. Hospital immediately but he was declared dead on  arrival.   He then went to the police station which was  adjoining the hospital and gave a statement at about 11 A.M.  which was recorded by PW 11 for offences punishable under  Sections 341 and 302 of the I.P.C.  On completion of the  investigation, a charge under Section 302 read with 34 IPC  was framed against the accused G. Raju ( A-4), Hari Lal (A-5),  M.A. Sathar (A-6) and Shivaji (A-7) and under Section 302  read with 109 was framed against accused P. Yellaiah (A-1), K.  Satyanarayana (A-2), and M. Ashok (A-3).   3.     The prosecution in support of its case placed reliance on  the evidence of 11 witnesses and several other pieces of  incriminating evidence.  The trial court held that PW 1 and PW  4,  Mohd. Hussain and  Sathi Reddy respectively were eye  witnesses to the incident as the latter  too had been walking  just ahead of the deceased at the time of the attack.  The  Court  observed that the test identification parade had been  conducted wherein PW 1 had identified four of the accused i.e.  A-4 to A-7 whereas PW 4 had identified only two of them i.e. A- 4 and A-7 in Court PW 1 had identified only A-3 to A-6

2

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 3  

meaning thereby that A-3 had been identified for the first time  in court and that A-7 who had been identified at the time of  the test identification parade had not been identified in the  court.  The Court also observed that PW 4 had identified only  A-4 and A-7 at the test identification parade but in the witness  box  he had identified  A-4 to A-7 as the culprits. The  trial   court accordingly held that the evidence as to the involvement  of A-3 to A-7 was doubtful and that there was no evidence  whatsoever to connect A-1 and A-2 to the offence.  The trial  court accordingly ordered that:  

       \023A4 to A6 are found guilty for the  offence under Section 302 read with 34  I.P.C and they are convicted under Section  235(2) Cr.P.C.  The other accused are  not  guilty for the offences charged against  them and they are acquitted under Section  235 (1) Cr.P.C.  The accused  Nos.2 and 7  shall be released forthwith, if they are not  required in any other case\024.  

4.      Two appeals were thereafter taken to the High Court by  the three convicted accused.  The court opined that both the  eye witnesses were consistent insofar as the involvement of A- 4 was concerned.  The court then held that insofar as A-5 and  A-6 were concerned, the eye witnesses\022 account at the test  identification parade did incriminate them and PW 1 had  asserted that he had been able to see the accused as he had  been wearing spectacles at the time when the chilly powder  had been thrown in his face.  The court also held that there  was no reason whatsoever to disregard the test identification  parade proceedings insofar as these accused were concerned,  as they had been conducted in the presence of a Magistrate  and the suggestion by the defence that the accused had been  shown to the eye witnesses before the parade could not be  believed.  It was also found that the presence of the two  witnesses at the spot at the relevant time had to be accepted,  more particularly as PW 4 had no substantial connection with  either of the parties and was truly an independent witnesses.   The appeal was accordingly dismissed and the judgment and  order of the trial court was maintained.  It is in these  circumstances that the present appeals are before us by way  of special leave.  5.     Mr. Rohit Minocha, the learned counsel for the  appellants has repeated the arguments addressed before the  two courts below.  It has been argued that there were material  discrepancies  between the statements of the two witnesses  with regard to the involvement of the appellants and that the  trial court itself had found that the involvement of four of the  accused had not been proved.  It has also been argued that  there was considerable delay in the conduct of the test  identification parade and as such no sanctity could be  attached to its proceedings.   6.     The learned Government counsel has, however,  supported the impugned judgments and has argued that  the  requisite sifting had already been done and benefit given to  such of the accused whose presence had been perceived as  doubtful.   7.     We have considered the submissions of the learned  counsel for the parties.  It must first and foremost, be noted  that the First Information Report had been recorded within a  very short time of the incident in which full details of the  incident had been given.  As per the record, the incident had  taken place at about 10.00 A.M. on 18th March, 1997 and the

3

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 3  

First Information Report had been recorded within an hour or  so at the police station itself.  We also find no reason  whatsoever to doubt the presence of the eye witnesses. PW 1 is  the first informant and PW 4 figures in the report.   We are  also of the opinion that there is no merit in the stand of the  learned counsel for appellants that an adverse inference ought  to be drawn from the fact that though the accused had been  arrested on 2nd April, 1997 the test identification parade had  been conducted in the presence of the Magistrate after a long  delay on 26th April, 1997.  We find that except for a bare  accusation that the accused had been shown to the witnesses  during the interregnum,  there is no evidence to show that this  had in fact happened and even the suggestion put to the  witnesses that they had seen the accused either in the police  station or at the I.D.P.L. Colony, shows that the defence was  probing in the dark and trying to make out a case for the  defence where none existed.   8.     It is also clear from the record that there appeared to be  some enmity between the deceased and the group headed by  P. Yellaiah (A-1) and though it has not been possible for the  prosecution to bring  evidence to show his involvement, but it  has come in the evidence of PW 1 that three days prior to the  incident, a meeting of all the colony members had been held  wherein a decision had been taken that about 20 plots were to  be sold to further develop the colony.  It appears that this is  the factor which precipitated the incident.  We are, therefore,  of the opinion that  there is no merit in the appeals. They are  accordingly dismissed.