http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 3  

CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  6913-6914 of 2003

PETITIONER: M.A. Murthy                                                      

RESPONDENT: Vs. State of Karnataka and Ors.                              

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/09/2003

BENCH:

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

(Arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 8113-8114/2002)

ARIJIT PASAYAT, J

       Leave granted.

       Both these appeals have common factual matrix, and legal panorama  and, therefore, are dealt with by this common judgment.  

       Factual backdrop in a nutshell is as follows:

       Karnataka State Financial Corporation (hereinafter referred to as  the ’Corporation’) invited applications for recruitment to two posts of  Manager (Finance and Accounts) by advertisement dated 18.7.1995. The  advertisement inviting applications for the two posts of Manager  (Finance and Accounts), one post for general and one post of scheduled  caste, prescribed the requisite educational qualification. It was  stipulated in the advertisement that the age and other qualifications  were to be reckoned as of 31.7.1995. It was also indicated that the  applications in the prescribed format with complete information should  reach the prescribed authority before 29th July, 1995 and incomplete  applications and applications without necessary enclosures were to be  rejected.  

       Appellant and respondents 4 and 5 were applicants in response to  the advertisement. Though respondent No.4 was not qualified on the last  date of submission of application, he was permitted to attend and  appear for the written test. However, on the date of interview he was  eligible. The written test was conducted on 1.10.1995 and the viva vice  was conducted on 25.11.1995. Similar was stated to be the position vis- Ã -vis respondent No.5. When respondent No.4 was selected, appellant  challenged his selection to be not in accordance with law. It is to be  noted that waiting list is prepared and respondent No.5 was placed in  the waiting list.  

A writ application was filed before the Karnataka High Court at  Bangalore challenging the selection of respondent No.4 and placing  respondent No.5 in the waiting list. Though, learned Single Judge of  the High Court held that respondent No.4 was ineligible as on the date  of employment, he held that in public interest the selection was to be  maintained.   

       A reference was made to the decision of this Court in Ashok Kumar  Sharma and Anr. v. Chander Shekher and Anr. (1993 Supp (2) SCC 611)  (described hereinafter as Ashok Kumar Sharma â\200\223 case No.I) where it was  held that if the applicant had acquired qualification by the time of

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 3  

interview that is sufficient.  

       A writ appeal was filed before the Division Bench. The view of  the learned Single Judge was affirmed by the Division Bench. A review  application was filed inter alia taking the stand that the view in  Ashok Kumar Sharma’s case No.I has been later on over-ruled in Ashok  Kumar Sharma and Ors. v Chander Shekhar and Anr. (1997 (4) SCC 18)  (described hereinafter as Ashok Kumar Sharma â\200\223 case No.II). Therefore,  a review of the judgment of the Division Bench was necessary. The High  Court by the impugned judgment held that though admittedly on 18.7.1995  i.e. on the date of advertisement the respondent No.4 was not qualified  to make an application, yet few dates and facts are relevant. He had  appeared for the M.B.A. examination in April 1995 and the results were  declared on 4.9.1995. The written examination was held on 1.10.1995 and  viva voce was conducted on 25.11.1995. At least by the time the written  examination and the viva voce tests were held, he had acquired the  requisite qualification. Judgment in Ashok Kumar Sharma’s case No. I  was delivered on 18.12.1992 and decision in the review petition in the  said case was rendered on 10.3.1997.  The appointment of respondent  No.4 was made when the earlier decision of Ashok Kumar Sharma’s case  No.I held the field. It was, therefore, held that on the date of  selection, the first judgment held the field; and, therefore, by  applying logic of that decision the selection of respondent No.4 cannot  be questioned.  

Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the approach of  the High Court is erroneous as the law declared by this Court is  presumed to be the law at all times. Normally, the decision of this  Court enunciating a principle of law is applicable to all cases  irrespective its stage of pendency because it is assumed that what is  enunciated by the Supreme Court is, in fact, the law from inception.  The doctrine of prospective over-ruling which is a feature of American  jurisprudence is an exception to the normal principle of law, was  imported and applied for the first time in L.C. Golak Nath and Ors. v.  State of Punjab and Anr. (AIR 1967 SC 1643). In Managing Director,  ECIL, Hyderabad and Ors. v. B. Karunakar and Ors. (1993 (4) SCC 727)  the view was adopted. Prospective over-ruling is a part of the  principles of constitutional canon of interpretation and can be  resorted to by this Court while superseding law declared by it earlier.   It is a device innovated to avoid reopening of settled issues, to  prevent multiplicity of proceedings, and to avoid uncertainty and  avoidable litigation.  In other words, actions taken contrary to the  law declared prior to the date of declaration are validated in larger  public interest.  The law as declared applies to future cases. (See  Ashok Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P. (1997) 5 SCC 201, Baburam v. C.C.  Jacob (1999) 3 SCC 362). It is for this Court to indicate as to whether  the decision in question will operate prospectively. In other words,  there shall be no prospective over-ruling, unless it is so indicated in  the particular decision. It is not open to be held that the decision in  a particular case will be prospective in its application by application  of the doctrine of prospective over-ruling. The doctrine of binding  precedent helps in promoting certainty and consistency in judicial  decisions and enables an organic development of the law besides  providing assurance to the individual as to the consequences of  transactions forming part of the daily affairs. That being the  position, the High Court was in error by holding that the judgment  which operated on the date of selection was operative and not the  review judgment in Ashok Kumar Sharma’s case No.II. All the more so  when the subsequent judgment is by way of Review of the first judgment  in which case there are no judgments at all and the subsequent judgment  rendered on review petitions is the one and only judgment rendered,  effectively and for all purposes, the earlier decision having been  erased by countenancing the review applications. The impugned judgments  of the High Court are, therefore, set aside.  

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 3  

       That brings us to the ticklish question as to how the reliefs can  be moulded. It is not in dispute that subsequently the appellant has  also been appointed on 9.11.2002. Though it was permissible for this  case to set aside the appointments of respondent no.4 and respondent  no.5, on the peculiar facts of this case, we consider it to be not  called for and the rights of parties instead could be adjusted by  working out equities, in the interests of substantial justice by  adopting a different course. The appellant shall rank senior to  respondent No.4 by treating his appointment to be with effect from the  date of selection of respondent No.4. This shall be only for the  purpose of fixing the seniority and continuity of service only not for  entitlement to any salary or other financial benefits. As respondent  No.5 was only in the waiting list, and it is stated that he has been  subsequently appointed, he will also rank below the appellant and  respondent No.4. The appeals are accordingly allowed. There shall be no  order as to costs.