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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  6663 of 2000

PETITIONER: LOK SEWA SHIKSHAN MANDAL

RESPONDENT: A.R. MUNDHADA CHARITABLE TRUST & ORS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/04/2007

BENCH: C.K. Thakker & H.S. Bedi

JUDGMENT: JUDGMENT

C.K. THAKKER, J.

       The present appeal is filed against the judgment  dated March 14, 2000, of the High Court of Judicature  at Bombay (Nagpur Bench) in Writ Petition No. 810 of  1986.  By the said judgment, the High Court held that  land acquisition proceedings in respect of acquisition of  land bearing Survey No. 187/3A, admeasuring 30 ares of  Malkapur Town, District Buldhana had lapsed.  Shortly stated, the facts leading to the institution of  present appeal are that the appellant is a ’Society’  registered on June 26, 1961 under the Societies  Registration Act, 1860.  It is also registered as ’Public  Trust’ under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 on  August 17, 1962.  The appellant is running a school in  Buldhana.  It approached the Government requesting   for acquisition of land for school as also for garden.  It  appears that a letter was written by the Under Secretary,  Revenue & Forest Department, Government of  Maharashtra to the appellant informing it about  acquisition of land of Survey Nos. 186 and 187 of  Malkapur in Buldhana District for public purpose, viz.  for running a school by the appellant.  It was stated by  the appellant that the respondent authorities prepared  Final Development Plan of Malkapur Town under the  Maharashtra Regional Town Planning and Development  Act, 1966 wherein 59 ares of land of Survey No. 186/4A  and 30 ares of land of Survey No. 187/3A was reserved  for the purpose of school and open space for garden for  the appellant.  A Resolution dated May 15, 1976 was  also passed giving sanction to the Development Plan.   Necessary proceedings were thereafter taken in  accordance with law for the acquisition of land.  So far  as acquisition of 59 ares of land of Survey No. 186/4A  for school is concerned, the question is no more under  controversy.  It had been finalized and the challenge to  the said acquisition failed.  The High Court in the  impugned judgment has observed that in its opinion, "no  fault can be found with the award of the Land  Acquisition Officer in relation to 59 ares of land."   To  that extent, therefore, the petition filed by the first  respondent herein (original petitioner) came to be  dismissed.  With regard to 30 ares of land of Survey No.  187/3A earmarked for garden for the school, the  contention of the first respondent \026 original petitioner  was that the award had not been passed in accordance

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with the provisions of Section 11A of the Land  Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the ’Act’)  and the proceedings lapsed.  The said contention was  upheld by the High Court and it was ruled that after the  final notification under Section 6 of the Act, award ought  to have been made within a stipulated period of two  years as required by Section 11A which was not done  and hence the proceedings lapsed.       The judgment of the  High Court to the extent to which it held that the  proceedings in respect of 30 ares of land of Survey No.  187/3A had lapsed that the appellant-Mandal is  aggrieved and has challenged it by filing the present  appeal.         It is not in dispute by and between the parties that  proceedings had been initiated by the authorities for  acquisition of land of two Survey Nos. (i) Survey No.  186/4A admeasuring 59 ares of land for school; and (ii)  Survey No.187/3A admeasuring 30 ares of land for  garden.  It is also clear from the decision of the High  Court impugned in the present appeal that though the  first respondent had challenged land acquisition  proceedings for both Survey Nos., the High Court  negatived all contentions as to acquisition of land  admeasuring 59 ares of Survey No. 186/4A and the  petition was dismissed.  It was only for 30 ares of land of  Survey No. 187/3A that the Court held that though the  notification under Section 6 was published on July 2,  1986, no award was made within two years as required  by Section 11A of the Act and the proceedings had  lapsed.         On July 28, 2000, the matter was placed for  admission-hearing.  Notice was issued and parties were  directed to maintain status quo.  On November 20, 2000,  leave was granted and interim relief was ordered to  continue.  The matter has now been placed for final  hearing.         We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.         Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, Senior Advocate appearing for  the appellant contended that the High Court has  committed an error of law as also of jurisdiction in  holding that the proceedings had lapsed under Section  11A of the Act.  It was submitted that the Court ought to  have taken into account the fact that the acquisition was  challenged by the first respondent by instituting a Writ  Petition which was entertained by the High Court. In  view of pendency of proceedings, no award could be  passed by the Land Acquisition Officer and Section 11A  of the Act had no application.  It was also urged that on  the one hand, the first respondent challenged the  proceedings and obtained interim relief and on the other  hand, it sought to contend that since the proceedings  could not be completed as required by law, they lapsed.   Such argument, submitted the counsel, would not lie in  the mouth of the person who had questioned the legality  of the proceedings.  It is settled law that a party cannot  take undue advantage of its own delay. The High Court  ought to have appreciated the said fact and dismissed  the petition.  According to the appellant, when the  proceedings were pending in the High Court and the  matter was sub-judice, the Land Acquisition Officer was  justified in not passing an award.  Once public purpose  had been established and notification under Section 6 of  the Act had been issued, it could not have been set at  naught or nullified on a technical ground that award had  not been made within a particular period. It was,

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therefore, submitted that the appeal deserves to be  allowed by setting aside the judgment of the High Court  and by upholding the action of the authorities that land  acquisition proceedings were in consonance with law.           Learned counsel for the first respondent, on the  other hand, supported the judgment of the High Court.   According to him, the language of Section 11A is  explicitly clear.  It is bounden duty of the Land  Acquisition Officer to make award within two years from  the date of publication of declaration under Section 6 of  the Act.  Since it was not done, the proceedings had  lapsed. The counsel stated that admittedly the  proceedings were not stayed by the High Court.  If it is  so, Explanation to Section 11A of the Act had no  application and in computing the period of two years  under Section 11A, the period of pendency of Writ  Petition could not be excluded.  He, therefore, submitted  that the appeal deserves to be dismissed.           Respondent Nos. 2 and 3, in their affidavit  contended that after the notification under Section 6 of  the Act was issued, the first respondent approached the  High Court and challenged the acquisitions proceedings.   In the light of pendency of Writ Petition, the authorities  did not proceed further with the acquisition proceedings  and the first respondent, who had challenged the  proceedings cannot take advantage of that situation.  It  was, therefore, submitted that the High Court was in  error in allowing the petition.         The question before this Court is as to whether the  High Court was right in holding that award which ought  to have been made under Section 11A of the Act was not  made within the stipulated period.  The learned counsel  for both the sides, in this connection, drew our attention  to the relevant provisions of law as also to the decisions  of this Court.   Now it cannot be gainsaid that every State has  power of eminent domain, which is the essential attribute  of sovereignty.  In exercise of the said power, the State  can acquire private property of its subjects for a public  purpose. The expression ’public purpose’ is defined in  Clause (f) of Section 3 of the Act.  Section 4 enables the  ’appropriate Government’ to issue ’preliminary  notification’ if it appears to such Government that any  land is needed or is likely to be needed for public  purpose.  Section 5A of the Act then provides for hearing  of objections against the proposed acquisition.  Section 6  empowers the ’appropriate Government’ to issue ’final  notification’. Such action, however, has to be taken after  considering the report, if any, submitted by the Collector  under Section 5A of the Act.  It also provides modes of  publication of notification and contains a provision in  sub-section (3) that such declaration ’shall be conclusive  evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose’.   The law also provides for giving of notice to persons  interested before taking over possession of land as also  for payment of compensation. Section 11 of the Act deals  with award of compensation by the Collector.  Section  11A, as inserted by the Land Acquisition (Amendment)  Act, 1984 (Act 68 of 1984) prescribes the period within  which an award should be made by the Collector.  The  said section is material and may be quoted in extenso :-         "11A. Period within which an award shall  be made \026 (1) The Collector shall make an  award under Section 11 within a period  of two years from the date of the

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publication of the declaration and if no  award is made within that period, the  entire proceedings for the acquisition of  the land shall lapse:

       Provided that in a case where the said  declaration has been published before the  commencement of the Land Acquisition  (Amendment) Act, 1984 (68 of 1984), the  award shall be made within a period of  two years from such commencement.

       Explanation. \026 In computing the period of  two years referred to in this section, the  period during which any action or  proceeding to be taken in pursuance of  the said declaration is stayed by an order  of a Court shall be excluded."

       Section 12 of the Act makes the award of the  Collector final.  We are not concerned with other  provisions of the Act in the present matter. Bare reading of Section 11A leaves no room of  doubt that the Collector is enjoined to make an award  within a period of two years from the date of publication  of declaration under Section 6 of the Act.  "If no award is  made within that period, the entire proceedings for the  acquisition of the land shall lapse." Explanation to  Section 11A, however, states as to how period of two  years should be counted.  It clarifies that in computing  the period of two years referred to in the section, the  period during which any action or proceedings is stayed  by an order of a court would be excluded.  Whereas it is  contended by the first respondent that the case on hand  is governed by the main provision of Section 11A, the  argument of the appellant is that it is governed by the  Explanation to the said provision. Let us now consider the relevant decisions of this  Court on the interpretation of the provision., In Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya v. State of  Gujarat, (1991) 4 SCC 531, a question came up for  consideration before this Court probably for the first  time. In that case, proceedings under the Act had been  initiated for acquisition of land of the appellant and final  notification under Section 6 of the Act was issued on  May 12, 1988.  The land-owner challenged the  notification by filing a petition in the High Court of  Gujarat.  A prayer was made for quashing the  notification and acquisition proceedings.  During the  pendency and final disposal of the Writ Petition, interim  relief of operation and implementation of the notification  was also sought. The High Court, however, granted  limited interim relief by restraining the authorities from  taking possession of the land pending the Writ Petition.   The Land Acquisition Officer then issued a notice under  sub-section (1) of Section 9 of the Act for the purpose of  determining compensation of land.  The land-owner in  the inquiry inter alia contended that two years had  lapsed after the publication of final notification under  Section 6 of the Act and, hence, no award could be  passed as the proceedings lapsed under Section 11A.   The contention of the land-owner, however, was rejected  by the Authorities.  The said decision was challenged by  the land-owner in the High Court by filing another  petition contending that there was no stay of ’further

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proceedings’ by the Court restraining the Authorities and  hence it was obligatory on the authorities to proceed  further under the Act.  As it was not done, the award  ought to have been made within two years as required by  Section 11A.  As the award was not passed within a  period stipulated by Section 11A of the Act, it was barred  by statutory limitation and the proceedings lapsed.  The  High Court rejected the contention observing that "the  Explanation to Section 11A is not confined to the staying  of the making of the award pursuant to Section 6 of the  notification, but it is widely worded and covers in its  sweep the entire period during which any action or  proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the declaration  under Section 6, is stayed by a competent court". The  award, therefore, could not be said to have been passed  beyond the statutory period, concluded the High Court.   The aggrieved land-owner challenged the said decision in  this Court.         This Court was called upon to consider whether the  High Court was right in invoking the Explanation to  Section 11A of the Act though limited interim relief was  granted qua possession only and had not stayed ’further  proceedings’.  On behalf of the land-owner, reliance was  placed on a decision of the High Court of Kerala in S.  Bavajan Sahib v. State of Kerala,  AIR 1988 Ker 280 that  the question of taking possession of the land arises only  when an award is passed under the Act except the cases  covered by Section 17 (Cases of urgency).  When Section  17 of the Act was not invoked, the case would be  governed by Section 11A of the Act and not by  Explanation thereto and if the award is not made within  a period of two years from the date of final notification  under Section 6 of the Act, the proceedings would lapse.   This Court, however, negatived the contention, disagreed  with Kerala view and observed; "We find ourselves  unable to agree with the learned Single Judge of the  Kerala High Court in the aforesaid judgment".  The Court  then considered the scheme of the Act and the phrase  "any action or proceedings",   to be taken in pursuance of  the notification and held that even if limited interim  relief was granted, the Explanation to Section 11A would  apply.         Interpreting the Explanation liberally, the Court  stated; "The said Explanation is in the widest  possible terms and, in our opinion, there is no  warrant for limiting the action or proceeding  referred to in the Explanation to actions or  proceedings preceding the making of the award  under Section 11 of the said Act. In the first  place, as held by the learned Single Judge  himself where the case is covered by Section  17, the possession can be taken before an  award is made and we see no reason why the  aforesaid expression in the Explanation should  be given a different meaning depending upon  whether the case is covered by Section 17 or  otherwise. On the other hand, it appears to us  that Section 11-A is intended to limit the  benefit conferred on a land holder whose land  is acquired after the declaration under Section  6 is made to in cases covered by the  Explanation. The benefit is that the award  must be made within a period of two years of  the declaration, failing which the acquisition

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proceedings would lapse and the land would  revert to the land-holder. In order to get the  benefit of the said provision what is required,  is that the land-holder who seeks the benefit  must not have obtained any order from a court  restraining any action or proceeding in  pursuance of the declaration under Section 6  of the said Act so that the Explanation covers  only the cases of those land-holders who do  not obtain any order from a court which would  delay or prevent the making of the award or  taking possession of the land acquired. In our  opinion, the Gujarat High Court was right in  taking a similar view in the impugned  judgment."

       In Government of T.N. & Anr. v. Vasantha Bai,  (1995) Supp (2) SCC 423, in a similar situation, this  Court reiterated the principle laid down in Yusufbhai and  observed that while calculating the period of limitation of  two years for making an award under Section 11A of the  Act, the period during which action or proceedings were  stayed by an order of the High Court would be excluded.   It was held that even if there was stay as to  dispossession only, it would tantamount to stay of  further proceedings and the entire period had to be  excluded.  In M. Ramalinga Thevar v. State of T.N. & Ors.,  (2000) 4 SCC 322 : JT 2000 (5) SC 27, this Court held  that as per Explanation to Section 11A of the Act, the  period of exclusion from time is the period during which  "any action or proceedings" to be taken in pursuance of  the said declaration is stayed.  Undoubtedly, one of the  actions contemplated pursuant to the declaration under  Section 6 is taking possession of the land though, such  action is a post award step in normal circumstances.  Nonetheless, it is one of the actions to be adopted as a  follow-up measure pursuant to the declaration envisaged  by Section 6 of the Act.  Observing that the consequence  mentioned in Section 11A is a self-operating statutory  process, the Court held that it can operate only when the  conditions specified therein conjoin together.  The  consequences would step in only when there is fusion of  all the conditions stipulated therein. If there is any stay  regarding any of the actions being taken pursuant to the  declaration then the consequence of lapse would not  happen.   This Court, therefore, concluded:- "Thus, the position is now well settled  that even when dispossession alone is  stayed by the Court the period during  which such stay operates would stand  excluded from the time fixed for passing  the award, the expiry of which would  render the acquisition proceedings  lapsed."  

       Recently, in Bailamma (Smt.) @ Doddabailamma  (dead) & Ors. v. Poornaprajna House Building Coop.  Society, (2006) 2 SCC 416 : JT 2006 (2) SC 108, it has  been held that period of stay of any action or  proceedings taken in pursuance of the declaration would  take out the matter from the main part to Section 11A of  the Act attracting the Explanation to the said section.         The Court stated;

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This Court emphasized the fact that  Section 11A was enacted with a view to  prevent inordinate delay being made by Land  Acquisition Officer in making the award which  deprived owners of the enjoyment of the  property or to deal with the land whose  possession has already been taken Delay in  making the award subjected the owner of the  land to untold hardship. The objects and  reasons for introducing Section 11A into the  Act were that "the pendency of acquisition  proceedings for long periods often causes  hardship to the affected parties and renders  unrealistic the scale of compensation offered to  them" and "it is proposed to provide for a  period of two years from the date of publication  of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act  within which the Collector should make his  award under the Act". The emphasis, therefore,  was on the Collector making his award within  the period prescribed. However, the legislature  was also aware of the reality of the situation  and was not oblivious of the fact that in many  cases acquisition proceedings were stalled by  stay orders obtained from courts of law by  interested parties. It, therefore, became  imperative that in computing the period of two  years, the period during which an order of stay  operated, which prevented the authorities from  taking any action or proceeding in pursuance  of the declaration, must be excluded. If such a  provision was not made, an acquisition  proceeding could be easily defeated by  obtaining an order of stay and prolonging the  litigation thereafter. Explanation to Section  11A was meant to deal with situations of this  kind. The explanation is in the widest possible  terms which do not limit its operation to cases  where an order of stay is obtained by a land- owner alone. One can conceive of cases where  apart from land-owners others may be  interested in stalling the land acquisition  proceeding. It is no doubt true that in most of  the reported decisions the party that obtained  the stay order happened to be the owner of the  land acquired. But that will not lead us to the  conclusion that the explanation applied only to  cases where stay had been obtained by the  owners of the land. There may be others who  may be interested in obtaining an order of stay  being aggrieved by the acquisition proceeding.  It may be that on account of development of  that area some persons in the vicinity may be  adversely affected, or it may be for any other  reason that persons in the locality are  adversely affected by the project for which  acquisition is being made. One can imagine  many instances in which a person other than  the owner may be interested in defeating the  acquisition proceeding. Once an order of stay  is obtained and the Government and the  Collector are prevented from taking any further  action pursuant to the declaration, they  cannot be faulted for the delay, and therefore,

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the period during which the order of stay  operates must be excluded. In a sense,  operation of the order of stay provides a  justification for the delay in taking further  steps in the acquisition proceeding for which  the authorities are not to blame.  

Dr. Dhawan strongly relied upon a decision of the  Division Bench of the High Court of Allahabad in Smt.  Kamla Pandey v. Collector, Agra & Ors., 1989 AWC 686.   In that case, no award was passed within a period of two  years from the date of publication of final notification  under Section 6 of the Act.  It was, therefore, contended  on behalf of the land owner that the acquisition  proceedings had lapsed under Section 11A of the Act.   The Court, however, negatived the contention observing  that it was a ’technical plea’ and the omission on the  part of the Authorities was that the "Special Land  Acquisition Officer did not determine the compensation  regarding the petitioner’s plot" on the ground that the  question whether the property should be exempted from  acquisition was pending consideration before the State  Government. The Court then stated :- "The only question, therefore, that arises  for consideration is whether the petitioner  himself had requested for exemption of the  land from acquisition or the Development  Authority or the Collector on their own  requested the Government to exempt the same  from acquisition.  The normal course of human  conduct persuades us to think that it is the  persons whose land or houses are being taken  away who would be interested in getting the  land exempted from acquisition.  Ordinarily,  no one likes expropriation even if he might get  compensation in lieu of acquisition.  We would,  therefore, prefer to rely on the version of the  Agra Development Authority that it was the  petitioner and others at whose instance the  matter was referred to the Government for the  exemption of their land.  At any rate, there is  nothing which might persuade us to accept the  petitioners’ version in preference to that of the  Agra Development Authority."     

It was also observed that when the land owner  himself contributed to the delay in making the award by  approaching the Government against acquisition, the   proceedings could not be quashed.  The Court said:-         "The omission was not a fraud on the  statute but was clearly bona fide based on the  consideration that there was a move afoot for  the release of the land from acquisition.   Moreover, the persons who would be hit by the  quashing of the acquisition proceedings are  not before us. To quash the proceedings in this  state of things would not, in our considered  view, be appropriate.  It would defeat the larger  public interest if we were to quash the  proceedings on the technicality, assuming that  the omission to make an award in respect of  the petitioners’ land within time produced the  effect of vitiating the entire acquisition

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proceedings.

       Apart from the fact that the above decision has no  binding effect, the question is no longer res integra and  had been finally settled by this Court in Yusufbhai and  reiterated from time to time.  In our opinion, therefore,  the above decision is of no help to the appellant.         In our considered opinion, Dr. Dhawan is also not  right in contending that as interim relief was granted,  the case was covered by Explanation to Section 11A and  not by the main provision of Section 11A.  It is,  therefore, necessary to consider the nature of order  passed by the High Court when the acquisition  proceedings were challenged by the first respondent.   Now from the record, it is clear that the first respondent  filed Writ Petition No. 810 of 1986 in the High Court on  April 2, 1986.  On April 30, 1986, the Court admitted the  petition by issuing Rule and the following order was  passed:- "Rule. To be put up with connected matter.  Rule on stay.  Liberty to move Vacation  Judge."                                 (Emphasis supplied)

       It is, thus, clear that the petition was admitted by  issuing rule nisi.  Rule was also issued on stay.  In our  opinion, however, the learned counsel for the first  respondent is right in contending that the Court had not  granted stay against "any proceeding". Merely Rule was  issued on the prayer of stay made by the petitioner in  the petition.         The matter then came up before the Court on July  31, 1986 for hearing on Rule on stay and following order  was passed\027 "The respondent No.3 if proceeds with the  construction of building that will be subject to  the decision of this petition."

Dr. Dhawan vehemently contended that even if it is  assumed for the sake of argument that on April 30,  1986, no actual stay was granted by the Court, interim  relief was granted on July 31, 1986.  He also drew our  attention to the communication of the order by the  Registry to the appellant herein, usually known as writ  issued in pursuance of an Order passed by the Court.   The communication inter alia stated\027 "Upon reading the petition of the applicant  presented to this High Court of Judicature  Bombay on the 21st day of April, 1986 praying  that to restrain the Respondent No. 2 and its  institutions and its employees, agents,  servants etc. from changing the nature of the  lands admeasuring 0.59 from Survey No.  186/4A and 187/3A as referred by the Award  purported to be dated 27.2.1986 in Land  Acquisition Case No. LAQ/Malkapur/4/1977- 78 at Annexure-L are concerned till the  decision of this petition and further to refrain  them from making any construction on  changes therein till the decision of this  petition\005"

Then quoting the order of the Court, it was stated:-

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"It is hereby accordingly directed that if you  proceed with the construction of building, that  will be subject to the decision of this petition."          Dr. Dhawan submitted that it was an interim order  communicated by the Assistant Registrar of the High  Court to the appellant. Upon reading the writ also, there is no doubt in our  minds that the above communication by the Registry of  the High Court did not state that acquisition proceedings  were stayed by the Court.  The writ, in our opinion, was  in consonance with the order passed by the Division  Bench of the High Court and expressly stated that if the  appellant will proceed with the construction of building,  it will be subject to the decision of the petition.  The  above communication thus does not take the case of the  appellant anywhere. It was then argued by Dr. Dhawan that the Land  Acquisition Officer was of the view that the acquisition  proceedings could not continue due to stay granted by  the Court and he proceeded to dispatch the relevant files  to the Government Advocate of the High Court.  For that,  the Counsel invited our attention to the facts stated in  the judgment that though there was no specific order  from the Court, a letter was issued by an Officer of the  Government Pleader to the Land Acquisition Officer to  send the record of the case.  The Court, however,  observed that the case file relating to the land bearing  Survey No. 187/3A was never sent by the Land  Acquisition Officer and the file which was sent related to  acquisition of land bearing Survey No. 186/4A.   The appellant also referred to a letter dated June  27, 2000 written by the President of the appellant- Mandal to the Land Acquisition Officer seeking  information on the file movement of the acquisition  proceedings in the High Court which was replied by the  Land Acquisition Officer vide his letter dated July 20,  2000 stating therein that the proceedings were stayed by  the High Court in Writ Petition No. 810 of 1986.  From  the letter, it is clear that it pertained to the proceedings  of Survey No. 186/4A.  But even otherwise, the order  passed by the Court was abundantly clear.  No stay was  granted by the Court, and hence, it could not be said  that Explanation to Section 11A got attracted and such  period would be excluded from computing the period of  two years.   It may also be stated that the High Court decided  the petition on March 14, 2000 whereas the letter on  which reliance is placed by the appellant was written by  the appellant-Mandal to the Land Acquisition Officer on  June 27, 2000 and the reply was sent by the Land  Acquisition Officer on July 20, 2000 \026 both after the  disposal of the writ petition in the High Court. In our opinion, therefore, the High Court was right  in observing that even if Order dated April 30, 1986,  issuing Rule on stay would mean that the Court had  granted stay of proceedings, (though no stay was granted  on that date), the Rule on stay was disposed of on July  31, 1986 clarifying that any construction would be  subject to the decision of the petition.  Thereafter there  was no question of any stay in the matter and as such  the case was squarely covered by main part of Section  11A of the Act. It was urged that the term ’stay’ was interpreted by  this Court very widely and it was held that even if stay

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was limited to maintenance of status quo or against  dispossession of the owner, extension of period of  limitation would apply.  There is no dispute about the  said proposition of law.  It is also immaterial and  irrelevant as to which party had obtained such stay. The  only question is whether there was any stay by the High  Court. In the case on hand, to us, the High Court was  right and wholly justified in holding that there was no  stay of any proceeding and hence, Explanation to Section  11A had no application.  If it is so, it cannot be held that  the High Court had committed an error of law or  misconstrued Section 11A by holding that since award  was not made within a period of two years from the date  of publication of final notification under Section 6 of the  Act, the proceedings lapsed.  Since the order passed by  the High Court impugned in the present appeal by the  appellant is in consonance with law, the appeal deserves  to be dismissed. For the foregoing reasons, we see no infirmity in the  order of the High Court.  The appeal deserves to be  dismissed and is accordingly dismissed, however,  without any order as to costs.