http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 6  

PETITIONER: LNANAK CHAND

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SHRI CHANDRA KISHORE AGARWALA AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 20/05/1969

BENCH: SIKRI, S.M. BENCH: SIKRI, S.M. RAMASWAMI, V.

CITATION:  1970 AIR  446            1970 SCR  (1) 565  1969 SCC  (3) 802  CITATOR INFO :  F          1975 SC  83  (26)  RF         1979 SC 381  (8)  R          1981 SC1243  (7,8)  RF         1981 SC1972  (7)  RF         1985 SC 945  (8)

ACT: Criminal  Procedure  Code 1898 s.  488--Expression  "child"- Whetherincludes   only   minor   children-Whether    Section impliedly   repealed  by  s.  4  of  Hindu   Adoptions   and Maintenance  Act 78 of 1958--If educational expenses  to  be taken into account for determining quantum of maintenance.

HEADNOTE: The  appellant’s  four  children,  the  respondents  in  the appeal,  two of whom were majors and two were minors,  filed an  application under s. 488 of the Criminal Procedure  Code in  September, 1963 for an order requiring the appellant  to pay   them  maintenance.   The  Trial  Court   allowed   the application  and  fixed the monthly amounts to  be  paid  as maintenance  to  each  of  the  children.   The  appellant’s revision  application  was dismissed but one  filed  by  the respondents  was  allowed whereby  the  Additional  Sessions Judge   submitted   the  case  to  the   High   Court   with recommendations  to enhance the maintenance allowance.   The High  Court  accepted, the reference and thereafter,  on  an application  by  the appellant granted a  certificate  under Art. 134(1)(c) for an appeal to this Court. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that (i) s.  488 Cr.   P.C.  was  impliedly repealed by s.  4  of  the  Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act 78 1956 insofar as it  applied to  Hindus;  (ii) that the word "child" in s.  488  means  a minor;  and (iii) that the maintenance fixed for two of  the major  children  was  based  on  wrong  principles  and  was excessive inasmuch as expenses for education had been  taken into consideration. HELD : Dismissing the appeal : (i)There  was no inconsistency between Act 78 of 1956  and s. 488 Cr. P.C. Both could stand together.  The Act of  1956 is an Act to amend and codify the law relating to  adoptions and  maintenance  among Hindus.  The law  was  substantially

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 6  

similar  before when it was never suggested that  there  was any inconsistency with s. 488 Cr.  P.C. The scope of the two laws  is different.  Section 488 provides a  summary  remedy and is applicable to all persons belonging to all  religions and  has  no  relationship  with the  personal  law  of  the parties. [568 A-B] Ram Singh v. State, A.I.R. 1963 All. 355; Mahabir  Agarwalla v.  Gita Roy, (1962) 2 Cr.  L.J. 528; and Nalini  Ranjan  v. Kiran Rani, A.T.R. 1965 Pat. 442; approved. (ii)The word "child" in s. 488 does not mean a minor son or daughter  and  the  deal  limitation  is  contained  in  the expression "unable to maintain itself". If  the concept of majority is imported into the section,  a major child who is an imbecile or otherwise handicapped will fall  outside the purview of this section.  If this  concept is  not  imported, no harm is done for  the  section  itself provides  a  limitation  by saying that the  child  must  be unable  to maintain itself.  The older a person becomes  the more  difficult it would, be to prove that he is  unable  to maintain himself. [569 F-H] 566 Shaikh Ahmad Shaikh Mahommad v. Ba Fatma, I.L.R. [1943] Bom. 38, 40; Jagir Kaur v. Jaswant Sinqh [1964] 2 S.C.R. 73,  84; in the matter of the Petition of W.B. Todd, (1873) 5  N.W.P. High Court Reports 237; and Bhagat Singh v. Emperor, 6  I.C. 960; referred to. Sint.   Purnasashi Devi v. Nagendra Nath, A.I.R.  1950  Cal. 465;  and  State  v.  Ishwarlal,  I.L.R.  [1951]  Nag.  475; approved. Amiritliammal   v.   Marimuthu,   A.I.R.   1967   Mad.   77; disapproved. (iii)While  it  was  not necessary  to  decide  whether expenses  for  education can be given under s. 488,  in  the present  case,  the Court below were right  in  taking  into consideration the situation at the time of passing the order i.e..  that  the two major children were  college  students. [570 G-H]

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.  6  of 1969. Appeal from the judgment and order dated May 2, 1968 of  the Delhi High Court in Criminal Revision Nos. 339-D of 1965 and 185-D of 1968. Sardar  Bahadur  Saharya and Yougindra Khushalani,  for  the appellant. S. C. Mazumdar and Yogeshwar Dayal, for the respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sikri,  J. This appeal by certificate of fitness granted  by the  High Court of Delhi arises out of an application  under S. 488, Cr. P.C. filed on September 4, 1963, in the Court of Magistrate,  1st  Class,  Delhi, by  four  children  of  the respondent,  Nanak  Chand.   The  first  applicant,  Chandra Kishore, was born on January 23, 1942, the second,  Ravindra Kishore,  was born on September 23, 1943, the  third  Shashi Prabha,  was  born  on February 23, 1947,  and  the  fourth, Rakesh  Kumar, was, born on September 21, 1948.   The  first two  applicants were thus majors at the time of  the  appli- cation,  the  third  though  a minor  at  the  time  of  the application  was a major on the date of the order passed  by the  Magistrate,  i.e.,  on March  26,  1965.   The  learned Magistrate   allowed  the  application  and   ordered   the, respondent,  Nanak  Chand,  to pay Rs. 35  p.m.  to  Chandra

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 6  

Kishore  for  four  months only, Rs.  36  p.m.  to  Ravindra Kishore  for 3 years only in case he continued his  medicine studies,  Rs.  45 p.m. to Shashi Prabha as  her  maintenance allowance  and education expenses and Rs. 45 p.m. to  Rakesh Kumar  as his maintenance allowance and education  expenses, from March 26, 1965. Both  the applicants and the respondent, Nanak Chand,  filed revisions  against  the  order of  the  Magistrate,  to  the Additional  Sessions  Judge,  who  dismissed  the   revision petition filed by the respondent, Nanak Chand, and  accepted the revision petition of the 567 applicants.   The  Additional Sessions Judge  submitted  the case  to the High Court with the recommendation  to  enhance the maintenance allowance of the applicants in terms of  the proposals  made  by  him.   The  Additional  Sessions  Judge observed  that the maintenance under s. 488 did not  include the  costs  of college education, and therefore he  did  not propose  to allow Chandra Kishore and Ravindra  Kishore  the expenses  of  their  college  education.   But  taking  into consideration the income of the respondent and the status of the family, the Additional Sessions Judge proposed to  allow Chandra  Kishore and Ravindra Kishore Rs. 100 p.m.  each  as maintenance  allowance until they finished their courses  of M.Com.  and M.B.B.S., respectively.  He further proposed  to allow  to  Rakesh  Kumar and Shashi Prabha  each  a  monthly maintenance allowance of Rs. 50 until Shashi Prabha was able to  earn  or was married, whichever was earlier,  and  until Rakesh Kumar was able to maintain himself. ’The  High Court accepted the reference made by the  learned Additional  Sessions  Judge,  and  dismissed  the   criminal revision  filed by the respondent.  The High  Court  granted the  certificate under art. 134(1) (c) of  the  Constitution because there is conflict of opinion on the question of  the interpretation  to be given to the word ’child’ in  s.  489, Cr.  P.C. The learned counsel for Nanak Chand has raised three  points before  us : first, that s. 488, Cr.  P.C. stands  impliedly repealed by s. 4 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956   (78   of  1956)--hereinafter  referred  to   as   the Maintenance  Act--insofar  as it is  applicable  to  Hindus; secondly, that the word ’child’ in s. 488 means a minor; and thirdly, that the maintenance fixed for Chandra Kishore  and Ravindra  Kishore  was  based on wrong  principles  and  was excessive inasmuch as expenses for education have been taken into consideration.               Section 4 of the Maintenance Act reads               "4.  Save as otherwise expressly  provided  in               this Act,-               (a)........               (b)   any  other  law  in  force   immediately               before  the  commencement of  this  Act  shall               cease  to  apply to Hindus insofar  as  it  is               inconsistent   with  any  of  the   provisions               contained in this Act." The  learned counsel says that s. 488 Cr.  P.C., insofar  as it  provides  for the grant of maintenance to  a  Hindu,  is inconsistent with Chapter III of the Maintenance Act, and in particular,  s.  20,  which  provides  for  maintenance   to children.  We are unable to Sup.  Cl/69-7 568 see  any  inconsistency between the Maintenance Act  and  S. 488, Cr. P.C. Both can stand together.  The Maintenance  Act is an act to amend and codify the law relating to  adoptions and  maintenance  among Hindus.  The law  was  substantially

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 6  

similar before and nobody ever suggested that Hindu Law,  as in  force immediately before the commencement of  this  Act, insofar  -as it dealt with the maintenance of children,  was in any way inconsistent with s. 488, Cr.  P.C. The scope  of the  two laws is different.  Section 488 provides a  summary remedy  and  is applicable to all persons belonging  to  all religions  and has no relationship with the personal law  of the   parties.   Recently  the  question  came  before   the Allahabad  High Court in Ram Singh v. State(1),  before  the Calcutta  High Court in Mahabir Agarwalla v. Gitia  Roy  (2) and  before the Patna High Court in Nalini Ranjan  v.  Kiran Ran(3).  The three High Courts have, in our view,  correctly come  to the conclusion that s. 4(b) of the Maintenance  Act does  not  repeal  or affect in any  manner  the  provisions contained in S. 488, Cr.  P.C. On  the  second  point there is sharp  conflict  of  opinion amongst the High Court and indeed amongst the Judges of  the same High Court.  In view of this sharp conflict of  opinion we  must  examine the terms of s.  488  ourselves.   Section 488(1) reads as follows               "488(1).   If  any  person  having  sufficient               means neglects or refuses to maintain his wife               or his legitimate or illegitimate child unable               to maintain itself, the District Magistrate, a               Presidency   Magistrate,   a    Sub-divisional               Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first  class               may,  upon proof of such neglect  or  refusal,               order such person +to make a monthly allowance               for the maintenance of his wife or such child,               at  such  manthly  rate,  not  exceeding  five               hundred   rupees   in  the  whole,   as   such               Magistrate thinks fit, and to pay the same  to               such  person  as the Magistrate from  time  to               time directs."               We  may  also  set out sub-s. (8)  of  S.  488               because some courts have placed reliance on it               :               "488(8).   Proceedings under this section  may               be  taken against any person in  any  district               where  he  resides  or is, or  where  he  last               resided with his wife, or, as the case may be,               the mother of the illegitimate child."               The  word ’Child’ is not defined in  the  Code               itself.   This word has different meanings  in               different contexts.  When it is used in               (1) A.I.R. [1963] All. 355.                (2) [1962] 2Cr.L.J.528.               (3)   A.I.R. [1965] Pat. 442.               569               correlation with father or parents,  according               to Shorter Oxford Dictionary it means :               "As  correlative  to parent.   The  offspring,               male or female, of human parents."               Beaumont,  C.J.,  in  Shaikh.   Ahmed   Shaikh               Mahomed v. Fatma(1) observed :               "The word "child" according: to its use in the               English   language  has   different   meanings               according  to  the context.  If  used  without               reference   to  parentage,  it  is   generally               synonymous with the word ’infant’ and means  a               person  who  has  not  attained  the  age   of               majority....  where the word ’child’  is  used               with  reference  to  parentage,  it  means   a               descendant  of  the first degree, a son  or  a               daughter  and  has no reference  to  age.   In

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 6  

             certain contexts it may include descendants of               more  remote  degree,  and  be  equivalent  to               "issue".   But,  at any rate, where  the  word               "child" is used in conjunction with  parentage               it  is not concerned with age.  No  one  would               suggest that gift "to all my children" or  "to               all  the children of A" should be confined  to               minor  children.   In s. 488 of  the  Criminal               Procedure Code the word is used with reference               to  the father.  There is no qualification  of               age; the only qualification is that the  child               must  be  unable to maintain  itself.   In  my               opinion, there is no justification for  saying               that this section is confined lo children  who               are under the age of majority." We  agree  with these observations and it seems to  us  that there is no reason to depart from the dictionary meaning  of the word. As  observed by Subba Rao, J., as he then was, speaking  for the Court in Jagir Kaur v. Jaswant Singh (2)  "Chapter XXXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure providing for  maintenance of wives and children intends to serve a social purpose." If the concept of majority is imported into the section a major child who is an imbecile or otherwise handicapped will  fall outside the purview of this section.  If this concept is not imported, no harm is done for the section itself provides  a limitation  by  saying  that the child  must  be  unable  to maintain  itself.   The  older a  person  becomes  the  more difficult it would be to prove that he is unable to maintain himself.   It  is  true  that  a  son  aged  77  may   claim maintenance  under the section from a father who is 97.   It is  very  unlikely to happen but if it does happen  and  the father is (1)  T.L.R.  [1943]  Bom. 38, 40. (2) [1964] 2 S.C.R. 73, 84. 570 able to maintain while the son is unable to maintain himself no harm would be done by passing an appropriate order  under s. 488.  We cannot view with equanimity the lot of  helpless children  who though major are unable to support  themselves because of their imbecility or deformity or other handicaps, and it is not as if such cases have not arisen.  As long ago as 1873, Pearson, J. In the matter of the Petition of W.  B. Todd(1) had to deal with a major son who was deaf and  dumb, and   he  had  no  hesitation  in  granting  an   order   of maintenance.  The same conclusion was arrived at by  Chevis, J.,  in  1910 in Bhagat Singh v. Emperor(2) and  he  allowed maintenance  to  a young man of about 20 who was  very  lame having a deformed foot.  We have seen no case in which a man of  77 has claimed maintenance and -we think, with  respect, that unnecessary emphasis has been laid on the fact that  it might be possible for a man of 77 to claim maintenance. It is not necessary to review all the case law.  The  latest judgment  which  was brought to our notice is  that  of  the Madras  High Court in Amirithammal v. Marimuthu(3) in  which Natesan,  J. has written a very elaborate judgment.  He  has referred  to  all the Indian cases and a number  of  English cases and statutory provisions both in England and in India. We  are unable to derive any assistance from  the  statutory provisions referred to by him or from the English Law on the point.  He relied on the use of the word "itself" in s.  488 as  showing that what was meant was a minor child.   We  are unable to attach so much significance to this word.  It  may well  be that it is simpler or more correct to use the  word "itself" rather than use the words "himself or herself."

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 6  

We may mention that Das Gupta, J., in Smt.  Purnasashi  Devi v.  Nagendra  Nath  (4)  and  Mudholkar,  J.,  in  State  v. Ishwarlal(5) came to the same conclusion as we have done. In  view  of the reasons given above we must hold  that  the word "child" in s. 488 does not mean a minor son or daughter and  the  real  limitation is contained  in  the  expression "unable to maintain itself." Coming  to the third point raised by the learned counsel  we are  of the view that the learned Additional Sessions  Judge and  the High Court were right in taking into  consideration the existing situation’ the situation being that at the time the order was -passe Chandra Kishore was a student of M.Com. and  Ravindra Kishore was a student of M.B.B.S. course.   We need not decide in this (1) [1873] 5 N.W.P. High Court Reports 237. (2) 6 T.C. 960. (3) A.I.R. [1967] Mad. 77. (4) A.T.R. [1950] Cal. 465 (5)  T.L.R. [1951] Nag. 474. 571 case  whether expenses for education can be given  under  s. 488   because  no  such  expenses  have  been   taken   into consideration  in fixing the maintenance in this  case.   It has  not  been  shown to us that the  amount  fixed  by  the learned Additional Sessions Judge and confirmed by the  High Court is in any way excessive or exorbitant. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed. R.K.P.S.                                   Appeal dismissed. 572