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PETITIONER: LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: INDIA AUTOMOBILES AND CO. AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT01/08/1990

BENCH: RANGNATHAN, S. BENCH: RANGNATHAN, S. SAIKIA, K.N. (J)

CITATION:  1991 AIR  884            1990 SCR  (3) 545  1990 SCC  (4) 286        JT 1990 (3)   383  1990 SCALE  (2)180

ACT:     Tamil  Nadu Buildings Lease and Rent  Control  Act--Sec- tions 4, 10(1), 10(2)(vii) and 19-- Whether Rent  Controller had jurisdiction to decide question of title.

HEADNOTE:     Two  separate properties bearing Door Nos. 2 and  3  ad- measuring  41  grounds and 2005 sq.  ft.,  which  originally formed  part  of an extent of land, situate at  Mount  Road, Madras  belonged  to several co-owners, who leased  out  the same to the Respondent, by two separate lease-deeds (Ex. P-1 and P-2)--item 1 and 2 in the Schedule A to the plaint.  The property contained in Door No. 2 which comprised an area  of 4  grounds and 151 sq- ft- with certain buildings was  given on rent for Rs. 150 p.m., whereas the property contained  in Door No. 3 which also had some buildings thereon was let out for Rs.200 p.m.     The owners sold the properties to the United India  Life Assurance  Co. and the New Guardian of India Life  Insurance Co. Ltd. in July 1953. In 1956, the Life Insurance  Corpora- tion  of India, the appellant stepped into the shoes of  the said companies- The appellant moved two applications  before the  Rent Controller for fixation of a ’fair rent’ for  each of  the premises; In respect of the property in Door No.  2, the  rent  claimed was Rs.2,399/03 while in respect  of  the other, the rent claimed was Rs.3266/50p. The tenants claimed that,  under both the lease deeds, what had been leased  out to them was only a vacant land and since the  superstructure had  been built by them, they were entitled to relief  under the  Madras  City Tenants’ Protection Act.  It  was  further contended  that the Rent Controller had no  jurisdiction  to fix a fair rent. The Rent Controller accepted the contention of the tenant so far as item No. 1 (property at Door No.  2) was  concerned but with regard to the second property  (Door No. 3), he fixed the fair rent at Rs. 1451 p.m.     There  were  then  two appeals to  the  Court  of  Small Causes.  The Small Causes Court came to the conclusion  that the  buildings  on the land leased vide P-1  had  also  been conveyed  to the appellant and that the LIC was entitled  to seek fixation of fair rent in respect of this premises also. However the order of the Rent Controller in regard to the

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546 other property in Door No. 3 was upheld. However, in certain earlier  proceedings for fixation of fair rent etc., it  had been held by the Rent Controller that item No. (Door No.  2) belonged to the LIC, but his order of eviction had been  set aside by the appellate court on some other ground. The Court of Small Causes did not treat that decision as res judicata. The  tenants  being aggrieved by the order of the  Court  of Small  Causes  filed revision petitions but they  were  dis- missed on 20.11.1968.     The  appellant  thereupon filed Civil Suit  against  the tenants-respondents for recovery of arrears of rent together with interests etc. on the basis of the fair rent fixed. The respondents-tenants also filed a civil suit claiming protec- tion under the Madras City Tenants’ Protection Act but  this suit  and further appeals therefrom were dismissed.  In  the suit  for recovery of rent filed by the appellant, the  ten- ants  contended that since the subject matter of  the  lease under  Ex. P-1 was only a vacant site, the  Rent  Controller had no jurisdiction to fix the fair rent in respect  thereof and  that, therefore, the claim in the suit for  arrears  of rent, based on the Rent Controller’s order in respect of the premises covered by Ex. P-1 had to fail. The trial Judge  in the High Court came to the conclusion that Ex. P-1 did  not, in  law, create a valid lease between the co-owners and  the tenants. He further held that the superstructure constructed on  the land had been conveyed to the vendee under the  sale deed dated 30.7.1953 and thus vested in LIC. On this reason- ing the High Court held that the Rent Controller had  juris- diction to fix the fair rent in respect of the premises. The tenants  filed an appeal. The appellate Bench confirmed  the decree  in respect of Item 2 but as regards Item No. 1,  the Appellate  Bench  vacated  the decree passed  by  the  trial Court.  It  held that there was a valid  lease  between  the owners  and the tenants under Exts. P-1 and P-2. The  appel- lant Bench held that the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to  entertain the application for fixation of fair  rent  in respect  of  the property which was only a vacant  piece  of land.  Thus, the Court held that the LIC could not  maintain the suit for recovery of rent based on the order made by the statutory tribunal under the Rent Control Act. The  tenants’ appeal was accordingly partly allowed.     LIC  came  up in appeal to this Court against  the  said order, after obtaining special leave.     Two  questions  arose for determination  by  this  Court viz., (1) Was the LIC the vendee only of a vacant land  with no  title to the buildings standing on the site in  Item  1, and (2) it open for the tenants to contend that the order of the Court of Small Causes in the earlier rent 547 control proceedings deciding to the contrary, and fixing the fair rent of item 1 could be completely ignored as an  order passed  totally  without jurisdiction though it  had  become final between the parties? Dismissing the appeal, this Court,     HELD:  There are clear indications in the Act and  rules that  the Rent Controller does not have the jurisdiction  to decide  questions of title. In a proceeding under  the  Act, whether  it  be for fixation of fair rent or  eviction,  the tenant  may  raise several objections. He may,  inter  alia, take the point that the opposite party is not the  landlord. [561C-D]     All  that  the Rent Controller has to do is  to  satisfy himself that the person seeking eviction or fixation of fair rent  is  a ’landlord’ who has, prima facie,  the  right  to

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receive the rent of the property in question. That the  Rent Controller’s jurisdiction on this issue is limited is  clear from the proviso to Section 10(1) of the Act. [561 F-G]     The  extensive  jurisdiction conferred on  civil  courts under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure should not be curtailed without a specific statutory warrant or except  on some  clear  principle. There is nothing in the  Tamil  Nadu Rent  Control Act which, in any way, takes away, or  narrows down, the civil court’s jurisdiction as, for example,  there is in the Delhi Rent Control Act (Section 50). [569G-H]     Section  4 of the Rent Control Act provides only  a  ma- chinery  for  fixation of fair rent in  respect  of  certain premises.  It  is the quantum of fair rent that  arises  for determination  by  the Rent Controller. There  is  no  doubt that,  since  an  application for this  purpose  cannot  lie except  at the instance of a landlord or a tenant, the  Rent Controller  has to deal with this incidentally but  this  is not one of the direct issues before the Rent Controller.  If and  only if, this relationship exists between the  parties, the  Rent  Controller  steps in for  a  limited  purpose--to determine  what the fair rent is-and then fades out  of  the picture.  Where  a fair rent is fixed by a  Controller,  the Rent Control Act does not provide for a machinery for recov- ery  of  the amount. The amount has to be recovered  by  the landlord  only by recourse to a civil court. This  gives  an indication  that the determination of the relationship  that gives  rise to the application is also not conclusive.  This is indeed made clear by the provisions relating to eviction. [570B-E]     If the civil court in the instant case, had come to  the conclusion that there is a relationship of a landlord and  a tenant, and that the LIC 548 was  entitled to recover the rent from the tenants, it  will have  to pass a decree in favour of the LIC on the basis  of the  fair rent fixed by the Rent Controller. It will not  be open to the civil court to re-determine the rent payable  by the tenant to the landlord because that is a matter squarely and exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Rent Control- ler  and, therefore, impliedly excluded from the purview  of the civil court. But his decision is not final on the  issue that opens up his jurisdiction and cannot preclude an  owner from  contending,  in a civil court, that he should  not  be asked  to  pay rent for his own property to some  one  else. [570F-H]     There  is  no  reason to hold that  contract  between  a person with himself and others is invalid. [571A]     Krishnamurthy  v.  Parthasarathy,  AIR  1949  Mad.  780; Manibhai Hathibhai v. Arbuthnot, AIR 1947 Bom. 413; Rai Brij Raj v. Shaw, [1951] SCR 145 at 147, 150; Official Trustee v. Sachindranath,  [1969] 3 SCR 92 & 99 pp. Antulay  v.  Nayak, [1988]  2 SCC 602 at 649, 677 and 700; Trideshwar  Dayal  v. Maheshwar  Dayal, [1989] 2 SCALE 1436 at 1437; Shiv  Chander Kapoor  v.  Amar  Bose, [1990] 1 SCC 234 paras  22  and  23: Palaniappa Chettiar and Ors. v. Vairavan Chettiar, [19631 76 L.W.  21;  Palaniappa  Chettiar v. Babu  Sahib  alias  Sheik Mytheen Sahib and Ors., [1964] 77 LW 551; Salay Mohamed Sail etc.  v. Jaffer Mohamed Sait’s Memorial  Dispensary  Charity and Ors., [1969] 1 Andhra Weekly Reporter (S.C. 16); Bhagwan Dayal  v. Reoti Devi, [1962] 3 SCR 440; Desika  Charyulu  v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ant., AIR 1964 SC 807; Dhulabhai v. State, [1968] 3 SCR 662; Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal and Ors.  v. Dossibai N.B. Jee jeebhoy, [1070] 3 SCR 830;  Jeeth Kaur and Ors. v. Smt. P. Rondalamma and Ant., AIR 1983  A.P. 219  and State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Samigal Madam  and

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Ors., [1985] 4 SCC 10.

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No  1514  of 1979.     From  the  Judgment  and Order dated  17.6.1977  of  the Madras High Court in O.S.A. 62 of 1973.     T.S.  Krishnamurthy lyer, M.J. Paul and Kailash  Vasudev for the Appellant.     K.  Parasaran, P.D. Sharma, T.K. Seshadri and  K.  Swami for the Respondents. 549 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     RANGANATHAN, J. A very interesting question comes up for consideration in this appeal. The question to be  ultimately decided falls within a very narrow compass but it is  neces- sary  to set out the facts leading to the present appeal  at some length.     The property, which is the subject matter of the present dispute, originally formed part of an extent of land situat- ed  on  Mount Road, Madras, bearing door Nos. 2  and  3  and measuring 41 grounds and 2005 sq. ft. It belonged to several co-owners.  These  co-owners had leased out  the  properties under  two lease deeds in favour of M/s. India  Automobiles, which was then the sole proprietary concern of one of  them- selves,  Ganshyamdas  Girdhardas (G.G.), but  was  converted subsequently,  in 1961, into a partnership concern  of  G.G. and his four sons. The firm and its partners arc hereinafter compendiously referred to as ’the tenants’. The first  lease (Ext.  P-1) was dated 22.9. 1947 and related to Door  No.  2 (Item No.1 in Schedule A to the plaint). This was a property comprising of an area of 4 grounds and 151 square feet  with certain buildings thereon. The rent for the premises was Rs. 150 per month. The second lease deed (Ext. P-2), dated 3.10. 1947  relating  to Door No. 3 (Item 2 in Schedule A  to  the plaint)  covered an area of 8700 sq. ft. and  some  building thereon. The rent as per lease deed was Rs.200 per month.     On 30.7.1953, all the co-owners of the property (includ- ing G.G.) sold the property to the United India Life  Assur- ance  Company and the New Guardian of India  Life  Insurance Company  Ltd.  In 1956, the Life  Insurance  Corporation  of India  (LIC) stepped into the shoes of these  two  insurance companies and became the owner of the property.     On  20.7.65, the LIC moved two applications  (being  HRC Nos.  3310 and 3311 of 1965) in the court of the  Rent  Con- troller (Sri A. Varadarajan who later became a Judge of  the this  Court) for fixation of a "fair rent" for each  of  the premises. The fair rent claimed was computed at  Rs.2,399.03 per  month in respect of item No. 1 as against the  rent  of Rs. 150 p.m. fixed under the lease deed. In respect of  item 2  the  fair rent claimed was Rs.3266.50 as  against  Rs.200 p.m. payable under the lease deed. The defendants (G.G.  and his sons) filed their objections to the above  applications. They claimed that, under both the lease deeds, what had been leased  out  to  them was only a vacant land  and  that  the superstructure had been built by them. They claimed,  there- fore, that they were entitled to relief under the Madras 550 City  Tenants’ Protection Act and that the  Rent  Controller Court had no jurisdiction to fix a fair rent. The  Rent Controller accepted the .above argument so far  as item  was  concerned.  So far as item 2  was  concerned,  it appears  that, at the time of the hearing, it  was  conceded

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before the Rent Controller that the respondents were tenants of the entire properties covered by the lease deed and  that they  had not constructed any of the premises thereupon.  In view  of this the Rent Controller dismissed H.R.C. 3310/  65 relating  to  item No. 1 and, in H.R.C. 3311/65,  fixed  the fair  rent  in respect of item no. 2 at Rs.  1451  p.m.  The order of the Rent Controller was dated 9.3. 1966.     There  were  appeals to the Court of  Small  Causes.  In respect  of  item No. 1, in H.R.A. 534/66, the Court,  on  a perusal  of  the sale deed dated 30.7.53 filed  by  the  LIC before it, came to the conclusion that the buildings on  the land leased under Ex. P-1 had also been conveyed to the  LIC and that the LIC was entitled to seek fixation of fair  rent in respect of this premises also. The fair rent fixed by the Rent Controller at Rs.994 p.m. was upheld. The order of  the Rent Controller in respect of item 2 was also upheld. It may be mentioned here that, even in certain earlier  proceedings for  fixation of fair rent and eviction (H.R.C.  867/73  and H.R.C.  2557/64),  it had been held by the  Rent  Controller that  item  No. 1 (door No. 2) belonged to the LIC  but  his order of eviction had been set aside by the appellate  court on  some  other ground. In the circumstances, the  Court  of Small  Causes, in the appeals now being referred  to  (H.RA. 534/66), did not treat the earlier decision as res  judicata but came independently to the same conclusion that item  No. 1  belonged  to the LIC. This was on 19th April,  1967.  The tenants  filed revision petitions against the order  of  the Court   of  Small  Causes  but  these  were   dismissed   on 20.11.1968.     After  the Civil Revision Petitions by the  tenant  were dismissed,  the LIC filed C.S. 64/1969 on the original  side of the Madras High Court against the tenants for recovery of arrears of rent on the basis of the fair rents fixed,  which were computed at Rs.98,250.97 in respect of the two items of property.  Further interest at the rate of 12% thereon  from date  of plaint to the date of decree and at  6%  thereafter till the date of realisation was also claimed.     It  may be mentioned here that the tenant filed C.S.  87 of  1972 claiming protection under the Madras City  Tenants’ Protection  Act but this suit and further appeals  therefrom have been dismissed. Turn- 551 ing now to C.S. No. 54 of 1969 (which was disposed of  along with  C.S.  No.  87  of  72  by  a  common  judgment   dated 23.10.1972),  the contention urged on behalf of the  tenants was that, since the subject matter of the lease under Ex. P- 1 was only a vacant site, the Rent Controller had no  juris- diction  to fix the fair rent in respect thereof  and  that, therefore, the claim in the suit for arrears of rent,  based on  the Rent Controller’s order in respect of  the  premises covered  by Ex. P-1 had to fail. The Court addressed  itself to  this question. It came to the conclusion that Ex.  P-  1 did not, in law, create a valid lease between the  co-owners and  the tenants. After referring to the terms of  the  sale deed  (Ex. P-3), the superstructure constructed on the  land was held to have been conveyed to the vendee under the  sale deed  dated 30-7. 1953 and to have thus vested in  the  LIC. The Rent Controller was, therefore, held to have had  juris- diction to fix the fair rent in respect of the premises.  It was,  therefore, held that the plantiff’s claim in the  suit should succeed. The suit was decreed accordingly.     The tenants filed an appeal being O.S.A. No. 62 of 1973. The Appellate Bench confirmed the decree in respect of  item No.  2 subject to certain modifications which are  not  here relevant.  However, so far as item No. 1 was concerned,  the

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Appellate  Bench  vacated  the decree passed  by  the  trial court.  It  held that there was a valid  tease  between  the quondam owners and the tenants under Exts. P-1 & P-2. Having regard  to  the express recitals in Ex. P-3,  the  Appellate Bench  held that it was impossible to hold that  the  build- ings,  which admittedly belonged to the defendants  and  had been  constructed by them on the vacant land taken on  lease under Ex. P- 1, ever were or could be the subject matter  of the sale under Ex. p-3. In view of this finding, it was held that  the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction  to  entertain the application for fixation of fair rent in respect of  the property  which was only a vacant piece of land.  In  conse- quence, it was held, the LIC could not maintain the suit for recovery  of rent based on the order made by  the  statutory tribunal under the Rent Control Act and claim the difference between  the so called fair rent and the contract rent.  The claim of the LIC for recovery of Rs.39,224.71, as arrears of rent, in respect of item 1 was thus held to be not maintain- able.  O.S.A.  62 of 1973 was, therefore,  allowed  to  that extent. The present appeal, by Special Leave granted on 3.7. 1979, is from the order of the Division Bench rejecting  the appellant’s claim for arrears of rent in respect of item No. 1 of the property set out in Schedule A to the plaint  based on  the difference between the fair rent fixed by  the  Rent Controller and the rent payable therefore under Ex. P- 1. 552     The questions to be decided in this appeal, on the above facts,  boil down to these: (1) Was the LIC the vendee  only of  a  vacant piece of land with no title to  the  buildings standing  on  the  site in item 17 (2) It is  open  for  the tenants  to  contend that the order of the  Court  of  Small Causes  in the earlier rent control proceedings deciding  to the  contrary and fixing the fair rent of item 1  at  Rs.994 p.m. should be completely ignored as an order passed totally without  jurisdiction, although it has become final  as  be- tween  the parties? Two interesting aspects may  be  pointed out  in regard to these two questions. The first is that  if either question is answered in the negative, the other  will not  arise for consideration and the appeal will have to  be allowed.  But an affirmative answer to either question  will necessitate  an  answer to the other. The  second  is  that, though  the claim in issue before us is only a  money  claim for arrears of rent, any decision given by us, based, as  it will  have  to  be, on the issue whether the  LIC  owns  the superstructure  or not and whether the tenants are the  les- sees only of vacant land or of both land and buildings, will have repercussions not only on the claim in this suit (which by now has accummulated to more than Rs.3 lakhs) but also on any other proceedings by way of ejectment or otherwise which the  LIC may have in contemplation against the tenants.  The decision in this appeal will, therefore, be of great  moment for the L.I .C.     So  far as the first question is concerned, we  have  no doubt that the Division Bench of the High Court has come  to the  correct conclusion. In our view, the conclusion of  the learned  Single Judge that the lease Ex. P- 1,  executed  by the co-owners of the property in favour of one of them,  was invalid, was erroneous. S.5 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, clearly envisages transfers of property by a person to "one or more living persons or to himself, or to himself and one  or  more  other living persons". Whatever  may  be  the position,  in spite of this provision, in respect of a  pur- ported transfer by a person to himself alone (which is  very often the position in the case of trusts)--which was consid- ered  by the House of Lords in Rye v. Rye, [1962] A.C.  496,

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there is no reason to hold that a contract between a  person with  himself  and other is invalid The Division  Bench,  we think,  has  tightly distinguished the decisions  in  Girish Chandra  v. Srinath, (3 C.L.J. 141) and Rye v.  Rye,  [1962] A.C. 496. The observations of Lord Denning, extracted by the learned  Judges, are quite apposite to the situation in  the present case.     Once  this objection is out of the way, the question  is whether  the  construction put upon the leased land  by  the lessees formed part of the 553 property  conveyed to the L.I.C. Sri Parasaran  pointed  out that  they  did  not and drew our  attention  to  subsequent correspondence  between  the parties to show that  even  the L.I.C.  had not claimed at any stage any rent in respect  of the superstructures (apart from the contractual rent,  which was  in respect of the land) and that both parties have  all along been proceeding on the footing that the superstructure on  item 1 belonged to the lessees. This appears to be  cor- rect  but it cannot be conclusive of the rights of the  par- ties. We have therefore gone carefully into the terms of Ex. P. 1 and Ex. P-3. They clearly make out that the superstruc- tures  put up by the lessee under Ex. P-1 were not  included in  the  property conveyed under the terms of  Ex.  P-3  and that,  whatever  may be the rights of the LIC to  evict  the tenant  with liberty to demolish the superstructure  on  the termination  of the lease, it had no property in the  super- structure  so  long as the lease subsisted.  We,  therefore, answer the first question posed by us in the affirmative.     This brings us, then, to the second, the really crucial, question  posed  earlier  viz. whether,  despite  the  above conclusion, we are precluded, by principles of, or analogous to,  res  judicata, from going behind the  findings  to  the contrary  given in the earlier rent control  proceedings  by the  Court  of Small Causes which have become final  on  the dismissal of the C.R.P. filed thereagainst     Sri  T.S.  Krishnamurthy lyer, learned counsel  for  the appellant, submitted that the Courts now are precluded  from going  behind the findings of the Court of Small  Causes  in the  earlier proceedings. He conceded that no  legal  conse- quenes can flow from a totally void order (see, Kiran  Singh v. Chaman Paswan, [1955] S.C.R. 117 @ 121). He also conceded that there may be a difference in principle between a  civil court and a court of limited jurisdiction. While the  former has  an  inherent jurisdiction to decide a  question  raised about  its  own jurisdiction and such a decision  cannot  be challenged in another court after it has become final: (See: Bhatia Cooperative Society Ltd. v. Patel, [1953] S.C.R.  185 and  Nageswara v. Canesa, AIR 1942 Mad. 675), the latter  is strictly  confined to the terms of the statute creating  it. But,  he  submitted, even the decision of a  Tribunal  or  a Court  of limited jurisdiction cannot be called in  question so  long  as it acts within the scope  of  the  jurisdiction conferred  on  it by the relevant statutes.  He,  therefore, invited us to peruse the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Build- ings  (Lease  and Rent Control) Act, 1960  (hereinafter  re- ferred  to as the Rent Control Act). Under the said Act,  he pointed out, a petition for fixation of fair rent under S. 4 could  be filed by either a landlord or a tenant:  (Raval  & Co. v. Rarnachandran, [1974] 1 SCC 424). This is 554 what the LIC purported to do when it filed H.R.C. Nos.  3310 and 33 11/64. When a petition under S. 4 is filed, the  Rent Controller,  on  the  language of S. 4 has  to  decide:  (1) whether  the applicant is a tenant in, or landlord  of,  the

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building  and (2) what the fair rent of the premises  should be  in  accordance with the provisions of the  Act.  In  the present  case  both the points had been put  in  issue.  The respondents denied that the L.I.C. was the landlord or  they the  tenants in respect of the property. They claimed to  be the owner of the superstructure and admitted tenancy only in respect of the site. The Rent Controller and, on appeal, the Court  of Small Causes were therefore, called upon  to  give their decision on this question which was completely  within their  statutory  jurisdiction and this  decision  certainly constitutes  res  judicata between the  parties:  see  also, Explanation VIII to S. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. At any  rate, it is not open to one of the parties  to  contend that the decision given by the Court of Small Causes,  which has  become  final between the parties, is a  total  nullity which can be completely ignored. It was, therefore, not open to  the High Court to entertain a collateral attack  on  the validity  of binding nature or correctness of the  order  of the  Court  of Small Causes and to  consider  and  determine afresh  the issue as to whether the L.I.C. is the  owner  of the premises as claimed or not.     In support of his contention, counsel referred to Krish- namurthy v. Parthasarathy, AIR 1949 Madras 780 reversing the decision  in the same case reported in AIR 1949 Madras  387. The appellant landlord had filed an eviction petition  under the  Rent Control Act without giving notice under s.  111(h) of  the Transfer of Property Act (which, in those days,  was considered to be a condition precedent even to the filing of an  eviction  petition under the Rent Control Act)  and  ob- tained an order of eviction. In these proceedings no conten- tion  had been raised by the tenant on the non-issue of  the notice under the Transfer of Property Act. An appeal by  the tenant  also failed but here again the above point  was  not taken. Thereafter the tenant filed a suit for a  declaration that  the  order of the Rent Controller was ultra  vires  in that  no notice to quit had been given as required  by  law. This  plea  was upheld by the learned Single Judge  but  was rejected in appeal. The Division Bench observed:-- "   .....  We agree with the learned Judge that  this  Court can  entertain  a  suit to set aside an order  of  the  Rent Controller  if the Rent Controller exceeded the powers  con- ferred on him. A Court or tribunal can, however, be said  to have no jurisdiction to entertain a suit or application only if it has 555 no  jurisdiction  with regard to the subject-matter  of  the suit or application  .....  But even these rules are subject to the qualification that, if the jurisdiction of the  Court depends upon the ascertainment of facts and the Court,  upon the  facts found, holds that it has jurisdiction,  then  the decree  of  that  Court cannot be ignored or  set  aside  in collateral proceedings." After reference to certain other decisions of the Court,  it was observed:-- "If a lessor brings a suit for eviction, he is to prove  the existence of a lease, the relationship of lessor and  lessee between  himself and the defendant and the determination  of the  lease.  If he fails to prove this, the  plaint  is  not returned  because  the suit is one which the  Court  has  no jurisdiction  to  entertain; but the suit  is  dismissed  as revealing no cause of action  .....  In a suit by a landlord against  his tenant for eviction, the determination  of  the tenancy  is merely one of the constituents of the  cause  of action that the landlord has to prove against his tenant  in order  to  succeed  in the suit. We are of  opinion  that  a

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tenant  can  waive notice to quit; but even  if  he  cannot, notice has not to be proved as a condition precedent to  the institution  of  the  suit  .....   Mr.  Srinivasa  Ayyangar concedes  that if a landlord filed a suit in  ejectment  and failed  to  say that the tenancy had  been  determined,  the Court  would dismiss the suit and not return the plaint.  In the same way, the Rent Controller would have to dismiss  the application  if  it were not alleged in the  affidavit  that notice  had  been  given or if it found,  upon  hearing  the parties  and considering the evidence, that notice  had  not been  given. It would follow from this, therefore,  that  if notice  to quit was necessary it would be merely one of  the issues to be decided by the Rent Controller and would not in any  way affect his jurisdiction to entertain  the  applica- tion.  That being so, if the Rent Controller did not  decide that  question properly, the matter would have to be  raised in  appeal to the Court of Small Causes and would give  this Court  no jurisdiction to entertain a suit by  the  defeated party;  for such a suit would be barred by S. 12(4)  of  the Act. Again, in Manibhai Hathibhai v. Arbuthnot, AIR 1947 Bom. 413 556 a  writ petition was filed to challenge the validity  of  an order  passed by the Rent Controller on the ground that  the circumstances  for the invocation of S. 13(b) of the  Bombay Rent,  Hotel .Rates and Lodging House Rates  (Control)  Act, 1944  had  not  been fulfilled. It  is  sufficient  for  our present purposes to extract the observations in paragraph 16 of the judgment:-- "16. It was sought to be argued on behalf of the petitioners that  the  respondent had no jurisdiction to  determine  the question as to whether the premises were at one time let out as  a  whole and then let out in parts as was sought  to  be contended by the applicants  .....  The jurisdiction of  the Rent Controller, (xxx) is a statutory jurisdiction which  is vested  in the Rent Controller by the terms of the  Act  it- self.  A  regular tribunal is established by the  Act  which functions  in  those cases where. the standard rent  of  the premises  as laid down in S. 3 of the Act exceeds Rs.80  per month. The tribunal owes its existence to the Act and not to any act of the parties, and it has, therefore,  jurisdiction to determine what are the cases which fail within its juris- diction.  If there is any dispute which arises  between  the parties  as  to  whether the  particular  application  falls within the jurisdiction of the tribunal, it is the  tribunal which  is  competent to decide that  dispute  and  determine whether the particular matter falls within its jurisdiction. If  the  tribunal  decided it wrongly, there  is  an  appeal provided  against  its decision. It  cannot,  therefore,  be contended, as the petitioners have done, that the respondent has no jurisdiction to determine the question as to  whether the  premises were at one time let out as a whole  and  then let out in parts as contended by the applicants." Shri  Iyer  submits that the appellants’ case here is  on  a stronger  footing  than  in the two  decisions  cited  above because  here,  in the earlier proceedings before  the  Rent controller  and the Court of Small Causes, a specific  point had been taken that the tenant was only a tenant of the land and  not  of the premises (which belonged to him)  and  that this  contention  had been specifically  over-ruled  by  the appellate court after a consideration of the relevant  mate- rial. Sri Krishnamoorthy Iyer also contended that even if it may  be an arguable question as to whether the  decision  in the earlier petitions constitutes res judicata or not and it may  plausibly  be argued that it does  not  constitute  res

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judicata,  the  question  for our  consideration  really  is whether the order passed in the 557 earlier eviction petition can be treated as a nullity  being passed by a court totally without jurisdiction. He submitted that  if the tenants had filed a suit for  declaration  that the  order  passed in the earlier proceedings as  a  nullity that would have been bound to fail. Shri Iyer also relied on certain observations of this Court in the decisions reported as Rai Brij Raj v. Shaw, [1951] SCR 145 @ 147, 150; Official Trustee  v.  Sachindranath, [1969] 3 SCR 92 @ pp.  99,  100; Antulay v. Nayak, [1988] 2 SCC 602 at pp. 649, 677 and  700; Trideshwar Dayal v. Maheshwar Dayal, [1989] 2 SCALE 1436  at p.  1437 and Shiv Chander Kapoor v. Amar Bose, [1990] 1  SCC 234, paras 22 and 23.     Shri K. Parasaran, appearing for the respondents, sought to support the High Court’s judgment on various grounds.  He contended  that,  even  if the arguments on  behalf  of  the appellant  were  to  be accepted, the  appellants  were  not entitled  to succeed, for the following reason. He drew  our attention to the reference in the 1967 order of the Court of Small Causes to H.R.C. 867/63, an earlier petition filed  by the L.I.C. The Court had said: "7.  The  Corporation had formerly filed a  petition  H.R.C. 867/1963  in respect of these two buildings for fixation  of fair rent. In that petition the tenant disputed the title of the Corporation in respect of the buildings. So, the  Corpo- ration  immediately filed an application H.R.C. 2557/64  for eviction on the ground of wilful denial of title. The  peti- tion for fixation of fair rent was dismissed by the  learned First  Additional  Rent Controller on the  ground  that  the lease  has  been taken under two separate deeds and  that  a single petition was not maintainable. In the other  petition he  ordered eviction on the ground that the denial  was  not bona fide. He gave an express finding that the building  No. 2. Mount Road belongs to the Corporation. In the appeal  the appellate  court  set  aside the order of  eviction  on  the ground that there was no denial of title prior to the insti- tution of the petition. Of course, the finding in that  case that the building belongs to the Corporation cannot  operate as  res  judicata because the tenant had no  opportunity  to file  an appeal against that finding since  the  application for eviction had ultimately been dismissed. On this point  I find that the building belongs to the petitioner." (Emphasis added) He  submitted that the Court erred in thinking that no  fur- ther proceed- 558 ings had been taken in the earlier matter, The fact was that a  Civil Revision Petition (C.R.P. 1839/66) had  been  filed against  the order of the appellate court (H.R.A.  1162/64). The C.R.P. had been allowed and the matter remitted back for fresh  disposal. When the matter came back to the  Court  of Small Causes, the learned Judge, in his order dated  9.4.69, went  into  the issue at length and came to  the  conclusion that  the superstructure belonged to Indian Automobiles  and had not been conveyed to the L.I.C He held, therefore,  that the  claim by India Automobiles in the eviction petition  of title  to  the superstructure would amount to  a  denial  of title  but  that the denial was bona  fide.  He,  therefore, allowed  the  appeal  and set aside the  order  of  eviction passed  against the tenants. Sri Parasaran, therefore,  sub- mitted  that the question of title had already been  decided in these earlier proceedings which we shall briefly refer to as  the ’first set of proceedings’. If at all, he  says,  it

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was  this  decision that constituted res  judicata  and  the Court  of  Small  Causes, in H.R.A. 534/66  arising  out  of H.R.A.  3310/64 (which we shall refer to as the ’second  set of  proceedings’) could not have considered the issue  again or taken a different view.     Sri Parasaran also sought to explain the reasons why the respondents  did not prefer any appeal or revision from  the order  of  the  Court of Small Causes in  H.R.A.  534/66  He submitted that the law then prevalent in Tamil Nadu as  laid down in the decisions of the Madras High Court in Palaniappa Chettiar and Others v. Vairavan Chettiar, [1963] 76 L.W.  21 and  Palaniappa Chettiar v. Babu Sahib alias  Sheik  Mytheen Sahib  and  Others, [1964] 77 L.W. 551, was  that  the  Rent Control Act would apply even in cases where the landlord had leased out only a vacant site and the tenant had put up  his own construction thereon. It was only in Salay Mohamed  Sait etc.  v. Jaffer Mohamed sait’s Memorial  Dispensary  Charity and Others, [1969] 1 Andhra Weekely Reporter (S.C.) 16, that this  view  was disapproved. At that stage,  therefore,  the respondents  could not have hoped to succeed even  if  their stand  that they were the owners of the  superstructure  had been accepted.     We do not think mat these contentions have any force. So far as the first contention is concerned, it may be  pointed out, firstly, that an answer to it is furnished by the terms of S. 19 of the Act (set out a little later) which does  not contain  a  reference to S. 4. The application  under  S.  4 could  not,  therefore, have been  summarily  rejected  even assuming  that the question of title could be said  to  have been  substantially  in issue and decided  in  the  previous proceedings. Secondly, the order now relied upon was  passed in April 1969 and was not in exist- 559 ence when the Court of Small Causes passed its order in  the second  set  of proceedings. Thirdi.v,  even  assuming  ’the argument  of learned counsel to be correct, all that can  be said is that, in the second set of proceedings, the  tenants could  have contended that it was not open to the  Court  of Small Causes to go into the question of title in view of the decision  in the first set of proceedings. But no such  plea was taken before it with the result that the court discussed the  matter and arrived at a decision. In  deciding  whether the  decision  constitutes res judicata or not, we  are  not entitled to go into the correctness of that decision.  Right or wrong, the second decision has become final and the  same issue, says the appellant, cannot be gone into again.  Last- ly, the 1969 decision of the Court of Small Causes was  only concerned with the question whether there was denial of  the L.I.C.’s  title  by the tenants and, if so, whether  it  was bona  fide. It was only this limited aspect-eviction on  the ground  of  non-bona fide denial of  title--that  was  under consideration  of the Court under S. 10(2)(vii) of  the  Act read  with the proviso to S. 10(1) and the Court’s  observa- tions  on  the question of title were one  on  a  collateral issue.  We do not, therefore, think that the  1969  decision can  be  an effective answer to the  appellant’s  contention based on the 1967 decision. The second argument,  explaining why  the  respondents did not challenge the  1967  order  in further appeal or revision, is also of no avail in consider- ing the issue raised by the counsel for the appellant.     But  we think Sri .Parasaran is right in the third  con- tention urged by him before us which goes to the root of the matter.  His  argument  is that a Rent  Controller  and,  on appeal from him, the Court of Small Causes, is not competent to  go  into a question of title to immovable  property  and

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that  a civil court cannot be barred from examining a  claim of  title  merely because the question may have  had  to  be considered  by the Rent tribunals as a collateral  issue  in deciding certain applications before them. He contended that it is a basic proposition, well-settled by authority, that a tribunal  of limited jurisdiction like the  Rent  Controller (this expression will, hereinafter, also include a Court  of Small  Causes  disposing of an appeal from  him)  cannot  be clothed  with jurisdiction to decide far-reaching  questions of title to immovable property. This, he said, is a proposi- tion  that is borne out on general principles as well as  on the provisions of the Rent Control Act. Taking up the provi- sions of the Act, he referred us to the provisions of Ss. 10 and 19 which read thus: S. 10(1)--Eviction of tenants. A tenant shall not be evicted whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except in 560 accordance  with the provisions of this section or  sections 14 to 16:          Provided  that nothing contained in the  said  sec- tions shall apply to a tenant whose landlord is the  Govern- ment:          Provided  further that where the tenant denies  the title of the landlord or claims right of permanent  tenancy, the  Controller shall decide whether the denial or claim  is bona  fide and if he records a finding to that  effect,  the landlord shall be entitled to sue for eviction of the tenant in  a Civil Court and the Court may pass a decree for  evic- tion  on any of the grounds mentioned in the said  sections, notwithstanding  that the Court finds that such denial  does not  involve  forfeiture of the lease or that the  claim  is unfounded. S.   19--Decisions  which have become final not to  be  reo- pened--Any application under section 3-A or section 12,  and any  application under sub-section (2) or subsection (3)  or sub-section (3-A) of section 10 or under sections 14, 15  or 16, shall be summarily rejected by the authorized officer or the  Controller.  as the case may be.  if  such  application raises  between  the same parties or between  parties  under whom  they  or  any of them claim.  substantially  the  same issues  as have been finally decided or as purport  to  have been finally decided in a former proceeding-- (i) under this Act, or           (ii)  under  any other law from time  to  time  in force  before the date of the commencement of this  Act  and relating to matters dealt with in this Act. counsel  contended  that S. 10 makes it clear  beyond  doubt that  the  Rent Controller is precluded  from  deciding  any issue regarding title to the property and that, if any  such question  arises, he should leave it to be decided by  ordi- nary civil courts in appropriate proceedings. The  procedure to be adopted by him in disposing of the applications before him  is  a summary one hardly conducive  to  a  satisfactory disposal of such complicated questions. Under Rule 12(2)  he is required to decide applications by recording a brief note of the evidence of parties and 561 witnesses  and  decide matters after giving the  parties  an opportunity to state their case: more or less, in the manner in  which a Court of Small Causes decides cases  before  it. Indeed,  in  the Presidency Town, he is subordinate  to  the Court of Small Causes which has been notified as the author- ity to hear appeals from his orders and it is a well settled proposition that the Court of Small Causes is not  competent to  adjudicate  on questions of title.  For  these  reasons,

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learned counsel submits, the decision of the Court of  Small Causes  in  the earlier proceedings cannot  fetter  a  civil court  from adjudicating upon all the issues arising  before it in a civil suit.     We think that this contention is well founded. There are clear  indications in the Act and rules that the  Rent  Con- troller  does not have the jurisdiction to decide  questions of title. In a proceedings under the Act, whether it be  for fixation  of  fair rent or eviction, the  tenant  may  raise several  objections. He may, inter alia, take up  the  point that  the opposite party is not the "landlord". The  defini- tion of "landlord" under the Act is very wide and encompass- es not only an owner but also persons "receiving or entitled to  receive the rent of the building which has been let  out or would be entitled to receive the rent of the building  if it  were let out to a tenant" in one of several  capacities. Denial of title of the landlord is itself one of the grounds on which eviction can be sought [S. 10(2)(vii) ]. Sri Krish- namurthy  Iyer is, therefore, certainly right in  contending that  the Act requires the Rent Controller to consider  this issue, among others, while disposing the applications before him.  But, we think, Sri Parasaran is right in saying  that, since  the Rent Controller has no jurisdiction to  entertain an  application except by a landlord or a tenant, the  ques- tion  of  title  to the property is one on  which  his  very jurisdiction  depends.  It cannot be described as  a  matter that is squarely and directly in issue in these  proceedings to which any finality can be attached, as the Rent  Control- ler,  by deciding the issue wrongly, cannot  clothe  himself with  jurisdiction  where  none exists. All  that  the  Rent Controller  has to do is to satisfy himself that the  person seeking  eviction or fixation of fair rent is  a  "landlord" who has, prima facie,’ the right to receive the rents of the property  in question. That the Rent Controller’s  jurisdic- tion  on this issue is limited is clear from the proviso  to S.  10(1) of the Act. In order to decide whether the  denial of the landlord’s title by the tenant is bona fide, the Rent Controller  may have to go into the tenant’s contentions  on the  issue but he is not to decide the question finally.  He has  only  to see whether the tenant’s denial of  the  land- lord’s title is bona fide in the circumstances of the  case. He may reach a conclusion, on the merits, that the  landlord has  title;  yet he cannot order eviction  if  the  tenant’s action in 562 denying  the title was bona fide. Per contra, he  may  reach the conclusion on the materials before him that the landlord has no title; yet, it seems, if he finds that the  applicant is  otherwise a landlord and that the grounds on  which  the tenant’s  denial was based were not bona fide, he will  have to  order eviction. So also, in an application under  S.  4, the  jurisdiction of the Rent Controller is to  determine  a fair  or standard rent for the premises. He has no doubt  to ensure  that  the person applying for the fair rent  is  the tenant  or  the landlord. He has also no  doubt  to  satisfy himself  as  to  the extent of the premises  qua  which  the relationship of landlord and tenant exists and in respect of which  rent  is receivable or payable.  For  deciding  these issues,  he may have no doubt also to consider the oral  and documentary  evidence  adduced by the parties.  Yet,  having regard to the manner in which he is required to come to this conclusion  and having regard to the fact that at  least  in the  Presidency  Town an appeal from his order goes  to  the Court of Small Causes, it is difficult to escape the conclu- sion  that  the  jurisdiction to be exercised by  him  is  a

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limited and a prima facie one. It will be anomalous to  hold that  where an owner of property seeks to evict  his  tenant under s. 10(2)(vii) but the Rent Controller refuses to  pass the   order   of  eviction--though   satisfied   about   his title--because  the tenant had acted bona fide, it would  be open  to  the  owner to seek eviction by  having  his  title adjudicated upon in a civil court but that the owner  cannot have a similar right in the matter of recovery of rent which is  basically a relief for which he has to approach a  civil court.  A question of title may be a complex  one  involving difficult issues. For instance, the "owner" may claim  title under  an adoption or a will or a trust deed or a gift  deed and  there may be contentious claims among  several  persons which  it  will not be possible for the Rent  Controller  to decide. It is important to remember that when an owner files a suit for arrears of rent, it is open to the tenant,  under the general law, to plead that no rent is payable in respect of the premises as, indeed, it belongs to him. The right  to raise  this  issue cannot be taken away without  a  specific statutory  provision. The terms of s. 11  C.P.C.,  including Explanation VIII, are not comprehensive enough to cover  the case.     The  limited  nature of the jurisdiction of  a  Tribunal like  the Rent Controller and the Court of Small Causes  has been  considered in a number of cases by this Court as  well as other courts:     (1)  We may start with an early Full Bench  decision  of the  Madras High Court: Venkatarama Rao & Ors.  v.  Musunuru Venkayya  and Ors., AIR 1954 Madras 788. It arose under  the Madras  Estates  Land  Act (1 of 1908). In  that  case,  the Revenue Divisional Officer, in 563 certain  earlier  proceedings, had held  that  a  particular village  was not an "estate" and this had been confirmed  by the  District  Collector and the High Court. Later  on,  the plaintiffs filed suits against the tenants in possession  of holdings  in the village for an injunction restraining  them from  removing  the paddy heaps standing on the  suit  lands until a due division was made of the crop and until the rent in  kind payable to the plaintiffs was paid by the  tenants. The  tenants wanted to contend in reply that the village  in question  was an "estate" within the meaning of the Act  and they had occupancy rights therein. The plaintiffs,  however, objected  that this plea was not open to the tenant in  view of  the  earlier  decision of  Revenue  Divisional  Officer. Negativing  the  plea of the plaintiffs, the  Court  pointed out: (8) xxx            xxx            xxx           If a particular matter is one which does not  fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the revenue court, then a decision of a revenue court on such a matter, which  might be incidentally given by the revenue court, cannot be  bind- ing  on  the parties in a civil court.  One  practical  test would be to determine if that particular matter would not be a  matter  in respect of which the civil  court  would  have jurisdiction. To give an obvious instance, suppose in a suit under S. 55 for the grant of a patta instituted by a  person claiming to be the adopted son of the ryot who was a  patta- dar,  the landlord raises a plea that he is not entitled  to the patta because his adoption is not valid, it may be  that the revenue court would have to summarily go into the  ques- tion  whether  the  person suing is or is  not  the  validly adopted  son of the previous ryot. Can it possibly  be  said that the finding of the revenue court on the issue of  adop- tion  is  binding on the parties in a subsequent suit  in  a

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civil court in which the validity of the adoption might fall to be decided? There can be no doubt about the answer.          That  is because the dispute as to the validity  of the adoption is not a dispute in respect of which a  revenue court has exclusive jurisdiction. Such a dispute is a matter well  within the jurisdiction of a civil court.  Thereafter, it cannot be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the  Reve- nue  court, and the decision of such a dispute by a  revenue court cannot be binding in a civil court. 564 Incidentally  it may be pointed out, this decision has  been cited with approval by this Court in Bhagwan Dayal v.  Reoti Devi, [1962] 3 SCR 440.     (2)  Desika  Charyulu  v. State of  Andhra  Pradesh  and another, AIR 1964 S.C. 807 was a decision  under the  Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act,  1948. In that case it was held, on a construction of section  9(1) of  the  Act, that the property in question being  an  "inam village" is assumed as a fact on the existence of which  the competence  of the Settlement Officer to determine the  mat- ters within his jurisdiction rests and that, as there are no words  in the statute empowering him to decide  finally  the former, he cannot confer jurisdiction on himself by a  wrong decision on this preliminary condition to his  jurisdiction. Any  determination  by him of this question,  therefore,  is (subject to the result of an appeal to the tribunal) binding on the parties only for the purpose of the proceedings under the Act, but no further. The correctness of that finding may be  questioned  in any subsequent legal  proceeding  in  the ordinary  courts of the land where the question might  arise for  decision. However, if the property is an inam  village, whether  the "inam village" is an "inam estate"  is,  within his exclusive jurisdiction and in regard to it the jurisdic- tion of the Civil Courts is clearly barred.     (3)  Dhulabhai v. State, [1968] 3 SCR 662 was  concerned with  the  interpretation  of the provision  in  the  Madhya Bharat  Sales  Tax  Act barring the  jurisdiction  of  civil courts  in  matters  entrusted to the  jurisdiction  of  the special  tribunals created under the Act. It is  unnecessary to refer in detail to this case except to set out a  passage from pages 682-3 where Hidayatullah, C.J., speaking for  the Constitution  Bench, reviewed all earlier cases on the  sub- ject  and enunciated the principles emerging  therefrom,  of which the following are relevant here: "The result of this inquiry into the diverse views expressed in this Court may be stated as follows,:--           (1)  Where  the statute gives a  finality  to  the orders of the special tribunals, the Civil Courts’ jurisdic- tion must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to  do  what the Civil Courts would normally do in  a  suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases  where the provisions of the particular Act have not been  complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity 565 with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure.          (2) Where there is an express bar of the  jurisdic- tion  of  the  court, an examination of the  scheme  of  the particular  Act to find the adequacy or the  sufficiency  of the provided may be relevant but is not decisive to  sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court.          Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out  the intendment becomes necessary and the result of  the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is  necessary to see if the statute creates a special right 0r a liability

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and provides for the determination of the right or liability and  further  lays down that all questions  about  the  said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals  so constituted,  and whether remedies normally associated  with actions  in Civil Courts are prescribed by the said  statute or not. XXX                                                      XXX XXX     (4)  in Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal & Ors. v.  Dossibai N.B.  Jeejeebhoy,  [1970] 3 SCR 830, the appellant  had  ob- tained lease of an open land for construction of  buildings. After putting up the buildings, he applied for determination of  standard rent under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and  Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. The application was  rejected holding that the provisions of the Act did not apply to open land  let for construction. This view was confirmed  by  the High  Court.  Sometime thereafter in another case  the  High Court  held that the question whether the provisions of  the Act  applied to any particular lease must be  determined  on its  terms and a building lease in respect of an  open  plot was  not  excluded  from the provisions of  the  Act  solely because  open land may be used for residence or  educational purposes  only after a structure is built  thereon.  Relying upon this judgment, the appellant filed a fresh  application for determining the standard rent. The trial Judge  rejected the  application holding that question of the  applicability of the Act was res judicata since it had been finally decid- ed by the High Court between the same parties in respect  of the  same  land in the earlier proceeding  for  fixation  of standard  rent. The order was confirmed by the first  appel- late  court  and on fur*her appeal by the  High  Court.  The Supreme  Court, however, reversed the judgment of  the  High Court. The Court observed: 566 "A  question relating to the jurisdiction of a Court  cannot be  deemed to have been finally determined by  an  erroneous decision of the Court. If by an erroneous interpretation  of the statute the court holds that it has no jurisdiction, the decision will not, operate as res judicata. Similarly by  an erroneous  decision if the Court assumes jurisdiction  which it does not possess under the statute, the decision will not operate  as res judicata between the same  parties,  whether the cause of action in the subsequent litigation is the same or otherwise."     (5) Gangabai v. Chhabubai, [1982] 1 SCR 1176, related to the jurisdiction of the Court of Small Causes. In that  case the  respondent,  being in need of money,  entered  into  an agreement  with the appellant for a loan of Rs.2,000 and  it was simultaneously decided that she should execute a nominal document of sale and rent note of her house. These documents were executed on January 7, 1953, but the respondent contin- ued in the possession of the house property throughout.  The appellant  was attempting to enforce the document as a  sale deed by filing suit in the Court of Small Causes for  recov- ery of rent and the said suits had resulted in decrees.  The respondent thereupon filed a suit for a declaration that she was and continued to be owner of the house property,  alleg- ing  that the documents executed on 7th January, 1953,  were never  intended to be acted upon. The appellant  in  defence maintained that the sale deed represented a genuine transac- tion and ownership of the house property had passed to  her. It was pleaded that the decrees passed by the Court of Small Causes operated as res judicata barring the respondent  from pleading  that the sale deed was merely a  nominal  transac- tion.  Reliance was also placed on section 92 of the  Indian

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Evidence  Act.  The High Court held that the sale  deed  and rent note were sham documents, that the decrees of the Court of  Small  Causes did not operate as res judicata  and  that section  92 of the Indian Evidence Act did not preclude  the respondent from establishing the true nature of the transac- tion.  The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. In regard  to this contention it was urged on behalf of the appellant that the High Court erred in applying the statutory provisions of section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that it should have invoked the general principles of res judicata. It  was submitted  that  it was necessary to find  out  whether  the Court  of Small Causes was competent to try the two  earlier ’suits  and decide the issues arising therein. After  refer- ring  to various decisions cited on behalf of  the  parties, the Court observed: 567 "It seems to us that when a finding as to title to immovable property is rendered by a Court of Small Causes res judicata cannot  be  pleaded as a bar in a subsequent  regular  civil suit  for the determination or enforcement of any  right  or interest  in immovable property. In order to operate as  res judicata  the  finding  must be one disposing  of  a  matter directly  and substantially in issue in the former suit  and the issue should have been heard and finally decided by  the court trying such suit. A matter collaterally or incidental- ly in issue for the purposes of deciding the matter which is directly in issue in the case cannot be made the basis of  a plea of res judicata. It has long been held that a  question of title in a Small Cause suit can be regarded as incidental only to the substantial issue in the suit and cannot operate  8as res judicata in a subsequent suit in which the question of  title is directly raised  .....  Our attention has been drawn to Expla- nation VIII to section 11 in the Code of Civil Procedure recently inserted  by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment)  Act,  1976. Section  97(3) of the Amendment Act declares that the new  provi- sion  applies to pending suits, proceeding, appeals and  applica- tions.  In our opinion the Explanation can be of  no  assistance, because it operates only where an issue has been heard and final- ly decided in the earlier suit."     (6) We may next refer to Jeeth Kaur and Ors. v. Smt.  P. Kondalamma and another, AIR 1983 AP 2 19. In that case,  the tenant filed a petition under the relevant Rent Control  Act for  permission  to  deposit rents in  court.  The  landlady denied  any relationship of tenant and landlord between  the applicant  and  herself. This contention was upheld  by  the appellate  court  and the High Court. In a  subsequent  suit filed  by the tenants in the civil court as tenants  of  the suit  building,  the  landlady contended  that  the  earlier decision  operated as res judicata, but this contention  was negatived. The Court observed: "The main relief sought for by.the tenants was for  deposit- ing  the  rents on the ground that the landlord  refused  to receive  the  same. In order to give that relief,  the  Rent Control Court must first have jurisdiction as it can adjudi- cate  disputes only between a landlord and a  tenant.  Since the  relationship is denied by the landlord, the  Rent  Con- troller had decided that question incidentally. This is  not the main relief for which the application is filed. In fact, it  is  not a dispute which is exclusively  triable  by  the Tribunals 568 under  the Act. The dispute has to be decided as  incidental to the granting of the main reliefs. The necessary condition for  exercise of jurisdiction by the Rent Controller is  the existence  of relationship of landlord and tenant. The  rent

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authorities  have no power to decide a dispute which is  not between  a landlord and tenant. Therefore, the  decision  on the question whether the relationship of landlord and tenant exists is a decision regarding jurisdictional facts and such a decision is neither conclusive nor final. In such  circum- stances, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain  a suit  in  which the question of jural  relationship  of  the landlord  and  tenant arises is not ousted. Since  the  said decision  is not final it can never operate as res  judicata between the parties. In fact if we examine the provisions of the  Act,  there are only five reliefs that can  be  granted under the Rent Control Act. One is fixation of fair rent and increase  thereof under sections 4, 5 and 6; the  second  is permission  to  deposit rents in the court under  section  8 (5);  the third is to order eviction under section  10;  the fourth  is to direct recovery of possession by the  landlord for  repairs  under section 12; and the fifth  is  to  order restoration  of amenities when they are  unjustly  withheld, under  section  14 of the Act. The rent  authorities  cannot grant the reliefs of declaration of occupancy rights.     (7) We may lastly refer to the decision of this Court in State  of  Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Samigal Madam  and  Ors., [1985] 4 SCC. In that case the plaintiff-respondent  claimed title to the suit land on the basis of its long and uninter- rupted possession since prior to 1938 as also under an order of  assignment of 1938 issued in its favour by the  Zamindar whereby  the right to cultivate in respect of that land  was granted to it subject to the payment of certain amounts.  In 1953  the plaintiff applied for a ryotwari patta in  respect of this land after abolition of the Estate but the Addition- al Settlement Officer, by order dated 25th June, 1954,  took a  decision  that  land was not a ryoti land  but  had  been registered  as  a  poramboke (village  communal  land)  and, therefore, no one was entitled to ryotwari patta in  respect of  that  land. The plaintiff thereupon filed a suit  for  a declaration of as title and right to continue in  possession and  enjoyment of the suit land subject to payment of  ryot- wari  or other cess to be imposed by Government without  any interference  from  the  Government. The  State  Tamil  Nadu resisted the suit on merits by contending that the suit land was  communal land and that the assignment or grant  by  the zamindar 569 in favour of plaintiff was invalid. It also took a technical plea that the decision of the Additional Settlement  Officer that  the suit land was poramboke and not ’ryoti’  land  was final  and  the Civil Court’s jurisdiction  to  decide  that question  was  barred under section 64-C of the  Tamil  Nadu Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act,  1948, which ran as follows: "64-C.  Finality  of orders passed under this  Act--(1)  Any order passed by the Government or other authority under this Act in respect of matters to be determined for the  purposes of  this Act shall, subject only to any appeal  or  revision provided by or under this Act, be final. (2)  No such order shall be liable to be questioned  in  any court of law. The State Government’s plea was rejected by the High  Court. In appeal, the State contended before this Court that  every refusal  of a ryotwari patta by a Settlement Officer  in  an inquiry  under  section 11 involves a decision on  his  part that  either the applicant is not a ryot or the land is  not ryoti land; in the instant cases it was the latter and  such decision  on  the nature or character of the land  has  been given  a finality under section 64-C which cannot  be  ques-

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tioned  in a court of law. Therefore, it was urged that  the civil court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the nature  or character  of the suit lands must be held to have  been  ex- cluded  or  ousted. After discussing  several  decisions  in regard  to the exclusion of a civil court’s jurisdiction  as well  as  the provisions of the Act, the Court  pointed  out that the terms of section 64-C a1one will not be decisive on the  point of ouster of the civil court’s jurisdiction.  The observations  made  by  the Court in paras 13  and  14  have relevance  to the present case and need not be set out  here in extenso.     We  are  of opinion, in the light of the  decided  cases referred  to  above, that the contention on  behalf  of  the respondents  has to be accepted. We are concerned  with  the jurisdiction  of a civil court. The  extensive  jurisdiction conferred  on civil courts under s. 9 of the Code  of  Civil Procedure should not be curtailed without a specific  statu- tory  warrant  or except on some clear principle.  There  is nothing  in  the Tamil Nadu Rent Control Act which,  in  any way,  takes away, or narrows down, the civil court’s  juris- diction as, for example, there is in the Delhi Rent  Control Act  (s. 50). As to principle, whether we look at it on  the analogy of res judicata or adopt the approach of Sri Iyer as to  whether  the order in the earlier proceedings is  to  be treated as an 570 order  that  is null and void or merely one  that  is  valid until  set aside, the answer has to turn on the true  nature and scope of the jurisdiction conferred on the Rent Control- ler under the Act. It is possible, we have to ask ourselves, having regard to the context, scheme and terms of the legis- lation,  that  the  statute could have  envisaged  the  Rent Controller  (and the authorities to whom appeal or  revision could be preferred from his orders) to be final  authorities to  adjudicate on issues of title also? The answer,  in  our opinion,  has to be in the negative. Section 4 of  the  Rent Control Act, as already pointed out, provides only a machin- ery  for fixation of fair rent in respect of  certain  prem- ises. It is the quantum of fair rent that arises for  deter- mination  by  the Rent Controller. There is no  doubt  that, since  an application for this purpose cannot lie except  at the instance of a landlord or a tenant, the Rent  Controller has  to deal with this incidentally but this is not  one  of the  direct issues before the Rent Controller. If, and  only if,  this relationship exists between the parties, the  Rent Controller steps in for a limited purpose--to determine what the fair rent is--and then fades out of the picture. Where a fair  rent  is fixed by a Controller, the Rent  Control  Act does not provide for a machinery for recovery of the amount. The  amount  has  to be recovered by the  landlord  only  by recourse to a civil court. This gives an indication that the determination  of  the relationship that gives rise  to  the application  is  also not conclusive. This  is  indeed  made clear  by the provisions relating to eviction. We  have  al- ready  referred  to the effect of the provisions  of  s.  10 (2)(vii)  read with the proviso to S. 10(1) and pointed  out how  jurisdiction to decide questions of title is denied  to the Rent Controller. The position cannot be different  under S.  4. Having regard to the much narrower scope of S. 4,  it would be anomalous to read a wider jurisdiction to the  Rent Controller thereunder than under S. 10. In our opinion, on a proper construction of the Rent Control Act, the question on which  the  jurisdiction of the civil court is  excluded  is only the determination as to the fair rent of the  premises. If  the civil court in this case had come to the  conclusion

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that there is a relationship of a landlord and a tenant  and that  the  LIC  was entitled to recover the  rent  from  the tenants, it will have to pass a decree in favour of the  LIC on the basis of the fair rent fixed by the Rent  Controller. It  will not be open to the civil court to re-determine  the rent payable by the tenant to the landlord because that is a matter  squarely and exclusively within the jurisdiction  of the Rent Controller and, therefore, impliedly excluded  from the  purview  of the civil court. But his  decision  is  not final on the issue that opens up his jurisdiction and cannot preclude an owner from contending, in a civil court, that he should not be asked to pay rent for his own property to some one else. 571     For  the reasons mentioned above, we are of the  opinion that the High Court reached the correct conclusion and  that this appeal has to fail. The appeal is therefore, dismissed. In the circumstances, however, we make no order as to costs. Y. Lal                                Appeal dismissed. 572