REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 281  OF 2003

Lakhwant Singh …Appellant

Versus

Jasbir Singh and Ors. ...Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a learned

Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court allowing

the application filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973 (in short the ‘Cr.P.C.’). Respondents had filed

an  application  praying  for  quashing  the  First  Information

Report (in short the ‘FIR’) registered against them for alleged

commission of theft on 13.7.1999. Statement in the FIR was

that while  executing the order in their  favour possession of

land  of  the  complainant  was  illegally  taken  in  execution  of

warrant of possession.  The High Court accepted the prayer

holding  that  the  aforesaid  aspect  of  the  matter  can  be

examined  if  any  objections  are  filed  before  the  concerned

Court that warrant officer/bailiff acted beyond the warrant of

possession, and this could not give rise to registration of the

crime and, therefore, the matter is before us.  

2. Learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  had  referred  to

document  appearing  at  Annexure  R/6  and  submitted  that

without even analyzing the factual  and legal aspects,  by an

abrupt conclusion the learned Single Judge should not have

quashed the proceedings. With reference to the objections filed

before the High Court it was pointed out that the challan had

already  been  filed  in  the  Court,  and  learned  Judicial

Magistrate, Ist Class had committed the case to the court of

Sessions Judge, Amritsar. Certain other factual aspects have

also been referred to.  It was further pointed out  that while

considering  the  application  filed  in  terms  of  Section  438

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Cr.P.C.,  learned  Additional  Sessions  Judge,  Amritsar  had

passed  a  detailed  order  highlighting  the  role  played  by

respondents 1 to 5.  

3. Learned counsel  for respondents  1 to 5 supported the

judgment of the trial Court.  

4. Exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in a case of

this nature is  the exception  and not the  rule.   The  section

does not confer any new powers on the High Court.  It only

saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before

the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances

under  which  the  inherent  jurisdiction  may  be  exercised,

namely,  (i)  to give  effect  to an order  under  the Code,  (ii)  to

prevent abuse of the process of court,  and (iii)  to otherwise

secure the ends of justice.  It is neither possible nor desirable

to  lay  down  any  inflexible  rule  which  would  govern  the

exercise  of  inherent  jurisdiction.  No  legislative  enactment

dealing  with  procedure  can  provide  for  all  cases  that  may

possibly arise.  Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart

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from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper

discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law.

That  is  the  doctrine  which  finds  expression  in  the  Section

which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the

High Courts.  All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in

the  absence  of  any  express  provision,  as  inherent  in  their

constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right

and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on

the principle quando lex aliquid alique concedit, conceditur et id

sine quo res ipsa esse non potest (when the law gives a person

anything  it  gives  him  that  without  which  it  cannot  exist).

While exercising powers under the Section, the Court does not

function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction

under the Section though wide has to be exercised sparingly,

carefully  and with caution  and only  when  such  exercise  is

justified by the tests specifically laid down in the Section itself.

It  is  to  be  exercised  ex  debito  justitiae to  do  real  and

substantial  justice  for  the  administration  of  which  alone

courts exist.  Authority of the court exists for advancement of

justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so

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as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such

abuse.  It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow

any  action  which  would  result  in  injustice  and  prevent

promotion of justice.  In exercise of the powers court would be

justified  to  quash  any  proceeding  if  it  finds  that

initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of

court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve

the  ends  of  justice.  When  no  offence  is  disclosed  by  the

complaint, the court may examine the question of fact.  When

a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look

into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged

and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations

are accepted in toto.

5. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab (AIR 1960 SC 866), this

Court  summarized  some categories  of  cases  where  inherent

power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings.

(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a  legal  bar  against  the  institution  or continuance e.g. want of sanction;

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(ii) where  the  allegations  in  the  first information report or complaint taken at its  face  value  and  accepted  in  their entirety  do  not  constitute  the  offence alleged;

(iii) where  the  allegations  constitute  an offence,  but  there  is  no  legal  evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.

6. In dealing with the last case, it is important to bear in

mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal

evidence  or  where  there  is  evidence  which  is  clearly

inconsistent  with  the  accusations  made,  and  a  case  where

there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not

support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under

Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily

embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is

reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it

accusation would not be sustained.  That is the function of the

trial  Judge.   Judicial  process  no  doubt  should  not  be  an

instrument  of  oppression  or  needless  harassment.  Court

should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion

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and  should  take  all  relevant  facts  and  circumstances  into

consideration  before  issuing  process,  lest  it  would  be  an

instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash

vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time

the Section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to

short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death.

The scope of exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code

and the categories of cases where the High Court may exercise

its power under it relating to cognizable  offences to prevent

abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends

of justice were set out in some detail by this Court in State of

Haryana v.  Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp (1)  SCC 335)  A note  of

caution  was,  however,  added  that  the  power  should  be

exercised sparingly and that too in rarest of rare cases.  The

illustrative categories indicated by this Court are as follows:  

“(1) Where  the  allegations  made  in  the  first information  report  or  the  complaint,  even  if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their  entirety do not prima facie constitute any  offence  or  make  out  a  case  against  the accused.

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(2) Where  the  allegations  in  the  first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying  the  FIR  do  not  disclose  a cognizable  offence,  justifying  an  investigation by police  officers  under  Section 156(1)  of  the Code  except  under  an  order  of  a  Magistrate within  the  purview  of  Section  155(2)  of  the Code.

(3) Where  the  uncontroverted  allegations made  in  the  F.I.R.  or  complaint  and  the evidence  collected  in  support  of  the  same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.  

(4)  Where the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute  a  cognizable  offence  but  constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a Police Officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under S. 155 (2) of the Code.  

(5)  Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint  are  so  absurd  and  inherently improbable  on the basis of  which no prudent person can ever  reach a just  conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.  

(6)  Where  there  is  an  express  legal  bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance  of  the  proceedings  and/or  where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.  

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(7)  Where  a  criminal  proceeding  is  manifestly attended  with  mala  fide  and/or  where  the proceeding  is  maliciously  instituted  with  an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite  him due  to private and personal grudge.”  

7. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court

under  Section  482  Cr.P.C.  are  very  wide  and  the  very

plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise.

Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of

this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power

should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. High

Court  being  the  highest  Court  of  a  State  should  normally

refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the

entire  facts  are  incomplete  and  hazy,  more  so  when  the

evidence  has  not  been  collected  and  produced  before  the

Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of

magnitude  and  cannot  be  seen  in  their  true  perspective

without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule

can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court

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will  exercise  its  extraordinary  jurisdiction  of  quashing  the

proceeding at any stage.  (See  :  The Janata Dal  etc. v.  H.S.

Chowdhary and others, etc. (AIR 1993 SC 892), Dr. Raghubir

Saran v. State of Bihar and another (AIR 1964 SC 1)). It would

not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the

complainant  in  the  light  of  all  probabilities  in  order  to

determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on

such premises, arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are

to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material

before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded

with.  In  proceeding  instituted  on complaint,  exercise  of  the

inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called for only in

a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is

frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in

the  complaint  do  not  constitute  the  offence  of  which

cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the

High  Court  to  quash  the  same  in  exercise  of  the  inherent

powers  under  Section  482  Cr.P.C.  It  is  not,  however,

necessary that there should be meticulous analysis of the case

before  the  trial  to  find  out  whether  the  case  would  end  in

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conviction  or  acquittal.  The  complaint  has  to  be  read  as  a

whole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations in

the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant

that the ingredients of  the  offence  or offences  are disclosed

and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala

fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no

justification  for  interference  by  the  High  Court.  When  an

information is lodged at the police station and an offence is

registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of

secondary importance. It is the material collected during the

investigation and evidence led in Court which decides the fate

of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against

the informant are of no consequence and cannot by itself be

the  basis  for  quashing  the  proceeding.  (See  :  Mrs.

Dhanalakshmi v.  R. Prasanna Kumar and others (AIR 1990

SC 494),  State of Bihar and another v.  P. P. Sharma, I.A.S.

and  another (1992  Suppl  (1)  SCC  222),  Rupan  Deol  Bajaj

(Mrs.) and another v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill and another (1995

(6) SCC 194),  State of Kerala and others v.  O.C. Kuttan and

others (1999 (2) SCC 651), State of U.P. v. O. P. Sharma (1996

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(7) SCC 705),  Rashmi Kumar (Smt.) v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada

(1997 (2) SCC 397),  Satvinder Kaur v.  State (Govt. of NCT of

Delhi) and another (1999 (8) SCC 728),  Rajesh Bajaj  v.  State

NCT of Delhi and others AIR 1999 SC 1216).  

8. These aspects were highlighted in  State of Karnataka v.

M. Devendrappa and another (2002 (3) SCC 89).  

9. In Jehan Singh v. Delhi Admn. (1974 (4) SCC 522) while

considering  a  case  under  Section  561-A  of  the  Code  of

Criminal  Procedure,  1898  (in  short  “the  Old  Code”)

corresponding  to  Section  482  CrPC,  it  was  observed  as

follows: (AIR p.1146)

“Where at the date of filing the petition under Section 561-A, no charge-sheet or a complaint has been laid down in court and the matter is only at the stage of investigation by police, the court  cannot,  in  exercise  of  its  inherent jurisdiction  under  Section  561-A,  interfere with  the  statutory  powers  of  the  police  to investigate into the alleged offence, and quash the  proceedings.  Even  assuming  that  the allegations  in  the  FIR  are  correct  and constitute an offence so as to remove the legal bar to institute proceedings in court, the court

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cannot  at  that  stage  appraise  the  evidence collected  by  the  police  in  their  investigation. Any  petition  under  Section  561-A at  such a stage  is,  therefore,  premature  and incompetent.” (SCC p. 526, paras 16-18)   

10. It is to be noted that the investigation was not complete

and at that stage it was impermissible for the High Court to

look into materials, the acceptability of which is essentially a

matter  for  trial.  While  exercising  jurisdiction  under  Section

482 Cr.P.C, it is not permissible for the Court to act as if it

was a trial court. Even when charge is framed at that stage,

the  Court  has  to  only  prima  facie  be  satisfied  about  the

existence  of  sufficient  ground  for  proceeding  against  the

accused.  For  that  limited  purpose,  the  Court  can  evaluate

material and documents on records but it cannot appreciate

evidence. The Court is not required to appreciate evidence to

conclude whether the materials produced are sufficient or not

for convicting the accused. In Chand Dhawan v. Jawahar Lal

(1992 (3) SCC 317), it was observed that when the materials

relied upon by a party are required to be proved, no inference

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can be drawn on the basis of those materials to conclude the

complaint  to be unacceptable.  The Court should  not act on

annexures  to  the  petitions  under  Section  482  CrPC,  which

cannot  be  termed  as  evidence  without  being  tested  and

proved.

11. These aspects are highlighted in State of Orissa v.  Saroj

Kumar Sahoo (2005 (13) SCC 540).  

12. Practically  non-reasoned  order  of  the  High  Court  does

not reveal  that the parameters relating to exercise  of power

under Section 482 Cr.P.C. were kept in view. The inevitable

conclusion is that order of the High Court deserves to be set

aside. We direct accordingly.   

13. The appeal is allowed.  

…………………….……..J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

………………………..….J. (G.S. SINGHVI)

New Delhi, September 16, 2008

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