http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 3  

PETITIONER: LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SHIVA PRASAD TRIPATHI & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       18/01/1996

BENCH: PUNCHHI, M.M. BENCH: PUNCHHI, M.M. VENKATASWAMI K. (J)

CITATION:  JT 1996 (2)   713        1996 SCALE  (1)541

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      Leave granted.      This is  an appeal  against the judgment and order of a Division Bench  of the  Bombay High  Court  dated  21-2-1995 passed in  Civil Writ  Petition No.276  of  1995  whereunder certain directions  have  been  made  towards  conferral  of jurisdiction on  the Small Causes Court, Bombay which, prima facie, it is debarred to have.      The  respondent  -  Shiva  Prasad  Tripathi  -  was  an employee of  the appellant-  Life Insurance  Corporation  of India and  on that basis was allotted the premises owned and possessed by it. On expiry of the tenure of his service, the respondent was  required to  vacate the  premises.  When  he refused to  do so, the Estate Officer of the Corporation was brought into action in issuing a notice to the respondent to show cause  why appropriate  orders under  Section 7  of the Public Premises  (Eviction of  Unauthorised Occupants)  Act, 1971 [for  short ’the  Act’] be  not passed against him. The cause shown  by the  respondent did not appeal to the Estate Officer and  thus an  order of eviction was passed. The said order  was   unsuccessfully  challenged  in  appeal  by  the respondent before  the City  Civil Court at Bombay. The plea of the  respondent before  the appellate court that he was a tenant in  the disputed premises, having security of tenure, was not entertained and the matter was left at large.      The respondent  then  moved  the  High  Court  in  Writ Jurisdiction so  as to  challenge the  orders of  the Estate Officer as  also that of the appellate authority. Though the respondent could  not demolish  the grounds  for eviction in the High  Court, he  clung to the plea of despair that if he were to  enter the  Small  Causes  Court  to  establish  his tenancy rights, his possession in the interregnums would not be protected  by the Small Causes Court due to Section 10 of the Act, which reads as follows:      "10.   Save   as   otherwise   expressly      provided in  this Act,  every order made

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 3  

    by  an   estate  officer   or  appellate      officer under  this Act  shall be  final      and shall  not be  called in question in      any  original   suit,   application   or      execution proceeding  and no  injunction      shall be  granted by  any court or other      authority in respect of any action taken      or to be taken in pursuance of any power      conferred by or under this Act."      The respondent was given a lee-way by the High Court on taking the  view that  the question  of tenancy  pertains to property, which  plea was  adjudicable before  a court  or a competent authority, and that court or authority could issue an injunction  or an  interim direction, and no bar could be erected to stop it towards the grant thereof. It is in these circumstances that  the High  Court directed that the Judge, Small Causes  Court, shall  adjudicate on  the  question  of tenancy when  raised by  the respondent in the suit and such court, in  that event,  would be  able to  issue any interim order or  injunction  which  the  respondent  may  be  found entitled to. In addition to that the High Court also ordered that the  impugned orders  of the  Estate  Officer  and  the appellate authority would remain suspended till the decision of the  application for  an interim  relief was filed before the Court  of Small  Causes. This  has  raised  the  instant challenge.      We regret  to say that the orders of the High Court are bereft of  any reasoning  in giving  a complete go-by to the bar erected  under section 10 of the Act. Section 10 had not to be  viewed in  isolation but  had to be understood in the context of  the other  provisions of  the  Act  standing  in support thereof.  Clearly, a  suit for  injunction to negate the orders  of those  two  authorities  stood  barred  under Section 10.  The legislative  mandate was  that the court by order cannot  obstruct the execution of the orders passed by the Estate  Officer and the appellate authority. The court’s power, otherwise,  to adjudicate  on the  question whether a person was  a tenant  or not, in no way, has been taken away by Section 10. The adjudication however would be declaratory in nature  and may sexually end up in a consequence. Nothing interim however  is obtainable.  We therefore  do not  agree with the  High Court  that whatever  stood achieved  by  the appellant under  the Act, would suffer deprival just because the plea  of the  respondent being  a tenant is debatable in the court.  We, therefore,  upset the  impugned order of the High Court  and dismiss  the Writ  Petition preferred by the respondent before the High Court.      Learned counsel  for the  respondent, however, has been successful in  persuading us to grant him a two-fold relief, namely,  (i)   the  respondent   shall  not  immediately  be disturbed and  would get  six months’  time for vacating the premises; of  course, on his executing the usual undertaking before this Court to vacate the premises, within a period of four weeks  from today,  the quantum of rent/damages payable not  forming   part  of,   or  made  reference  of  in  that undertaking; and  (ii) within  a period  of two  months, the appellant shall  be duty  bound to clear the retrial dues of the respondent such as Provident Fund, gratuity etc., as are legally due to him, so that he has enough funds in his hands to seek an alternate accommodation in the meantime.      The appellant is, accordingly, directed.      The  question   of  rent/damages   is  left  open.  The appellant  has   gracefully  given   out  that   should  the respondent  make  a  representation  to  the  appellant  for waiving of rent/damages for the period for which those would

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 3  

be  payable,  the  appellant  undertakes  to  consider  that representation sympathetically. It is so ordered.      In light  of the above, this appeal stands allowed. For the respondent however, this matter stands concluded finally because of the individual reliefs we have granted to him. No costs.