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PETITIONER: LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: JYOTISH CHANDRA BISWAS

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       09/08/2000

BENCH: S.  RAjendra Babu J.  & Shivaraj V.  Patil J.

JUDGMENT:

Shivaraj V.  Patil,J.

L.......I.......T.......T.......T.......T.......T.......T.J         Leave  sought  for is granted.  The Life  Insurance Corporation  of  India and its officers have  brought  this appeal  to  this  Court  aggrieved by  the  judgment  dated 8.10.1999,  passed by the Division Bench of the High  Court of  Calcutta.  The relevant facts, which are necessary  for the  disposal of this appeal, are the following:  While the respondent was working as a Development Officer in the Life Insurance  Corporation of India at Calcutta (for short  the ’Corporation’),  a  charge-sheet  was   issued  to  him  on 15.2.1968  alleging that he remained unauthorisedly  absent from  his duties for a total number of 61 days between  the period  18.10.1967 to 13.2.1968 and that he remained absent from his station at Calcutta during the said period without prior  permission  of the authorities.  He was directed  to submit   his  written  statement  to  the   said   charges. Accordingly,   he   submitted  his    reply   in   writing. Thereafter,  the  Divisional  Manager,   Calcutta  of   the Corporation  was  appointed as Inquiry Officer  to  inquire into the said charges levelled against the respondent.  The Inquiry  Officer,  on  the  basis of  evidence,  found  the respondent  guilty  of all the charges.  The Zonal  Manager being  the  Disciplinary  Authority   concurring  with  the findings   recorded  by  the   Inquiry  Officer  issued   a communication  dated  15.11.1968 to the respondent  stating that  he proposed to dismiss him from service and directing him  to  show cause within 21 days as to why  the  proposed punishment  should  not be imposed.  The respondent made  a further  representation dated 11.1.1969.  The Zonal Manager having considered the representation passed the order dated 28.1.1969  dismissing  the respondent from service  of  the Corporation  with  immediate effect finding that there  was nothing  new  in the said representation of the  respondent dated  11.1.1969.   The respondent having kept quiet for  a period  of  about five years, however, by his letter  dated 9.1.1974 in addition to other contentions requested for his re-employment  in  the  Corporation.   The  Corporation  by letter   dated  15.2.1974  (Annexure   P-5)  informed   the respondent  that as per Regulation 12 of the Life Insurance Corporation  of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 (for  short the  ’Regulations’) no person, who has been dismissed  from the  service  of  the Corporation,  shall  be  re-employed. Thereafter,  the respondent filed the writ petition in  the High  Court  on  25.3.1975  questioning  the  validity  and

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correctness of the order of termination of the services and for  consequential  reliefs.   The   learned  single  Judge dismissed  the said writ petition observing that:  - "on  a careful consideration of the records and proceedings in the instant  case, it appears to me that the impugned order and the  proceedings  in  which it was passed do  not  ex-facie suffer  from any defect.  It also does not appear that  the said  order  was passed in violation of the  principles  of natural  justice.   On  the contrary, it appears  that  the petitioner  was given an opportunity at every stage of  the inquiry  to  make his representation.  The  allegations  of mala  fide  and erroneous procedure followed urged  by  the petitioner  in  his  application, in my  view,  has  little force.   In  any event, it appears that the  petitioner  is guilty  of unreasonable delay and laches inasmuch as he has sought  to impugn the order of dismissal passed in January, 1969,  in  March, 1975.  There is no explanation  for  this delay."

       Respondent  took up the matter in appeal before the Division  Bench of the High Court, which was allowed.   The Division Bench noticed that the respondent in the meanwhile had  superannuated and directed that he should be deemed to have  continued  in service till his age of  superannuation and  would  be entitled to the terminal  benefits  together with  compensation  of  Rs.25,000/-.   In  the  order   the Division  Bench has stated thus:  "The learned trial  Judge by  a laconic order dismissed the application, inter  alia, holding that the petitioner is guilty of unreasonable delay without   explaining  the  same.   As  regards  the   other findings,  no  reason  has  at all been  assigned  nor  the contention  of  the appellant to the effect that the  Zonal Manager  being  the appellant authority, he could not  have acted  as  a  disciplinary authority had  been  taken  into consideration."

       The   Division  Bench  also   observed  that   writ application  should  have been allowed only on  the  ground that  the  appellate authority had acted as a  Disciplinary Authority  as  a  result  whereof the  appellant  had  been deprived  of  a right to appeal.  It was pointed out to  us that  the respondent had not raised this ground before  the learned  single  Judge and as such no fault could be  found with the order of the learned single Judge.  It was further urged  on behalf of the appellants that the learned  single Judge  was  right  and  justified in  dismissing  the  writ petition  on the ground of delay and laches when there  was absolutely  no explanation whatsoever for inordinate  delay of  about  six  years  in filing the  writ  petition;   the respondent either had accepted or reconciled with the order of  termination  of  his services by keeping  quiet  for  a period  of  five  years  and  thereafter  seeking  for  his re-employment  in  the Corporation.  The  submissions  were made  on  behalf of the respondent supporting the  judgment under appeal.  Further our attention was specifically drawn to Regulations 39 and 40 and Schedule-I to contend that the Zonal  Manager being the appellate authority ought not have passed  the  order  of  termination   of  services  of  the respondent,  depriving him of a right to appeal.  The order terminating  the  services of the respondent was passed  on 28.1.1969.   The  writ petition was filed  challenging  the said  order  on  25.3.1975, almost after a  period  of  six years.   There  was  no explanation in  the  writ  petition whatsoever  for  this  inordinate  delay.   The  respondent sought  for  his  re-employment in the Corporation  by  his

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letter  dated 9.1.1974 almost after a period of five  years from  the  date  of termination of his services.   It  only indicated  that he accepted the order of termination of his services,  if  not  expressly but impliedly.  In  the  writ petition no ground was raised as to deprivation of right of appeal  to  the  respondent  against   the  order  of   the termination  of  his services.  It is not the case  of  the respondent  that  he was denied any  opportunity  offending principles  of natural justice.  Inquiry was held  pursuant to  the  charge sheet;  witnesses were examined;  and  even the respondent examined three witnesses on his behalf.  The Inquiry  Officer looking to the evidence brought on  record found  the  respondent guilty of the charges.  It was  also not  shown  that  any prejudice was caused to  him  in  the inquiry.   The  Disciplinary Authority concurring with  the findings  recorded  by  the Inquiry Officer,  after  giving further  opportunity  to the respondent, passed  the  order terminating  the  services of the respondent.  These  being the facts and circumstances of the case, in our opinion the learned  single  Judge  was right in  dismissing  the  writ petition.   We  find that the order of the  learned  single Judge  is  a  detailed  and considered  one.   We  find  it difficult  to accept the observations made by the  Division Bench  of  the  High court extracted above that  the  order passed by the learned single Judge was laconic.  When there was  no  explanation whatsoever given by the respondent  in the writ petition for delay of about six years, the learned single  Judge  was  right in saying so and  dismissing  it. When the ground that the respondent was deprived of a right to  appeal  was not taken before the learned  single  Judge either  in the writ petition or in arguments, the  Division Bench  was  not  right  and justified in  saying  that  the learned  single Judge did not assign any reason  whatsoever in  support  of  his judgment in this regard.  We  fail  to understand   how  such  a   non-existing  ground  could  be considered  by  the learned single Judge.   The  respondent having  attained  the age of superannuation retired  during the  pendency of proceedings before the High Court and  had succeeded  before  the  Division Bench of the  High  Court. Having  regard  to the facts and circumstances of the  case and that he was dismissed from services as early as in 1969 and  was  also deprived of other benefits, we think  it  is just  and  appropriate to award cost to him.   Thus  viewed from  any  angle the judgment of the Division  Bench  under appeal  cannot be sustained.  Hence the appeal is  allowed, the  judgment under appeal is set aside and the  appellants shall pay cost to the respondent quantified at Rs.25,000/-.