REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.    1283           OF 2009 (Arising out of SLP (CRL.) No. 2703 of 2008)

KISHAN LAL     … APPELLANT

Versus

DHARMENDRA BAFNA & ANR.            … RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

S.B. Sinha, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Jurisdiction of a Magistrate to direct reinvestigation of a case from  

time to time as laid down under sub-section (8) of Section 173 of the Code  

of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, “the Code”) is the question involved  

in this appeal.  It arises out of a judgment and order dated 13th March, 2008  

passed by a learned single judge of the High Court of Judicature at Madras  

in Crl. R.C. No. 245 of 2008 allowing the criminal revision application filed

by the respondent No.1 from an order dated 13th February, 2008 passed by  

the learned III Metropolitan Magistrate, George Town, Chennai.

3. Indisputably,  on  or  about  30th December  2005,  a  complaint  was  

lodged by the appellant against Accused Nos. 1 to 9, namely, Lakshmichand  

Bafna  (Accused  No.1),  Dharmendra  Bafna  (Accused  No.2),  Mahendar  

Bafna  (Accused  No.3),  Rakesh  Bafna  (Accused  No.4),  G.R.  Surana  

(Accused  No.5),  Shantilal  Surana  (Accused  No.6),  Vijayaraj  Surana  

(Accused No.7), Dinesh Chand Surana (Accused No.8) and Maran (Accused  

No.9) before the Commissioner of Police, Chennai City, Chennai inter alia  

alleging that they connived together from the beginning and cheated him a  

sum of Rs.4.65 crores by denying to return the money which was given to  

them for purchase of gold.  It was alleged that the amount was entrusted on  

various dates from 06th October 2005 to 17th November 2005. Although they  

have admitted the liability to the extent of 4.95 crores, but did not return  

either any gold or money to the complainant.   

4. On or about 12th January 2006, an application for grant of anticipatory  

bail before the High Court of Madras was filed by all the accused  stating  

that the Accused Nos. 5 to 8 are brothers and are the directors of their family  

business known as M/s Surana Corporation Limited.  It was admitted that  

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the  Accused  No.2  is  the  sub-agent  of  Surana  Corporation  Limited  who  

introduces investors.   

5. A  First  Information  Report  (“FIR”)  was  lodged  by  the  appellant  

against all the accused on or about 22nd January, 2006 in the Central Crime  

Branch Station.   

Allegedly, on or about 27th January 2006, in the aforementioned bail  

application, the said accused filed statement of accounts of the appellant/de  

facto complainant mentioned in the Multi  Commodity  Exchange of India  

Limited  (“MCX”)  which  is  a  Government  approved  On-Line  Trading  

Exchange  of  Bullion,  Energy,  Metal  and  Oil,  admitting  that  they  had  

undertaken bullion trade with MCX by using the appellant’s money.  

Apart from the said FIR, the parties have filed some Civil Suits also.  

Indisputably,  however,  Banwarlal  Sharma  (Accused  No.10)  was  

subsequently added.  It is furthermore not in dispute that the investigation  

was transferred to CBCID, Chennai by the Director General of Police, Tamil  

Nadu.   

On or about 8th October,  2007, a charge-sheet was filed before the  

learned  III  Metropolitan  Magistrate,  George Town,  Chennai  only  against  

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Accused Nos. 1 and 2 under Sections 406, 420 and 120B of the Indian Penal  

Code  (“IPC”).   The  learned  Magistrate  took  cognizance  against  the  said  

accused.   

On  or  about  29th October  2007,  on  the  premise  that  the  learned  

Magistrate had not taken cognizance against the other accused, the appellant  

filed an application under Section 482 of the Code before the High Court for  

setting aside the said order.  The said application was disposed of by the  

learned single judge of the High Court in the following terms:

“8. Therefore  in  the  considered  view  of  this  order, the above criminal original petition can be  disposed of with the following directions:-

The  petitioner  is  at  liberty  to  file  an  appropriate  petition  before  the  III  Metropolitan  Magistrate,George  Town,  Chennai,  incorporating  his grievances and the alleged lapses on the part of  the  investigating  agency  and  seek  further  investigation in the case.  On such petition being  filed,  the  learned  Magistrate,  shall  consider  the  same  in  accordance  with  law and  if  the  learned  Magistrate is satisfied that a case has been made  out  by  the  petitioner  for  ordering  further  investigation under Section 173(8) of the Criminal  Procedure Code, the learned Magistrate is entitled  to invoke the powers under Sections 173(8) of the  Criminal Procedure Code and direct the respondent  to further investigate into the matter.”

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Pursuant to or in furtherance of the said observations, appellant filed  

an application for further investigation before the learned Magistrate and by  

an order dated 13th February 2008, a direction for further investigation was  

issued, observing:

“While  considering  the  averments  made  in  this  petition,  this  Court  holds  that  several  kinds  of  issues  were  not  undisclosed  and  beyond  from  knots of doubts.  If those doubts were not cleared  through  suitable  investigation,  no  opportunity  could be given to get it revealed the true picture.  While  considering  the  nature  of  the  case,  it  is  important to find out how the amount given by the  petitioner  utilized,  when  it  was  utilized  and  on  which  state  the  amount  has  been  kept.   But,  as  alleged on behalf of the petitioner, it is the duty of  this Court to find out the truth by holding suitable  investigation of the matters which were unearthed.  In the event of this court refusing to find out the  true  picture  by  ordering  a  reinvestigation,  either  party is likely to get hardships and losses. If the  reinvestigation is ordered, a situation for handing  out an opportunity for both the parties to bring out  the hidden truths in this case and the facts in this  case and this Court holds that it would pave a way  for conducting a trial in the proper direction.  

As  this  court  holds  that  certain  cause  of  actions available in this case, and in view of the  necessity to find out several facts in this case and  in accordance of the orders of the High  Court of  Madras in CRL.O.P. 33354 of 2007, it is to meet  the ends of justice, the case could be ordered for  reinvestigation and thereby the petition presented  by  the  Petitioner/complainant  u/s  173(8)  is  allowed.”

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Accused No.2 filed revisional application thereagainst before the High  

Court.  By reason of the impugned judgment, as noticed hereinbefore, the  

said revision application has been allowed.

6. Mr.K.T.S. Tulsi, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the  

appellant would contend:

(i) The High Court committed a serious error in opining that no  

direction  for  further  investigation  or  reinvestigation  can  be  

directed after cognizance of an offence is taken.

(ii) The application for a direction for further investigation having  

been filed only in terms of the order of the High Court dated  

17th December 2007, another learned judge of the same High  

Court could not have taken a contrary view.

(iii) Direction  for  further  investigation  having  been  made  by  the  

learned Magistrate upon taking into consideration all aspects of  

the  matter,  the  High  Court  committed  a  serious  error  in  

interfering therewith.   

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(iv) The  High  Court  committed  a  serious  error  in  passing  the  

impugned  judgment  insofar  as  it  failed  to  take  into  

consideration that Accused No.6 being father of Accused No.2  

and Accused Nos. 5, 7 and 8 being his brothers; were running  

and  operating  Surana  Corporation  Limited  and  having  

admittedly invested the said amount in MCX, they must be held  

to  have  conspired  together  for  misappropriation  of  the  

aforementioned  amount  of  Rs.4.65  crores  entrusted  by  the  

appellant to the accused No.2, and consequent refusal on their  

part to return the amount on the ground that they have suffered  

a huge loss.

7. Mr. U.U. Lalit, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the  

accused other than accused Nos. 2 and 6, on the other hand, urged:

(i) Despite  the fact  that  the learned Magistrate had the requisite  

jurisdiction to direct further investigation, such order could not  

have been passed in the instant case as all aspects of the matter  

had been taken into consideration by the Investigating Officers.

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(ii) Further investigation, the learned counsel would urge, could be  

directed only in the event where investigation was not carried in  

respect of certain aspects of the matter or where during trial it  

came to  the  notice  to  the  court  that  some  facts  which  were  

relevant for arriving at the truth had not been gone into.

8. Mr.  M.N.  Rao,  learned  Senior  Counsel  appearing on behalf  of  the  

State would take us through the detailed counter affidavit filed on behalf of  

the State to contend that the investigation had been carried out in a fair and  

diligent manner touching all aspects of the matter.   

9. It is now a well settled principle of law that when a final form is filed  

by any Investigating Officer in exercise of his power under sub-section (2)  

of Section 173 of the  Code, the first informant has to be given notice.  He  

may file a protest  petition which in a given case may be treated to be a  

complaint petition, on the basis whereof after fulfilling the other statutory  

requirements  cognizance may be taken.   The learned Magistrate can also  

take  cognizance  on  the  basis  of  the  materials  placed  on  record  by  the  

investigating agency.  It is also permissible for a learned Magistrate to direct  

further investigation.   

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The  Investigating  Officer  when  an  FIR  is  lodged  in  respect  of  a  

cognizable offence, upon completion of the investigation would file a police  

report.  The power of investigation is a statutory one and ordinarily and save  

and except  some exceptional  situations,  no interference  therewith by any  

court is permissible.  

In  Naresh Kavarchand Khatri  vs.  State of Gujarat & Anr. [(2008) 8  

SCC 300], this Court held:

“6. The power of the court to interfere with an  investigation is limited. The police authorities, in  terms  of  Section  156  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure, exercise a statutory power. The Code of  Criminal  procedure  has  conferred  power  on  the  statutory  authorities  to  direct  transfer  of  an  investigation from one Police Station to another in  the  event  it  is  found that  they  do  not  have  any  jurisdiction  in  the  matter.  The  Court  should  not  interfere in the matter at an initial stage in regard  thereto.  If  it  is  found  that  the  investigation  has  been  conducted  by  an  Investigating  Officer  who  did  not  have  any  territorial  jurisdiction  in  the  matter,  the same should be transferred by him to  the police station having the requisite jurisdiction.

In  Dharmeshbhai Vasudevbhai  & Ors.  vs.  State  of  Gujarat  & Ors.  

[2009 (7) SCALE 214], this Court held:

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“9. Interference in the exercise of the statutory  power  of  investigation  by  the  Police  by  the  Magistrate far less direction for withdrawal of any  investigation which is sought to be carried out is  not  envisaged  under  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure.  The Magistrate’s power in this regard  is limited.  Even otherwise, he does not have any  inherent  power.   Ordinarily,  he has no power  to  recall his order.

This  aspect  of  the  matter  has  been  considered by this Court in S.N. Sharma v.  Bipen  Kumar  Tiwari  &  Ors. [(1970)  1  SCC  653],  wherein  the law has been stated as under :

“6. Without  the  use  of  the  expression “if he thinks fit”, the  second  alternative  could  have  been held to be independent of  the  first;  but  the  use  of  this  expression,  in  our  opinion,  makes  it  plain  that  the  power  conferred by the second clause  of  this  section  is  only  an  alternative  to  the  power  given  by  the  first  clause  and  can,  therefore,  be exercised only in  those  cases  in  which  the  first  clause is applicable.

7. It may also be further noticed  that, even in sub-section (3) of  Section  156,  the  only  power  given  to  the  Magistrate,  who  can  take  cognizance  of  an  offence under Section 190, is to  order an investigation; there is  no  mention  of  any  power  to  stop  an  investigation  by  the  police.  The  scheme  of  these  

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sections, thus, clearly is that the  power  of  the  police  to  investigate  any  cognizable  offence  is  uncontrolled  by  the  Magistrate,  and  it  is  only  in  cases  where  the  police  decide  not to investigate the case that  the  Magistrate  can  intervene  and  either  direct  an  investigation,  or,  in  the  alternative,  himself  proceed  or  depute a Magistrate subordinate  to  him  to  proceed  to  enquire  into the case. The power of the  police  to  investigate  has  been  made  independent  of  any  control by the Magistrate.”

Interpreting  the  aforementioned  provisions  vis-a-vis  the  lack  of  inherent  power  in  the  Magistrate in terms of Section 561-A of the Old  Criminal  procedure  Code  (equivalent  to  Section  482 of  the  new Code  of  Criminal  procedure),  it  was held :

“10. This  interpretation,  to  some extent, supports the view  that the scheme of the Criminal  Procedure  Code  is  that  the  power  of  the  police  to  investigate  a  cognizable  offence  is  not  to  be  interfered  with  by  the  judiciary.  Their  Lordships of the Privy Council  were, of course, concerned only  with  the  powers  of  the  High  Court  under  Section  561-A  CrPC,  while  we  have  to  interpret  Section  159  of  the  

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Code which defines the powers  of  a  Magistrate  which  he  can  exercise  on  receiving  a  report  from  the  police  of  the  cognizable  offence  under  Section 157 of the Code. In our  opinion, Section 159 was really  intended  to  give  a  limited  power  to  the  Magistrate  to  ensure  that  the  police  investigate  all  cognizable  offences and do not refuse to do  so by abusing the right granted  for certain limited cases of not  proceeding  with  the  investigation of the offence.”

Yet  again  in  Devarapalli  Lakshminarayana  Reddy  &  Ors. v.  V.  Narayana  Reddy  &  Ors.  [(1976) 3 SCC 252], this Court, upon comparison  of the provision of the old Code and the new Code,  held as under :

“7.  Section  156(3)  occurs  in  Chapter XII, under the caption :  “Information to the Police and  their  powers  to  investigate”;  while Section 202 is in Chapter  XV  which  bears  the  heading:  “Of complaints to Magistrates”.  The  power  to  order  police  investigation  under  Section  156(3)  is  different  from  the  power  to  direct  investigation  conferred  by  Section  202(1).  The  two  operate  in  distinct  spheres at different stages. The  first  is  exercisable  at  the  pre- cognizance stage, the second at  

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the post-cognizance stage when  the Magistrate is in seisin of the  case. That is to say in the case  of  a  complaint  regarding  the  commission  of  a  cognizable  offence,  the  power  under  Section 156(3) can be invoked  by  the  Magistrate before he  takes cognizance of the offence  under Section 190(l)(a).  But if  he once takes such cognizance  and  embarks  upon  the  procedure embodied in Chapter  XV,  he  is  not  competent  to  switch  back  to  the  pre- cognizance  stage  and  avail  of  Section 156(3). It may be noted  further  that  an  order  made  under sub-section (3) of Section  156,  is  in  the  nature  of  a  peremptory  reminder  or  intimation  to  the  police  to  exercise their plenary powers of  investigation  under  Section  156(1).  Such  an  investigation  embraces the entire continuous  process  which begins  with  the  collection  of  evidence  under  Section  156  and  ends  with  a  report  or  charge-sheet  under  Section 173. On the other hand,  Section 202 comes in at a stage  when some evidence  has been  collected  by  the  Magistrate  in  proceedings under Chapter XV,  but  the  same  is  deemed  insufficient  to  take  a  decision  as  to  the  next  step  in  the  prescribed procedure. In such a  situation,  the  Magistrate  is  

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empowered  under  Section  202  to  direct,  within  the  limits  circumscribed  by  that  section  an  investigation  “for  the  purpose of deciding whether or  not  there  is  sufficient  ground  for  proceeding”.  Thus  the  object of an investigation under  Section 202 is not to initiate a  fresh case on police report but  to  assist  the  Magistrate  in  completing proceedings already  instituted  upon  a  complaint  before him.”

We are,  however, not oblivious of the fact  that recently a Division  

Bench of this Court in Sakiri Vasu vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. [(2008)  

2 SCC 409] while dealing with the power of the court to direct the police  

officer to record an FIR in exercise of power under Section 156(3) of the  

Code  observed  that  the  Magistrate  had  also  a  duty  to  see  that  the  

investigation is carried out in a fair manner (correctness whereof is open to  

question).  

10. An  order  of  further  investigation  can  be  made  at  various  stages  

including the stage of the trial, that is, after taking cognizance of the offence.  

Although some decisions have been referred to us, we need not dilate  

thereupon as the matter has recently been considered by a Division Bench of  

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this Court in  Mithabhai Pashabhai Patel & Ors.  vs.  State of Gujarat [2009  

(7) SCALE 559] in the following terms:

“16. This  Court  while  passing  the  order  in  exercise  of  its  jurisdiction  under  Article  32  of  Constitution  of  India  did  not  direct  re- investigation.  This court exercised its jurisdiction  which  was  within  the  realm  of  the  Code.  Indisputably the investigating agency in terms of  sub-section  (8)  of  Section  173  of  the  Code  can  pray  before  the  Court  and  may  be  granted  permission  to  investigate  into  the  matter  further.  There are, however, certain situations, where such  a formal request may not be insisted upon.   

17. It is, however, beyond any cavil that ‘further  investigation’  and  ‘re-investigation’  stand  on  different  footing.   It  may  be  that  in  a  given  situation  a  superior  court  in  exercise  of  its  constitutional  power,  namely  under  Articles  226  and 32 of the Constitution of India could direct a  ‘State’ to get an offence investigated and/or further  investigated by a different agency. Direction of a  re-investigation, however, being forbidden in law,  no  superior  court  would  ordinarily  issue  such  a  direction.  

Pasayat,  J.  in  Ramachandran v.  R.  Udhayakumar,  [(2008)  5  SCC  413], opined  as  under :-

“7.  At this juncture it would be  necessary  to  take  note  of  Section 173 of the Code. From  a  plain  reading  of  the  above  section  it  is  evident  that  even  after  completion  of  

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investigation under sub-section  (2) of Section 173 of the Code,  the  police  has  right  to  further  investigate  under  sub-section  (8),  but  not  fresh investigation  or reinvestigation…”

11. We have referred to the aforementioned decision only because Mr.  

Tulsi contends that in effect and substance the prayer of the appellant before  

the learned Magistrate was for reinvestigation but the learned Magistrate had  

directed further investigation by the Investigating Officer inadvertently.  

The Investigating Officer may exercise his statutory power of further  

investigation in several situations as, for example, when new facts come to  

its notice; when certain aspects of the matter had not been considered by it  

and it found that further investigation is necessary to be carried out from a  

different angle(s) keeping in view the fact that new or further materials came  

to its notice.  Apart from the aforementioned grounds, the learned Magistrate  

or the Superior Courts can direct further investigation, if the investigation is  

found to be tainted and/or otherwise unfair or is otherwise necessary in the  

ends of justice.

12. The question,  however,  is  as  to whether  in a case of  this  nature a  

direction for further investigation would be necessary.   

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Mr. Dhayalan, Inspector of Police, Crime Branch CID, Metro Wing,  

Chennai in his counter affidavit inter alia brought to this Court’s notice that  

the  matter  was  investigated  by  (1)  Tr.  S.  Saravana  Brabu,  Inspector  of  

Police, Chennai CCB, (2) Tr. Salathraj, Assistant Commissioner of Police,  

CCB Chennai (3) Tr. S. Veiladurai, Assistant Commissioner of Police, Job  

Rocket  and Video Piracy,  Chennai  City,  (4)  Tr.  C.  Edward,  Inspector  of  

Police, CCB, Chennai and (5) Tr. K.G. Rajakumar, Assistant Commissioner  

of Police, CCB, Egmore, Chennai apart from him.  

We have noticed hereinbefore that the investigation was transferred to  

CBCID by an order dated 29th March 2007 passed by the DGP, Tamil Nadu.  

The matter, thus, has been investigated by two specialized agencies.  The  

deponent of the counter affidavit  categorically stated that  he had made a  

thorough  investigation  and  upon  consideration  of  the  materials  gathered  

during  investigation  identified  that  there  was  no  connection  between  the  

money of the de facto complainant and Accused Nos. 3 to 10 and hence the  

final form was filed in their favour.  It was pointed out that the complainant  

had filed the aforementioned application under Section 173(8) of the Code  

principally  on  the  premise  that  no  investigation  had  been  carried  out  in  

respect of three documents being (1) The additional grounds raised in the  

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anticipatory bail  application,  (2) The plaint  filed by Accused No.2 in the  

Civil Suit filed by him and (3) the letter written by Mahaveer Surana, the  

authorized signatory of Surana Corporation Ltd., to the Chief Minister’s cell.

It was furthermore pointed out:

“(b) The  second  accused  came  forward  with  improbable  stories  for  him  to  escape  from  prosecution.   The  version  of  the  accused  in  his  anticipatory  bail  application  is  without  any  material to support the same and was not believed.  Similarly, the version of A2 in the suit filed by him  was also not believed as it was not borne out by  any  documentary  evidence.   Similarly,  the  letter  written  by  Mahaveer  Surana  to  the  Chief  Minister’s Cell is also a document intended to save  A-1 and A-2 from the crime and hence not to be  believed.  The version of the de facto complainant,  the petitioner herein and also of A-2 to establish  the connection between the money paid by the de  facto complainant to A-2 with A-3 to A-10 is not  borne out by any documentary evidence.  Hence,  the case against A-3 to A-10 were dropped.  All  the three documents are that of the accused.  The  documents cannot be proved through accused.  No  accused can be compelled to be a witness against  himself.   The  documents  could  be  hit  by  under  Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India.”

The  investigating  officer  was  of  the  opinion  that  the  amount  of  

Rs.4.65 crores was given to Accused No.2 for both trading in gold and silver  

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on the  basis  of  orally  agreed  terms.   Accused  No.  2  was  introduced  by  

Accused No.1.  Accused No.2 had given the said amount on 18th November  

2005 to M/s Vinayaga Vyapar Limited on various dates on its own risks and  

on the basis whereof M/s Vinayaga Vyapar Ltd. entered transactions with  

M/s Surana Corporation Ltd. on 17th November 2005 and all payments had  

been made through cheques only.  Upon giving the details, the Investigating  

Officer had come to the following conclusion:

“These  transactions  were  for  speculative  trading  only.  It is stated in the FIR filed by the petitioner  that the transaction between the petitioner and the  A-2  Dharmendra  Bafna  are  independent  transaction between themselves and no third party  was  involved.   The  petitioner  did  not  make  any  agreement  or  contract  with  the  A-2  Dharmendra  Bafna  for  doing  gold  bullion  forward  trade  business and failed to obtain the trade order, trade  execution order and trade confirmation order from  the  A-2  Dharmendra  Bafna  and  did  not  deal  in  cheque  transactions.   The  petitioner  has  given  Rs.4.65 crores by cash and entered upon a shady  transaction with the A4 Dharmendra Bafna.”

In regard to the statements made by the accused in their application  

for anticipatory bail with regard to account with M/s MEGHA GG, it has  

been contended that the same cannot be construed to be an admission on the  

part of the Accused Nos. 3 to 10 especially when the petition had not been  

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signed by any of the accused and all the documentary evidence and material  

gathered  during  the  investigation  were  to  the  contrary.   The  said  Shri  

Dhayalan had also stated in great details as to why Accused Nos. 3 to 10  

were dropped.  He had also taken into consideration the dealings by and  

between the parties inter se as also the litigations filed by them against each  

other.  It is neither necessary nor desirable to notice the statements made  

therein by us as we are concerned with a question of law.

13. It  is  correct  that  the  revisional  court  should  not  interfere  with  the  

discretionary  jurisdiction  exercised  by  the  learned  Magistrate  unless  a  

jurisdictional error or an error of law is noticed.  

We  have  noticed  hereinbefore  the  order  passed  by  the  learned  

Magistrate.  His order that “several kinds of issues were not disclosed and  

beyond from knots of doubts” is vague in nature.  It has not been pointed out  

that in what respect the investigation has not been carried out.   What are  

hidden truths required to be unearthed had also not been pointed out.  The  

learned Magistrate did not consider the fact that the investigation had been  

carried out by two different agencies and by responsible police officers.  It  

has not  been found that the Investigating Officer  was in any way biased  

towards the  complainant.   Furthermore,  if  the  contention of  Mr.  Tulsi  is  

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correct, the question as to whether Accused Nos. 3 to 10 were involved in  

the matter could be pointed out from the materials which had already been  

brought  on  record.   Furthermore,  whether  the  admissions  made  in  the  

application for anticipatory bail  were binding on them, the same being a  

matter of inference can also be urged.  The other and further remedies as  

pointed out can be resorted to as also invocation of the provisions of Section  

319  of  the  Code  at  the  stage  of  trial  is  also  permissible  in  law,  if  an  

appropriate  case  is  made  out  therefor.   We  furthermore  clarify  that  any  

observations  made by the  High Court  or  by  us  should  not  prejudice  the  

either party and the learned Magistrate should consider the matter on its own  

merit and without in any way being influenced by the same, if any occasion  

arises in this behalf in future.   

14. For  the  reasons  aforementioned,  we  do  not  find  any  merit  in  this  

appeal.  The appeal is dismissed accordingly.  

.……………………………….J. [S.B. Sinha]

...…………………………..…J. [Deepak Verma]

New Delhi;

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July 21, 2009

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