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PETITIONER: KHUSHIRAM BEHARI LAL & CO.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: ASSESSING AUTHORITY, SANGRUR & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT08/10/1976

BENCH: KHANNA, HANS RAJ BENCH: KHANNA, HANS RAJ SINGH, JASWANT

CITATION:  1976 AIR 2372            1977 SCR  (1) 752  1976 SCC  (4) 322

ACT:             Writ jurisdiction of the High Court--Scope for interfer-         ence with findings of departmental authorities.

HEADNOTE:         In     response  to a notice from  the  assessing  authority         under  the Punjab General Sales Tax Act that  the  appellant         had  not  filed a return in respect of the  assessment  year         1959-60,  the appellant claimed that the firm had ceased  to         do any work since February. 1961 and that a formal  document         to that effect was executed in August, 1961.  The  assessing         authority  made an order of assessment in March 1962.  In  a         writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution   filed’         by  the  appellant; the High Court directed  the  Sales  Tax         Officer  to  enquire and report if  the  appellant-firm  had         proved its dissolution in August 1961 or before the date  of         assessment  order.  The Sales Tax Officer reported  that  it         had not, The High Court itself examined the matter and  came         to  the  s.me conclusion of that reached by  the  Sales  Tax         Officer.  It also found that though intimation was  required         to be given under s. 16 of the Act regarding the dissolution         of  the  firm  within 30 days of such  dissolution  no  such         intimation  was  given under April, 1962 and  dismissed  the         writ petition.         Dismissing the appeal to this Court,             HELD:  (1)  There is no sufficient ground  to  interfere         with the judgment of the High Court.  The facts and  circum-         stances  referred to by the High Court throw a  considerable         doubt upon the correctness of the appellant’s statement that         it had stood dissolved in August, 1961. [754 D & B]             (2)  The High Court was dealing with the matter  on  the         writ side.  In a writ petition, the scope for  interference.         with a finding of the departmental authorities is much  more         restricted and the court can normally interfere only if  the         finding  is based upon extraneous or irrelevant evidence  or         is  otherwise  perverse.   The same cannot be  said  of  the         finding  of the sales tax authority embodied in  its  report         sent to the High Court in the present case. [754 C]

JUDGMENT:

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       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 442 of 1974.             (From  the Judgment and Order dated the 17th of  August,         1970  of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Civil  Writ  No.         413/62).         V.C. Mahajan and O.P. Sharma, for the Appellant.         Harbans Singh, for Respondent No. 2.         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by             KHANNA, J.  This is an appeal on certificate against the         judgment  of the Punjab ’and Haryana High Court whereby  the         High Court held that the appellant-firm had failed to  prove         that  it had stood dissolved on a date prior to the date  of         assessment, viz., March 12, 1962.             The  appellant-firm carries on business  as   commission         agents   of cotton and food grains.  In respect of the  year         1959-60,  the appellant did not submit any return under  the         Punjab  General  Sales  Tax Act.   A  notice  was  thereupon         issued to the appellant-firm and the         753         case was fixed for July 1, 1960.   The appellant  challenged         the  validity  of the assessment proceedings by means  of  a         writ petition in the High Court.   The High Court during the         pendency  of the petition, stayed the  proceedings.    Ulti-         mately,  it seems, the writ petition  was dismissed and  the         assessment  proceedings were resumed on November  30,  1961.         Various dates were fixed thereafter.   February 17, 1962 was         fixed as the final date of hearing.   On that date,  intima-         tion  was given on behalf. of the appellant that the  appel-         lant-firm had ceased to do any work since February 1961.  It         was  also represented that a formal document had  been  exe-         cuted  on August 8,  1961.  The assessing authority  despite         that intimation proceeded to make an order    of  assessment         dated March 12, 1962.   The appellant thereupon filed anoth-         er  petition  under article 226 of the Constitution  in  the         Punjab  High Court, praying for the quashing of the  assess-         ment order.   It was stated on behalf of the appellant  that         the  appellant-firm  had been dissolved before the  date  of         assessment  order  and as such, the  sales  tax  authorities         could  not  make an order for assessment.   The  High  Court         dismissed  the  petition on the ground that  the  assessment         proceedings had been initiated long before the alleged  date         of  dissolution of the firm.  The appellant thereafter  came         up to this Court in appeal against the said decision of  the         High Court.  This .Court set aside the judgment of the  High         Court, following its decision in the case of State of Punjab         v.  M/s  Jullundur Vegetables Syndicate.(1)   The  case  was         remanded  to the High Court as no definite finding had  been         given  by  the High Court regarding the dissolution  of  the         appellant-firm  and  about the fact as to whether  the  said         dissolution had taken place before the date of the order  of         assessment, namely, March 12, 1962.             After  remand, the High Court called upon the sales  tax         officer to make an enquiry and submit a report on the  point         as  to  whether  the appellant-firm had  been  dissolved  on         August  8, 1961 as alleged by the appellant.  The sales  tax         officer  thereafter made an enquiry and submitted  a  report         that the appellant-firm had not proved its dissolution    on         August 8, 1961 or before the date of assessment order.   The         High  Court, ’after receipt of the report,  itself  examined         the  matter and came to the conclusion that on the  material         on  record brought by the appellant, it had not been  proved         that  the  appellant-firm had stood dissolved    on  a  date         prior  to  March 12, 1962.   It is the  correctness  of  the         above decision of the High Court which has now been assailed         before us by the appellant in this appeal.             We have heard Mr. Mahajan on behalf of the appellant and

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       find no cogent ground to take a view different from that  of         the  High Court. The High Court, in the course of its  judg-         ment,  has pointed out that though the assessment order  was         made on March 12, 1962 a large number of hearings took place         between  March 8, 1961, the alleged date of dissolution  and         March  12, 1962.   At no hearing, was  any intimation  given         by  the appellant to the assessing authority that  the  firm         had  stood dissolved.   All that was intimated  on  February         17, 1962 was that the firm had ceased to do work in February         1961 and         (1) 119661 2 S.C.n. 457.         754         that a formal document had been executed on August 8,  1961.         It was also not the case. of the appellant that all the  six         partners  of the appellant firm, had signed  that  document.         Another  factor  which weighed with the High Court was  that         though  intimation is required to be given under section  16         of  the Punjab General Sales Tax Act regarding the  dissolu-         tion  of  a firm within thirty days of such  dissolution  no         such intimation was given by the appellant-firm until  April         2, 1962, i.e., nearly eight months after the alleged date of         dissolution.             In our opinion, the facts and circumstances referred  to         by  the  High  Court throw a considerable  doubt.  upon  the         correctness  of the statement made on behalf of  the  appel-         lant-firm’ that it had stood dissolved    on August 8, 1961.         It  has to be borne in mind that the High Court was  dealing         with the matter on the writ side.   In a writ petition,  the         SCOpe  for interference with a finding of  the  departmental         authorities  is much more restricted and the court can  nor-         mally  interfere only if the finding is based upon  no  evi-         dence  or is based upon extraneous   or irrelevant  evidence         or  is otherwise perverse.  The same cannot be said  of  the         finding  of the sales tax authority embodied in  its  report         sent  to  the High Court in the present case.    We  see  no         sufficient ground to interfere with the judgment of the High         Court.   The appeal fails and is dismissed.   There will  be         no order as to costs.         P.B.R.                                            Appeal         755