KESHAV DUTT Vs STATE OF HARYANA
Bench: ALTAMAS KABIR,A.K. PATNAIK, , ,
Case number: Crl.A. No.-001560-001560 / 2010
Diary number: 36626 / 2009
Advocates: GAURAV AGRAWAL Vs
KAMAL MOHAN GUPTA
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1560 OF 2010 (@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION(CRL.) No.2742 of 2010)
KESHAV DUTT … APPELLANT VS.
STATE OF HARYANA … RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
ALTAMAS KABIR, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Two short points fall for consideration in
this Appeal. One is whether the opinion of a
handwriting expert can be admitted in evidence
without examination of the handwriting expert and
the other is whether a person who is charged of an
offence under Section 7 read with Section 13(1)(d)
of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and is
subsequently acquitted of the charge under Section
7, can still be convicted under Section 13(1)(d) of
the aforesaid Act.
3. The Appellant and one Kewal Kumar were
convicted by the Special Judge, Yamuna Nagar at
Jagadhari, under Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention
of Corruption Act, 1988, and were sentenced to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three
years and to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/-, in default,
to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a further
period of six months. The co-accused Mahesh Kumar
was, however, acquitted of all the charges.
4. According to the prosecution, on 23rd April,
2002, one Anil Kumar, son of Kewal Prakash Mehta,
made an application to the Superintendent of
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Police, Vigilance, Ambala, stating that he was
running a dairy adjoining his house. On 19th April,
2002, Kewal Kumar and the Appellant herein, who
were employed as Assistant Lineman and Meter
Reader, respectively, under the Electricity Board,
Sadhaura, came to his house for checking the
electric meter. After such checking, the said Anil
Kumar was made to sign on a paper and was informed
that the load in the meter was in excess of the
permissible load and the matter would have to be
reported to the Board which could entail a fine of
at least Rs.14,000-15,000/-. The accused persons
then informed him that he would have to pay a sum
of Rs.7,000/- as bribe if he wanted the case to be
hushed up. The further case of the prosecution is
that on 25th April, 2002, both the accused came to
Anil Kumar’s house and, once again, demanded the
bribe money and ultimately the said two accused
agreed to accept a sum of Rs.2,000/- between 4.00–
5.00 p.m. on the next date, failing which the case
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against him would have to be made ready, but if
payment was made, the matter would be hushed up.
5. The matter was endorsed by the Superintendent
of Police to the Vigilance Inspector before whom
the complainant produced Rs.2,000/- for the purpose
of laying a trap. Ultimately, the accused Kewal
Kumar as well as Mahesh Kumar came to the
complainant’s house and went inside and on a signal
being given, the members of the raiding party went
inside the house and asked Kewal Kumar to hand over
the bribe money which he had taken from the
complainant. Kewal Kumar indicated that the money
had been given to Mahesh Kumar and on demand Mahesh
Kumar made over the same to the Inspector. The
hands of both Kewal Kumar and Mahesh Kumar were got
washed separately in a solution of Sodium
Carbonate, the colour of which turned pink. The
accused were put under arrest and after police
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investigation, a charge sheet was filed against
them in Court for their trial.
6. All the three accused were charged under
Section 7 read with Section 13(1)(d) of the above-
mentioned Act and were convicted and sentenced as
mentioned hereinbefore. The judgment and order of
the Trial Court was questioned before the High
Court in Criminal Appeal No.427-SB of 2005 filed by
Keshav Dutt, the Appellant herein, and Criminal
Appeal No.438-SB of 2005 filed by Kewal Kumar.
The third Appeal No.1328-SB of 2009 was filed by
the State of Haryana against the acquittal of
Mahesh Kumar of the charges framed against him.
The High Court while affirming the judgment of the
Trial Court as far as Kewal Kumar and the Appellant
are concerned, reduced the sentence of imprisonment
from three years to one year. The High Court also
dismissed the Appeal preferred by the State.
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7. It is against the said order that the present
Special Leave Petition has been filed.
8. The main contention of Mr. Nitin Sangra,
learned Advocate appearing for the Appellant, is
whether a charge under Section 120-B IPC could be
maintained against the Appellant in respect of an
offence committed by his co-accused. Elaborating
further, learned counsel also raised the question
as to whether the Appellant’s conviction under
Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988, was maintainable when the accused had
been acquitted under Section 7 of the Act and the
Appellant neither received the bribe money nor was
he present when such bribe amount was said to have
been paid to the co-accused and no charge under
Section 120-B/34 IPC had been brought against the
accused persons.
9. The other question raised was whether without
examining the handwriting expert his report could
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have been admitted into evidence and relied upon
although the same formed the main basis of
conviction. In this regard, the learned counsel
placed reliance on the decision of this Court in
State of Maharashtra Vs. Damu [2000 (6) SCC 269],
wherein while considering the case of abducting and
triple infanticide, this Court had occasion to
consider whether reliance could be placed on the
opinion of the Assistant State Examiner of
Documents without examining him as a witness in
Court. This Court held that from the opinion
itself it could not be gathered whether his office
would fall within the purview of Section 293
Cr.P.C. Accordingly, the Court observed that
without examining him as an expert witness, no
reliance could be placed on his opinion. Learned
counsel urged that the conviction of the Appellant
on the basis of the above could not be sustained.
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10. The submissions made on behalf of the Appellant
were opposed on behalf of the State of Haryana and
it was submitted that the provisions of Sections 7
and 13(1)(d) contemplated separate offences which
could stand independently and were not entirely
dependent on each other. Learned counsel urged
that even if an accused was acquitted of the charge
under Section 7, he could still be convicted under
Section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988, as has been done in the instant case. It was
observed by the High Court that PW.5 had
categorically stated that he had not authorized
accused Kewal Kumar as also the Appellant to check
the meter installed at the residence of the
complainant and that it was because of this reason
that the Trial Court had excluded this accused from
the offence under Section 7 of the Act. The Trial
Court, in fact, observed that the complaint Ex.PJ
was written by some official of the Vigilance
Department or by someone at the instance of the
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Inspector and even the complainant could not
identify the person who had written the complaint.
However, as far as the offence under Section
13(1)(d) is concerned, the High Court affirmed the
findings of the Trial Court that the bribe money
had been demanded and received by the accused
persons. The Appeal Court also observed that the
bribe money had been initially received by Kewal
Kumar who had handed over the same to Mahesh Kumar,
who was acquitted by the Trial Court. However, the
document Ex.PR which bears the signature of the
complainant, coupled with Ex.PY, the report of the
Forensic Science Laboratory, connected the
Appellant herein with the commission of the crime
and it was held that he could not be allowed to go
free only because he was not present or apprehended
at the time of the raid. Learned counsel for the
State submitted that the submissions made on behalf
of the Appellant did not justify interference of
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this Court with the impugned judgment of the High
Court.
11. We have considered the submissions made on
behalf of respective parties and have also taken
note of the fact that the Appellant had neither
received the bribe money nor was he present at the
spot when the same was received by Kewal Kumar, who
handed over the same to Mahesh Kumar, but the
involvement of the Appellant did not require the
presence of the Appellant at the time of the raid
as he was connected with the offence in view of
Ex.PR which is the paper on which the meter reading
was jotted down allegedly by the Appellant, which
was proved by the handwriting expert to be in the
handwriting of the Appellant. In this context, the
plea taken on behalf of the Appellant as to whether
the opinion of the handwriting expert could have
been relied upon without examining him becomes
relevant. The Trial Court has dealt with this
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question by taking recourse to Section 73 of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which enables the Court
to compare the signatures, writing or seal with
others admitted or proved. In the instant case,
the report of the fingerprint expert who had not
been examined indicates that a specimen writing had
been given by the Appellant and on a comparison of
the same with the writings in Ex.PR, the
fingerprint expert had come to the conclusion that
they had been written by the same person. The Trial
Court skirted the issue by holding that the defence
counsel could have examined in their defence to
rebut the findings of the Assistant Director,
Forensic Science Laboratory, Haryana. The High
Court also skirted the issue by observing that the
science of handwriting being imperfect and
inaccurate, it is very difficult, if not impossible
to give the opinion that the writings were in the
hand of one and the same persons. The High Court
went on to observe that the Appellant did not have
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the courage to examine any counter expert in
rebuttal of the report. The High Court recorded
that the report having gone unrebutted could be
relied upon without any demur.
12. We are afraid that we cannot concur with the
views either of the Trial Court or of the High
Court in the above regard. When the Trial Court
chose to rely on the report of the handwriting
expert (Ex.PR), it ought to have examined the
handwriting expert in order to give an opportunity
to the Appellant and the other accused to cross-
examine the said expert. There is nothing on
record to show that the Appellant and the other
respondents had admitted the report of the
handwriting expert. In our view, the Trial Court
ought to have allowed the Appellant an opportunity
to cross-examine the expert and both the Trial
Court and the High Court erred in denying him such
opportunity and shifting the onus on the accused to
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disprove Ex.PR which had not been formally proved
by the prosecution. The decision cited on behalf
of the Appellant regarding reliance on the opinion
of an expert who had not been examined as a
witness, however, includes an Assistant Director of
the State Forensic Science Laboratory in clause (e)
of Sub-section (4) of Section 293 Cr.P.C. Section
293(1)(4)(e), which is relevant for our purpose is
extracted below :-
293. Reports of certain Government scientific experts. (1) Any document purporting to be a report under the hand of a Government scientific expert to whom this section applies, upon any matter or thing duly submitted to him for examination or analysis and report in the course of any proceeding under this Code, may be used as evidence in any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code. (2) xxx xxx XXX (3) xxx xxx xxx (4) This section applies to the following Government scientific experts, namely, (a) xxx xxx xxx
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(b) xxx xxx xxx
(c) xxx xxx xxx
(d) xxx xxx xxx
(e) The Director [Deputy Director or Assistant Director of a Central Forensic Science Laboratory or a State forensic Science Laboratory];
(f) xxx xxx xxx”
13. In the instant case, it is only the report of
the handwriting expert, Ex.PY, which connects the
Appellant with the offence on account of Ex.PR
which is said to be in his handwriting. Since the
Appellant had neither received the money nor was he
present at the spot from where the other accused
were apprehended, his case has to be treated on a
different footing and since his complicity has not
been established beyond doubt on the basis of Ex.PR
and Ex.PY, he must be given the benefit of doubt.
14. Without, therefore, going into other questions
which have been raised in this Appeal, we are of
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the view that the same should be allowed on the
aforesaid ground alone.
15. The Appeal, accordingly, succeeds and is
allowed and the judgment of conviction and sentence
of the Appellant under Section 13(1)(d) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, is set aside.
In the event, the Appellant has since been
apprehended and is in custody, he shall be released
forthwith, if not wanted in connection with any
other case.
…………………………………………………J. (ALTAMAS KABIR)
……………………………………………………J. (DR.MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA)
New Delhi, Dated: 19.08.2010.
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