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PETITIONER: KERALA STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD, TRIVANDRUM

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: T.P.K.K. AMSOM AND BESOM, KERALA

DATE OF JUDGMENT29/10/1976

BENCH: RAY, A.N. (CJ) BENCH: RAY, A.N. (CJ) BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH SHINGAL, P.N.

CITATION:  1977 AIR  282            1977 SCR  (1) 996  1976 SCC  (4) 634  CITATOR INFO :  R          1985 SC1007  (3)  R          1988 SC1172  (3)  R          1992 SC1918  (8)

ACT:             Limitation Act, 1963, Article 137,--Whether confined  to         applications under the Code of Civil Procedure--Applicabili-         ty  to petitions under the Indian Telegraph Act,   1885,  S.         16(5).

HEADNOTE:             The  appellant cut and removed some trees from  the  re-         spondent’s land for laying electric lines, and assessed  the         compensation.   Later,  the  respondent  filed  a   petition         under-section  16(5)  of  the Indian  Telegraph  Act,  1885,         claiming  an enhanced compensation.  The  Appellant  opposed         the petition contending that it was time-barred under  Arti-         cle  137 of the Limitation Act, 1963.  The  respondent  con-         tended  that Article 137 of the Limitation Act was  not  ap-         plicable to petitions to the District Judge under the Indian         Telegraph Act.  The District Judge dismissed the petition as         time-barred,  but in revision, the High Court set aside  the         order  and  remanded the matter for disposal  in  accordance         with law.         Allowing the appeal, the Court.             HELD:  (1)  Article 137 will apply to  any  petition  or         application filed under any Act to a Civil Court.  The words         "any other application" under Article 137 cannot be said  on         the  principle of ejusdem generis to be  applications  under         the  Civil  Procedure Code other than  those   mentioned  in         part I of  the  third division. [998 E-G, 1000 B-C]             Nityananda  M.  joshi & Ors. v.L.I.C. of  India  &  Ors.         [1970] 1 SCR 396. applied.             Town  Municipal  Council, Athani  v.  Presiding  Officer         Labour Court, HubIi & Ors. [1970] 1 SCR 51, overruled.             Shri  Mulchand  & Co. Ltd. (In liquidation)  v.  Jawahar         Mills Ltd. (1955 SCR 351) referred to.             (2) The District Judge under the Telegraph Act acts as a         Civil  Court  in dealing with applications under section  16         of  the Telegraph Act.  The petition is one contemplated  by         the  Telegraph      Act for  judicial  decision and  is   an

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       application  falling  within the scope of  Article   137  of         the  1963  Limitation Act. [1001 E-G]             National  Telephone Co. Ltd. v. The  Post-master-General         [1913] A.C.  546 applied.             Kerala State Electricity Board v. Paravathi Amma I.L.R.         [1973] 2  Kerala 524 Referred to.             Town  Municipal  Council  Athani  v.  Presiding  Officer         Labour Court,  HubIi and Ors. [1970] 1 SCR 51 and Nityananda         M.  Joshi & Ors. v.  Life  Insurance Corporation of India  &         Ors. [1970] 1 SCR 396 distinguished.

JUDGMENT:         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 246 of 1975.             (Appeal  by  Special Leave from the Judgment  and  Order         dated 3.6.1974 of the Kerala High Court in C.R.P. No. 302 of         1974)         S.T. Desai and A. C. Puddissary for the appellant.         K.T. Harindranath and T.T. Kunhikanan, for the Respondent.         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by             RAY,  C.J.--This  appeal is by special  leave  from  the         judgment dated 3 June, 1974 of the High Court of Kerala.             The  respondent filed a petition under sections  10  and         16(5) of the Indian Telegraph Act 1885 read with section  51         of  the  Indian Electricity Act 1910  claiming  compensation         against the appellant.             The Kerala State Electricity Board is constituted  under         section 5 of the  Indian Electricity Supply Act, 1948.   The         Board  ’cut and removed some trees standing on the  property         of  the respondent for the purpose of laying  electric  line         from Calicut to Cannanore.  The Board assessed the compensa-         tion at Rs. 1619.90.             On 10 March, 1972 the respondent filed a petition before         the  District Judge, Tellicherry under section 16(3) of  the         Indian Telegraph Act 1885 claiming an enhanced  compensation         of Rs. 19,367.60. The Board raised several objections.   One         of  the objections was that the petition was barred by  time         under  Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963.   The  Board         contended  that  the  notice intimating the  fixing  of  the         compensation was served on 4 March, 1969 and therefore   the         petition was barred by time.  The respondent contended  that         Article  137  of the 1963 Limitation Act did  not  apply  to         applications  to  the District Judge under the Indian  Tele-         graph Act.  The District Judge held that the application was         governed  by  Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation  Act,  and,         therefore, the petition was filed beyond three years and was         barred by time.             The  respondent  filed revision petitions  to  the  High         Court of Kerala. The respondent also applied for condonation         of  delay  in  filing  the revision petitions  in  the  High         Court.   The  High Court condoned the delay  in  filing  the         petitions.   The High Court in view of the decision  of  the         High Court in Kerala State  Electricity  Board  v.  Parvathi         Amma(1) set aside the order of the District Judge and remit-         ted  the matter back to the court for disposal in accordance         with law.             The provision contained in Article 137 of the Limitation         Act 1963 is as follows :--         Description of        Period of    Time from which pe-         application           limitation    riod begins to run         Any other application for      When the right to apply         which no period    3 years     accrues.         of limitation is provided         elsewhere in this Division.

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           The view of the Kerala High Court is that Article 137 of         the Limitation Act 1963 has the same meaning as Article  181         of the  Indian Limitation Act 1908.         (1) I.L.R. [1973] 2 Kerala 524.         908  Article 181 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908  was  as         follows :--         Description of       Period of    Time for which pe-         application          limitation     riod begins to run         Applications for which no     When the right to appeal         period of limitations Three      accrues.          years is provided elsewhere in         this schedule or by section 48         of the Code of Civil procedure.             In  the Kerala State Electricity Board case (supra)  the         High  Court held that in view of the decision of this  Court         in   Town   Municipal Council, Athani v.  Presiding  Officer         Labour  Court, Hubli & Ors(1). the same construction  should         be  put upon Article 137 as had been put upon  Article  181.         In  the  Ahani Municipal Council case  (supra)  the  workmen         applied  to  the Labour Court under section  33C(2)  of  the         Industrial  Disputes Act for computation of benefit  in  re-         spect of over time.  The Labour Court accepted’ the applica-         tion of the workmen. The Athani Municipal Council challenged         the  decision  of the Labour Court in a writ  petition.   On         appeal to this Court it was contended, that the jurisdiction         of the Labour Court was barred by the provisions of  Minimum         Wages  Act  1948 and second the applications to  the  Labour         Court  were time barred under Article 137 of the  Limitation         Act, 1963. This  Court  held  as  follows:  The      altera-         tion  in  the  1963 Limitation Act in Article 137,   namely,         the  inclusion  of the words "other   proceedings"   in  the         long title  to  the  1963  Limitation Act, the omission   of         the  preamble  and  the  change  in  the definition so as to         include  petition in the word "application" do not show  any         intention  to  make Article ’137 applicable  to  proceedings         before  bodies  other  than courts  such  as  quasi-judicial         tribunals  and  executive bodies.  The word "other"  in  the         first  column of the Article giving the description  of  the         application  "any other application for which no  period  of         limitation  is provided elsewhere in  this  division"  indi-         cates  that  the interpretation of Article 181 in  the  1908         Limitation  Act  on the basis of ejusdem generis  should  be         applied   to Article 137.  The application was presented  to         the Labour Court, a tribunal which was not a court  governed         by  the Civil or Criminal Procedure Codes,  and,  therefore,         the  applications  are not governed  by Article 137  of  the         Limitation Act, 1963.         In Nityananda M. Joshi & Ors. v. Life Insurance  Corporation         of  India  &  Ors. (2)  the  appellants  filed  applications         against the respondent under section 33C(2) of the Industri-         al Disputes Act for computing in terms of money, the benefit         of holidays and for recovering the amount. The Labour  Court         dismissed the applications in so far as the claim was for  a         period  beyond three years on the ground that  the  applica-         tions         (1) [1970] 1 S.C.R. 51.           (2) [1970] 1 S.C.R. 396.         999         were  barred  under Article 137 of the Limitation  Act.   In         Nityananda Joshi’s case (supra) this Court held as follows:             Article   137  contemplates  applications  to   ordinary         courts.  Section  4 of the Limitation Act provides  for  the         contingency   when   the   prescribed    period   for    any         application    expires    on   a    holiday  and  the   only         contingency  contemplated  is "when the  court  is  closed".         Further  under section 5 of the Limitation Act only a  court

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       is  enabled  to admit an application  after  the  prescribed         period  has  expired  if the court  is  satisfied  that  the         applicant  had  sufficient  cause for   not  preferring  the         application.   The  Labour Court is not a court  within  the         meaning of the Limitation Act.             This Court in Nityananda Joshi’s case (supra) said  that         it  was not necessary to express views on the  first  ground         given  by  this  Court  in  Athani  Municipal  Council  case         (supra).   The  first ground given in the  Athani  Municipal         Council case (supra) was that in spite of change the  inter-         pretation of Article 181 would apply to Article 137 of   the         Limitation  Act.   This  Court in  Nityananda  Joshi’s  case         (supra)  said  that it would require  serious  consideration         whether  applications   to courts  under  other  provisions,         apart from Civil Procedure Code, are included within Article         137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 or not. The Athani Municipal         Council case (supra) is a two Judge Bench decision.   Nitya-         nanda Joshi’s case (supra) is a three Judge Bench decision.             The Schedule to the Limitation Act is with reference  to         section  2(j)  and 3 of the Act.  Section 2(j)  of  the  Act         speaks of the period of limitation prescribed for any  suit,         appeal  or  application  by  the  Schedule  and  "prescribed         period"  is the period of limitation computed in  accordance         with the provisions of this Act.             Section  3 of the Act states that subject to the  provi-         sions  contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the  Act         every suit instituted, appeal preferred and application made         after  the  prescribed period shall  be  dismissed  although         limitation has not been set up as a defence.             "Application"  is defined in section 2(b) of the Act  to         include a petition.             The  Schedule is divided in three divisions.  The  first         division  relates to suits.  The first division consists  of         10  parts and consists of 113 Articles.  The first 10  parts         speak of 10 categories of suits. The second division  speaks         of appeals.  The second division consists of Articles 114 to         117.   The third division speaks of applications. The  third         division is in two parts.  Part I speaks of applications  in         specified cases.  Part II speaks of other applications.             The  main contention on behalf of the appellant is  that         the  petition  before the District  Judge  for  compensation         would be an application for which no period of limitation is         provided  elsewhere in this division and would  fall  within         Article 137.         1000             This  Court in Sha Mulchand & Co.  Ltd.   (In   Liquida-         tion) v. Jawahar Mills(1) Ltd held that the construction put         upon Article 181 of the Limitation Act 1908 is that the long         catena  of decisions under Article 181 may well be  said  to         have,  as it were, added the words "under the Code"  in  the         first column of that Article.             The alteration of the division as well as the change  in         the  collocation of words in Article 137 of  the  Limitation         Act  1963 compared with Article 181 of the  1908  Limitation         Act  shows that applications contemplated under Article  137         are not applications confined to  the, Code of Civil  Proce-         dure.   In  the 1908 Limitation Act there  was  no  division         between  applications in specified cases and other  applica-         tion  as in the 1963 Limitation Act.  The words  "any  other         application" under Article 137 cannot be said on the princi-         ple of ejusdem  generis to the applications under the  Civil         Procedure  Code other than those mentioned in Part I of  the         third  division.   Any other application under  Article  137         would  be petition or any application under any Act. But  it         has  to  be an application to a court for  the  reason  that

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       sections 4 and 5 of the 1963 Limitation Act speak of  expiry         of  prescribed period when Court is closed and extension  of         prescribed  period  if applicant or the appellant  satisfies         the court and he had sufficient cause for not preferring the         appeal or making the application during  such period.             In the present case, the applications contemplated under         section 16(3) of the Telegraph Act are applications to.  the         District  Judge  within whose jurisdiction the  property  is         situate.   Applications   are contemplated  if  any  dispute         arises concerning the sufficiency of  the compensation to be         paid  under section 10 of the Telegraph Act. Section  10  of         the Telegraph Act states that the telegraph authority  shall         pay  compensation to all persons interested for any  damages         sustained by them by reason of exercise of powers  mentioned         in section 10 of the Telegraph Act 1885.  Reference may also         be made to  section 16(1) which states that if the  exercise         of  powers  mentioned in section 10 in respect  of  property         referred  to  in clause (d)’is resisted  or  obstructed  the         District  Magistrate may order that the telegraph  authority         shall be permitted to exercise them.             The  provisions in the Telegraph Act  which  contemplate         determination by the District Judge of payment of  compensa-         tion  payable under section 10 of the Act indicate that  the         District  Judge acts judicially as a court.  Where by  stat-         utes  matters are referred for determination by a  Court  of         Record  with no further provision the necessary  implication         is that the court will determine the matters as a court. See         National  Telephone Co. Ltd. v. The Postmaster-General.  (2)         In  the presence case the statute makes the reference to the         District Judge as the Presiding Judge of the District Court.         In  many  statutes reference is made to the  District  Judge         under this particular title while  the intention is to refer         to  the Court of the District Judge.   The Telegraph Act  in         section  16  contains intrinsic evidence that  the  District         Judge is mentioned there as the court of the District Judge.         Section 16(4)  of  the’ Telegraph  Act   requires    payment         into   the         (1) [1953] S.C.R. 351.                  (2) [1913] A.C. 546.         1001         court  of the District Judge such amount as  the   telegraph         authority  deems sufficient if any dispute arises as to  the         persons  entitled    to  receive  compensation.    Again  in         section  34 of the Telegraph  Act reference is made to  pay-         ment  of  court fees and issue of processes  both  of  which         suggest  that  the ordinary machinery of a  court  of  civil         jurisdiction is being made available for the settlement   of         these    disputes. Section 3(15) of the General Clauses  Act         states  that the  District Judge in any Act of  the  Central         Legislature   means the Judge of a principal civil court  of         original  jurisdiction  other  than the High  Court  in  the         exercise of its original civil jurisdiction, unless there is         anything  repugnant in the context.   In the  Telegraph  Act         there  is nothing in the context to suggest that the  refer-         ence to the District Judge is not intended as a reference to         the District Court which seems to be the meaning implied  by         the definition applicable thereto. The District Judge  under         the  Telegraph  Act acts as a ciVil court  in  dealing  with         applications under section 16 of the Telegraph Act.             The  changed  definition of the  words  "applicant"  and         "application" contained in section 2(a) and 2(b) of the 1963         Limitation Act indicates the object of the Limitation Act to         include  petitions,  original or  otherwise,  under  special         laws.   The interpretation which was given to Article 181 of         the 1908 Limitation Act on the principle of ejusdem  generis         is  not  applicable with regard to Article 137 of  the  1963

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       Limitation  Act.   Article 137 stands in isolation from  all         other Articles in Part I of the third division.   This Court         in  Nityanada Joshi’s case (supra) has rightly thrown  doubt         on   the  two  Judge Bench decision of this Court in  Athani         Municipal  Council case (supra) where this  Court  construed         Article 137 to be referable to applications under the  Civil         Procedure Code.   Article 137 includes petitions within  the         word  "applications."  These petitions and applications  can         be under any special Act as in the present case.             The conclusion we reach is that Article 137 of the  1963         Limitation  Act  will apply to any petition  or  application         filed  under  any Act to a civil court.    With  respect  we         differ  from the view taken by the two Judge Bench  of  this         Court  in  Athani Municipal Council case (supra)   and  hold         that  Article   137   of the 1963  Limitation  Act  is   not         confined  to  applications  contemplated  by  or   under the         Code of Civil Procedure.    The petition in the present case         was to the District Judge as a court.  The petition was  one         contemplated  by  the Telegraph Act for  judicial  decision.         The  petition is an application failing within the scope  of         Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act.             For  the foregoing reasons we accept the appeal and  set         aside  the judgment of the High Court.  The  appellant  will         pay costs to the respondent in accordance with order made at         the time of granting special leave.         MR                                            Appeal allowed         1002