REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 6850-6851 OF 2003 KENDRIYA KARAMCHARI SEHKARI GREH NIRMAN SAMITI LTD., NOIDA … APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF U.P. & ANR. … RESPONDENTS

WITH CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 6854-6855 OF 2003

V. SINGH  … APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF U.P. & ANR. … RESPONDENTS

WITH CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 6852-6853 OF 2003

VIJAY SINGH … APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF U.P. & ANR. … RESPONDENTS

WITH CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 6856-6857 OF 2003

CHARAN SINGH … APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF U.P. & ANR. … RESPONDENTS WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 6858-6859 OF 2003

CHARAN SINGH … APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF U.P. & ANR. … RESPONDENTS

WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6860 OF 2003

AJAY SINGH … APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF U.P. & ANR. … RESPONDENTS

WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6861 OF 2003

A. SINGH … APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF U.P. & ANR. … RESPONDENTS

WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6862 OF 2003

RAN SINGH … APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF U.P. & ANR. … RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

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C.K. THAKKER, J.

1. In the present group of appeals, the

appellants  have  challenged  the  judgment  and

final order dated September 03, 2001 passed by

the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in

Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 31958 of

2001 and companion matters as also the order

dated January 04, 2002 passed in Review Civil

Miscellaneous  No.  85091  of  2001  and  cognate

matters. 2. Since common questions of fact and law

have been involved in all these appeals, it is

appropriate to deal with and decide them by a

common judgment. 3. To  appreciate  the  controversy  raised

by the appellants, it may be appropriate to

narrate the facts of the case in Civil Appeal

Nos.  6850-6851  of  2003.  According  to  the

Kendriya Karamchari Sehkari Grah Nirman Samiti

Ltd.(‘the Samiti’ for short)-appellant herein,

proceedings  under Land  Acquisition Act,  1894

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(hereinafter  referred  to  as  ‘the  Act’)  for

acquisition of 325.353 acres of land of village

Chhalera,  Pargana  &  Tehsil  Dadri,  District

Gautam Budh Nagar had been initiated. The land

was sought to be acquired for public purpose,

viz.,  Planned  Development  of  New  Okhla

Industrial  Development  Authority  (NOIDA),

Gautam  Budh  Nagar.  Preliminary  notification

under Section 4 read with Section 17 of the Act

by  applying  urgency  clause,  was  issued  on

October  30,  1987.  It  was  published  in  the

Official  Gazette  on  February  27,  1988.  The

final notification under Section 6 read with

Section 17 of the Act was issued on June 12,

1989  and  published  in  Official  Gazette  on

December 14, 1989. Notices were published in

the newspaper indicating acquisition of land of

various land-owners on February 05, 1990. Award

was  made  by  the  Special  Land  Acquisition

Officer, NOIDA, District Ghaziabad in terms of

Dispute  No.  135  of  1988-92  on  February  04,

1992.  According  to  the  appellant,  the  Land

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Acquisition Officer awarded compensation to the

land-owners at the rate of Rs.43.64 ps. per sq.

yard. It may be stated that according to the

appellant-Samiti, it purchased a part of the

land  on  November  15,  1990.  The  land  was

transferred in the name of the Samiti. It is

the case of the appellant Samiti that several

land-owners were not satisfied with the amount

of  award  offered  by  the  Land  Acquisition

Officer and they sought Reference under Section

18 of the Act. More than 50 such References,

therefore, came up for consideration before the

Reference Court. The Court of the Additional

Upper District Judge-X, Ghaziabad by judgment

and order dated August 28, 2000 enhanced the

compensation  awarded  to  the  land-owners  by

holding that the land-owners were entitled to a

sum  of  Rs.148.75  ps.  per  sq.  yd.  with  30%

solatium and 12% interest per annum. It was

also observed that the amount paid pursuant to

the  award  passed  by  the  Land  Acquisition

Officer would be adjusted while making payment

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by  the  authorities  as  per  the  order  in

Reference. 4. So  far  as  the  appellant-Samiti  is

concerned, it could not make Reference along

with other land-owners under Section 18 of the

Act.  It,  therefore,  filed  an  application

through its President Charan Singh, son of late

Budh  Singh  on  September  06,  2000  to  the

Additional  District  Magistrate  (Land

Acquisition), Gautam Budh Nagar under Section

28A of the Act,  inter alia,  praying therein

that  the  land  of  the  applicant  had  been

acquired for public purpose, the applicant, who

was the President of the Samiti, had purchased

the land from the Samiti in December, 1990 and

his name had also been entered in the Revenue

Record. It was also stated by him that he could

not  challenge  the  Award  passed  by  the  Land

Acquisition  Officer.  The  Reference  Court,

however, decided the Reference in other cases

and  granted  enhanced  compensation.  The  same

benefit, therefore, should be allowed to him

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also on the basis of the order passed by the

Reference Court. The said application was made

on September 06, 2000 i.e. within a period of

three months from the date of decision in the

Reference. 5. The  main  grievance  of  the  applicant

was that though in the light of the decision of

Reference  Court  allowing  the  Reference  and

granting enhanced compensation to other land-

owners, the appellant also ought to have been

granted the similar benefit and he ought to

have been paid additional amount as held by the

Reference Court, no decision had been taken by

the  Additional  District  Magistrate  and  his

application was kept pending. According to the

applicant, probably it was done keeping in view

the  fact  that  being  aggrieved  by  the  order

passed by the Reference Court, the authorities

preferred appeal being FAO No. 456 of 2001,

etc.  and  the  order  passed  by  the  Reference

Court was challenged in the High Court. It also

appears that the High Court entertained those

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appeals and also passed interim order of stay

on  September  17,  2001.  By  the  said  order,

operation of the order passed by the Reference

Court was stayed on condition that NOIDA would

deposit  the  entire  amount  awarded  under  the

Reference within two months from the date of

the  order.  The  claimants  were  permitted  to

withdraw 25% of such amount without furnishing

security  and  further  25%  on  furnishing

security.  The  remaining  amount  (50%)  was

ordered to be invested in Fixed Term Deposit in

a Nationalized Bank. 6. The  appellant  also  felt  that  the

action of keeping pending the application of

the appellant instituted under Section 28A of

the  Act  was  taken  in  pursuance  of  policy

decisions  taken  by  the  State  vide  two

Government Orders, dated January 14, 1994 and

June 13, 2001. According to the appellant, the

Government  Orders  provided  that  if  an  order

passed  by  a  Reference  Court  enhancing

compensation is challenged by the authorities

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and the matter is pending before a High Court

or the Supreme Court and an application under

Section 28A has been made by the persons who

had  not  sought  Reference,  such  applications

should  be  kept  pending  till  the  matter  is

finally disposed of by the High Court as well

as  by  the  Supreme  Court  and  no  enhanced

compensation should be paid to the applicants

under Section 28A of the Act at the enhanced

rate. 7. The appellant being aggrieved by the

non-disposal of his application under Section

28A of the Act, because of Government Orders,

challenged the validity of both the Government

Orders dated January 14, 1994 and June 13, 2001

by filing Writ Petition No. 31958 of 2001 in

the  High  Court  of  Judicature  at  Allahabad.

Similar  writ  petitions  were  filed  by  other

land-owners. 8. The Division Bench of the High Court,

however, on a totally irrelevant and extraneous

ground,  viz.,  that  the  underlying  object  of

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Section 28-A of the Act was to protect ‘little

Indians’  who  because  of  their  poverty  and

ignorance,  could  not  file  an  application

seeking Reference under Section 18 of the Act

which was not the position in the case on hand.

According  to  the  High  Court,  since  the

petitioner before the High Court could not be

said to be a ‘little Indian’ who could not seek

Reference due to ‘poverty or ignorance’, his

application  was  liable  to  be  dismissed.  The

Court,  in  this  connection,  referred  to  and

relied upon a decision of the said Court in

Nanak Chand & Ors. v. State of U.P., (1996) 2

All  WC  1294.  The  petition  was  accordingly

dismissed. 9. The appellant was convinced that the

High Court was wholly wrong in dismissing the

writ petition on the ground which was not at

all germane or relevant and Nanak Chand had no

application  as  it  was  decided  in  completely

different set of circumstances. He, therefore,

filed Review Petition but by a cryptic order

10

even  Review  Petition  was  dismissed.  The

appellant, therefore, has approached this Court

by filing the present appeal. 10. Similar  question  has  been  raised  by

the appellants in all other matters. 11. On April 12, 2002, notice was issued.

Similar notices were issued in other matters.

Leave  was  granted  on  August  29,  2003.  The

matters  were  thereafter  placed  for  final

hearing and that is how the matters are before

us. 12. We have heard learned counsel for the

parties. 13. The learned counsel for the appellants

submitted that the order passed by the High

Court  was  totally  erroneous  and  wholly  ill-

founded. The question before the High Court was

not as to maintainability of application under

Section 28A of the Act. The controversy was

limited  to  the  validity  or  otherwise  of

Government Orders of 1994 and 2001. The High

Court misconstrued the prayer of the appellants

11

and dismissed the petition which was illegal

and improper. The counsel also urged that the

High  Court  was  wrong  even  in  interpreting

Section 28A of the Act as held by this Court in

several  cases.  The  only  requirement  of

application under Section 28A of the Act is

that  an  order  must  have  been  passed  by  a

Reference Court under the Act and the person

moving an application under Section 28A must

not have sought such Reference. Admittedly, in

the instant case, the Award passed by the Land

Acquisition Officer and the offer made by him

was not accepted by certain land-owners and the

Award was challenged by them. The appellant was

not one of those land-owners. Reference Court

enhanced the amount of compensation. It was,

therefore,  open  to  the  appellant  to  seek

similar relief by invoking Section 28A of the

Act. He, accordingly, made an application. The

Additional District Magistrate did not reject

the application of the appellant on the ground

that no such application was maintainable. He,

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however, did not decide it. The grievance of

the  appellant-landowner  was  limited  to  a

direction to the Additional District Magistrate

to  decide  the  application.  The  High  Court,

however, held that the application filed by the

appellant  under  Section  28A  was  itself  not

maintainable which has caused serious prejudice

to the appellant. 14. The  counsel  submitted  that  the

underlying object of Section 28A of the Act is

to  treat  equals  equally  and  the  point  is

concluded  by  several  pronouncements  of  this

Court. Hence, even if a person is not poor or

‘little Indian’, he cannot be deprived of the

benefit of Section 28A. On that ground also,

the order passed by the High Court deserves to

be set aside. A prayer was, therefore, made to

quash and set aside order passed by the High

Court as also two Government Orders challenged

in  the  writ  petition  by  issuing  a  writ  of

mandamus ordering the respondents to act as per

the order passed by the Reference Court, to

13

decide the application under Section 28A of the

Act and to pay enhanced compensation to the

appellants. 15. The  learned  counsel  for  the

respondent-authority,  on  the  other  hand,

supported the order passed by the High Court.

He submitted that the Statement of Objects and

Reasons behind enacting Section 28A of the Act

was explicitly clear. The provision has been

inserted  in  the  Act  with  a  view  to  protect

‘little  Indians’  who  due  to  poverty  or

ignorance of law could not challenge the Award

passed  by  the  Land  Acquisition  Officer  by

seeking Reference. If a person who is otherwise

aware of legal provisions and is in a position

to  challenge  the  Award  by  seeking  Reference

under Section 18 of the Act, he cannot take

advantage of his own in-action or negligence by

claiming  enhanced  compensation  in  favour  of

other persons who had sought Reference. It was

also  submitted  that  in  any  case,  after  the

decision by the Reference Court, if the State

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or acquiring body has challenged the legality

and  validity  of  the  enhanced  amount  of

compensation  in  the  High  Court  or  in  the

Supreme Court and the matter is sub judice, no

amount can be paid to an applicant who has made

an application under Section 28A of the Act

inasmuch as the main controversy and the order

on the basis of which such application is made

is  pending  adjudication  before  the  superior

Court.  The  action  of  the  Collector  of  not

deciding the application, thus, is strictly in

accordance with law as also equitable and no

prejudice can be said to have been caused to

the applicant.  16. It  was  also  submitted  that  an

application under Section 28A of the Act can be

made  only  by  ‘person  interested’.   In  the

instant  case,  according  to  the  respondents,

notification under Section 4 was issued in 1987

and notification under Section 6 was issued in

1989.  Even  according  to  the  appellant,  he

purchased the property in November, 1990  i.e.

15

after both the notifications were issued and

published.  He,  therefore,  by  no  stretch  of

imagination,  can  be  termed  as  ‘person

interested’.  On  that  ground  also,  the

application under Section 28A of the Act, was

not maintainable and the appellant could not

have filed a writ petition nor he could have

challenged the order passed by the High Court

since he had no interest in the land when the

land was acquired. On all these grounds, it is

submitted  that,  the  appeals  deserve  to  be

dismissed. 17. Having heard learned counsel for the

parties, in our opinion, the appeals deserve to

be partly allowed. 18. It is no doubt true that a preliminary

objection has been raised by the respondents as

regards  locus of  the  appellant  herein.

According to the respondents, application under

Section 28A was filed (Civil Appeal No. 6850 of

2003) by Charan Singh, son of late Shri Budh

Singh in his individual capacity and not for

16

and  on  behalf  of  the  Samiti  and  such  an

application  was  not  maintainable.  The

contention of the appellant, on the other hand,

is that the objection raised by the respondents

is  not  well  founded  inasmuch  as  the

application,  which  is  produced  on  record,

itself expressly recites that the application

has  been  made  by  the  Samiti  ‘through  its

President’ Charan Singh. It is true that the

land was purchased by the appellant from the

Samiti and his name had been entered in Revenue

Record.  But  the  appellant  was  also  the

President of the Samiti and an application was

made in the capacity of the President. 19. We  would have entered into the said

question provided it had been considered by the

High Court and appropriate decision had been

taken thereon. The High Court, however, has not

decided  the  maintainability  or  otherwise  of

application and  locus standi of the appellant

herein.  The  High  Court,  relying  on  Nanak

Chand, dismissed the writ petition holding that

17

the petitioner before the Court could not be

said to be a ‘little Indian’ who could not seek

Reference under Section 18 of the Act because

of  ‘poverty  and  ignorance’.  We,  therefore,

leave  the  question  of  maintainability  of

application under Section 28A of the Act by the

appellant open. 20. So  far  as  interpretation  of  Section

28A is concerned, it may be stated that the

said provision came to be inserted by the Land

Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (Act 68 of

1984) with effect from September 24, 1984. 21. The said Section reads as under;

28A. Re-determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the Court.-

(1) Where in an award under this Part, the  Court  allows  to  the  applicant  any amount of compensation in excess of the amount  awarded  by  the  Collector  under section  11,  the  persons  interested  in all the other land covered by the same notification  under  section  4,  sub- section (1) and who are also aggrieved by  the  award  of  the  Collector  may, notwithstanding that they had not made an  application  to  the  Collector  under section  18,  by  written  application  to

18

the Collector within three months from the  date  of  the  award  of  the  Court require that the amount of compensation payable to him may be re-determined on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court:

Provided that in computing the period of three months within which an application to  the  Collector  shall  be  made  under this sub-section, the day on which the award  was  pronounced  and  the  time requisite  for  obtaining  a  copy  of  the award shall be excluded.

(2) The Collector shall, on receipt of an  application  under  sub-section  (1), conduct an inquiry after giving notice to all the persons interested and giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard, and make an award determining the amount  of  compensation  payable  to  the applicants.

(3) Any person who has not accepted the award  under  sub-section  (2)  may,  by written  application  to  the  Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court and the provisions of sections 18 to 28 shall, so far as may be, apply to  such  reference  as  they  apply  to  a reference under section 18.

22. In  the  Statement  of  Objects  and Reasons, for insertion of Section 28A, it was,

inter alia, observed;

19

“Considering  that  the  right  of reference  to  the  civil  court  under Section  18  of  the  Act  is  not  usually taken advantage of by inarticulate and poor  people  and  is  usually  exercised only by the comparatively affluent land- owners and that this causes considerable inequality  in  the  payment  of compensation  for  the  same  or  similar quality of land to different interested parties,  it  is  proposed  to  provide  an opportunity  to  all  aggrieved  parties whose  land  is  covered  under  the  same notification to seek re-determination of compensation, once any one of them has obtained  orders  for  payment  of  higher compensation  from  the  reference  court under Section 18 of the Act”.

23. The  provision  came  up  for

consideration  before  this  Court  in  several

cases.  In  the  leading  case  of  Mewa  Ram

(Deceased)  by  his  Lrs.  &  Ors.  v.  State  of

Haryana  through  The  Land  Acquisition

Collector,  Gurgaon,  (1986)  4  SCC  151,  this

Court held that having regard to the Statement

of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Act, it

is clear that Section 28A is intended and meant

for the inarticulate and poor people who by

reason  of  their  poverty  and  ignorance  have

failed  to  take  advantage  of  the  right  of

20

Reference to Civil Court under Section 18 of

the Act. It was also held that the provision

was not intended to reopen an Award which had

attained finality and was of binding nature. 24. Again,  in  The  Scheduled  Caste  Co-

operative  Land Owning Society Ltd., Bhatinda

v. Union of India and others, (1991) 1 SCC 174,

the Court held that once a claimant has sought

and secured a Reference under Section 18 of the

Act  and  an  order  is  passed,  he  cannot

thereafter invoke Section 28A of the Act for

re-determination of compensation. 25. In the well known decision in  Babua

Ram & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Anr.,  (1995) 2

SCC 689, this Court considered the question in

detail. It was held that before Section 28A of

the Act can be invoked, a person must show that

he is person interested and is aggrieved as in

respect  of  other  lands  covered  by  the

same  notification  under  Section  4,  higher

compensation  has  been  awarded.  An  aggrieved

person  who  had  not  made  an  application  for

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Reference  under  Section  18  of  the  Act  thus

becomes entitled to apply under Section 28A of

the Act. The right to an aggrieved person under

Section  28A  arises  only  when  the  Reference

Court  grants  compensation  in  excess  of  the

amount awarded by the Collector under Section

11.  It  was  also  observed  that  such  an

application  can  be  made  in  writing  by  any

‘aggrieved’ person. The said expression would

cover any interested person who had failed to

make an application for Reference under Section

18  and  would  not  be  confined  to  those  who

received  compensation  under  protest.  It  was

also indicated that Section 28A is a ‘complete

Code’ in itself providing substantive right to

‘an  aggrieved  person’  to  claim  compensation

equal to that awarded to his neighbour covered

by the same notification under Section 4(1).

26. In  Union of India & Anr. v. Pradeep

Kumari & Ors.,  (1995) 2 SCC 736, this Court

discussed the object underlying Section 28A of

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the Act and observed that such object would be

better achieved by giving the expression ‘an

award’ in Section 28A its natural meaning as

meaning the award that is made by the court in

Part III of the Act after the coming into force

of  Section  28A.  If  the  said  expression  in

Section  28A(1)  is  thus  construed,  a  person

would be able to seek re-determination of the

amount of compensation payable to him provided

the following conditions are satisfied;

(i)   An award has been made by the court

under  Part  III  after  the  coming  into

force of Section 28A;

(ii)   By  the  said  award  the  amount  of

compensation  in  excess  of  the  amount

awarded by the Collector under Section

11 has been allowed to the applicant in

that reference;

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(iii) The person moving the application under

Section 28A is interested in other land

covered by the same notification under

Section  4(1)  to  which  the  said  award

relates;

(iv)   The person moving the application did

not make an application to the Collector

under Section 18;  

(v)   The application is moved within three

months from the date of the award on the

basis of which the re-determination of

amount of compensation is sought; and

(vi)   Only  one  application  can  be  moved

under  Section  28A  for  re-determination

of compensation by an applicant.

27. A Constitution Bench of this Court in

Union of India (UOI) & Anr. V. Hansoli Devi &

Ors., (2002) 7 SCC 273 held that dismissal of

24

an application seeking reference under Section

18 on the ground of delay also would not come

in the way of the claimant for re-determination

of compensation under Section 28A of the Act.

Such  person  can  be  said  to  be  a  ‘person

aggrieved’ and would be entitled to make an

application  to  receive  compensation  provided

the conditions of the said section are complied

with.

28. From the aforesaid decisions, in our

judgment, the law is well settled and it is

that against an award, if the Reference Court

allows the applicant and awards any amount of

compensation in excess of the amount awarded by

the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11

of the Act, any person interested in the land

covered by the same notification may make an

application under Section 28A of the Act within

the period specified in the said section and

may seek the same relief which has been granted

to other land-owners by the Reference Court.

25

29. We  are,  however,  of  the  considered

opinion that the appellant is not entitled to

the  relief  he  prayed  in  the  writ  petition

before the High Court as well as before us in

the present proceedings so far as the direction

to decide his application under Section 28A of

the  Act  is  concerned.  It  is  true  that  once

Reference Court decides the matter and enhances

the  compensation,  a  person  who  is  otherwise

eligible  to  similar  relief  and  who  has  not

sought Reference, may apply under Section 28A

of the Act. If the conditions for application

of the said provision have been complied with,

such  person  would  be  entitled  to  the  same

relief which has been granted to other persons

seeking  Reference  and  getting  enhanced

compensation. But, it is equally true that if

Reference  Court  decides  the  matter  and  the

State  or  acquiring  body  challenges  such

enhanced amount of compensation and the matter

is  pending  either  before  the  High  Court  or

before  this  Court  (Supreme  Court),  the

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Collector  would  be  within  his  power  or

authority to keep the application under Section

28A  of  the  Act  pending  till  the  matter  is

finally  decided  by  the  High  Court  or  the

Supreme Court as the case may be. The reason

being  that  the  decision  rendered  by  the

Reference Court enhancing compensation has not

attained ‘finality’ and is sub judice before a

superior Court. It is, in the light of the said

circumstance that the State of U.P. issued two

Government orders on January 14, 1994 and June

13, 2001.

30. We  see no illegality in keeping the

applications  under  Section  28A  of  the  Act

pending till the issue is finally settled by

the Court and a decision has been arrived at.

31. The point is no longer res integra. In

Babua  Ram,  a  similar  contention  was  raised

before this Court. It was submitted on behalf

of the claimant invoking Section 28A of the Act

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that  once  a  Reference  Court  enhances  the

compensation  and a  person similarly  situated

makes an application under Section 28A of the

Act,  the  Collector  is  bound  to  decide  the

application and grant enhanced compensation. It

was, therefore, submitted that the Collector/

Land Acquisition Officer was under obligation

to  re-determine  compensation  by  granting

benefit of the order of the Reference Court.

32. Negativing the contention, this Court

observed;

   “However, with a view to avoiding uncertainty and fluctuation, it would be appropriate  that,  the  Collector,  while paying  compensation  under  Section  31, should explain in vernacular language of the  claimant  informing  all  persons interested in the compensation that they have a right to protest the compensation determined under s. 11 before receiving the same; has right to seek reference in writing  under  Section  18  to  the  civil court and that the application should be made expressing the specific objections in  writing  within  the  limitation prescribed under Section 18. In case of his  failure  to  avail  of  the  same,  he would not be entitled to further right

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and remedy to seek higher compensation. In case the claimant to be illiterate, it should be properly explained to him in his mother tongue. The statement made in this behalf by the Collector should be in the mother tongue of the claimant. The  Collector  should  append  a certificate that it was truly, correctly and  properly  explained  and  obtain  the signature or thumb impression in token thereof and this should be kept as part of the record of the award proceedings. He  should  also  maintain  a  regular register in his office in the serietum duly  signed  by  him  and  sealed  and  be kept  in  the  personal  custody  of  the Collector. This would not only obviate the hardship to the interested persons but  also  prevent  corrupt  practices  in fabricating  the  applications  for reference after the bar of limitation. In  this  behalf,  it  is  also  necessary that  the  Collector/L.A.O.  should  also maintain another register for receipt of the  applications  under  Section  28A indicating the date of its receipt, seal of the office and personal signature of the  Collector/L.A.O.  concerned  and  the receipt thereof duly communicated to the government or the authorised officer in proviso to s. 11 of the Act”.

33. The view in  Babua Ram  was reiterated

in  U.P.  State  Industrial  Development  Corpn.

Ltd. v. State of U.P. & Ors., (1995) 2 SCC 766.

There, the Court stated;     “The entire controversy has been considered  by this Court in  Babua Ram

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and  Ors.  v.  State  of  U.P. dated 4.10.1994 rendered in C.A. Nos. 563/94 & batch and held that since an appeal has been preferred by the State against the award  of  the  Dist.  Judge  made  under Section 26 of the Act, the proper course open  to  the  L.A.O.,  on  an  application made under Section 28-A(1) of the Act, would be to keep the applications under Section 28-A(1) pending till the appeal filed  against  the  award  of  the  Dist. Judge is disposed of by the High Court and then to take action as per Section 28-A(2)  of  the  Act.  Following  the  law laid  down  therein  and  subject  to directions  contained  therein,  we  hold that  the  High  Court  was  not  right  in dismissing  the  writ  petitions. Therefore, the order of the High Court is set aside. The award of the Collector made under Section 28-A(2) is quashed. The Collector/L.A.O. is directed to keep the application filed under Section 28-A (1) of the Act pending till the disposal of  the  appeal.  On  receipt  of  the judgment from the High Court or in an appeal  by  this  Court  the  L.A.O.  is directed  to  determine  the  compensation based on the final judgment according to law”.

34. In  our  opinion,  therefore,  the

Collector  was  right  in  not  deciding  the

application in view of the fact that the order

passed by the Reference Court was challenged by

the New Okhla Industrial Development Authority

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(NOIDA) by filing first appeals before the High

Court.  The  High  Court  had  entertained  the

appeals  and  also  passed  interim  order.  The

contention of the appellants before the High

Court that Government Orders dated January 14,

1994 and June 13, 2001 were illegal, arbitrary

and  ultra vires has no force. In fact, those

Government Orders are in consonance with law

laid down by this Court in Babua Ram and other

cases. We, therefore, see no infirmity in the

action of the Collector in not deciding the

applications. 35. For  the  foregoing  reasons,  in  our

opinion,  the  appeals  deserve  to  be  partly

allowed. The order passed by the High Court in

all these matters are set aside but validity of

Government Orders dated January 14, 1994 and

June 13, 2001 is upheld. 36. We may, however, hasten to add that as

observed hereinabove, we are not deciding about

the locus standi of the appellant. As and when

the  question  will  come  up  before  the

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Collector/Land Acquisition Officer, after the

disposal of first appeals before the High Court

or  before  this  Court  or  after  the  decision

attains  finality,  such  question  as  to

maintainability  may  be  decided  on  its  own

merits  after  hearing  the  parties.  All

contentions of all parties are kept open. 37. The appeals are accordingly allowed to

the  extent  indicated  above.  In  view  of  the

facts and in the circumstances of the cases,

however, there shall be no order as to costs.

………………………………………………J. (C.K. THAKKER)

NEW DELHI, ………………………………………………J. NOVEMBER 07, 2008. (D.K. JAIN)

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