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PETITIONER: KEHAR SINGH & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: CHANAN SINGH & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 14/12/1967

BENCH: RAMASWAMI, V. BENCH: RAMASWAMI, V. SHAH, J.C. BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA

CITATION:  1968 AIR  806            1968 SCR  (2) 651

ACT: Customary  law,  Punjab-Sidhu  Jats  of  Muktsar  Tahsil  of Ferozepore  District-5th  degree  callaterals,  of  deceased landowner whether take precedence over his married daughters in  succession to his non-ancestral property-General  custom in  Rattigan’s Digest or special custom in  Riwaj-i-am-Which to prevail.

HEADNOTE: D,  a  Sidhu  Jat of Muktsar  Tahsil,  Ferozepore  District, Punjab  was  tile last male holder of certain land  in  that area.  He was succeeded by his widow after whose death,  the land  was  mutated in favour of D’s collaterals in  the  5th degree.   D’s daughter filed a suit for a  declaration  that she  was  the  legal heir of .he land and  was  entitled  to inherit  to  the exclusion of the  collaterals.   The  trial court  held  that  the  land  was  not  ancestral  but   the defendants  were preferential heirs under the custom of  the district.   The decree was affirmed by the  first  appellate court.  In second appeal, however, the High Court decided in favour  of  the plaintiff holding that  the  general  custom recorded  in  Rattigan’s  Digest had not been  shown  to  be displaced  by  any  special custom in  the  Riwaj-i-am,  The defendants appealed. HELD : The entries in the Riwaj-i-am on which the appellants relied,  did not refer at all to non-ancestral property  and were therefore not relevant evidence to establish a  special custom among the Sidhu jats of Muktsar Tahsil of  Ferozepore District  entitling  collaterals  for  succession  to   non- ancestral   property  in  preference  to   daughters.    The appellants  had not discharged the onus which lay upon  them of  proving  that the general custom had been  varied  by  a special  custom  enabling  the collaterals  to  exclude  the daughters.  It was manifest therefore that the customary law among  the  Sidhu  Jats  of  Muktsar  Tahsil  of  Ferozepore district -Is regards non-ancestral property was the same  as recorded  generally for the State of Punjab in Paragraph  23 of  Rattigan’s  Digest  i.e.  a  daughter  is  preferred  to collaterals. [657 G-H] Mst.   Rai Kaur v. Talok Singh, A.I.R. 1916 Lab. 343,  Budhi Prakash  v.  Chandra Bhan, A.I.R. 1918 Lab. 225,  Narain  v.

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Mst.   Gaindo,  A.I.R. 1918 Lab. 304, Fatima  Bibi  v.  Shah Nawaz.  A.I.R. 1921 Lab. 180, Abdul Rahiman v. Mst.   Natho, I.L.R. [1932] 13 Lab. 458, Mst.  Hurmate v. Hoshiaru, I.L.R. 25 Lab. 228 and Mst.  Subhani v. Nawab and Ors., 68 I.A.  1, referred to. (ii) Even  on  the assumption that  the  Riwaj-i-am  entries referred  to  the non-ancestral property of  the  last  male holder  the  appellants could not succeed.  For  though  the entries  in  the  Riwaj-i-am  are  entitled  to  an  initial presumption  in favour of their correctness, the quantum  of evidence necessary to rebut this presumption would vary with the facts and circumstances of each particular case.  Where, for   instance,  the  Riwaj-i-am  laid  down  a  custom   in consonance  with  the  general agricultural  custom  of  the State, very strong proof would be required to displace  this presumption, but where, on the &-her hand, this was not  the case,  and  the  custom as recorded in  the  Riwaj-i-am  was opposed to the rules generally 652 prevalent  the presumption would be  considerably  weakened. Likewise, when the Riwaj-i-am affected adversely the  rights of  females  who had no opportunity  whatever  of  appearing before  the  revenue authorities, the presumption  would  be weaker  still,  and very little evidence  would  suffice  to rebut it. [658 B-D] Har  Narain  v. Mst.  Deoki, (1893) 24.   P.R.  124.   Sayad Rahim  Shah  v. Sayad Hussain Shah, (1901) 102  P.  R.  353, Bholi  v. Man Singh, ( 1908) 86 P. R. 402 and  Mahant  Salig Ram v.  Mst.  Maya Devi [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1191, referred to. (iii)In. the present case the High Court bid mentioned three instances in its judgment which showed that the  presumption attaching to Riwaj-i-am had been rebutted in this case.  The appellant’s-defendants had not relied upon any instances  in support  of  their case.  The High Court  therefore  rightly decided in favour of the plaintiffs. [660 C-D] Mst.  Rai Kaur v.  Talok Singh, A.I.R. 1916 Lah. 343,  Ratta v. Mst Jai Kaur, (1934) P.L.R. 69 and R.F.A. No. 220 of 1954 decided by the Punjab High Court on April 11 1961,  referred to.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 781 of 1964. Appeal from the judgment and decree dated September 6,  1961 of the Punjab High Court in Regular Second Appeal No. 54  of 1960. N.   S.  Bindra,  Kartar Singh Suri, Champat Rai and  E.  C. Agrawala, for the appellants. S.   P. Sinha, S. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta, for  respondents Nos. 1, 3, 5 and 6. Bishan  Narain, S. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta, for  respondent No. 4. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami,  J. The question to be considered in this  appeal is whether under the customary law applicable to Sidhu  Jats of Muktsar Tahsil of Ferozepore district collaterals of  the 5th degree of the deceased land-owner could take  precedence over  his  married  daughters  in  succession  to  his  non- ancestral property. The dispute relates to 1574 kanals 4 marlas of land situated in   village  Kotli  Ablu,  Muktsar  Tahsil  of   Ferozepore district.  Dulla Singh was the last male holder of the  land and he was succeeded by his widow, Smt.  Indi on his  death. Suit.   Indi  died on September 8, 1955 and  thereafter  the

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estate was mutated by the revenue authorities on February 1, 1956  in favour of the defendants who were the  reversioners of  her husband in the 5th degree.  Smt.  Nihal Kaur is  the daughter   of  Dulla  Singh.   On  November  14,  1957   she instituted  the  suit  which is the  subject-matter  of  the present  appeal in the court of Subordinate  Judge,  Muktsar for  a declaration that she was the legal heir of  the  land left by Smt.  Indi and that                             653 she  was entitled to inherit the estate to the exclusion  of the  collaterals.  The suit was resisted by  the  defendants who  claimed  that the whole of the land was  ancestral  and they  were  preferential heirs to the deceased  Dulla  Singh than  the plaintiff.  The trial court held that the land  in dispute  was not the ancestral property of Dulla Singh,  but the  defendants  who were 5th degree  collaterals  of  Dulla Singh were entitled to exclude his daughter from  succession even  to the non-ancestral property under the custom of  the district.  Accordingly the trial court dismissed the suit of the  plaintiff.  The decree was affirmed by  the  Additional District  Judge,  Ferozepore in appeal.   Mst.   Nihal  Kaur preferred a Second Appeal to the Punjab High Court which was allowed and the suit of the plaintiff was decreed.  The High Court took the view that the general custom of the Punjab as laid down in Rattigan’s Customary Law was that the daughters excluded  collaterals  for succession to  the  self-acquired property  of their father and the special custom set out  in the  Riwaj-i-am that the agnates, however,  remote,  exclude daughters  from  succession to their father’s  property  was opposed  to  the general custom referred to  above  and  the Riwaj-i-am was only a presumptive evidence in favour of  the collaterals  and  the presumption has been rebutted  by  the plaintiff  Mst.   Nihal  Kaur in the  circumstances  of  the present case.  In other words, the High Court, held that the general  custom  in  favour  of  the  daughter’s  succession prevailed and the defendants had not been able to prove that the  general  custom  had been varied by  a  special  custom enabling the collaterals to exclude the daughters. This  appeal is brought by the defendants on  a  certificate from the judgment of the Punjab High, Court dated  September 6, 1961 in Regular Second Appeal No. 54 of 1960. On  the question of custom the respondents relied  upon  the statements in paragraph 23 of Rattigan’s Digest of Customary Law  (14th  Edn.), a book of unquestioned authority  in  the Punjab,  State.  In para 23, p. 132 it is stated that (1)  a daughter  only succeeds to the ancestral landed property  of her  father,  if an agriculturist, in default :-(1)  of  the heirs  mentioned  in  the preceding  paragraph  (viz.,  male lineal  descendants, widow or mother), or (2) of  near  male collaterals of her father, provided that a married  daughter sometimes   excludes  near  male  collaterals   in   certain circumstances specified in the paragraph, (2) But in  regard to  the  acquired property of her father,  the  daughter  is preferred  to collaterals.  It is further stated at  p.  152 that  "the  general  custom of Punjab  is  that  a  daughter excludes collaterals in succession to self-acquired property of  her  father and the initial onus, therefore, is  on  the collaterals to show that the general custom in favour of the daughter’s  succession to the self-acquired property of  her father, has been varied by a special custom 654 excluding daughters".  This being the legal position of  the parties  -the  question arises whether  the  defendants  had discharged  the onus ,of proving the existence of a  special custom   excluding  the  daughters.   On  this   point   the

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appellants  relied upon the answers to ,Questions 48 and  49 in  the  Compilation  of the  Customary  Law  of  Ferozepore district  by  M.M.L.  Currie,  Settlement  Officer.    These ,questions  and answers are comprised in the  Riwaj-i-am  of the  settlement  of  Ferozepore district  of  1914  and  are reproduced below :               "  Question  48-Under what  circumstances  are               daughters  entitled  to  inherit  ?  Are  they               excluded by the sons or near male kindreds  of               the  deceased  ? If they are excluded  by  the               near male kindred, is there any fixed limit of               relationship  within  which  such  near   male               kindred  must  stand towards the  deceased  in               order to exclude his daughter ? If so, how  is               the  limit  ascertained? If  this  depends  on               descent  from a common ancestor, state  within               how   many  generations  relatively   to   the               deceased such common ancestor must come?               Answer-At  last settlement Mr.  Francis  wrote               "Except  a few Sayyads all tribes say  that  a               daughter can never succeed.  Some Sayyads  say               that an unmarried daughter can succeed like  a               son; but no instances are given.’               The  custom has now changed  completely,  most               tribes  admitting that a daughter is  entitled               to  succeed till marriage in the absence of  a               widow   or  male  lineal   descendants.    The               following groups, however, do not admit that a               daughter  can  succeed  :-Dogars  of  Fazilka,               Nipals,   Sayyads  of  Ferozepore,  Zira   and               Muktsar,   Bodlas   (unless   there   are   no               collaterals  in  the  5th  degree),  ,Chishtis               (unless  no  collaterals in the  7th  degree),               Pathans  of  Ferozepore  (except  the  Kasuria               group), Rajputs of Fazilka, Wattus of Zira and               Fazilka,   Moghals   except   in   Ferozepore,               Mahtams,  Sodhis,  Bagri  Jats,  Kumhars   and               Suthars, Bishnois and the following Jat  Sikhs               in Fazilka Tahsil-Dhaliwals, Sidhhus, Gils and               Sandhus.               The  Kasuria  Pathans state  that  a  daughter               succeeds if there are no sons, and the  Arians               state that she excludes collaterals who do not               come within the 4th degree.               Question 49-Is there any distinction as to the               rights   of  daughters  to  inherit  (i)   the               immovable or ancestral,               (ii)  the  movable  or  acquired  property  of               their father ?                                    655               Answer-There is no distinction.  A father  can               of   course  gift  his  movable  or   acquired               property to his daughter." In  the present case, there is no proof of any instance  for or  against  the  right of inheritance of a  daughter  of  a deceased  last  male  holder of the, Sidhu  tribe  of  Jats, either  in  the Muktsar Tahsil or in the whole  district  of Ferozepore.  At least, none was brought to the notice of the lower  courts  by the plaintiff or the defendants.   It  was contended on behalf of the appellants that the Riwaj-i-am of 1914 was entitled to a presumption as to the existence of  a custom  even though not supported by proof of instances  and it   must  therefore  be  held  that  the  defendants   have discharged  the  initial onus of proving  that  the  general custom has been varied by a special custom enabling them  to

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exclude the married daughter.  The real controversy in  this appeal  is, however, on the question whether the entries  in the Riwaj-i-am on which the defendants rely refer at all  to non-ancestral  property or not.  In Mst.  Raj Kaur v.  Talok Singh(1)  Sir Donald Johnstone, the Chief Justice held  that the  Riwaj-i-am  as compiled, did  not  cover  self-acquired property   and  that  where  the  Riwaj-i-am  talked   about succession to land without discrimination between  ancestral and  self-acquired  land, the rule laid down could  only  be taken to apply to ancestral property.  This case related  to property  in  Ferozepore district, though with regard  to  a different  tehsil and different sub-caste of Jats,  but  the important  point is that the questions of the Riwaj-i-am  of 1878  in  that  case were exactly in the  same  language  as questions  48 and 49 of the Riwaj-i-am of 1914.   A  similar view  was  taken by Shadilal and Wilberforce, JJ.  in  Budhi Prakash v. Chandra Bhan(2).  The view was followed by  other judges   of  the  Lahore  High  Court  in  Narain  v.   Mst. Gaindo(3),  and Fatima Bibi v. Shah Nawaz ( 4 ) .  In  Abdul Rahman v. Mst. Natho(5) it was observed by the High Court as follows :               "  According  to  the  Customary  Law  of  the               district, collaterals within the fifth  degree               exclude    daughters,   but   it   has    been               consistently held by this Court that  Riwaj-i-               am  refer only to ancestral land unless  there               is  a clear statement to the contrary.  It  is               unnecessary to refer to the numerous decisions               on  this  point.   Customary law  is  in  fact               usually   only   concerned   with   protecting               ancestral   property,   while    self-acquired               property  can  be  disposed of  as  the  owner               pleases,  that  is, reversioners  are  usually               concerned  only  with property  ancestral  qua               them." (1) A.I.R. 1916 Lah. 343.                   (2) A.I.R.  1918 Lah. 225. (3)  A.I.R. 1918 Lah. 304.                 (4)  A.T.R.  1921 Lab. 180. (5)  I.L.R. [1932] 13 Lah. 458. 656 The decision of this case was affirmed by the Full Bench  of the Lahore High Court in Mst.  Hurmate v. Hoshiaru(l).   Din Mohammad, J. delivering the leading judgment in this  case,, observed as follows :               "In my view, the raison d’ etre of those cases               which  lay down that the Manuals of  Customary               Law  were ordinarily concerned with  ancestral               property    only   is   quite    intelligible.               Collaterals  are, as stated by Addison, J.  in               Abdul Rehman  v.  Mst.   Natho (  2  )  really               speaking interested in    that  property  only               which descends from their common ancestor  and               this is the only basis of the agnatic  theory.               What  a maleholder acquires himself is  really               no  concern  of  theirs.   It  is  reasonable,               therefore,  to  assume that when  manuals-  of               customary  law  were originally  prepared  and               subsequently revised, the persons  questioned,               unless  specifically  told  to  the  contrary,               could normally reply in the light of their own               interest alone and that, as stated above,  was               confined to the ancestral property only.   The               fact that on some occasions the questioner had               particularly  drawn some  distinction  between

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             ancestral and non-ancestral property would not               have  put them on their guard in  every  case,               considering  their lack of education and  lack               of  intelligence in general.   Similarly,  the               use  of  the terms ’in no case’ or  ’under  no               circumstances’   would  refer   to   ancestral               property  only  and not be extended so  as  to               cover   self-acquired  property   unless   the               context favoured that construction." The decision of the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court  was approved by the Judicial Committee in Mst.  Subhani v. Nawab and  Ors.(3) in which the controversy arose with  regard  to the  interpretation of questions 16 and 17 and  the  answers thereto  in  Wilson’s  Manual of  Customary  Law  which  are reproduced below               "Question 16 (p. 48)-Under what  circumstances               are  daughters entitled to inherit ? Are  they               excluded  by the sons or by the widow,  or  by               the  near male kindred of the, deceased  ?  If               they are excluded by the near male kindred, is               there  any fixed limit of relationship  within               which such near kindred must stand towards the               deceased  in order to exclude his daughters  ?               If  so, how is the limit ascertained ?  If  it               depends  on  descent from a  common  ancestor,               state  within how many generations  relatively               to  the  deceased such  common  ancestor  must               come.               (1)        I.L.R.      25      Lah.       228.               I.L.R. [1932] 13 Lah.  458.               (3)   68 I. A. 1.               657               Answer 16-All Musalmans.               A  married  daughter in no case  inherits  her               father’s  estate  or  any  share  in  it.   An               unmarried  daughter  succeeds to no  share  in               presence   of   agnate  descendants   of   the               deceased,  or of her own mother; but if  there               be no agnate descendants and no sonless widow,               the  un  married daughters  succeed  in  equal               shares   to  the  whole  of   their   father’s               property,  movable and immovable,  till  their               marriage, when it reverts to the agnate heirs.               If  there be a widow and daughters of  another               wife who has died, the unmarried daughters  of               the  deceased wife succeed to  their  mother’s               share till their marriage.               Question  17 (p. 49)-Is there any  distinction               as  to the rights of daughters to inherit  (1)               the immovable or ancestral, (2) the movable or               acquired, property of their father?               Answer 1.7-All Musalmans.               As  regards  the  right  of  the  daughter  to               inherit,  no distinction is made  between  the               movable and immovable ancestral and  acquired,               property  of the father.  If she  inherits               at all she takes the, whole estate." It  was  held by the Judicial Committee that though  in  the answers to question No. 17 in Wilson’s Manual no distinction was  made  between ancestral and  non-ancestral  or  between movable and immovable property, and the rule was stated as a wide  generalization (in answer to question No. 16)  that  a married daughter in no case inherits her father’s estate  or any  share in it, it must be taken in view of  the  numerous decisions  of  the Punjab courts that the  Riwaj-i-am  which

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states  the  rule  in such wide and  general  terms  governs ancestral   property  only.   It  should  be  noticed   that Questions  16 and IT of the Wilson’s Manual are  couched  in similar  language to Questions 48 and 49 of the  Riwaj-i-ani with which we are concerned in the present appeal.  In  view of   these  authorities  we  have  therefore  come  to   the conclusion  that the entries in the Riwaj-i-ani with  regard to  Questions 48 and 49 on which the appellants rely do  not refer at all to non-ancestral property and are therefore not relevant  evidence to establish a special custom  among  the Sidhu   Jats  of  Muktsar  Tahsil  of  Ferozepore   district entitling   collaterals  for  succession  to   non-ancestral property  in preference to daughters.  It follows  therefore that  the appellants have not discharged the onus  which-lay upon them of proving that the general custom has been varied by a special customs enabling the collaterals to exclude the daughters.  It is manifest therefore that the customary  law among  the  Sidhu  Jats  of  Muktsar  Tahsil  of  Ferozepore district as regards non-ancestral property is the same 658 as  recorded generally for the State of Punjab in  paragraph 23  of  Rattigan’s Digest i.e., a daughter is  preferred  to collaterals. We  shall, however, assume in favour of the appellants  that Questions  48  and  49  of the  Riwaj-i-am  relate  also  to succession  of  non-ancestral  property  of  the  last  male holder.   Even upon that assumption we are of  opinion  that the  case of the appellants cannot succeed.  The  reason  is that though the entries in the Riwaj-i-am are entitled to an initial  presumption  in favour of  their  correctness,  the quantum  of  evidence necessary to  rebut  this  presumption would  vary with the facts and circumstances of each  parti- cular case.  Where, for instance, the Riwaj-i-am laid down a custom in consonance with the general agricultural custom of the  State, very strong proof would be required to  displace this presumption, but where, on the other hand, this was not the  case, and the custom as recorded in the Riwaj-i-am  was opposed  to the rules generally prevalent,  the  presumption would   be  considerably  weakened.   Likewise,  where   the Riwaj-i-am affected adversely the rights of females who  had no  opportunity  whatever  of appearig  before  the  revenue authorities, the presumption would be weaker still, and very little  evidence  would suffice to rebut it.  In  Narain  v. Mst.  Deoki(l), Roe, J. stated as follows :               "There  is no doubt a general tendency of  the               stronger  to  over-ride  the  weak,  and  many               instances  may occur of the males of a  family               depriving  females  of  rights  to  which  the               latter  are legally entitled.  Such  instances               may be followed so generally as to establish a               custom,  even though the origin of the  custom               were  usurpation;  but the  Courts  are  bound               carefully  to  watch over the  rights  of  the               weaker party, and to refuse to hold that  they               had  ceased to exist unless a  custom  against               them is most clearly established". In a later case, Sayad Rahim Shah v. Sayad Hussain Shah (2) a similar caution was uttered by Robertson, J. who  observed as follows:               "The  male relations, in many cases at  least,               have been clearly more concerned for their own               advantage than for the security of the  rights               of  widows  and ’other female  relatives  with               rights or alleged rights over family property,               and  the statements of the male  relatives  in

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             such matters have to be taken cum grano  salis               where  they  tend to minimize  the  rights  of               others and to extend their own. (1)  (1893) 24 P-R. 124. (2) (1901) 102 P.R. 353. 6 5 9 The  same view was expressed by the Lahore High Court  in  a still later case-Bholi v. Man Singh(1) where the  Riwaj-i-am had  laid down that daughters were excluded by  collaterals, even up to the tenth degree and it was stated as follows:               "As the land is rising in value under  British               rule,  the land-holders are becoming more  and               more  anxious  to exclude  female  succession.               They  are  ready  to state  the  rule  against               daughters as strongly as possible, but if  the               custom  is so well established, it is  strange               that  they  are  unable  to  state  a   single               instance  in  point on an  occasion  like  the               compilation  of the Riwaj-i-am, when  detailed               inquiries are being made and when the  leading               men  are supposed to give their  answers  with               deliberation and care." The  principle was reiterated by this Court in Mahant  Salig Ram  v. Mst.  Maya Debi(2) It was pointed out in  that  case that  it  was well-settled that the general  custom  of  the Punjab State was that the daughter excluded collaterals from succession  to self-acquired property of her father  and  so the  initial  onus must therefore be on the  collaterals  to show  that the general custom  in favour of  the  daughter’s succession  to the self-acquired property of her father  has been varied by a special custom excluding the daughter.   It was also well-settled that the entries in the Riwaj-i-am are entitled  to  an  initial presumption  in  favour  of  their correctness  but the presumption will be considerably  weak- ened  if it adversely affects the rights of the females  who have   no  opportunity  of  appearing  before  the   Revenue authorities.   In the present case, apart from  the  general custom  of the Punjab to which due weight must  be  attached three instances have been referred by the High Court in  the course  of  its  judgment  to  show  that  the   presumption attaching to Riwaj-i-am has been rebutted in this case.  The first instance is the subject-matter of the decision in Mst. Rai Kaur v. Talok Singh(3).  It was a case of Gill Jats from Zira  Tahsil  of Ferozepore district.  It was held  in  that case that the plaintiffs on whom the onus rested had  failed to  prove  that by custom among Gill Jats of  mauza  Lohara, tahsil Zira, district Ferozepore, they, as near  collaterals of  a  deceased sonless proprietor, succeeded to  his  self- acquired  estate  in preference to a daughter.  As  we  have already pointed out earlier, Questions 48 and 49  correspond to  Questions 1 and 2 of the Riwaj-i-am of 1878  which  were dealt with in this case.  The second instance is reported as Ratta v. Mst.  Jai Kaur(4).  It is case of a Daliwal Jat  of Tahsil  Moga,  District Ferozepore.  It  was  admitted  that daughter of the last male holder was entitled to succeed  to his self-acquired property.  It is true that the case (1)  (1908) 86 P.R. 402. (3)  A.T.R. 1916 Lah. 343. L2 SupCI/68 12 (2)  [1955]1 S.C.R. 1191. (4)  (1934) P. L.R. 69. 660 was   decided  upon  the  admission  of  Counsel   for   the collaterals but it is improbable that if there was  material evidence  in  support of the collaterals the  Counsel  would

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have made such an admission.  The third instance referred to by  the  High Court is R.F.A. no. 220 of  1954,  decided  on April 11, 1961, in which it was held that sister of the last male  holder  excludes his collaterals from  inheritance  in regard to his non-ancestral or acquired property.  That is a case  of  Jats from Fazilka tahsil of  Ferozepore  district. The property, however, was situated in two villages, one  in Fazilka tahsil and the other in Muktsar tahsil.  It was held in  that  case that in Muktsar and in Fazilka in  regard  to non-ancestral  or acquired property of the last male  holder his   sister  was  a  preferential  successor   as   against collaterals.   In this connection it should be noticed  that in the Riwaj-i-am of 1914 Question 58 concerns the rights of succession  of sisters and sisters’ sons and the  answer  is that they never inherit.  Considering therefore that in  the neighbouring tahsils of the same district in regard to  non- ancestral  property a daughter has excluded collaterals  and in  Muktsar tahsil a sister has excluded collaterals,  there is  in  our  opinion sufficient  material  to  displace  the presumption of correctness of the Riwaj-i-am entries in this case.   In view of the considerations already  mentioned  in the  judgment  the presumption attaching to  the  Riwaj-i-am entries is a weak presumption and in our opinion it has been sufficiently  discharged  by  the evidence  adduced  by  the respondents  in this case.  It is necessary to add that  the appellants-defendants have not relied upon any instances  in support of their case. For  the reasons expressed we hold that the judgment of  the High Court dated September 6, 1961 in Regular Second  Appeal No. 54 of 1960 is correct and this appeal must be  dismissed with costs. G.C.                                                  Appeal dismissed 661