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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  2479 of 2007

PETITIONER: Kaushlya Devi

RESPONDENT: Shri Karan Arora & Ors

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 14/05/2007

BENCH: Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT & LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T  

CIVIL  APPEAL NO.     2479           OF 2007 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.16500 of 2005)  

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

                Leave granted.

       Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a  Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court which  dismissed the appeal filed by the husband of the appellant.  In  the appeal, appellant was respondent no.4.   The background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

A claim petition was filed by the husband of the  appellant, namely, Balwant Singh in terms of Sections 166,  140 and 141 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (in short the  ’Act’). In the claim petition, the present appellant was  impleaded as respondent no.4 while the driver of the vehicle  no. HR 41/3347 and the owner of the vehicle were impleaded  as respondents 1 and 2.  The United India Insurance  Company Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the ’insurer’) was  impleaded as respondent no.3.  In the claim petition filed on  15.3.1997 which was registered on 17.3.1997, it was alleged  that the son of Balwant Singh (claimant) and the present  appellant, died as a result of the vehicular accident in which  the aforesaid car was involved.  The deceased was aged about  14 years and was the only son of the appellant.  The accident  took place on 5.2.1997 when Karan Arora (respondent no.1)  came to the house of the claimant and requested the deceased  to accompany him in his car.  The car was being driven by the  said Karan Arora. The vehicle met with an accident.  The  deceased lost his life. A claim of Rs.10,00,000/- was made.   On receipt of the notice from the Motor Accident Claims  Tribunal, Chandigarh (in short the ’Tribunal’) responses were  filed by the respondents.  Respondent no.2 i.e. the owner of  the vehicle stated that the driver was a minor and the claim  petition was not maintainable against him. Though some other  points were urged they were treated not to be of consequences  by the Tribunal.  The insurer took the stand that since the  death of the deceased was never intimated to the insurer and  also about the alleged accident, the petition appears to have  been a collusive petition. The claim in the claim petition was

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that the deceased was earning Rs.10,000/- per month.  The  insurer took the stand that it was not liable as it was the  admitted stand that the driver did not have any driving  licence. The present appellant as respondent no.4 accepted the  claim in the claim petition and prayed that the same be  accepted and indicated that she was entitled to share in the  amount of compensation.

The Tribunal on consideration of the rival stand came to  hold that the accident took place in the manner described.   Since the driver was a minor he did not have any liability but  the owner of the vehicle was liable to pay compensation as per  the award.  It was further held that the insurer has no liability  as the driver was not authorized to drive any vehicle.  A sum of  rupees one lakh was awarded along with 12% interest from  the date of the claim till realization.  The manner in which the  amount was to be deposited was also indicated in the award.   An appeal was preferred by the claimant Balwant Singh which  as noted above was dismissed by the High Court.   

In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the  appellant submitted that the awarded amount is meagre and  considering the background from which deceased came and  his academic career the award should have been more.   Learned counsel for the owner of the vehicle on the other hand  supported the order. Similar was the stand of the insurance  company.

In Mallett v. McMonagle 1970 (AC) 166, Lord Diplock  analysed in detail the uncertainties which arise at various  stages in making a rational estimate and practical ways of  dealing with them.  In Davies v. Taylor (1974) AC 207, it was  held that the Court, in looking at future uncertain events,  does not decide whether on balance one thing is more likely to  happen than another, but merely puts a value on the chances.   A possibility may be ignored if it is slight and remote.  Any  method of calculation is subordinate to the necessity for  compensating the real loss.  But a practical approach to the  calculation of the damages has been stated by Lord Wright in  Davies v. Powell Duffryn Associated Colleries Ltd. (1942) 1 All  ER 657, in the following words:

"The starting point is the amount of  wages which the deceased was earning, the  ascertainment of which to some extent may  depend on the regularity of his employment.   Then there is an estimate of how much was  required to be spent for his own personal and  living expenses.  The balance will give a datum  or basic figure which will generally be turned  into a lump sum by taking a certain number of  years’ purchase."             In State of Haryana and Anr. v. Jasbir Kaur and Ors.   (2003(7) SCC 484) it was held as under:

"7.  It has to be kept in view that the Tribunal  constituted under the Act as provided in  Section 168 is required to make an award  determining the amount of compensation  which is to be in the real sense "damages"  which in turn appears to it to be "just and  reasonable". It has to be borne in mind that  compensation for loss of limbs or life can  hardly be weighed in golden scales. But at the

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same time it has to be borne in mind that the  compensation is not expected to be a windfall  for the victim. Statutory provisions clearly  indicate that the compensation must be "just"  and it cannot be a bonanza; not a source of  profit; but the same should not be a pittance.  The courts and tribunals have a duty to weigh  the various factors and quantify the amount of  compensation, which should be just. What  would be ’just" compensation is a vexed  question. There can be no golden rule  applicable to all cases for measuring the value  of human life or a limb. Measure of damages  cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical  calculations. It would depend upon the  particular facts and circumstances, and  attending peculiar or special features, if any.  Every method or mode adopted for assessing  compensation has to be considered in the  background of ’just" compensation which is  the pivotal consideration. Though by use of the  expression "which appears to it to be just" a  wide discretion is vested in the Tribunal, the  determination has to be rational, to be done by  a judicious approach and not the outcome of  whims, wild guesses and arbitrariness. The  expression ’just" denotes equitability, fairness  and reasonableness, and non-arbitrary. if it is  not so it cannot be just. (See Helen C. Rebello  v. Maharashtra SRTC (1999(1) SCC 90)

There are some aspects of human life which are capable  of monetary measurement, but the totality of human life is  like the beauty of sunrise or the splendor of the stars, beyond  the reach of monetary tape-measure.  The determination of  damages for loss of human life is an extremely difficult task  and it becomes all the more baffling when the deceased is a  child and/or a non-earning person.  The future of a child is  uncertain.  Where the deceased was a child, he was earning  nothing but had a prospect to earn. The question of  assessment of compensation, therefore, becomes stiffer.  The  figure of compensation in such cases involves a good deal of  guesswork.  In cases, where parents are claimants, relevant  factor would be age of parents.

In case of the death of an infant, there may have been  no actual pecuniary benefit derived by its parents during the  child’s life-time. But this will not necessarily bar the parent’s  claim and prospective loss will find a valid claim provided  that the parents establish that they had a reasonable  expectation of pecuniary benefit if the child had lived. This  principle was laid down by the House of Lords in the famous  case of Taff Vale Rly. V. Jenkins (1913) AC 1, and Lord  Atkinson said thus:

".....all that is necessary is that a  reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit  should be entertained by the person who sues.  It is quite true that the existence of this  expectation is an inference of fact - there must  be a basis of fact from which the inference can  reasonably be drawn; but I wish to express my  emphatic dissent from the proposition that it is  necessary that two of the facts without which

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the inference cannot be drawn are, first that  the deceased earned money in the past, and,  second, that he or she contributed to the  support of the plaintiff. These are, no doubt,  pregnant pieces of evidence, but they are only  pieces of evidence; and the necessary inference  can I think, be drawn from circumstances  other than and different from them." (See Lata  Wadhwa and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors.  (2001 (8) SCC 197) This Court in Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra) while  computing compensation made distinction between deceased  children falling within the age group of 5 to 10 years and age  group of 10 to 15 years.              In cases of young children of tender age, in view of  uncertainties abound, neither their income at the time of  death nor the prospects of the future increase in their income  nor chances of advancement of their career are capable of  proper determination on estimated basis.  The reason is that  at such an early age, the uncertainties in regard to their  academic pursuits, achievements in career and thereafter  advancement in life are so many that nothing can be assumed  with reasonable certainty.  Therefore, neither the income of the  deceased child is capable of assessment on estimated basis  nor the financial loss suffered by the parents is capable of  mathematical computation.

       These aspects were highlighted in New India Assurance  Co. Ltd. v. Satender and Ors. (AIR 2007 SC 324).          Applying the principles indicated in last named case  (supra) to the facts of the present case, and the fact that the  husband of the appellant has already died, we find no scope  for interference with the quantum awarded.  

       The appeal deserves dismissal which we direct.