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PETITIONER: KARNANI PROPERTIES LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: AUGUSTIN

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/11/1956

BENCH: SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P. BENCH: SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P. JAGANNADHADAS, B. IMAM, SYED JAFFER

CITATION:  1957 AIR  309            1957 SCR   20

ACT: Rent Control-Standard rent, Fixation of-Lease Providing  for a consolidated rent-Landlord undertaking to Provide  special amenities including supply of electric current-Applicability of  the Act Determination of fair and reasonable rent-  West Bengal  premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act  of 1950 (West Bengal XVII of 1950), s. 9 cl. (g), Sch.  A.

HEADNOTE: The appellant was the common landlord of the three  premises in respect of which three analogous proceedings were started by the respective tenants for standardisation of rent  under s.  9  read with Sch.  A of the West  Bengal  Premises  Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1950.  Under the terms of  the  lease, which provided for  a  consolidated  monthly rent,   the  landlord  was  to  provide,  besides   electric installations,  electric current for consumption  and  other special  amenities.   His  defence  was  that  the   special incidents  of  the tenancies took the tenancies out  of  the scope of the Act and if not, alternatively, cl. (g) of s.  9 of   the   Act   should  apply  and   the   rent   increased proportionately to the increase in the charges for  electric current  and enhanced Government duty payable thereon.   The Rent  Controller  rejected  the contentions  and  fixed  the standard rent in accordance with the rules laid down in Sch. A of the Act.  The Chief Judge of the Small Causes Court, on appeal by the landlord, applied cl. (g) of s. 9 of the  Act, gave relief in respect of the higher charges for electricity and Government duty and fixed the standard rent at a  higher figure.  The tenants moved the High Court in revision and it held  that  cl.  (g) of s. 9 did not  apply  and  virtually, though  not  entirely,  affirmed the decision  of  the  Rent Controller.   The landlord appealed by special leave on  the questions of law involved. Held, that the Act applied to the premises and the standard rent must be determined, under the provisions of cl. (g)  of s.  9  of  the  Act and the  decision  of  the  Chief  judge restored. 21 The  term ’Premises’ as defined in s. 2(8) of_ the  Act  was wide  enough  to  cover the  tenancies  with  their  special

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incidents   and  the  consolidated  monthly  rent  for   the amenities   provided  by  the  landlord  came   within   the comprehensive  sense in which the word rent was used by  the Act and was as such liable to be controlled under it. The observation to the contrary made in respect of such rent in  the  case of Residence Ltd. v. Surendra  Mokan  did  not correctly represent the legal position. Property Holding Co., Ltd. v. Clark, (1948) I K. B. 63o, and Alliance  Property Co. Ltd. v. Shaffer, (1948) 2  K.B.  464, referred to. Residence  Ltd.  v. Surendra Mohan, A.I.R.  1951  Cal.  126, considered. The  purpose which the legislature had in view  in  enacting the  Act  and the wide terms in which it  defined  the  term ’premises’  leave  no  manner of doubt  that  its  operative provisions were intended to have a wide application and  the mere  putting  in  of  a term in the  lease,  not  in  terms provided  for by any of the clauses of S. 9, could not  take the tenancy out of the scope of the Act and it would be  the duty  of the Court, in order that the provisions of the  Act might  have full effect, to give as wide an  application  to them as was permissible under the Act. Where,  as  in the instant case, the lease  provided  for  a consolidated  monthly  rent, the Rent Controller  and  other authorities  under the Act were empowered by the  provisions of  cl.  (g)  of s. 9 to determine the standard  rent  on  a consideration of all the payments that constitued the agreed rent  and  they did not prohibit a recourse  to  such  other provisions of the Act as could be applied, either in part or as a whole, in arriving at a fair and reasonable rent.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 32 to 34 of 1955. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated September  5,  1952,  of the Calcutta High  Court  in  Civil Revision cases Nos. 3257, 3258 and 3259 of 1951 arising  out of the order dated September 7, 1951, of the Court of  Small Causes at Calcutta, 4th Bench, in Rent Appeal Nos. 115,  743 and 744 of 1951. C.   K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, D. N. Mookerji and Sukumar Ghose, for the appellant. S.C. Janah and S.N. Mookerji, for the respondent. 1956.   November 9. The Judgment of the Court was  delivered by SINHA J.-Thesubstantial question for determination in  these three analogous appeals by special leave 22 is  whether  the  provisions  of s. 9  of  the  West  Bengal Premises  Rent  Control  (Temporary  Provisions)  Act,  1950 (which  hereinafter will be referred to as "the Act")  apply to  the  three promises which formed the subject  matter  of three separate proceedings in the courts below; and, if  so, which clause thereof.  The common landlord is the  appellant in each case the respondent in each case being the tenant of the particular tenement. In  order to appreciate the points of law at  issue  between the  parties,  it is necessary to state the  relevant  facts shorn  of  all details relating to the basic  rent  and  the standard rent fixed at different stages of the  proceedings. Those  details  are not necessary for the  determination  of these appeals.  The undisputed facts are that the  appellant is  seized  and  possessed  of  several  municipal  holdings

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collectively  known  as  the Karnani  Mansions,  25-A,  Park Street,  together  with adjoining premises situated  at  the junction  of Park Street and Free School Street in the  city of  Calcutta.  There are about 210 flats of different  types and  shop-rooms  in  the  said  Karnani  Mansions  let   out separately  to  tenants.  The tenant in each  of  the  three cases  leading  up  to the appeals in this  Court  had  been inducted  by the predecessor-in-title of the appellant.   In each case the tenancy consisted of a single room, a bath and a covered verandah.  The tenant has also the use of a number of  fans,  plug  points, towel racks,  besides  a  basin,  a commode  and  a  glass shelf.  The  landlord  also  supplies without   any  additional  charge  electrical   energy   for consumption by the tenant for the use of lamps, fans, radio, ovens    for   cooking,   for   ironing,   laundering    and refrigerators.  The landlord is also responsible for repairs of the electric installations and sanitary fittings, as also for  supplying  service of night guards,  sweepers,  liftmen etc.   The  tenant  in each case  applied  before  the  Rent Controller  of Calcutta under s. 9 read with Schedule  A  of the Act for fixation of standard rent in respect of the flat occupied  by  the  applicant.   The  landlord  resisted  the application  on  the  ground,  inter  alia,  that  the  Rent Controller  was not authorised by the Act to deal  with  the tenancies in question because 23 the  premises were outside the scope of the Act; that  there had  been  a great increase in the cost of  maintenance,  as also  of  repairs  and replacements of  electric  and  other installations,   that   there  had   been   a   considerable enhancement  of the charge for electricity supplied  by  the Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. and of  Government duty on the same; that if the court held that these premises were  governed by the’ provisions of the Act,  the  landlord was  entitled to proportionate increase in respect of  those charges;  that the fact that the Act does not make  specific provision  for  increasing the rent with  reference  to  the charges  aforesaid would also point to the  conclusion  that the Act was not intended to the applied to the tenancies  in question.   The  Rent Controller  after  having  inspections -made  of the premises in question fixed a standard rent  in accordance  with  the rules laid down in Schedule A  to  the Act.   The  rent thus standardized was to take  effect  from September 1, 1950.. The appellant preferred an appeal to the Chief Judge of the Small Cause Court, Calcutta, against  the aforesaid  order  of  the Rent  Controller.   The  Appellate Authority  allowed the landlord’s appeal in part by  setting the standard rent at a higher figure than that arrived at by the Rent Controller by applying the provisions of cl. (g) of s.  9.  The  Appellate  Authority  aforesaid  negatived  the landlord’s   contention  that  the  premises   in   question providing the special services and amenities aforesaid  were outside  the ambit of the Act.  It gave the landlord  relief in  respect of the higher charges for  electric  consumption and Government duty aforesaid.  The standard rent thus fixed by  the  appellate authority was in excess of  the  original rent  agreed between the parties.  The tenant in  each  case moved   the  High  Court  of  Calcutta  in  its   revisional jurisdiction.   The learned single Judge of the High  Court, who heard the revisional applications allowed them in  part, giving  effect  virtually,  though  not  entirely,  to   the decision of the Rent Controller and holding that cl. (g)  of s.  9  of  the  Act  was not  attracted  to  the  facts  and circumstances of the cases before the court.  He relied upon a  Division  Bench ruling of the same Court in the  case  of

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Residence 24 Ltd. v.  Surendra Mohan(1), which, it is agreed at the  Bar, is  on  all fours with the facts and  circumstances  of  the present  case.  After the rejection by the High Court of  of the appellant’s petition for a certificate under Art. 133 of the  Constitution,  the appellant obtained from  this  Court special  leave to appeal on common questions of law.   Hence the  appeals  in each of these three cases have  been  heard together.  In these appeals the learned Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the appellant raised substantially two points  for determination,  namely, (1) that the Act does not  apply  to the premises in question in view of the specify incidents of the  tenancy as disclosed in the terms of the lease  in  the standard  form as exhibited in Civil Appeal No. 42  of  1955 (Exhibit J) between the appellant and Miss M. Augustin,  and as found by the courts of fact below; and (2) alternatively, that  if the Court were to come to the conclusion  that  the premises  in  question  were within the ambit  of  the  Act, clause  (g)  of s. 9 should be applied to the  tenancies  in question as determined by the appellate authority aforesaid. Adverting  to  the  first  point raised  on  behalf  of  the appellant,  we have to notice an argument which  was  raised for  the first time before ’us, namely, that the  definition of " premises " in s. 2 (8) would not in terms apply to  the tenements in question and that if any provisions of the  Act could  be attracted totes cases, cl. (3) of s. 2 defining  " hotel or lodging house " could more appropriately be applied to  the tenancies in question.  As this point in  this  form has  not  been  raised in the courts below or  even  in  the statement  of the case in this Court, we refuse to  go  into that  question,  even  assuming that  the  controversy  thus raised  does not require any fresh findings of fact.   These cases  have  not  been fought on that  ground  and,  in  our opinion,  it  is  too late to raise for  the  first  time  a controversy in that form.  We have therefore to examine  the question whether the definition of " Premises " as contained in s.   2 (8) of the Act is not comprehensive enough to be (1) A.1.R. 1951 Cal- 126 25 applicable  to  these  cases.  The definition  is  in  these terms:- "  premises’ means any building or part of a building or any hut or part of a hut let separately and includes- (a)the gardens, grounds and out-houses (if any) appertaining to  such building or part of a building or hut or part of  a hut, (b)any  furniture  supplied or any fittings affixed  by  the landlord for use of the tenant in such building or part of a building  or  hut or part of a hut, but does not  include  a room or part of a room or other accommodation in a hotel  or lodging house or a stall in a municipal market as defined in clause (44) of s. 3 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923,  or in  any other market maintained by or belonging to  a  local authority  or  a stall let at variable  rents  at  different seasons  of  the year for the retail sale of  goods  in  any other  market  as  defined in clause (39) of  s.  3  of  the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923, or clause (30) of s. 3 of  the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932 ". It has been contended for the appellant that premises " thus defined do not include tenements with the special facilities and  conveniences agreed by the landlord to be  supplied  to the  tenants.  In this connection reference was made to  the

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definition  of  " premises " as contained  in  the  previous legislation  like  the Calcutta Rent Act (Bengal  Act  III), 1920,  the  Calcutta  House Rent Control  Order,  1943,  the Calcutta  Rent Ordinance (No.  V), 1946 and the West  Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, XXXVIII of 1948, which has been replaced by the Act.  It will serve  no useful   purpose  to  go  into  the  ramifications  of   the definitions  in  the different pieces of  legislation  which deal with the same subject matter.  We have to construe  the Act as it stood.  The Act has now been replaced by the  West Bengal  Premises  Tenancy Act (Act XII), 1956.   But  it  is agreed  at the Bar that we are concerned with the Act as  it stood  before  it  was replaced by the  Act  of  1956.   The definition  of  "  premises " set out above is in very  wide terms 4 26 and includes not only gardens, grounds and outhouse, if any, appertaining  to a building or part of a building, but  also furniture supplied by the landlord for the tenants’ use  and any  fittings affixed to the building, thus indicating  that the legislature was providing for all kinds of letting.  The definition  of  " premises " and "hotel  or  lodging  house" between  them almost exhaust the whole field covered by  the relationship   of  landlord  and  tenant,  subject  to   the exceptions noted in the definition of "premises." It is admitted at the Bar that the tenancies in question are regulated  by the terms and conditions appearing in  Exhibit J,  the  most  important  of which  is  clause  (1)  in  the following terms:- " That the tenant shall occupy the said flat paying therefor unto the Bank a monthly rent of Rs. 100 including hire of  2 A.C.  fans  and extra Government duty  on  electric  current without any reduction or abatement to be paid at the Bank on or before the 7th of succeeding month for which the rent  is due  and  that  the said rent is inclusive  of  charges  for current  for  fans,  lights, radio and  electric  stove  not exceeding  600 Watts for heating meals and making tea  only, use  of lift, hot and cold water, the owner  and  occupier’s shares of Municipal Taxes." It  is clear from the terms of the clause quoted above  that the landlord was to place at the disposal of the tenants not only electric installation including fans but also  electric current  to  be consumed in the use of  those  installations etc.,  besides radio and electric stove. it was argued  that the tenancy comprised not only buildings and structures  and permanent  fixtures but also. the supply of  electric  power without any fresh charge for the same.  It was also  pointed out that s. 9 dealing with fixation of standard rent did not in  terms contemplate the enhancement or reduction  of  rent according  as the rates for electric current and  Government duty thereon were enhanced or reduced. it is true that  none of  the cls. (a) to (f) of s. 9 has any reference  to  these considerations Clause (b) makes a specific reference only to increase in municipal taxes, 27 rates  or cesses.  But then there is the residuary  cl.  (g) and the question whether that clause applies to the  present cases  will have to be discussed separately when the  second point in controversy will be taken up for consideration.  It is  enough to point out at this stage that  the  legislature was  conscious that contingencies may arise which would  not be  covered by any of the specific cls;. (a) to (f) of s.  9 which  is  the  operative section in  the  Act  relating  to fixation  of  standard rent.  Under this head  the  question

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reduces  itself  to.  this: whether,  if  by  a  stipulation between the landlord and the tenant the’ landlord agrees  to provide  for  additional amenities like electric  power  for consumption and such other facilities, the case is taken out of the operation of the Act.  The Act is intended " to  make better  provision for the control of rents of premises."  It has  defined "premises" in very wide terms, as  pointed  out above.  Hence it is difficult, if not impossible, to  accept the contention that the legislature intended the  provisions of the Act to have a limited application depending upon  the terms  which an astute landlord may be able to  impose  upon his  tenants.   In  order  fully  to  give  effect  to   the provisions  of the statute, the court has to give  them  the widest application possible within the terms of the statute. Having  those considerations in view, we do not  think  that the  ,supply  of  the amenities  aforesaid  would  make  any difference to the application of the Act to the premises  in question.   In this connection reference may be made to  the decision  of  the -Court of Apeal in the  case  of  Property Holding  Co-.   Ltd.  --v.   Clark (1)-  and’  the  case  of Alliance  Property Co. Ltd.  V. Shaffer (2)  which  followed the earlier decision to the effect that if the  stipulations between landlord and tenant include payment of rent for  not only  what may properly be characterized as premises  within the  ordinary  acceptation of the term but also  payment  in respect  of lighting cooking equipment, the  furnishing  and cleaning  of  hall and staircase and certain  other  similar amenities,  the sum total of the payments in respect of  the building  or  part -of the building and other  services  and amenities constitute (2)[1948] 2 K. B. (1) [1948] 1 K.B. 630. 28 rent.   In the earlier case of Property Holding Co. Ltd.  v. Clark  (supra)  the  facts, shortly stated,  were  that  the agreement  between  the landlord and the tenant  in  writing provided for the payment of pound 110 a year as rent and  an additional  payment  of pound 30 a year in  respect  of  the additional  amenities  and conveniences  like  lighting  and cooking  equipments,  furnishing and cleaning  of  hall  and staircase etc.  In an action for rent by the landlord at the rate of pound 140 a year the tenant contended that the  rent proper was only pound 110 and not the total sum of pound 140 a  year  payable on all counts, as aforesaid..The  Court  of Appeal  allowed  the  landlord’s appeal and  held  that  the standard rent was pound 140 and not only pound 110.  In  the course of his judgment Asquith L.J. adopted the language  of Younger  L. J. in the case of Wilkes v. Goodwin (1)  to  the following effect:- "The first of these (considerations) is that the word Arent’ in this exception surely means not rent in the strict  sense but the total payment -under the instrument of letting.  The exception  assumes  that ’rent’ so called may  include,  for example,  ’board’, payment of which is not rent.  I am  here paraphrasing  the statement of Shearman J. in Nye  v.  Davis (2)with which I agree." Their  Lordships  of  the  Court  of  Appeal  repelled   the contention that the additional payment was not part of  rent and  held  that  the payment in respect  of  the  additional amenities aforesaid was also part of rent within the meaning of  the  English Act which corresponds to  the  Bengal  Act. Those English decisions are authorities for the  proposition that  "rent" included not only-what is ordinarily  described as rent in an agreement between a landlord and a tenant  but also payment in respect of special amenities provided by the

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landlord  under  the agreement between him and  his  tenant. The  term "rent" has not been defined in the Act.  Hence  it must  be taken to have been used in its ordinary  dictionary meaning.   If, as already indicated, the term it, rent "  is comprehensive  enough to include all payment;.agreed by  the tenant to be paid to his landlord for the use and occupation not only of the building and (1) [1923] 2 K.B. 105. (2) [1922] 2 K.B. 56. 29 its  appurtenances  but also of  furnishings,  electric  in- stallations  and other amenities agreed between the  parties to  be  provided by and at the cost of  the  land-lord,  the conclusion is irresistible that all that is included in  the term  "rent" is within the purview of the Act and  the  Rent Controller  and other authorities had the power  to  control the  same.  In view of these considerations we overrule  the first- contention raised on behalf of the appellant. But the second contention raised on behalf of the appellant, in  our opinion, is well founded.  "Standard  rent"  has been defined in el. (10) of s.  2  as follows:standard rent’ in relation to any premises means- (a)the  standard  rent determined in  accordance.  with  the provisions of Schedule A; (b)where  the  rent has been fixed under s. 9, the  rent  so fixed;  or at which it would have been fixed if  application were made under the said section;........... This  is a definition by in corpation of the  provisions  of Schedule A and of s. 9. it is common ground that no standard rent had- so far been determined in respect of the  premises in question before the present proceedings were commenced at the  instance of the respective tenants.  Schedule A to  the Act in clause (1) defines "basic rent" and then cl. (2) lays down  the formulae for determination of standard  rent  once the basic rent has been arrived at.  The tenant in each case in  the present appeals invoked the provisions of s. 9  read with Schedule A of the Act for fixing the standard rent  for their respective premises.  The question arises which clause or  clauses apply to the terms of the tenancy  as  indicated above.   Clause (a) cannot apply because it cannot  be  said that  "There is no cause for the alteration of the  rate  of standard  rent as determined according to the  schedule  for any  of the reasons mentioned in the following  clauses,  in accordance  with the provisions of Schedule A." It  has  not been  denied that electric charges and the  Government  duty thereon have been enhanced and that the municipal taxes also have been increased.  Clause (b) also in terms cannot  apply because 30 it  does  not by itself entirely cover the  cases  in  hand. There  has  been increase not only. in municipal  taxes  but also  in  electric  charges,  Government  duty  on  electric consumption  and  in  the cost of  the  other  services  and amenities  specially provided for by the  agreement  between the  parties.  Clause (c) is out of the way of  the  parties because  there  is no question of  addition,  alteration  or improvement   in  the  premises.   Clause(d)  is   similarly inapplicable because it is nobody’s case that any  furniture not  already provided by the landlord has been  supplied  to any -of the premise,% for the use of the tenant.  Clause (e) also  has not been claimed by either party to be  applicable because  the special circumstances contemplated therein  are not   found   in  these  cases.   Clause  (f)   is   clearly inapplicable  because  the  premises  had  been  constructed admittedly  much earlier than December 31, 1949.   The  only

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remaining clause is el. (g) which is in these terms:-  " Where no provisions of this Act for fixing standard  rent apply to any ’Premises, by determining the standard rent  at a rate " which is fair and reasonable." It  will appear from the terms of the contract  between  the landlord  and  the tenant in each  case,  particularly  from clause  (1)  of the agreement quoted hereinbefore  that  the land-lord  has not only agreed to supply electric and  other installations but also electric power and other services for which  no separate  payment has been stipulated It  has  not been  denied as a matter of fact, coun’ Sol for the  tenats- respondents  clearly admitted-that the rent fixed  ’in  each case  included  payment for those additional  amenities  and services  though  the amounts in respect of them  have  been separately  shown  in the agreement.  The rent fixed  was  a consolidated sum for all those amenities and services, as is clearly stated in para.1 of the agreement set out above’ But even  after making that concession the learned  counsel  for the  respondents  strongly  relied upon the  decision  of  a Division  Bench of the Calcutta High Court given on  Letters Patent  Appeal  from a judgment of a single  Judge  of  that Court, in Residence, Ltd. v. Surendra It has been  laid-down in that case that the (1)  A.I.R. 1951 Cal. 126. 31 Act  is applicable to a tenancy the terms of which  included such  additional  conveniences and facilities as  have  been provided  by the landlord in these cases.  We  have  already indicated that we agree with that conclusion.  But the  case also  lays down the proposition that what is paid.  as  rent for the flat does not include any payment for the additional facilities and conveniences provided by the landlord for the use  of the tenant.  In this connection the High Court  made the following observations:- "  In  my  judgment when a flat is let,  with  the  landlord agreeing  to provide certain free services, what is  let  is the  flat  and what is paid is paid for the  flat  with  the landlord  providing certain amenities or performing  certain obligation.   What is paid is rent for the flat and no  part of. it can be truly regarded as payment for the services." With all due deference to the views the views thus expressed by that very experienced and learned Judge, we cannot  agree that  those observations correctly represent the true  legal position.   As  a  matter of fact,  the  learned  Judge  has referred to with approval the judgments of the Appeal  Court and  of  the King’s Bench Division in  the  cases  mentioned above  to show that the term "rent" is comprehensive  enough to  include not only rent in the narrower sense of the  term as ordinarily understood but also payment in respect of  the additional  conveniences and amenities.  The  learned  Judge goes on to make the following observations:- " If he has undertaken obligations by the tenancy  agreement the monthly payment or the yearly payment as the case may be would  be suitably adjusted.  That, however, would not  make the monthly or yearly payment any the less rent." The  two  parts of the observations quoted above  cannot  be reconciled  unless it can be said that the learned Judge  is using  the  word  "rent" not in the same sense  but  in  its different  connotations  according to the context.   If  the learned  Judge  used the word "rent"  in  its  comprehensive sense  in -which the Act must. be construed as  having  used that term, this part of the 32 judgment  cannot  be  said to  be  against  the  appellant’s contention  that  the  standard  rent  must  be  fixed  with

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reference to all the constituents which made up the lump sum as  fixed in each case as rent.  This position  emerges  not only   from  a  consideration  of  the  legal  position   in contemplation  of  the Act, but also from the terms  of  the agreement between the parties, as indicated above. The  provisions  of el. (g) of a. 9 of the Act  empower  the Rent  Controller and the other authorities under the Act  to determine the standard rent after taking into  consideration all  the constituents which make up the total sum  shown  in the  agreement  as  monthly  rent.   Those  authorities  are authorised  to determine rent which is fair and  reasonable. In thus arriving at a fair and reasonable rent they are  not precluded from having recourse to such of the provisions  of the Act as may be found applicable either in their  entirety or  in  so  far as they can be made  applicable.   The  Rent Controller  gave the landlord credit only for the amount  by which the municipal taxes had been increased and no more, by applying  the provisions of cl. (b) of s. 9.  The  Appellate Authority  on the other hand, applied the provisions of  el. (g)  of  s. 9 by determining the fair  and  reasonable  rent after  taking  into  consideration the  fact  that  electric charges  as  also  Government duty  on  the  consumption  of electric  power  had  been increased.  So had  the  cost  of providing for the other amenities and services.  In view  of our  conclusion  that the residuary el. (g) applies  to  the terms  of  the tenancy in these cases, it follows  that  the decision  of the Appellate Authority was more in  consonance with  the  provisions  of  cl. (g) than  that  of  the  Rent Controller  or of the High Court. As the figures arrived  at by  the Appellate Authority have not been challenged  before us, we would direct, that the orders passed by it should  be restored  and  those  of  the High Court  and  of  the  Rent Controller set aside. The  appeal  is  accordingly allowed in  part  as  indicated above.   But in view of the directions of this Court at  the time  of  granting  the  special  leave,  even  though   the appellant is successful in this Court, he 33 must  pay the costs of the respondents, one set  of  hearing fee to be equally divided amongst the three respondents. Appeal allowed in part.