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PETITIONER: KARIMBIL KUNHIKOMAN

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF KERALA

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/12/1961

BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N. BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N. GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. SARKAR, A.K. GUPTA, K.C. DAS AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA

CITATION:  1962 AIR  723            1962 SCR  Supl. (1) 829  CITATOR INFO :  R          1964 SC1515  (1,5,7,8)  R          1965 SC 845  (12)  RF         1967 SC1643  (43,65,227,259)  RF         1972 SC 425  (5)  R          1972 SC2027  (18,20,27,28,32,34)  RF         1972 SC2240  (10)  RF         1980 SC1789  (36)  RF         1980 SC2097  (10)  RF         1981 SC 234  (31)

ACT:      Ryotwari   lands-If   "estates"-Compensation- Provisions for plantations of tea and coffee etc., if  violative  of  egual  protection  of  laws-The Kerala Agrarian  Relations Act, 1961 (IV of 1961), ss. 3(39), 3(viii), 52,57,58,59,64,80-Constitution of India, Arts. 14, 31A (I).

HEADNOTE:      The  Kerala   Agrarian  Relations   Act   was impugned on various grounds. ^      Held, (per  Gajendragadkar, Wanchoo  and  Das Gupta, JJ.) that (1) the bill which was originally passed  by   a  Legislative   Assembly  which   as dissolved and  was reconsidered and re-passed by a new legislative assembly did not lapse and validly became the  law when  the President assented to it after it  was passed  by  the  second  legislative assembly. 830      Purushothaman Nambudiri  v. State  of Kerala, [1962] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 753, followed.      (II) The  Act which  made certain  deductions from the  compensation payable  to the landholders under Ch.  II and  to others  who held excess land under Ch.  III cannot be struck down as a piece of colourable  legislation   which  is   beyond   the competence of the State Legislature, and it cannot

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be said  that any  device has been employed in the Act to  take away  the moneys of the landowners or the persons  from whom  excess land  is taken away for the  purpose of  adding to  the revenue of the State.      Section  80  of  the  Act  provides  for  the Constitution of  an  agriculturist  rehabilitation fund for  the purpose  of rendering help by way of loan, grant  or otherwise  to persons  affected by the Act  and eligible for the same under the rules but rr.  161 (a)  (III) and  161 (b)  (III) are so framed as  to take within their scope even persons not affected  by the  Act. Those  rules are  ultra vires of s. 80 and must be struck down.      (III) The lands held by ryotwari pattadars in the area  which came  to the  State of  Kerala  by virtue of  the States  Reorganisation Act from the State of  Madras  are  not  ’estates’  within  the meaning of  Art. 31A(2)(a) of the Constitution and therefore the  Act is not protected under Art. 31A (1) from  attack under  Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution.      State of  Bihar v.  Rameshwar  Pratap  Narain Singh, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1649, referred to.      (IV) The  reasons which call for exemption of tea, coffee  and rubber  plantations from  certain provisions of  the Act  equally apply to areca and pepper plantations  and there  is no  intelligible differentia related  to the  object and purpose of the Act which would justify any distinction in the case of  tea, coffee  and  rubber  plantations  as against  areca   and   pepper   plantations.   The provisions in  the Act relating to plantations are violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution.      The provisions relating to plantations cannot be severed  from the  Act and  struck down only by themselves. The  whole Act  must be struck down as violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution so far as it applied to ryotwari lands in those areas of the State which  were transferred to it from the State of Madras.      (V) The  manner in  which  ceiling  has  been fixed  under   s.  58(1)   is  violative   of  the fundamental right  enshrined in  Art.  14  of  the constitution and  as that  section is the basis of entire Ch. III the whole chapter must fall with it 831      (IV) The  manner in  which  progressive  cuts have been  imposed on  the purchase price under s. 52 and  the market  value under  s. 64 in order to determine the  compensation payable  to landowners or intermediaries  in one case and to persons from whom excess  land is  taken in another, results in discrimination and  cannot  be  justified  on  any intelligible differentia which has any relation to the objects and purposes of the Act. The provision as to compensation is all pervasive and the entire Act must be struck down as violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution  in its  application to  ryotwari lands which  have come to the State of Kerala from the State of Madras.      Per Sarkar,  J.-Sections 52 and 64 of the Act which  provide  for  payment  of  Compensation  at progressively smaller  rates for larger valuations of the  interests  acquired  are  not  invalid  as

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offending  Art.   14  of   the  Constitution.  The provisions in  the act  making a discrimination in favour  of   tea,  coffee,   rubber  and  cardamom plantation  and   also   in   favour   of   cashew plantations cannot be upheld. Sections 3(viii), 57 (1) (d)  and 59  (2) are  therefore invalid. These are however  severable from the other parts of the Act and  the whole  Act cannot  be held  to be bad merely because those provisions are bad.      Per Ayyangar,  J.-Properties held on ryotwari tenures and the interest of the ryot in such lands would not  be "estate"  for the  purposes of  Art. 31A(2) as it stood even after the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution.      Where an  existing law  in relation  to land- tenures in  force in an area contains a definition of an  ’estates’ and  that definition excludes the interest of  a ryotwari proprietor, the very words of Art.  31A(2) of  the Constitution negatived the applicability of its provisions to that tenure.      Ram Ram  Narain Medhi,  v. State  of  Bombay, [1959] Supp. I S.C.R. 489 and Atma Ram v. State of Punjab, [1959] Supp. I S.C.R. 748, referred to.      Section 2(39)  which by  definition  excludes pepper and  areca plantations from the category of the plantations  named in  it which  are  exempted from the operative provisions of the impugned Act, s. 58  for the  determination of  the  ceiling  in respect of  different individuals  who are brought within the  scope of  the enactment and ss. 52 and 64 for determining the compensation payable to the several  classes   of  persons   whose  lands  are acquired under  the Act  are all  violative of the guarantee of  equal protection  of laws under Art. 14 of the Constitution.

JUDGMENT:      ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petitions Nos. 114 and 115 of 1961.      Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of Fundamental Rights. 832      M. K.  Nambiar, M.  K. Govind  Bhatt,  S.  N. Andley, and Rameshwar Nath, for the petitioners.      M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, K. K. Mathew,  Advocate- General  for  the  State  of Kerala, Sardar Bahadur, George Pudissary and V. A. Seyid Muhammad, for the respondents.      1961. December  5. The  Judgment of  Gajendra gadkar, Wanchoo  and Das  Gupta, JJ., was deliverd by  Wanchoo,   J.  Sarkar,  J.  and  Ayyangar,  J. delivered separate Judgment.      WANCHOO, J.-  These two  writ petitions which were heard  along with  Purushothaman Nambudiri v. The   State    of    Kerala    (1)    raise    the constitutionality of the Kerala Agrarina Relations Act, No. IV of 1961 hereinafter referred to as the Act. The  petitioners come  from that  part of the State of  Kerala which  was formerly  in the South Canara district of the State of Madras and came to the State  of kerala  by the  State Reorganisation Act of  1956. Their  lands are  situate in Hosdrug and kasargod  Taluks which have now been made part

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of the  Cannanore District in the State of Kerala. They hold  large areas of lands, the major part of which is  held by  them as  ryotwari parradars, of Madras under  the Board’s  Standing Orders of that State. In  these lands  they have areca and pepper plantations besides  rubber plantation.  They also grow other  crops on some of the lands. The Act is being attacked  on the  ground that it contravenes Arts. 14,  19 and  31 of the Constitution. Besides this, it  is  also  contended  on  behalf  of  the petitioners that  the Bill  which became  the  Act lapsed under  the provisions  of the Constitution, and therefore  the assent given to the Bill by the President was  of no  effect and did not result in the Bill  becoming an  Act. We  do  not  think  it necessary to  set out the details of the attack on this last  score in  the present  petitions as the matter 833 has been considered in full in the judgment in the connected Writ  Petition  No.  105  of  1961.  The petitioners further  submit that their lands which they hold  as ryotwari  pattadars are  not estates within the  meaning of  Art.  31A  (2)(a)  of  the Constitution and  therefore the  Act so  far as it affects them  is not protected under Art. 31A, and it is  open to  them to  assail it as violative of the rights  conferred on  them by Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution. They have attacked the Act on  a   number  of  grounds  as  ultra  vires  the Constitution in  view of  the provisions  of Arts. 14,  19  and  31.  We  do  not  however  think  it necessary  to   detail  all  the  attacks  on  the constitutionality of the Act for present purposes. It is  enough to  say that  the main attack on the constitutionality of  the Act has been made on the following six grounds:-      (1)  The Bill which became the Act had lapsed           before  it   was  assented   to  by  the           President and  therefore the  assent  of           the President to a lapsed bill was of no           avail to turn it into law.      (2)  The  Act   is  a   piece  of  colourable           legislation  as   it  has  made  certain           deductions from the compensation payable           to landholders  under Chap.  II  and  to           others who  held excess land under Chap.           III and  this amounts  to acquisition of           money by  the  State  which  it  is  not           competent  to   do   under   the   power           conferred on  it in  Lists II and III of           the    Seventh     Schedule    to    the           Constitution.      (3)  The properties  of the  petitioners  who           are ryotwari  pattadars are  not estates           within the  meaning of  Art. 31A  of the           Constitution and  therefore the  Act  is           not protected  under that Article so far           as  it  applies  to  lands  of  ryotwari           pattadars like the petitioners.      (4)  The  Act   exempts  plantation  of  tea,           coffee, rubber and cardamom from certain 834           provisions   thereof,    but   no   such           exemption   has    been    granted    to

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         plantations of  areca  and  pepper,  and           this is  clearly discriminatory  and  is           violative of Art. 14.      (5)  The manner  in which  ceiling  is  fixed           under the  Act results in discrimination           and is therefore violative of Art. 14.      (6)  The compensation  which is payable under           Chapters II  and III of the Act has been           reduced  by   progressive  cuts  as  the           amount of compensation increase and this           amounts   to    discrimination   between           persons   similarly   situate   and   is           therefore violative of Art. 14.      The petitions  have been opposed on behalf of the State and its contention is, firstly, that the Bill did  not lapse and the President’s assent was rightly given  to it rightly became law; secondly, that the  petitioners’ estates  lands are  estates within the  meaning of Art. 31A (2)(a) and the Act is  therefore   protected  under   that   Article; thirdly, that the Act is not a piece of colourable legislation  and   the   State   Legislature   was competent to  enact the  Act under item 18 of List II and item 42 of List III of the Seventh Schedule and there  is no acquisition of money by the state under the  Act and  reference is  made to s. 80 of the Act  in this  connection; and lastly, that the discrimination    alleged    with    respect    to plantations,  the  fixation  of  ceiling  and  the deductions   from   compensation   payable   under Chapters II and III is really no discrimination at all and the provisions in that behalf are based on an intelligible differentia which is in accordance with the object and purpose of the Act. Re. (1).      The question  whether the  Bill which finally received the  assent of  the President  on January 21,  1961,  had  lapsed  because  the  legislative assembly which  originally passed it was dissolved and a  new legislative  assembly which  came  into being after 835 the general  elections reconsidered  and re-passed it under  Art. 201  of the  Constitution has  been considered by us in Writ Petition No. 105 of 1961, judgment in  which has  just been delivered and it has been  held there  that the  bill did not lapse and therefore  it  validly  became  law  when  the President assented  to it.  The attack  on the Act therefore on this grounds must fail.      We now  come to the attack made on the Act on the ground  that  it  is  a  piece  of  colourable legislation beyond  the legislative  competence of the  State   legislature.   What   is   colourable legislation  is   now  well-settled:   see  K.  C. Gajapati Narayan  Deo v.  The State of Orissa (1), where it was held "that the question whether a law was a  colourable legislation and as such void did not depend  on the  motive or  bona fides  of  the legislature  in  passing  the  law  but  upon  the competency  of   the  legislature   to  pass  that particular  law,  and  what  the  courts  have  to determine in  such cases  is  whether  though  the legislature has purported to act within the limits of its  powers, it  has in  substance and  reality

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transgressed those  powers, the transgession being veiled by  what appears, on proper examination, to be a mere pretence or disguise. The whole doctrine of colourable  legislating is based upon the maxim that you  cannot do  indirectly what you cannot do directly.      The Act has been passed under the legislative powers vested  in the State legislature under item 18 of  List II  and item  42 of  List III  of  the Seventh Schedule.  Item 18  of List II deals inter alia with "land, that is to say, rights in or over land,  land-tenures   including  the  relation  of landlord and  tenant, and the collection of rents" Item 42  of list  III deals  with "acquisition and requisitioning of  property."  The  contention  on behalf of  the petitioners is that in the guise of legislating under  these two  entries the    State legislature by the employment of certain 836 devices has  taken away  money, which  should have gone to  land-owners or  to those from whom excess lands were  being acquired. The attack is based on the facts  that in  s. 52  of the Act compensation payable to  a  land-owner  is  reduced  after  the purchase price  to be  paid by  the tenant to whom the land  is to  be assigned has been ascertained, and that  in s.  64 of  the Act  the  compensation payable to  a person  from whome  excess  land  is taken in  reduced by  certain percentage after the market value  of the  land has been determined. It is urged  that  by  these  devices  the  State  is acquiring money which should properly have gone to the land-owner  to whome  compensation is  payable under s.  52 and  to  the  person  who  surrenders excess land to whome compensation is payable under s. 64.  There is  no doubt that certain deductions are made  from the  purchase price  payable by the tenant under  s. 45  and  from  the  market  value before compensation  is arrived  at for payment to the land  owner under  s. 52  and  to  the  person surrendering excess  land under  s. 64. But if one looks at the purpose and object of the Act it will be clear  that the  main provisions of the Act are clearly within  the legislative  competence of the State legislature  under item  18 of  List II  and item 42  of List III. The scheme of the Act so far as Chap.  II dealing  with extinction of the land- owner’s right  is  concerned  is  that  the  land- owner’s right vested in the State under ss. 41 and 42 on  a day  to be  notified by the Government in that  behalf.  Thereafter,  s.  43  provides  that cultivating tenants of the lands which have vested in the  State shall  have a right to assignment of the right,  title and  interest so  vested in  the State on  payment of  a  certain  price  which  is calculated under  s. 45 and is called the purchase price. After the purchase price is determined, the compensation to  be  paid  to  the  land-owner  is provided by  s. 52  and there  is reduction in the purchase  price   for   the   purpose   of   given compensation.  It  is  however  obvious  that  the object of  Chap. II  is to  vest proprietorship in the land in the 837 cultivating tenants  and for that purpose Chap. II

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provides  for  carrying  out  the  object  in  two stages. In  the first  stage, the  property of the landowner is  vested in  the State. Thereafter the tenant is given the right to acquire that property from the  State. What  price the  tenant is to pay for the  land is  worked out under s. 45, and what compensation the State is to pay to the land-owner is worked  out under  s. 52, which however reduces the purchase  price arrived at under s. 45 for the purpose of  giving  compensation.  It  is  however clear that  tenants are  not  bound  to  apply  to acquire the  land which  they hold  as tenants and where they  do not  do so, s. 44 (3) provides that they become the tenants of Government and shall be liable to  pay to  the Government the rent payable in respect  of the land from the date on which the right, title  and interest over the land vested in the Government.  It cannot  therefore be said that the scheme  which provides for two stages, namely, first  acquisition   by  Government  and  secondly assignment to  tenants is  a camoflage devised for the purpose  of taking  away the money which would otherwise have  been payable  to the land-owner in case the  interest of  the landowner  was directly transferred to the cultivating tenants. It is also clear that there is bound to be a time lag between the acquisition  under  ss.  41  and  42  and  the assignment  to   tenants  under   s.  43  and  the subsequent  sections   and  in  the  meantime  the Government  would  be  the  owner  of  the  rights acquired. Clearly,  therefore Chap.  II of the Act envisages  first   the  acquirement  of  the  land owner’s  interest   by   the   State   for   which compensation is payable under s.52. Thereafter the State will assign to such cultivating   tenants as may apply  the rights  acquired by  the State  and there is  likely to be an interval between the two transactions. Besides some cultivating tenants may not apply  at all  and that  part of  the property will remain  with the  State Government.  In these circumstances it  cannot be  said that  the scheme evolved in Chap. II is a device for 838 taking away any part of the money to the landowner from  the   tenant  to   whom  his   interest  may eventually be  assigned. Besides  the adequacy  of compensation provided  under s. 52 for acquisition by the  State of  the interest  of the  land-owner cannot  be   challenge  on  the  ground  that  the compensation provided  by the law is not adequate: See  Art.   31(2).  It   is   only   because   the compensation provided  under s. 52 is a percentage of the  purchase price  as calculated  under s. 45 that it  appears as  if the State is taking away a part of  the compensation  due to  the  landowner. Section  52   is  however   only  a   method   for determining    compensation    and    the    whole compensation due  to the land-owner is to be found in s.  52 and it cannot therefore be said that any part of  the compensation  is being  taken away by the State.      Similarly  the  scheme  of  Chap.  III  which provides a  ceiling is  that any land in excess of the ceiling  shall vest in the Government under s. 62. Thereafter  the land  so vested  in Government

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can be  assigned under s. 70 to persons who do not possess any land or possess land less than 5 acres of double crop nilam or its equivalent. It is true that Government  may assign the lands to those who apply under s. 70 but it is not bound to do so and here again  there will  be a  time lag between the vesting of the excess land in the Government under s.62 and  its assignment to those who are eligible under s. 70. The charge that in this Chapter there is a  device for  taking away the compensation due to the  land-owner is based on the fact that s. 72 the person  to whom  the land is assigned under s. 70 has  to pay 55 per cent. Of the market value of the land  while the  person from  whom the  excess land is  taken is  not always paid 55 per cent. Of the market  value, inasmuch as the percentage goes down to  25 per  cent.  Of  the  market  value  in certain  circumstances.   But   here   again   the compensation is  provided entirely under s. 64 and it is  that section  which sets  out the manner in which the compensation is to be 839 provided. The adequacy of that compensation cannot be questioned in view of Art. 31(2). The fact that under ss.  70 and  72 when  the Government  in its turn assigns  land to  those who  are eligible for such assignment,  a different percentage of market value is  fixed would  not make these provisions a device to  take away  the money  due to  those who surrender excess land. As we have already said the compensation to those who surrender excess land is all provided  by s.  64 and  even if  there  is  a difference between  the price  payable under s. 72 by the  assignee and  the compensation  payable to the landowner under s. 64 that would not amount to taking away the money of the landowner by a device particularly when  the assignment is bound to take place  sometime   after  the   property  has  been acquired by Government.      It  is   also  clear   from  the   provisions contained in  Chapters II  and III of the Act that the main  purpose of  the Act  is to  do away with intermediaries and  to fix  a ceiling and give the excess land,  if any, to the landless or those who hold land  much  below  the  ceiling.  The  method employed to  carry out  this object  is  first  to acquire the  land for  the State and thereafter to assign it  to the  cultivating tenants  or to  the landless or  to those  with small amounts of land. The main  provisions  of  the  Act  therefore  are clearly within  the legislative  competence of the State legislature  under item  18 of  List II  and item 42 of List III and this is not being disputed on  behalf  of  the  petitioners.  But  what  they contend is  that in the process of doing this, the Government has  by adopting  certain devices taken away the  money which was due to the land-owner or to  the  person  from  whom  the  excess  land  is acquired.  This  argument  is  however  fallacious because the  compensation due to the land-owner or the person  from whom  excess land  is acquired is not what is provided by s. 45 and s 72 but what is provided in  s. 52  and s 64. The adequacy of that compensation cannot be 840

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challenged in  view of  Art. 31(2),  and there  is therefore no  justification for  saying  that  the money due to the landowner or the person from whom the excess land is acquired is being taken away by the State. That argument would only be possible if the compensation  was the  whole amount arrived at under s.  45 or  under s.  72 and  from  that  the Government deducted  money due  to the  landowner. That however  is not  so and  the compensation  to which the  landowner or  the person  from whom the excess land is acquired is to be found only in ss. 52 and  64 and there is thus no question of taking away any money due to the landowner.      Further,  whatever  unfairness  might  appear because of the difference between ss. 45 and 52 on the one  hand and  ss. 64  and 72 on the other and the manner in which the compensation is shown as a percentage of  the purchase  price or  the  market value is  removed by the provision in s. 80 of the Act. That section provides for the constitution of an agriculturist  rehabilitation fund in which the surplus, if  any, of  the purchase price after the disbursement therefrom  of the  compensation is to be put  along with other moneys. This surplus does not to  go to  the revenues  of the  State and the State cannot  be said  to have  taken away for its own purpose  any part of the compensation. Further s. 80 provides that the fund shall be utilised for rendering help  by way of loan, grant or otherwise to persons  affected by  the Act  who are eligible for the  same in  accordance with the rules framed by the  Government.  The  fund  therefore  created under s.  80 of  the surplus,  if any,  is  to  be utilised for rendering help to persons affected by the Act.  That in our opinion clearly means either the landowners  whose rights are affected by Chap. II or  the persons  from whom excess land is taken under Chap. III. The surplus money therefore is to be  utilised   for  the  benefit  of  the  persons affected by  the  Act  as  indicated  above.  This section also 841 provides that the Government will frame rules with respect  to   the  persons   affected  and   their eligibility for  help from the fund. Our attention in  this   connection  has   been  drawn   to  the eligibility rules  framed under  this section  for the administration  of the fund, and in particular to r.  161  which  provides  for  eligibility  for grants and  loan. That  rule in  our opinion  goes beyond the scope of s. 80 in so far as it provides for   making of  grants or  loans to  persons  not affected by  the Act.  We may  in this  connection refer to r. 161 (a)(i) and (ii) and r. 161 (b) (i) and (ii)  which are  so framed  as to  take within their scope  even persons not affected by the Act, though r. 161 (a)(iii) and r. 161(b)(iii) are with respect to persons who may be affected by the Act. Rule 161(a)(i)  and (ii) and r. 161(b)(i) and (ii) in so  far as they take in persons not affected by the Act are ultra vires of the provisions of s. 80 and must  be struck  down on  that ground  and may have to  be replaced  by more  suitable rules. But the rules which have been actually framed will not affect the  provisions of s. 80 which clearly show

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that the  fund is for the benefit of those who are affected  by   the  Act,  namely,  those  who  are affected by  Chapters II and III of the Act, i.e., those landowners  whose rights  have been acquired under ss.  41 and  42 and  those persons from whom excess land  is taken away under s. 62. Section 80 thus clearly shows that any surplus that may arise is not taken away by the State for its own revenue purposes but  is meant  to be used for the benefit of those  affected by  the Act  and therefore even the apparent  result of the difference between ss. 45 and  62 and  ss 64  and 72 is taken away by the constitution of  the fund  under  s.  80,  and  it cannot be said at all under the circumstances that any device  has been  employed in  the Act to take away the  moneys of  the landowners or the persons from whom  excess  land  is  taken  away  for  the purpose of  adding to the revenue of the State. We are therefore of opinion that 842 the Act"  cannot be  struck down  as a  colourable piece  of   legislation  which   is   beyond   the competence of the State Legislature. Re. (3).      Article 31A  was inserted in the Constitution by the  Constitution (First  Amendment) Act, 1951, with retrospective  effect  so  that  it  must  be deemed to  have been  in the Constitution from the very  beginning,   i.e.,  January  26,  1950.  The article was  further amended  by the  Constitution (Fourth Amendment)  Act, 1955  which was also made retrospective and  therefore Art. 31A as it stands today must  be deemed  to have  been part  of  the Constitution right  from the  start, i.e., January 26, 1950.  We are  not concerned  in  the  present petitions with  cl. (1)  of Art.  31A,  which  was extensively amended in 1955 but only with cl. (2). This clause originally read as follows:-      "In this article,-           (a) the  expression ’estate’  shall,  in      relation to  any local  area, have  the  same      meaning  as  that  expression  or  its  local      equivalent has  in the  existing law relating      to land-tenures  in force  in that  area, and      shall also  include any  jagir, inam or muafi      or other similar grant.           (b) the  expression ’right’  in relation      to  an   estate,  shall  include  any  rights      vesting  in   a  proprietor,  sub-proprietor,      under-proprietor,  tenure-holder   or   other      intermediary and  any rights or privileges in      respect of land revenue." In 1955,  in sub-cl.  (a) the  words "and  in  the States of  Madras and Travancore-Cochin any janmam rights "  were added  at the  end while in sub-cl. (b) the  words "  raiyat under-raiyat " were added after the  word "  tenure-holder "  and before the words "or other intermediary". 843      It will  be seen therefore that so far as the meaning of  the word  "estate" is concerned, there was no  change in  sub-cl. (a) and the only change was with  respect to  the inclusive  part  of  the definition of  the word "estate". The word "estate has all  along  been  defined  to  have  the  same

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meaning in  relation to  any local  area  as  that expression or  its local  equivalent  has  in  the existing law  relating to  landtenures in force in that area.  It is  also remarkable  that the  word "intermediary"  does  not  occur  in  sub-cl.  (a) though it occurs in sub-cl. (b). The definition in sub-cl. (a)  is self-contained  and  there  is  no scope for  importing any  idea of  intermediary in the definition  from sub-cl.  (b). The  reason why the words "other intermediary" are used in sub-cl. (b) which defines rights in relation to an estate, is  that     sub-clause   mentions  a   number  of intermediaries  as   such,  like  sub-proprietors, under-proprietors,  tenure-holders  but  does  not give a  complete enumeration of all intermediaries that may  be existing in an estates all over India and therefore  uses the words "other intermediary" to bring  in all  kinds of intermediaries existing in an  estate. As  an example  we may mention that formerly in  Uttar Pradesh  there were  fixed rate tenants in  the permanently  settled districts who were also intermediaries and it is such persons or their likes  who were  brought in within the sweep of the  definition of  rights in  relation  to  an estate  by   the   use   of   the   words   "other intermediary". Therefore,  when the words "raiyat, under raiyat  " were added in sub-cl. (b) in 1955, it was  further enumeration within a class already there; further  as held  in The  State of Bihar v. Rameshwar Pratap Narain Singh (1), their inclusion in the circumstances and in the particular setting showed that  the words "or other intermediary" did not necessarily  qualify or  colour the meaning to be attached  to these  new tenures. The meaning of the word "estate" has however to be found in 844 sub-cl. (a)  and it is the words used in that sub- clause  only  which  will  determine  its  meaning irrespective of  whether any  intermediary existed in an  estate or  not. The  meaning  of  the  word "estate" in  sub-cl (a) is the same as it might be in the  existing law  relating to  land-tenure  in force in  a particular area. Where therefore there is an  existing law  in a particular area in which the word  "estate" as  such is  defined  the  word would have that meaning for that area and there is no  necessity  then  for  looking  for  its  local equivalent. But if in existing law of a particular area the word "estate" as such is not defined, but there is  a definition of some other term which in that area  is the  local equivalent  of  the  word "estate" then  the word  "estate" would  have  the meaning assigned  to that term in the existing law in that  area. In  order, however, that one may be able to  say that a particular term in an existing law in  a particular area is a local equivalent of the  word  "estate"  used  in  sub-cl  (a)  it  is necessary to  have some  basic idea of the meaning of the  word "estate" for that purpose. That basic idea seems  to be  that  the  person  holding  the estate should  be the  proprietor of  the soil and should be  in direct  relationship with  the State paying land-revenue to it, when it is not remitted in whole  or in  part.  If  a  term  therefore  is defined in  any existing law in a local area which

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corresponds to  this basic  idea of an estate that term would  be a  local  equivalent  of  the  word "estate" in that area. It is unnecessary to pursue the matter further because this aspect of the case has also  been considered in Writ Petition No. 105 of 1961.      It may be added that as the definition of the word "estate"  came  into  the  Constitution  from January 26,  1950, and is based on existing law we have to  look into  law existing  on  January  26, 1950, for  the purpose  of finding out the meaning of the word "estate" in Art. 31A. 845      Let us  therefore look at state of the law as it was in the State of Madras on January 26, 1950, for the  area from  which these petitions come was then in  the district  of South  Canara, which was then a  part of  the  Province  of  Madras,  which became the  State of  Madras on  January 26, 1950. The usual feature of land-tenure in Madras was the ryotwari form  but in  some districts,  a landlord class had  grown  up  both  in  the  northern  and southern parts  of the  Presidency of Madras as it was  before   the  Constitution.   The   permanent settlement was  introduced in a part of the Madras Presidency  in   1802.  There  were  also  various tenures arising  out of  revenue free  grants  all over the  Province (see Chap. IV, Vol. III of land Systems of  British India  by  Baden  Powell)  and sometimes in some districts both kinds of tenures, namely, landlord  tenures and the ryotwari tenures were prevalent.  There were  various Acts in force in  the  Presidency  of  Madras  with  respect  to landlord  tenures   while  ryotwari  tenures  were governed by  the Standing  orders of  the Board of Revenue.   Eventually,   in   1908,   the   Madras legislature passed the Madras Estate Land Act, No. 1 of  1908, which  was later  amended from time to time.  It   contains  a  definition  of  the  word "estate"  as   such  in   s.  3(2)  and  when  the Constitution came  into force the relevant part of the definition was as follows:-      "Estates’ means:-           (a)   any  permanently settled estate or      temporarily settled zamindari;           (b)   any  portion of  such  permanently      settled   estate   or   temporarily   settled      zamindari which  is separately  registered in      the office of the Collector;           (c)   any unsettled palaiyam or jagir;           (d)   any  inam  village  of  which  the      grant has  been made, confirmed or recognised      by the  British  Government,  notwithstanding      that 846      subsequent to the grant, the village has been      partitioned  among   the  grantees   or   the      successors-in  title   of  the   grantee   or      grantees." This Act  applied  to  the  entire  Presidency  of Madras except  the Presidency  town of Madras, the district of Malabar and the portion of the Nilgiri district known  as  South  East  Wynaad.  It  thus applied to the district of South Canara from where these petitions  come. So  far  therefore  as  the

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District of  South Canara was concerned, there was an existing  law which  defined the  word "estate" for  that   local   area.   Shortly   before   the Constitution   came    into   force   the   Madras legislature  had   passed   the   Madras   Estates (Abolition and  Conversion into  Ryotwari) Act No. XXVI of  1948. That Act provided for the abolition of estates  subject to  certain restrictions  with which we  are not  concerned. It also provided for repeal  of   the   Madras   Permanent   Settlement Regulation, 1802, and the Estates Land Act of 1908 to  the   extent  and   from  the  date  on  which notifications were  made under  s. 3  of that Act. There was  thus no  repeal of Act I of 1908 by the Act of 1948, and it is not in dispute that Act No. 1 of  1908 was  in force  on January  26, 1950, in large parts  of the  Province of  Madras including South Canara,  and is still in force in such parts of it  as have not been notified under s. 3 of the Act of 1948. Therefore, we reach the position that when Art.  31 became  applicable from  January 26, 1950, Act  No. 1  of 1908  was still  in force  in large parts of the Madras State and it contained a definition of  the word "estate" as such. Further, Act I of 1908 was clearly a law of land-tenures as a  brief  review  of  its  provisions  will  show. Section 6 of the Act conferred occupancy rights on tenants of  certain lands  in "estates" as defined in the  Act of  1908. Chapter  II dealt  with  the general rights  of landlords  and tenants. Chapter III dealt with provisions relating to rate of rent payable by  tenants and  provided for enhancement, reduction, commutation, alteration 847 and remission  of  rent.  Chapter  IV  dealt  with pattas and  muchilikas.  Chapter  V  provided  for payment of  rent and for realisation of arrears of rent.  Chapter   VI  provided  the  procedure  for recovery of  rent. Other Chapters dealt with other matters  including   Chap.  X   which  dealt  with relinquishment  and   ejectment.   It   is   clear therefore that  the Act of 1908 was a law relating to landtenures.  Therefore, we  reach the position that in  a law  relating to land-tenures which was in  force   in  the   State  of  Madras  when  the Constitution came into force the word "estate" was specifically defined. This law was in force in the whole of the State of Madras except some parts and was thus  in force  in the  area  from  which  the present petitions  come. This area was then in the south Canara  district of  the State of Madras. We are therefore of opinion that the word "estate" in the circumstances  can only have the meaning given to it  in the Act of 1908 as amended up to 1950 in the State  of Madras  as it  was on  the date  the Constitution came into force.      We have  already said  that the  Act of  1908 dealt with  landlord tenures  of Madras and was an existing law  relating to  land-tenures. The other class  of   land-tenures  consisted   of  ryotwari pattadars  which  were  governed  by  the  Board’s Standing  Orders,   there  being  no  Act  of  the legislature with  respect to  them. The holders of ryotwari pattas  used to  hold lands on lease from Government. The  basic idea of ryotwari settlement

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is that every bit of land is assessed to a certain revenue and  assigned a survey number for a period of  years,   which  is  usually  thirty  and  each occupant of  such land  holds it  subject  to  his paying the land-revenue fixed on that land. But it is open  to the occupant to relinquish his land or to take  new land  which has  been relinquished by some other  occupant or become otherwise available on payment  of assessment,  (see Land  Systems  of British India by Baden-Powell, Vol. III, Chap. IV, s. II,  p. 128).  Though, theoretically, according to some authorities, the occupant of ryotwari 848 land held  it under an annual lease (see Macleane, Vol. I  Revenue Settlement,  p. 104),  it  appears that  in  fact  the  Collector  had  no  power  to terminate  the  tenant’s  holding  for  any  cause whatever except  failure to pay the revenue or the ryot’s own relinquishment or abandonment. The ryot is generally  called a tenant of Government but he is not  a tenant,  from year to year and cannot be ousted  as   long  as  he  pays  the  land-revenue assessed.  He  has  also  the  right  to  sell  or mortgage or  gift the  land or  lease it  and  the transferee becomes  liable in  his place  for  the revenue.  Further,   the  lessee   of  a  ryotwari pattadar has  no  rights  except  those  conferred under the  lease and is generally a sub-tenant at- will liable  to ejectment at the end of each year. In the  Manual of  Administration,  as  quoted  by BadenPowell,  in  Vol.  III  of  Land  Systems  of British India  at p.  129, the  ryotwari tenure is summarised as  that  of  a  tenant  of  the  State enjoying a  tenant-right which  can be  inherited, sold, or  burdened for  debt in precisely the same manner as  a proprietary  right subject  always to payment of  the revenue  due to the State". Though therefore the  ryotwari pattadar is virtually like a proprietor  and has  many of  the advantages  of such a  proprietor, he  could still  relinquish or abandon his  land in  favour of the government. It is because  of this  position  that  the  ryotwari pattadar was  never considered a proprietor of the land under  his patta,  though he  had many of the advantages of  a proprietor. Considering, however, that the  Act of  1908 was  in force  all over the State of Madras but did not apply to lands held on ryotwari settlement  and contained a definition of the  word   "estate"  which  was  also  applicable throughout the  State of  Madras except  the areas indicated above,  it is clear that in the existing law relating to land-tenures the word "estate" did not  include  the  lands  of  ryotwari  pattadars, however valuable might be their rights in lands as they eventually came to be recognised. 849      Turning now  to the  district of South Canara and the  areas from  which the  present  petitions come  it  appears  that  originally  the  ryotwari settlement was  not in  force in this area and two kinds  of   tenures   were   recognised,   namely, mulawargdar and Sarkarigniwargdar. It is, however, unnecessary to  go into  the past  history of  the matter, for it is not in dispute that the ryotwari system was  introduced in South Canara district in

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the early  years of this century. The history will be found  in the  Book "Land Tenures in the Madras Presidency" by S. Sunderaraja Iyengar, IIEdn., pp. 45-47,  where   it  is   said  that   "after   the introduction of  the ryotwari  system  into  South Canara, no  distinction  now  exists  between  the wargadar, the  mnulawargadar and  kudutaledar  and they are  all ryotwari  pattadars" Therefore, when the Constitution  came  into  force  the  ryotwari pattadars  of   South  Canara  were  on  the  same position as  the ryotwari pattadars of the rest of the State  of Madras.  Further, as the Act of 1908 was in  force in  South Canara  also, though there may not  be many estates as defined in that Act in this area  it follows  that in  this area also the word "estate"  would have  the same  meaning as in the Act  of 1908  and therefore ryotwari pattadars and their  lands would  not be covered by the word "estate". Further,  there can  be no  question  of seeking for  a local  equivalent so  far  as  this parts of  the State of Kerala which has come to it from the  former State  of Madras is concerned. We are  therefore  of  opinion  that  lands  held  by ryotwari pattadars  in this part which has come to the State  of  Kerala  by  virtue  of  the  States Reorganisation Act  from the  State of  Madras are not estates  within the meaning of Art. 31A (2)(a) of the  Constitution and  therefore the Act is not protected under  Art. 31A  (I) from  attack  under Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution. 850 Re. (4).      The  next   contention  on   behalf  of   the petitioners is that the Act makes a discrimination between areca  and pepper  plantations on  the one hand and  certain other  plantations on  the other and should  therefore be  struck down as violative of Art.  14 of  the Constitution. Section 2(39) of the Act defines "plantation" to mean any land used by a  person principally  for the  cultivation  of tea, coffee, rubber or cardamom or such other kind of special  crops  as  may  be  specified  by  the Government by  notification in  the gazette. Areca and  pepper  plantations  have  however  not  been included in this definition. It is urged on behalf of the  petitioners that in this part of the State there are  a large  number  of  areca  and  pepper plantations which  are practically run on the same lines as  tea, coffee  and rubber  plantations and there is  no reason  why discrimination  should be made between  areca and  pepper plantations on the other hand  and tea, coffee and rubber plantations on the  other. The discrimination is said to arise from the  provisions of s. 3 and s. 57 of the Act. Section 3(viii)  which occurs  in Chap. II dealing with the acquisition of the interest of landowners by  tenants   excepts  tenancies   in  respect  of plantations exceeding  thirty acres in extent from the application  of that  chapter. The  result  of this is  that  tenants  in  plantations  exceeding thirty acres in extent cannot acquire the interest of the landowners with respect to such plantations and  the   landowners   continue   to   own   such plantations as  before. Further  s. 57 which is in Chap.  III   provides   for   exemption   of   all

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plantations  whatever   their  extent   from   the provisions of  that Chapter. Thus the ceiling area provided in  s. 58  will not  apply to plantations which will  be left out in calculating the ceiling area for  the purpose  of s.58.  Further,  s.59(2) provides that  in calculating the ceiling area any cashew estate  if it was a cashew estate on April, 11, 1957 and continued as such at the 851 commencement of  s. 59 (provided the cashew estate was principally  planted with  cashewnuts tree and be a  contiguous area  not below  10  acres)  will continue to be owned or held as before, though the ceiling in  such cases would be reduced to half of that provided in s.58. These provisions inter alia confer benefits  on those  who hold plantations as defined in  s. 2(39)  and also  on those  who have cashew estates as defined in the Explanation to s. 59(2). The contention on behalf of the petitioners is that  there is  no reason why the same benefits which  have   been  conferred  on  plantations  as defined in  the Act  should not  be  conferred  on those who  hold areca  and pepper plantations, and that there  are no  intelligible differentia which would justify  the State  legislature in  treating the pepper  and areca plantations differently from rubber, tea and coffee plantations.      Article  14   has   been   the   subject   of consideration  by   this  Court  on  a  number  of occasions and  the  principles  which  govern  its application  have  been  summarised  in  Shri  Ram Krishna Dalmia  v. Shri  Justice S.  R.  Tendolkar (1), in these words:-      "(a) that a  law may  be constitutional  even           though it relates to a single individual           if,   on   account   of   some   special           circumstances or  reasons applicable  to           him and  not applicable  to others, that           single individual  may be  treated as  a           class by himself;      (b)  that there  is always  a presumption  in           favour of  the constitutionality  of  an           enactment and the burden is upon him who           attacks it to show that there has been a           clear     transgression      of      the           constitutional principles;      (c)  that  it   must  be  presumed  that  the           legislature  understands  and  correctly           appreciates the  need of its own people,           that its laws are directed to problems 852           made manifest by experience and that its           discriminations are  based  on  adequate           grounds;      (d)  that  the   legislature   is   free   to           recognise  degrees   of  harm   and  may           confine its  restrictions to those cases           where the  need  is  deemed  to  be  the           clearest;      (e)  that in order to sustain the presumption           of constitutionality  the court may take           into  consideration  matters  of  common           knowledge, matters of common report, the           history of  the  times  and  may  assume           every  state   of  facts  which  can  be

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         conceived  existing   at  the   time  of           legislation; and      (f)  that while  good faith  and knowledge of           the existing conditions on the part of a           legislature are to be presumed, if there           is nothing on the face of the law or the           surrounding circumstances brought to the           notice  of   the  court   on  which  the           classification   may    reasonably    be           regarded as  based, the  presumption  of           constitutionality cannot  be carried  to           the extent  of always holding that there           must be  some  undisclosed  and  unknown           reasons    for     subjecting    certain           individuals or  corporations to  hostile           or discriminating legislation." The petitioners rely on cl.(f) of this summary and contention is that there is nothing to show either in the  Act or  even in  the  affidavit  filed  on behalf of  the State  in reply to the petitions or in the  circumstances brought to the notice of the court that  the classification  in this case which excludes areca and pepper plantations and includes tea, coffee  and rubber  plantations is  a  proper classification based  on intelligible  differentia which are  related to  the objects and purposes of the Act. 853      This brings  us to  a  consideration  of  the reasons which may have impelled the legislature to treat plantations  as  a  class  differently  from other  lands.   The  objective   of  land   reform including  the  imposition  of  ceilings  on  land holdings is  to remove all impediments which arise from the  agrarian structure  inherited  from  the past in order to increase agricultural production, and to  create conditions for evolving as speedily as possible  an agrarian economy with a high level of efficiency  and productivity (see p. 178 of the Second Five  Year Plan). It is with this object in view  that   ceiling  on  land-holdings  has  been imposed  in   various  States.   Even  so,  it  is recognised that  some exemptions  will have  to be granted from  the ceiling in order that production may not  suffer. This was considered in the Second Five Year  Plan at  p. 196  and three main factors were  taken   into  account   in   deciding   upon exemptions from the ceiling, namely:-           (1)  integrated  nature  of  operations,      especially where  industrial and agricultural      work   are    undertaken   as   a   composite      enterprise,           (2)  specialised      character       of      operations, and           (3)  from  the  aspect  of  agricultural      production   the    need   to   ensure   that      efficiently  managed   farms   which   fulfil      certain conditions are not broken up. Bearing these  criteria in mind it was recommended in the Second Five Year Plan (see p. 196) that the following categories of farms may be exempted from the operation of ceiling namely:           "(1)tea, coffee and rubber plantation;           (2)  orchards  where   they   constitute      reasonably compact areas;

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854           (3)  specialised farms engaged in cattle      breeding, dairying, wool raising etc;           (4)  sugarcane farms  operated by  sugar      factories; and           (5)  efficiently  managed   farms  which      consist of  compact blocks,  on  which  heavy      investment    or     permanent     structural      improvements have  been made and whose break-      up  is   likely  to   lead  to   a  fall   in      production." The same  view has been reiterated in Chap. XIV of the Third  Five Year Plan dealing with Land Reform and ceiling  on agricultural  holdings and para 28 thereof  refers   to  the   grounds  of  exemption envisaged by  the Second  Five Year  Plan.  It  is obvious therefore  that when the State legislature in this  case exempted  tea,  coffee,  rubber  and cardamom plantations  from the ceiling under Chap. III and  treated plantations of over 30 acres as a special case  for the purpose of Chap. II, it must have had  the principles  enunciated above in mind to differentiate them from ordinary cultivation of other  crops.   If  that   be  so,   the  question immediately arises whether there is any reason for treating areca and pepper plantations differently. If there  is none and areca and pepper plantations stand so  far as these conditions are concerned on the  same   footing  as  tea,  coffee  and  rubber plantations there will clearly be a discrimination against them by the provisions of the Act referred to above.      Turning now  to pepper plantations, first, we may refer  to the  information contained  in  Farm Bulletin No.  55 relating to pepper cultivation in India  issued   by  the   Farm  Information  Unit, Directorate of  Extension, Ministry  of  Food  and Agriculture,  New  Delhi  in  September  1959.  It appears from this bulletin that Kerala is the most important pepper  producing State  in India, where pepper is  cultivated on  an organised  plantation scale over 855 fairly extensive  areas. There  are three distinct regions of  the pepper  growing belt,  namely, (1) The Travancore  and Cochin region. (2) The Malabar and South  Canara region,  and (3)  the Coorg  and North Canara  region. Though pepper is essentially a homestead  garden crop,  growers were encouraged to grow it on plantation scale since 1928 when the price of pepper rose to about Rs. 700/- per candy. Since then  there has  been a  further rise in the price of pepper with the result that new homestead gardens and  plantations have sprung up and pepper cultivation has  extended a  good deal. During the last fifty  years,  pepper  which  was  largely  a household garden  crop has emerged as a plantation crop and  fairly large sized plantations of pepper exist in  the submontane  eastern parts  of  North Malabar and  the Hosdrug  taluk of  South  Canara, (the area  from which  these petitions  come).  In Hosdrug taluk in particular pepper is grown mostly on large scale plantations and it is here that the finest and  the best  organised pepper plantations in India  exist. Some  of the  largest plantations

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among them  have an  area of  a 100  to 150 acres. Pepper vines  commence yielding  usually from  the third year,  the yield  increasing gradually until the vines come to full bearing in about ten years. The economic  life of  a vine varies from place to place. From  the tenth to the 25th year, the vines are in  full bearing,  and  the  yield  begins  to decline after the 30th year. The initial outlay on pepper plantations  is heavy  and the  pepper crop requires continuous  attention and care. The total area under  pepper is  over 2  lakhs acres  out of which about  20,000 acres  are under  pure  pepper plantations. The initial expenditure on laying out a pepper  plantation can  be recovered  only after several years  and the  best  organised  and  most extensive pepper  plantations of  India are in the Hosdrug taluk,  South  Canara  (from  where  these petitions come) and North Malabar. 856      This information  taken from Farm Bulletin 55 shows that in the last fifty years pepper in India has reached the plantation stage and in particular in Hosdrug  taluk from  where these petitions come there are  the best  organized and  most extensive pepper plantations  in India.  The initial cost of laying out  a pepper  plantation is  heavy and the pepper vines  yield nothing  for three  years  and full production  comes only  in  the  tenth  year. Therefore,  where   pepper  is   cultivated  as  a plantation crop on a large scale the cost is heavy and may be comparable to the outlay on large scale tea, coffee and rubber plantations. It is in these circumstances that  we have  to  consider  whether there  has   been  discrimination  against  pepper plantations when  they have  not been  included in the definition of plantation under s. 2(39) of the Act.      Turning to arecanut, reference may be made to Farm Bulletin No. 14 issued by the same authority. The major  arecanut growing belt in India is again the same  regions, i.e.,  South  Canara,  Malabar, Coorg and  Travancore-Cochin along  with parts  of Mysore, Bengal  and Assam.  Arecanut is also grown on plantation scale. Since the crop begins to bear fruit after  about eight years, large sums have to be expended  up to  the bearing  stage without any income  till   then.  The  estimated  life  of  an arecanut garden  is about  50 to  60 years, though some of  the palms  in the  garden will  be  dying occasionally or becoming uneconomic and it will be necessary  to   replace  them.   For  this  reason underplanting is taken up periodically. It appears further from  the Proceedings  of the Ninth Annual General Special  and Twelfth  Ordinary Meetings of the Indian  Central  Arecanut  Committee  held  on January  23,   1958,  that  the  question  whether arecanut gardens  should be  put under  ceiling or not  and  whether  there  would  be  hampering  of production  which   would  be   against   national interest if a ceiling were imposed on such gardens had  been   referred  to   a   Sub-committee   for consideration. 857 The Sub-committee  reported that  if areca gardens were brought  under the  ceiling it  would  hamper

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production which  would be  against  the  national interest   and   recommended   to   the   Planning Commission, the  Central Government  and the State Governments that,  as  proposed  by  the  Planning Commission in  respect of  tea, coffee  and rubber plantations,  orchards,   specialised  farms   and efficiently managed  farms,  arecanut  gardens  be also similarly  exempted from  ceiling.  The  Sub- committee also  noticed that  arecanut cultivation involved heavy  capital  outlay  in  establishing, maintaining and  protecting  the  arecanut  trees. This recommendation  of the  Sub-committee came up for  consideration   before  the   Indian  Central Arecanut Committee  on January  23, 1958,  and was accepted.  Thus   these  proceedings   show   that fixation of  ceiling  on  arecanut  gardens  would hamper production  which would  be detrimental  to national  economy.   It  is   in  this  background therefore that  we have  to consider  whether  the non-inclusion of  areca and  pepper plantations in the definition  in s.  2(39) with  the result that areca and  pepper plantations do not enjoy similar benefits as others, is discriminatory.      From what  we have said above it has not been shown that  there is  any  appreciable  difference between the  economics of  tea, coffee  and rubber plantations and  areca and  pepper plantations. It is true  that plantations  in areca and pepper are not  so  widespread  as  tea,  coffee  and  rubber plantations but  it is  equally true  that in this particular area  from which  these petitions  come areca and  pepper plantations are very common. The fact however that areca and pepper plantations are very common  only in  this area  of the  State  of Kerala is  no reason for treating them differently from tea,  coffee and rubber plantations which are apparently more  evenly distributed throughout the State. If  the criteria  evolved by  the  Planning Commission, as  already indicated,  apply to  tea, coffee and rubber 858 plantations in  our opinion  they equally apply to areca and  pepper  plantations  and  there  is  no reason for  differentiating between these two sets of plantations.  So far  as areca  is concerned we have  the  recommendation  of  the  Sub-committee, mentioned above,  endorsed by  the Indian  Central Arecanut Committee,  that it  would be detrimental to national  economy not  to extend the benefit of exemption from  ceiling to arecanut plantations in the same way as is done in the case of tea, coffee and rubber  plantations. As  for pepper we have it from Farm  Bulletin No. 55 that the best organised and most extensive pepper plantations of India are in Hosdrug  Taluk of South Canara and that some of them are  even as  large as 100 to 150 acres each. The result  of the  application of the ceiling and other provisions  of the Act would mean the break- up of  these plantations and may result in fall in production. It  is to  avoid the  break-up of tea, coffee and  rubber plantations  and the consequent fall in  production  that  ceiling  has  not  been imposed on  these plantations. The same reasons in our opinion  lead to  the conclusion  that  pepper plantations should  also be  treated similarly. In

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this connection  reference  may  be  made  to  the opinion expressed  in Farm  Bulletin No.  55 where the author  has said that it is impossible to keep a large  plantation  of  pepper  in  good  tip-top condition, without incurring heavy expenditure and without great  efforts and  has added  that in the existing conditions  no one  planter  should  have more than  10 acres  of  pepper  plantation.  This would  seem  to  suggest  that  10  acres  is  the economic optimum  limit for pepper plantations. It is  not   clear  however   on  what   basis   this recommendation  is   based,  for  undoubtedly  the bulletin shows  that there are plantations of much larger extent  in this  area and  the  plantations here are the best organised and the most extensive throughout the  whole of  India. The  only  reason which seems  to have  been given in support of the opinion that 859 10  acres   is  the  optimum  area  for  a  pepper plantation is  that one planter in that region was of the  view that unless the price of one candy of pepper  remained  at  a  high  level  of  anything between Rs.  1,500/- and  Rs. 2,000/-  it will  be impracticable and  unprofitable to  maintain large scale plantations  of pepper in these regions, and if prices  go down  for below  this  level,  large scale pepper  plantations  may  have  even  to  be abandoned. This does not afford a sufficient basis for holding  that 10  acres is the optimum holding for a pepper plantation. In the first place, it is mentioned at  p. 8  of the  bulletin  that  pepper began to  be grown  on plantation  scale when  the price rose  to about  Rs. 700/- per candy in 1928. Therefore  even  if  the  price  falls  below  Rs. 1,500/- to  Rs. 2,000/-  per  candy  there  is  no reason why  pepper  cultivation  on  a  plantation scale should become impracticable, particularly as it is  unlikely that  the cost of only pepper will fall and  not all  other commodities. At p. 72 the bulletin mentions  that the cost of cultivation of pepper can  be brought  down only  if the  general price level  is brought  down  substantially.  Now there is  no reason to suppose that there would be a catastrophic  fall in  the price level of pepper only which would make all pepper plantations above 10 acres  uneconomic and unprofitable. In any case this is  not the  reason urged  on behalf  of  the State  in   support  of   not   including   pepper plantations in  the definition  of plantation.  In this connection  we ought  to add that the counter affidavit  filed   by  the   respondent  is   very unsatisfactory; no  serious attempt  has been made at all  to justify  the exclusion  of  pepper  and arecanut  from   the  exemption  granted  to  tea, coffee, rubber  and cardamom;  no facts are stated and no  data supplied  in reply  to  the  detailed allegations made  in the petitions challenging the validity of  the classification  in question.  The only reason  given by  the State  in  the  counter affidavit is  that a  plantation crop is generally understood 860 to refer  only  to  tea,  coffee  and  rubber  and cardamom. It  is not  quite clear  what exactly is

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meant  by   this  one   sentence  in  the  counter affidavit in  support  of  the  definition.  If  a plantation crop  is generally  understood to refer to only  tea, coffee,  rubber and  cardamom, it is not understood  why the  definition  provides  for extending the  word "plantation  to other crops by notification. The  very fact  that power  has been reserved   for   extending   the   definition   by notification to other crops shows that other crops can also  be grown  on plantation  scale. In  view therefore of  what we have said above with respect to the  economics of areca and pepper cultivation, it is  obvious that  no sufficient reason has been shown  for   differentiating  areca   and   pepper plantations in  this area  from  tea,  coffee  and rubber plantations  in the  State. Making  all the presumptions in  favour of the classification made under s.2(39) it is clear that there is nothing on the  face   of  the   law   or   the   surrounding circumstances which has been brought to our notice in this case on which the classification contained in s.  2(39) can  be said  to be reasonably based. Considering the  object and purpose of the Act and the basis  on which  exemption  has  been  granted under  Chapters  II  and  III  to  plantations  as defined in  the Act, there appears to be no reason for making any distinction between tea, coffee and rubber on the one hand and areca and pepper on the other in  this particular  case. It  is not  as if tea, coffee  and rubber  are grown only on a large scale while areca and pepper are mostly grown on a small scale.  We  find  from  the  report  of  the Plantation Inquiry  Commission, 1956,  that  small holdings  exist   in  tea,   coffee   and   rubber plantations also  and are  in fact the majority of such plantations.  For example,  in the  report of the  Plantation  Inquiry  Commission  relating  to coffee at  pp. 9  and 14  we find  that out of the total number of registered estates more than 4,500 are between  5 acres and 25 acres while only about 2,200 861 estates are above 25 acres. Further there are more than 24,000 estates below 5 acres. Similarly at p. 97, Chap.  XI, Part III of the Report dealing with rubber, out  of the  total of  over 26, 709 rubber estates, 23,300  are up to 5 acres, 1,900 up to 10 acres and  only about  1,500 above 10 acres. So it appears that  the large  majority  of  plantations whether they  be of  coffee or rubber are below 10 acres and  that is  also the  case with  area  and pepper plantations.  Thus there  is no  reason for giving preference  to plantations  of tea,  coffee and rubber over plantations of area and pepper for the conditions  in the  two  sets  of  plantations whether for the purpose of ceiling under Chap. III or for  the purpose  of acquisition of landowners’ rights under  Chap. II  are the  same. The reasons therefore which  call for exemption of tea, coffee and rubber  plantations equally apply to areca and pepper plantations  and there  is no  intelligible differentia related  to the  object and purpose of the Act which would justify any distinction in the case of  tea, coffee  and  rubber  plantations  as against  area   and  pepper  plantations.  We  are

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therefore of  opinion that the provisions relating to plantations  are violative  of Art.  14 of  the Constitution.      The next question is whether these provisions are severable,  that is to say, whether the Kerala legislature would  have  passed  the  Act  without these provisions.  That depends upon the intention of the legislature and as far as we can judge that intention from the provisions of the Act, it seems clear to  us that  the legislature  did not intend that the  provisions relating  to  acquisition  by tenants and  ceilings should  apply to plantations as defined in the Act, so that they may have to be broken-up with  consequent loss  of production and detriment to  national economy.  It seems that the legislature could  not have  intended in  order to carry out  the purpose of the legislation to do so even after breaking-up all the plantations which 862 existed in  the State.  It follows  therefore that the legislature  would not have passed the rest of the  Act   without  the   provisions  relating  to plantations. As these provisions affect the entire working out of Chapter II and III of the Act which are the  main provisions  thereof, it follows that these provisions relating to plantations cannot be severed from  the Act  and  struck  down  only  by themselves.  Therefore,  the  whole  Act  must  be struck  down  as  violative  of  Art.  14  of  the Constitution so  far as  it  applies  to  ryotwari lands in  those areas  of  the  State  which  were transferred to it from the State of Madras, and we order accordingly. Re. (5).      Then we  come to  the attack  that the Act is violative of  Art. 14  on account of the manner in which ceiling  has been fixed under s. 58 thereof. Section  2(12)   defines  a  "family"  as  meaning husband, wife  and their  unmarried minor children or such of them as exist. There are three kinds of families existing  in this State namely, the joint Hindu   family,    Marumakhathayam   family    and Aliyasanthana  family,   the  latter   two   being matriarchal. In the matriarchal family the husband and wife  are not  members of  the same family but belong to  different  families.  The  joint  Hindu family does  not merely  consist of  the  husband, wife and  unmarried minor children; it consists at least of  the husband  wife and  all the  children whether married  or unmarried and whether minor or adult. The definition of "family" therefore in the Act is an artificial one which does not conform to any of  the three  kinds of  families prevalent in the State.      Turning now  to s.  58, the  ceiling has been fixed in  two ways. The first is by reference to a family as defined in the Act of not more than five members which  is allowed  15 acres of double crop nilam or  its equivalent  with an  addition of one acre of  double crop  nilam or  its equivalent for each 863 member in  excess of  five, so  however  that  the total extent of the land shall not exceed 25 acres of double crop nilam or its equivalent. The second

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is by  reference to  an adult unmarried person who is allowed  7.50 acres of double crop nilam or its equivalent. It  has been  urged on  behalf of  the State that  the provisions  as they  stand do  not make any  discrimination whatsoever  for there  is the same provision for all adult unmarried persons and the  same for  all families  as defined in the Act. This in our opinion is an over-simplification of the  provision relating to ceiling under s. 58. On an  argument of  this kind  no provision  would ever be  discriminatory for  it is unlikely that a provision  would   on  the   face  of  it  make  a discrimination. The  discriminatory nature  of the provision has  to be  judged from the results that follow from  it and  we have  no  doubt  that  the results which follow from this double provision as to ceiling  are bound to be discriminatory. If the ceiling  had   been  fixed  with  respect  to  one standard whether  it be of an individual person or of a  natural family  by which  we mean  a  family recognised in  personal law,  the results  may not have been discriminatory. But where the ceiling is fixed as  in the present case by a double standard and over  and above that the family has been given an artificial definition which does not correspond with a  natural family  as known  to personal law, there is bound to be discrimination resulting from such  a  provision.  A  simple  illustration  will explain how the results of the manner in which the ceiling has been fixed by s. 58 will lead to clear discrimination between person and person. Take the case of  an adult unmarried person and a minor who is an  orphan with  no father,  mother brother  or sister. Assume  further that each owns 25 acres of land under personal cultivation. The former who is an adult  unmarried person will retain 7 acres and will have to surrender 17.50 acres as excess land. The latter  will be an artificial family under the definition of that word 864 in s.  2(12). This  follows from  the fact  that a family  consists   of  husband,   wife  and  their unmarried minor children or such of them as exist. This is  also made  clear by  s. 61(2) which shows that even  a minor  who has  no  parents,  and  no brothers or sisters will constitute a family under s. 2(12).  This minor  therefore as constituting a family will  be entitled  to 15  acres of land and will have  to surrender  only 10  acres as  excess land. No  justification has  been shown  to us  on behalf  of   the  State  for  this  discriminatory treatment of  two individual  persons; nor  are we able to  understand why  such discrimination which clearly  results   from  the  application  of  the provisions of  s. 58(1)is not violative of Art. 14 of the  Constitution. Examples  can be  multiplied with reference to joint Hindu families also, which would show  that in many cases discrimination will result on  the application  of these provisions to joint Hindu families. Similar would in our opinion be the case with Marumakhathayam and Aliyasanthana families where  as we have already pointed out the husband and  wife do not belong to the same family as known to personal law. Discrimination therefore is writ large on the consequences that follow from

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the provisions  of s.  58(1). We  are therefore of opinion  that   s.  58(1)   is  violative  of  the fundamental right  enshrined in  Art. 14;  as that section is the basis of entire Chap. III the whole Chapter must  fall  with  it.  This  would  be  an additional reason  why Chap.  III should be struck down as  violative of Art 14 in its application to ryotwari landas  which have  come to  the State of Kerala from the State of Madras. Re. (6)      It is  contended that the manner in which the compensation is  cut down  progressively in ss. 52 and 64  of the  Act is  violative of  Art. 14. The Compensation payable  under s. 52 is determined in this manner.  First the  purchase price is arrived at under  s. 45.  Thereafter s.  52(2)(b) provides that the  landowner or the intermediary, except in the 865 case  of  religious,  charitable  and  educational institution of  a public nature, would be entitled to compensation. The compensation would consist of (1) the value of structures, wells and embankments of a  permanent nature  situated in  the land  and belonging to the landowner or the intermediary, as the case  may be,  and (2)  the percentage  of the value  of   interest  of   the  landowner  or  the intermediary  in  respect  of  the  land  and  the improvements other  than those  falling under sub- cl. (i)  according to the scales specified in Sch. II. Schedule  II then  provides that the first Rs. 15,000/-. of  the compensation  will  be  paid  in full. Thereafter  there will  be a  reduction of 5 per cent.  in each  slab of  Rs. 10,000/-  till we reach compensation above Rs. 1,45,000/- Thereafter the compensation  arrived at under s. 52 read with s. 45  is reduced  by 70  per  cent  so  that  the landowner or  the intermediary  gets only  30  per cent of  what has  been arrived at under s. 52 (2) (b) read with s. 45.      Similarly in  s. 64  the compensation payable for excess  land surrendered is (i) the full value of any  structures, wells  and  embankments  of  a permanent nature situate in the land and belonging to the  person who  surrenders such land, and (ii) the percentage of the market value of the land and improvements other  than  those  specified  above. Here again  on the first Rs. 15,000/- compensation at 60  per cent  is to  be  paid.  Thereafter  the compensation is  reduced by  5 per  cent for  each slab of  Rs.  15,000/-  till  we  reach  over  Rs. 1,75,000/- when  the compensation is reduced by 75 per cent.      The contention  on behalf  of the petitioners is that  there is  no intelligible  differentia on which the purchase price determined under s. 45 or the market  value is  to be  reduced by  different percentages depending  on the total purchase price or the  total market  value of  the interest to be acquired. The reply on behalf of the State is that there is really no discrimination inasmuch 866 as  the  same  percentage  is  reduced  where  the compensation payable  to different  persons is the same. That  is undoubtedly  so. But  that alone is

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not in  our opinion  the end  of the  matter.  The question which  is posed  for our consideration is why a  person in  whose case the purchase price or the market  value Rs. 15,000/- should get the full purchase price or suffer a reduction in the market value at  a certain  rate while  another person in whose case  compensation is more than Rs. 15,000/- should suffer reductions at a different rate which reductions  become  progressively  higher  as  the purchase price  or the  market value increases. We could understand  once the  purchase price  or the market value  had been  determined a  uniform  cut therefrom   for    all   persons    entitled    to compensation. That  would then  raise the question of adequacy of compensation and unless the cut was so large  as to make the compensation illusory the cut may  be protected  by Art.31(2).  But  in  the present case  there is  not a  uniform cut  on the purchase  price   or  the  market  value  for  all persons, the  cut is  higher as the purchase price or the  market value  gets bigger and bigger after the first slab of Rs. 15,000/-. This difference in cut in  being justified  on behalf of the State on the same principle on which (for example) the slab system exists  for purposes  of income-tax. We are however of  opinion that  there is  no  comparison between the  slab system  of income-tax  rates and the present  cuts. Taxation  is a  compulsory levy from  each  individual  for  the  purpose  of  the maintenance  of   the  State.   We  may  therefore reasonably expect  that a rich man may be required to make  a contribution  which may  be higher than what may  be proportionately  due from  his income for that  purpose as  compared to a poor man. This principle cannot  be applied  in a  case  where  a person is deprived of his property under the power of eminent  domain for  which he  is  entitled  to compensation. There  is no  reason  why  when  two persons are  deprived of their property one richer than the other, they should be paid at 867 different rates  when the  property of  which they are deprived  is of the same kind and differs only in extent.  No such  principle can  be applied  in case where  compensation is  being  granted  to  a person for  deprivation of his property. Where one person owns  property valued at Rs. 15,000/- while another owns property valued at Rs. 30,000/-, both are  equally   deprived  of   the  property.  When therefore it  comes to  a question  of payment  of compensation we  can see  no reason  why a  person whose compensation  amounts to Rs. 15,000/- should get the  whole of  it or  a large part of it while another person whose compensation amounts to (say) Rs. 30,000/-  should get  something less  than the first person.  It is  not  as  if  there  is  some difference in  the nature  of the  property  which might justify  different payments of compensation. What the  Act provides is to work out the purchase price or the market value first for the purpose of determining compensation  and then  make different cuts from  the purchase  price or the market value according to  whether in  one  case  the  purchase price or  the market  value is Rs. 15,000/- and in another case  it is  more than  Rs.  15,000/-.  No

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justification,   is    pointed   out    for   this discrimination except  the principle  on which the slab system  for  the  purpose  of  income-tax  is justified. That principles as we have just pointed out does not apply to a case of compensation.      Nor  are   we  able   to  see   any  rational classification which  would justify different cuts based simply  on the amount of compensation worked out on  the basis  of  purchase  price  or  market value. The only thing we can see is that because a person is possibly richer he must be paid less for the same type of land while a person who is poorer must be  paid more. This kind of discrimination in the payment  of compensation cannot in our opinion be possibly  justified on the objects and purposes of the  Act. The object and purpose of the Act, as we have  already  said,  is  to  grant  rights  to cultivating tenants so that they may 868 improve their lands resulting in larger production to the  benefit of the national economy. Secondly, the object  of the  Act is to provide land for the landless and  to those who may have little land by taking excess  land  from  those  who  have  large tracts of lands so that peasant proprietorship may increase with  consequent increase  in  production due to  greater interest  of the cultivator in the soil. But  these objects have no rational relation which would  justify the  making of different cuts from the  purchase price  or the  market value for the purpose  of giving compensation to those whose interests are being acquired under the Act. We can therefore  see   no   justification   for   giving different compensation  based  on  different  cuts from the  purchase price  or the  market value  as provided in ss. 52 and 64 of the Act.      We may  in this connection refer to Kameshwar Singh v.  The State of Bihar (1), in which similar question with  respect to compensation provided in the Bihar  Land Reforms  Act, 1950,  came  up  for consideration. There the Act provided compensation at different  rates depending upon the net income. The landowner having the smallest net income below Rs. 500/-  was to  get twenty times the net income as compensation  while the  landowner  having  the largest net income, i. e., above 1,00,000/- was to get  only   three  times   of  the   net   income. Intermediate slabs  provided  different  multiples for  different   amounts  of   net  income.   That provision was  struck down by the Special Bench of the Patna  High Court  as violative of Art. 14. It may be  mentioned that   decision was given before the Constitution (First Amendment) Act adding Art. 31A and the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution was passed. Three learned Judges composing the Special Bench who heard that case were unanimously of the 869 opinion  that   such  difference  in  payment  was violative  of   Art.  14   and  the  principle  of progressive taxation did not apply to compensation for land acquired. We are of opinion that the view taken in that case is correct and the same applies to the  present case.  We may point out that  case came in  appeal to  this Court  (see, The State of Bihar v.  Maharajadhiraja Sir  Kameshwar Singh (1)

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). The appeal however was heard after Art. 31A and the Ninth  Schedule had  been  introduced  in  the Constitution  and  therefore  this  Court  had  no occasion to  consider whether  such difference  in payment of compensation would be violative of Art. 14. We  are therefore  clearly of opinion that the manner in which progressive cuts have been imposed on the  purchase price  under s. 52 and the market value under  s.  64  in  order  to  determine  the compensation   payable    to   land    owners   or intermediaries in  one case  and to  persons  from whom excess  land is  taken in  another results in discrimination and  cannot  be  justified  on  any intelligible differentia which has any relation to the objects  and  purposes  of  the  Act.  As  the provision as  to compensation  is all  pervasives, the entire Act must be struck down as violative of Art. 14 in its application to ryotwari lands which have come to the State of Kerala from the State of Madras.      In view  of what  we have  said above  on the main  points   urged  in   the  petitions,  it  is unnecessary to  consider other  subsidiary  points attacking particular  sections of  the Act  on the ground that they were unreasonable restrictions on the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property under  Art.   19(1)(f).  We  therefore  allow  the petitions and  strike down  the Act in relation to its application  to ryotwari lands which have come to the  State of  Kerala from the State of Madras. The petitioners  will get  their  costs  from  the State of Kerala, one set of hearing costs. 870      SARKAR, J.-I  wish to  say a few words on two of the questions that arise in these cases.      The Act, the validity of which is challenged, provides for  acquisition of  lands for  equitable distribution among  the people  who require it for cultivation by themselves. It provides for payment of  compensation  to  those  whose  interests  are acquired. It also provides for a mode of valuation of these interests. Then it provides by ss. 52 and 64 for  payment of compensation at a progressively smaller rate for larger valuations. For the higher slabs in  the valuation  made as  provided by  the Act, less and less is paid by way of compensation. It is said that these provisions for progressively diminishing compensation  are  discriminatory  and unconstitutional. This  is the  first  point  with which I propose to deal.      The  question   is  whether  the  payment  of compensation at  a progressively  smaller rate  as the valuation  is higher  offends Art.  14 of  the Constitution.  Now   it  is   not  disputed   that progressively higher  rate of  taxation by  an Act taxing income  is not  unconstitutional.  I  think such taxation  is too  well recognised  now to  be challenged. If  that is  so-and that was the basis on which  arguments proceeded  in this  case-I  am unable  to   see  that  a  statute  providing  for acquisition  of   property  and   for  payment  of compensation at a progressively lower rate for the higher slabs of valuation can be unconstitutional.      "The reason  for progressive  taxation in the case of  inheritance taxes and income taxes is the

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ability of  those receiving  or  giving  to  pay": Willis’s Constitutional Law (1936 ed.) p. 597. The cases in  America that  I have  looked up also put the matter  on the  same basis. The classification by  progressively  higher  taxation  in  a  taxing statute is  therefore good  if based  on  the  tax payers’ ability to pay.      It is  however said  that what applies in the case of a taxing statute cannot apply to a statute 871 permitting acquisition  of property  on payment of compensation. I  do not  see why  ? I am not aware that the  test for  determining whether  there has been unequal treatment is different with different varieties of  statutes, that the test for a taxing statute is  not the  same as  that for  a  statute providing   for    acquisition   on   payment   of compensation. I think the test is the same for all statutes,  and   it  is  that  there  must  be  an intelligible   differentia   having   a   rational relation to the object of the Act.      Now the  object of  a taxing  statute  is  to collect revenue for the governance of the country. Ability  to   pay  is   acknowledged  to   be   an intelligible differentia having a relation to such an object. The object of the statute with which we are concerned  is to  acquire land  on payment  of compensation so  that the  land may  be  equitably distributed among  the people.  If under a statute whose object  is to  collect revenue  more can  be legitimately demanded  from a  person having more, it seems  to me  that under a statute whose object is to acquire land by paying compensation less can equally legitimately  be paid  to a person who has more. Ability  to pay,  or which is the same thing as ability  to bear  the loss arising from smaller payment received,  would  in  either  case  be  an intelligible   differentia   having   a   rational relation to  the object of the Act. In one case it serves the  object by  collecting more revenue for adding to  the resources for governing the country and in  the other  case it  serves the  object  by making it  possible for  the State  by payment  of less money  out of  its resources to acquire lands for better  distribution. In  both cases the State resources are  benefited, in  one by  augmentation and  in   the  other   by  prevention   of  larger depletion. Therefore,  I would  accept the learned Attorney-General’s argument  that ss. 52 and 64 of the Act  cannot be  held to  be discriminatory and void for the same reason on which 872 progressive rates  of taxation  are held not to be so in the case of an Income-tax Act.      The next  question on  which I  wish to say a few words  concerns those  provisions of  the  Act which exempt plantations of tea, coffee, rubber or cardamom or  such other  kinds of special crops as the   Government   may   specify,   from   certain provisions  of  the  Act.  Plantations  have  been defined in  s. 2(39)  of the Act as land used by a person principally  for the  cultivation  of  tea, coffee,  rubber  or  cardamom  or  other  notified crops. No other crop appears to have been notified yet. Section  58 of  the Act  provides the ceiling

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area of  land which  may be held by any individual proprietor. Land  above  the  ceiling  has  to  be surrendered to  the Government.  Section 57 of the Act provides  that this  provision would not apply to plantations  as defined in s. 2(39). Again, Ch. 2 of  the Act which gives the tenants the right to purchase land  from the landlords and vests in the Government  the   lands  of   the  landlords   not themselves  cultivating  them  above  the  ceiling fixed, is  by s.  3 (viii)  not made applicable to plantations exceeding  thirty acres in extent. The question is  whether the  benefit so  given to the plantations   as    defined   in    the   Act   is discriminatory. The  petitioners own  large  scale cultivation of areca and pepper. They contend that no legitimate  differentiation is possible between lands on  which areca  and pepper  are  grown  and lands on  which tea,  coffee, rubber  and cardamom are grown.      No doubt the presumption is that a statute is constitutional  but   such  presumption   is   not conclusive. It  is  also  true  that  a  court  is entitled to  assume the  existence of all rational basis on  which the  classification made by an Act may be  justified. Even  so, it  seems to me, that the present  classification is,  on the  materials now before  us  not  justified.  It  may  be  that plantations of tea, coffee 873 rubber and  cardamom, especially  the first three, are  usually   large  in   size  and  require  big investments. It may be that they are carried on as industries which give employment to a large labour force.  These  characteristics  may  however  only justify the  putting of large plantations of these crops in  a class.  The Act  however  exempts  all lands on  which tea, coffee, rubber or cardamom is grown irrespective  of the  size of  the  business carried on  or of  labour employed  on them,  as a class. Materials  have been  placed before  us  to show that there are a very large number of smaller plantations growing  tea, coffee and rubber. There are  also   many  areca   and  pepper  plantations exceeding thirty acres in area. There is no reason to  put   tea,   coffee,   rubber   and   cardamom plantations  in  a  class  as  distinguished  from similar sizes  of plantations of areca and pepper. None at  least has  been shown  by  the  State  of Kerala to  exist. The  only ground  shown  in  the affidavit  of  the  State  of  Kerala  seeking  to justify the  classification of tea, coffee, rubber and cardamom  plantations in  one  class  is  that "plantation crop  is generally understood to refer only to tea, coffee, rubber and cardamom" and that "areca and  pepper are  not generally  grown on  a plantation scale". I am unable to think that these afford  sufficient   justification  for  making  a discrimination in  favour of  tea, coffee,  rubber and cardamom plantations. It would appear from the Planning Commission’s  Report that  other kinds of crops might  profitably  be  grown  as  plantation crops. In  any case,  a general understanding even if there  was one,  is not  sufficient  basis  for discrimination.   With   regard   to   the   other statements of  the State, it is enough to say that

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the Act  does not make a discrimination because of the size  of the  plantations. Therefore, there is no point  in saying  that areca and pepper are not grown on a plantation scale.      For these  reasons I  think the provisions in the Act making a discrimination in favour of tea, 874 coffee, rubber  and cardamom plantations cannot be upheld.  For   the  same   reason,  I   think  the discriminatory treatment  made in favour of cashew plantation  also  cannot  be  sustained.  Sections 3(viii),  57(1)(d)   and  59(2)  of  the  Act  are therefore, in my opinion, invalid. I think however that these  provisions are  severable  from  other parts of  the Act. I think it cannot be reasonably said that  the legislature  would not  put the Act into operation  if these  provisions are taken out of it.  The deletion  of the  provisions does  not further make it impossible for the rest of the Act to operate.  I am, therefore, unable, to hold that because the  sections mentioned above are bad, the whole Act should be declared to be bad.      That is  all I  wish to say in this judgment. With regard  to the  other matters arising in this case, I  agree  with  the  judgment  delivered  by Wanchoo J.      AYYANGAR, J.-I  entirely agree with the order that the  petitions  should  be  allowed  and  the impugned  Act  struck  down  in  relation  to  its application to  ryotwari lands which came into the State of  Kerala from  the  State  of  Madras-this being the  only relief  which the petitioners seek from this  Court. My only reason for this separate judgment is  because I  do  not  agree  with  that portion of  the reasoning in the judgment just now pronounced in  these petitions where it deals with the interpretation  of Art. 31A(2). In my judgment in the  companion case-Writ  Petition No.  105  of 1961-I have endeavored to point out what according to me  is the  proper construction of this Article and I adhere to that view.      I consider  that on  Art. 31A(2) as it stands even after  the fourth  Amendment, properties held on ryotwari  tenures and  the interest of the royt in such  lands would  not  be  "estates"  for  the purposes of  that Article. No doubt as pointed out by me in the 875 other judgment, if there was a law existing on the date of  the Constitution  in  relation  to  land- tenures  under  which  "estate"  were  defined  as including not  merely lands held by intermediaries and of  others holding  under favourable tenurers, but also  of ryotwari  proprietors  having  direct relationship with  the Government  and paying full assessment,  such  latter  category  of  interests might  also   be  comprehended   within  the  term "estate" by  reason of  the words  "have the  same meaning  as   that  expression.......has   in  the existing law  relating to land tenures in force in that area"  in Art.31A(2)(a).  That  is  the  real basis and  the ratio  underlying the  decisions of this Court  in Ram  Ram Narain  Medhi v.  State of Bombay(1), and  Atma Ram v. State of Punjab(2). In all other  cases (apart  from the  two  categories

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specially added  by the Fourth Amendment) no lands other than those held by intermediaries or held on a  favourable   tenure  would   fall  within   the definition of  "an estate" this being according to me the  central concept  or the  thread which runs through the entire definition.      The    choice     between    the    different interpretations of  the Article  does not  however present itself  for the  disposal of this petition which  has   to  be  answered  in  favour  of  the petitioner even  on the  view of the scope of Art. 31A which  has commended  itself to my colleagues. Where an "existing law in relation to land-tenures in force  in an  area" contains a definition of an "estate" and that definition excludes the interest of  a  roytwari  proprietor,  the  very  words  of Art.31A(2)(a) which I have extracted earlier would negative the  applicability of  its provisions  to that tenure.      Art. 31A  being out  of the  way I agree that the provision in (1) s. 2 (39) of the Act which by definition excludes  pepper and  areca plantations from the  category of  the plantations  which  are named in  it which are exempted from the operative provisions of the impugned Act, (2)s. 58 for the 876 determination  of   the  ceiling   in  respect  of different individuals  who are  brought within the scope of  the enactment,  and (3) ss.52 and 64 for determining  the   compensation  payable   to  the several  classes   of  persons   whose  lands  are acquired under  Act, all  these are  violative the guarantee of  the equal  protection of  laws under Art. 14 of the Constitution.      I therefore  agree in the order proposed that the petitions be allowed, and with costs.                                 Petitions allowed.