KANTA DEVI Vs STATE OF HARYANA
Bench: ALTAMAS KABIR,MARKANDEY KATJU
Case number: C.A. No.-001330-001332 / 2003
Diary number: 685 / 2001
Advocates: Vs
T. V. GEORGE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL Nos.1330-1332 OF 2003
Kanta Devi & Ors. ...Appellant(s) Vs.
State of Haryana & Anr. ...Respondents With
CIVIL APPEAL No. of 2008 @ SLP(C) No.9486 of 2003
CIVIL APPEAL No. of 2008 @SLP(C) No.9380 of 2003
CIVIL APPEAL No. of 2008 @SLP(C) No.18028 of 2001
CIVIL APPEAL No. of 2008 @SLP(C) No.3914 of 2002
CIVIL APPEAL No. of 2008 @SLP(C) No.18029 of 2001
CIVIL APPEAL No. of 2008 @SLP(C) No.3793 of 2001
CIVIL APPEAL No. of 2008 @SLP(C) No.15919 of 2001
CIVIL APPEAL No. of 2008 @SLP(C) No.15925 of 2001
CIVIL APPEAL No. of 2008 @SLP(C) No.15926 of 2001
CIVIL APPEAL No. of 2008 @SLP(C) No.15922 of 2001
CIVIL APPEAL No. of 2008 @SLP(C) No.15921 of 2001
CIVIL APPEAL No. of 2008 @SLP(C) No.15923 of 2001
CIVIL APPEAL No. of 2008 @SLP(C) No.16136 of 2001
CIVIL APPEAL No. of 2008 @SLP(C) No.16137 of 2001
CIVIL APPEAL No. of 2008 @SLP(C) No.18032 of 2001
CIVIL APPEAL No. of 2008 @SLP(C) No.9488 of 2003
CIVIL APPEAL No. of 2008 @SLP(C) No.9499 of 2003
AND
CIVIL APPEAL No. of 2008 @SLP(C) No.9531 of 2003
J U D G M E N T
ALTAMAS KABIR,J.
1. Apart from Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos.
9488, 9499 and 9531, all of 2003, leave is
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granted in respect of all the other Special
Leave Petitions heard along with Civil Appeal
Nos. 1330-1332 of 2003.
2. These appeals, have their genesis in a common
award dated 14th March, 1989, made by the Land
Acquisition Collector, Kurukshetra, whereby he
awarded compensation in respect of the
acquired lands at the rate of Rs.60,000/- per
acre for land in the form of Chahi, Gair
Mumkin Tubewell, etc. and at the rate of Rs.
40,000/- per acre in respect of Gair Mumkin
Talab Land and Rasta Land.
3. Twenty seven References were made to the Land
Acquisition Judge, Kurukshetra, under Section
18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the
same were disposed of by an Award dated 2nd
January, 1993.
4. Being dissatisfied as to the extent of
compensation awarded, the claimants filed
Regular First Appeals before the High Court.
Similarly, being aggrieved by the enhancement
of the market value of the lands, the State
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also preferred 27 Regular First Appeals. In
all, 51 Regular First Appeals, arising from
the common Notification, Award, and Judgment
of the Land Acquisition Judge, were taken up
for hearing together and were disposed of by
the learned Single Judge of the High Court by
a common Judgment dated 10th August, 1999.
5. Aggrieved by the judgment of the learned
Single Judge, the appellants herein filed
Letters Patent Appeals (L.P.As) before the
Division Bench of the High Court which were
mostly dismissed in limine or on account of
technicalities. All the appellants, however,
are similarly circumstanced and having the
same grievance. This batch of appeals have
been preferred against the said judgment and
order of the Division Bench of the High Court
in the various Letters Patent Appeals.
6. Applications have been filed in SLP(C) Nos.
9488/2003, 9499/2003 and 9531/2003 for
substitution and setting aside abatement and
also permission to file Special Leave
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Petition. As they all arise out of the said
common judgment of the High Court, they are
allowed and leave is also granted in the
connected Special Leave Petitions. As all the
appeals relate to the same Notification under
Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, and
arise out of the same Award, they were taken
up for hearing and final disposal together.
7. Coming back to the facts of the case, it may
be indicated that on 12th June, 1986, the
State of Haryana issued a Notification under
Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
(hereinafter, referred to as the “LA Act”) for
the acquisition of 265 kanals and 19 Marlas of
land in the revenue estate of village
Ismailabad, District Kurukshetra for the
establishment of a new grain market,
construction of rest house, staff quarters and
other connected purposes of the Market
Committee, Ismailabad. Notification under
Section 6 was thereafter issued on 9th June,
1987 and the Collector, Kurukshetra, by his
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Award dated 14th March, 1989 awarded
compensation for 250 kanals and 17 marlas,
comprising the first category of land referred
to above, at the rate of Rs.60,000/- per acre.
For 15 kanals and 2 marlas of land comprising
the second category of lands, the compensation
was awarded at the rate of Rs.40,000/- per
acre. Solatium and interest were also awarded
in terms of the provisions of the LA Act.
8. As indicated earlier, twenty seven References
were made under Section 18 of the LA Act to
the District Judge, Kurukshetra. All the said
References were heard together and by his
award dated 2nd January, 1993, the District
Judge, Kurukshetra enhanced the compensation
in respect of
the first category of lands to Rs.1,28,000/- per
acre and in respect of the second category of lands
to Rs.80,000/- per acre.
9. In the Regular First Appeals filed both by the
claimants and the State of Haryana, the High
Court by a common Judgment dated 10th August,
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1999, enhanced the compensation for the
acquired lands to Rs.2,88,000/- per acre and
it was indicated that all the claimants were
entitled to uniform compensation as the lands
had been acquired for a common purpose.
Consequently, the appeals preferred by the
State of Haryana were dismissed and those of
the claimants were allowed in part.
10. It may be relevant to mention at this stage
that in enhancing the compensation payable to
the claimants-appellants herein, the learned
Single Judge took one exemplar (Ex. P-6) for
the purpose of comparison vis-à-vis the land
acquired. Ex. P-6 is a sale deed, whereby on
30th January, 1986, a plot of land measuring
148 square yards was sold for Rs.24,000/-,
whereas the notification under Section 4 was
issued six months after on 12th June, 1986.
On the basis of the above, the price of the
land in question works out to Rs.9,60,000/-
per acre. The learned Single Judge, while
accepting the aforesaid valuation, directed
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deduction of 70% of the value of the lands
towards development charges to make the
acquired land suitable for the purpose for
which it had been acquired and also having
regard to the nature of the lands on the date
of publication of the notification under
Section 4 of the LA Act. On the basis of such
deduction, the learned Single Judge uniformly
enhanced the compensation in respect of the
lands acquired to Rs.2,88,000/- per acre. As
indicated hereinbefore, most of the Letters
Patent Appeals filed by the appellants were
dismissed by the Division Bench in limine or
on technical grounds.
11. These appeals have been preferred by the
claimants where Letters Patent Appeals were
disposed of by cryptic orders although they
were aggrieved by the rate of deduction
applied by the learned Single Judge of the
High Court while disposing of the Regular
First Appeals preferred by the appellants as
also the respondents.
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12. On behalf of the appellants, it was contended
that the rate of deduction as applied by the
learned Single Judge was highly excessive as
the acquired lands were situated in an area
which was already developed. It was
submitted that the acquired lands were
situated at Ambala Pehowa Road in Village
Ismailabad and were adjacent to the Village
abadi where there were houses and shelters,
power house, telephone exchange and a factory.
13. It was also submitted that since the
acquired lands were reserved for commercial
and residential purposes, the claimants had
demanded compensation at the rate of
Rs.15,000/- per marla from the Collector and
in support thereof Sale Deeds in respect of
lands adjacent to the acquired land had been
placed on record to show that the valuation of
the said lands were between Rs.8,000/- to
Rs.9,000/- per marla.
14. It was submitted that this Court had
repeatedly held that in assessing the
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compensation payable in respect of
agricultural land or undeveloped land which
had potential value for housing or commercial
purposes, normally 1/3 of the assessed value
of the land is deducted depending on the
nature of the land, its location, extent of
expenditure involved for development, and the
land required for roads and other civic
amenities to make the land suitable for
residential or commercial purposes. However,
in the instant case, despite the location of
the acquired land and its potential value, the
compensation payable to the claimants was
reduced drastically without proper reason for
such drastic deduction.
15. In addition to the above, it was submitted
that both the learned District Judge and the
learned Single Judge of the High Court had
erred in holding that the sale deed in respect
of a small plot of land was not a proper
indicator for the purpose of determining the
value of a large tract of land. It was urged
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that even with regard to the said question,
this Court had consistently indicated that
such sale deeds or such exemplars should not
be discarded in limini, but were to be taken
into consideration while fixing the value of
the lands acquired.
16. In support of the aforesaid submissions
reliance was placed on the decision of this
Court in Lucknow Development Authority vs.
Krishna Gopal Lahoti and Ors. [2007 (12) Scale
685] where deduction for development charges
at the rate of 1/3 of the amount of
compensation was accepted to be normal.
However, it was also indicated that there may
be various factors which were required to be
taken into consideration while deciding the
amount of deduction to be made towards
developmental charges. While in some cases,
it could be more than 1/3, in other cases it
could be less, having regard to the difference
between a developed area or an area having
potential value which is yet to be developed.
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17. In the same decision, while observing that
where a large area is the subject matter of
acquisition the rate at which small plots are
sold cannot be said to be a safe criteria, it
was also observed that it could not be laid
down as an absolute proposition that the rates
fixed for small plots could not be the basis
for fixation of the value of the acquired
land. However, in such cases necessary
deduction/adjustments have to be made while
determining the value and in the said context
it was held that a deduction of 1/3 of the
compensation amount was considered to be
normal.
18. It was also sought to be urged that apart from
Exh. P.6 on which reliance had been placed by
the High Court certain other exemplars were
also produced on behalf of the claimants which
were not relied upon on the ground that they
had not been properly proved. It was submitted
that with the incorporation of Section 51-A in
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the LA Act by way of amendment the degree of
proof had been altered and although the
previous legal position was that all sale
deeds on which reliance was placed by the
parties were required to be proved, after the
amendment such proof was not strictly required
and the various foras up to the stage of
Regular First Appeal could rely on such
documents, which included certified copies, as
exemplars without having to prove the same. It
was urged that having regard to the provisions
of Section 51-A of the LA Act the different
foras, including the High Court, had erred in
not placing reliance on all sale deeds that
had been produced on behalf of the claimants
in assessing the amount of compensation
payable in respect of the acquired land.
19. In support of the aforesaid submission
reliance was placed on a Constitution Bench
decision of this Court in Cement Corporation
of India Ltd. vs. Purya and ors. (2004) 8 SCC
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270 and Ranvir Singh Vs. Union of India (2005)
12 SCC 59, which supported such contention.
20. Since the grievance of the appellants was only
with regard to the rate of deduction on
account of the developmental charges and an
attempt was made on behalf of the appellants
to assert that 70% deduction was unwarranted
as the lands sought to be acquired were
already within or adjacent to a developed
area, on behalf of the State-respondent such
deduction was sought to be justified.
21. It was submitted on behalf of the State-
respondent that the observations made in the
Lucknow Development Authority case was more by
way of caution than laying down the general
law which finds consistent expression in
various other decisions of this Court, such as
Union of India vs. Ram Phool and another
(2003) 10 SCC 167 in which it had been held
that an isolated deed of sale showing a very
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high price cannot be the sole basis for
determining the market value.
22. It was submitted that the said view was
reiterated in the case of Ranvir Singh
(supra), which, in fact,had been relied upon
by the appellants in relation to the
submissions made with regard to Section 51-A
of the LA Act.
23. It was urged that this Court has consistently
held that small tracts of land purchased for a
particular purpose may fetch fancy prices in
terms of its location and the need for
acquisition by the vendee, but the same basis
could not be applied to each tract of land
which were yet to be developed for public
purposes such as housing or setting apart an
area for a particular purpose such as
education and/or industrialization. It was
submitted that in such cases there could be no
comparison with regard to the value of the
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lands covered by the sale deed and those
proposed to be acquired, and that the sale
price of such a small tract of land was not a
safe basis for determining the value of a very
large tract of land using the comparative
method.
24. It was, however, fairly submitted that in
Ravinder Narain vs. Union of India (2003) 4
SCC 481 it has been observed in paragraphs 6
and 7 as follows:
“6. Where large area is the subject- matter of acquisition, rate at which small plots are sold cannot be said to be a safe criterion. Reference in this context may be made to three decisions of this Court in Collector of Lakhimpur v. Bhuban Chandra Dutta (1972) 4 SCC 236, Prithvi Raj Taneja v. State of M.P.(1977)1 SCC 684 and Kausalya Devi Bogra v. Land Acquisition Officer, Aurangabad (1984) 2 SCC 324.
7. It cannot, however, be laid down as an absolute proposition that the rates fixed for the small plots cannot be the basis for fixation of the rate. For example, where there is no other material, it may in appropriate cases be open to the adjudicating court to make comparison
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of the prices paid for small plots of land. However, in such cases necessary deductions/adjustments have to be made while determining the prices.”
25. It was also submitted that in the instant case
excluding all the other exemplars, the High
Court had chosen to rely on Ex. P.6, where a
small tract of land (148 sq. yards) had been
sold at the rate of Rs.9,60,000/- per acre and
the compensation had been worked out on such
basis after applying deduction of 70% of the
market value towards developmental charges,
since the lands acquired were agricultural and
huge investment was required to be made by the
State to make the same suitable for the
purpose for which they had been acquired,
namely, the setting up of a new grain market
with all the ancillary infrastructure needed
by the Market Committee, Ismailabad.
26. It was submitted that the deduction of 70%,
which had been applied by the High Court, was
17
quite reasonable as the sale deed relied upon
by the appellants related to lands sold for
shops etc. and Ex. P.6 and other sale
instances had been relied upon by the
appellants for smaller areas. It was urged
that in Viluben Jhalejar Contractor (Dead) by
Lrs. Vs. State of Gujarat, (2005) 4 SCC 789,
this Court had held that there can be
different deductions depending upon various
factors. It was submitted that in various
other decisions and in particular in
K.S.Shivadevamma vs. Assistant Commissioner of
Land Acquisition Officer, (1996) 2 SCC 262, it
was held that although as a general rule 33-
1/2 per cent is required to be deducted for
laying of roads and other amenities, deduction
to the extent of 53% was not improper and the
extent of deduction depends upon the
development need in each case. In Vasavva
(Smt) and others vs. Special Land Acquisition
Officer and others, (1996) 9 SCC 640, this
Court upheld a deduction of 65%.
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27. As an alternative argument it was urged on
behalf of the State-respondent that since the
High Court had relied only on Ex. P.6 which
related to the sale of only 4 marlas of land,
the matter could be remanded to the High Court
for consideration of all the various sale
deeds which were produced on behalf of the
parties, to arrive at a fresh valuation for
the acquired lands.
28. It was submitted that in view of the above the
submissions made on behalf the claimants under
Section 51-A of the LA Act was not relevant
for determination of the point raised in these
appeals.
29. Having carefully considered the submissions
made on behalf of the respective parties we
see no reason to interfere with the decision
of the High Court.
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30. The learned Single Judge of the High Court has
taken into consideration the nature of the
land sought to be acquired in relying on
Ex.P.6 in assessing the market value thereof
and has applied a deduction of 70% in arriving
at the compensation to be awarded to the
claimants in respect of the said lands. The
various other documents which were produced on
behalf of the claimants were in respect of the
lands which were similar to the lands forming
the subject matter of Ex.P.6. The learned
Single Judge has given reasons for not relying
on all the other exemplars in choosing to rely
on Ex.P.6 alone. But the rate of deduction
applied appears to be on the high side in
relation to the developmental work involved in
making the acquired land suitable for the
purposes for which they were so acquired. The
acquired lands are adjacent to the village
abadi which is already developed. Having
regard to the consistent view that a deduction
of 1/3rd of the market value is normal, though
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a higher deduction is permissible, we are of
the view that deduction of 60% would meet the
expenditure towards developmental charges
considering the proximity of the acquired
lands to the areas already developed.
31. In our view, the Division Bench of the High
Court while dismissing the Letters Patent
Appeal filed by the claimants could have given
proper reasons before dismissing the same in
limine. However, since the decision of the
Division Bench endorses that of the learned
single Judge, with which we have dealt with in
detail, and with which we agree, save for the
amount of deduction applied towards
developmental charges, these appeals against
the decision of the Division Bench in
dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant
in C.A.Nos.1330-1332 of 2003, and all the
other connected appeals have to be allowed in
part. As far as the alternative submissions
made on behalf of the State regarding remand
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of these appeals to the High Court is
concerned, we are not inclined to accept the
same, since we are not convinced that such a
course of action needs to be adopted.
32. The appeals are accordingly allowed in part
only to the extent that the deduction of 70%
applied by the learned Single Judge and
endorsed by the High Court is reduced to 60%.
33. Having regard to the facts of the case there
will be no order as to costs.
………………………………………J. (ALTAMAS KABIR)
…………………………………………J. (MARKANDEY KATJU)
New Delhi Dated: July 8, 2008
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