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PETITIONER: KAMESHWAR PRASAD AND OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF BIHAR AND ANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 22/02/1962

BENCH: AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA BENCH: AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. SARKAR, A.K. WANCHOO, K.N. GUPTA, K.C. DAS

CITATION:  1962 AIR 1166            1962 SCR  Supl. (3) 369

ACT: Government  Servant-Participation in strikes  or  demonstra- tions-Rule prohibiting strikes or demonstrations  pertaining to  conditions  of service-Constutional  validity  of  rule- "Demonstration".   meaning  of-Bihar   Government   Servants Conduct  Rules,  1956, r. 4-A-Constitution of  India,  Arts. 19(1)(a), 19(1)(b), 19(1) (c),33,309.

HEADNOTE: By  a notification dated August 16, 1957, the Government  of Bihar introduced r. 4-A into the Bihar Gevernment  Servants’ Conduct  Rules, !956, which provided "No Government  servant shall participate in any demonstration or resort to any form of  strike in connection with any matter pertaining  to  his conditions  of service.  " The appellants filed  a  petition before  the High Court of Patna under Art. 226 of  the  Con- stitution  of India challenging the validity of the rule  on the grounds, inter alia, that it violated sub-cls. (a),  (b) and (c) of Art. 19 and that, in consequence, the rule was in excess of the rule making power conferred by Art. 309.   The High  Court took the view that the freedom guaranteed  under Arts.  19 (1) (a) and 19 (1) (c) did not include a right  to demonstrate  or to strike so far as servants  of  Government were concerned, and that in any case, the impugned rule  was saved as imposing reasonable restrictions. Held, that r. 4-A of the Bihar Government Servants’  Conduct Rules,  1956,  in  so  far as  it  prohibited  any  form  of demostration, be it however innocent or however incapable of causing  a breach of public tranquillity, was  violative  of Arts. 19 (1) (a) and 19 (1)(b) of the Constitution of India, and since on the language of the rule as it stood it was not possible  to  so read it as to separate the legal  from  the unconstitutional portion of the -.,,vision, the entire  rule relating  to  participation  in any  demonstration  must  he declared as ultra vires. The Superetendant, Central Prison, Fetehgarh v. Ram  Manohar Lohia, [1960] 2 S. C. R. 821, relied on. The  Constitution  has under Art. 33, selected  two  of  the Services under the State, the members of which might be

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370 deprived   of  the  benefit  of  the.   fundamental   rights guaranteed  to  other  persons and  citizens  and  also  has prescribed  the  limits within which  such  restrictions  or abrogation  might  take  place; but the  other  clausses  of servants  of  Government in common with  other  persons  and citizens  of  the  country  cannot  be  excluded  from   the protection  of the rights guaranteed by part III  by  reason merely  of  their  being  Government  servants,  -though  on account  of  nature and incidents of the duties  which  they have to discharge in that capacity, certain restrictions  on their freedoms might have to be imposed. Held,  further,  that the rule in so far  as  it  prohibited strikes was valid, because there was no fundamental right to resort to a strike. All India Bank Employees Association v. National  Industrial Tribunal, [1962] 3 S.C.R. 269, followed.

JUDGMENT: Civil  Appellate  Jurisdiction : Civil Appeal.  No.  413  of 1959. Appeal  from the judgment and decree dated July 7  1958,  of the Patna High Court in M. J. C.. No. 456 of 1957. B.   P. Maheshwari, for the appellants. S.   P. Varrma, for the respondents. B.   Sen and R.H. Dhebar, for the Intervener No. I (Union of India). A’ S. R. Chari " M. K. Ramamurthi, R. K. Garg, D. P.   Singh and S. C. Agarwal, for the Intervener No. 2 (E.  X. Joseph). 1962.  February 22.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by AYYANGAR,  J.-This  appeal comes before us by  virtue  of  a certificate  of  fitness  granted  under  Art.  132  of  the Constitution  by  the  High Court of  Patna.   The  question involved   in  the  -appeal  is  a  short  one  but  is   of considerable  public importance and of great  constitutional significance.   It  is  concerned  with  the  Constitutional validity of r. 4-A,                             371 which    was   introduced   into   the   Bihar    Government Servants’Conduct  Rules,  1956,  by a  notification  of  the Governor of Bihar dated August 16, 1957 and reads :               "4-A. Demonstrations and strikes.-               No Government servant shall participate in any               demonstration or resort to any form of  strike               in  connection with any matter  pertaining  to               his conditions of service." Very  soon after this rule was notified the six  appellants, the first of whom is the President of the Patna  Secretariat Ministerial   Officers’  Association  and  the  others   are Assistants or Clerks under the Bihar State Government, filed on  August  26, 1957, a petition before the  High  Court  of Patna  under  Art. 226 of the Constitution  challenging  the validity of the rule on various grounds including inter alia that  it  interfered  with  the  rights  guaranteed  to  the petitioners by sub-cls. (a), (b) and (c) of cl. (1) of  Art. 19 of the Constitution of India and that in consequence  the rule was in excess of the rulemaking power conferred by Art. 309  of  the  Constitution  which  was  the  source  of  the authority enabling service-rules to be framed.  They  prayed for  an order restraining the respondent-State  from  giving effect  to the rule and to desist from interfering with  the petitioners’   right   to   go  on   strike   or   to   hold

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demonstrations.   The learned Judges of the High  Court  who heard  the  petition were of the opinion  that  the  freedom guaranteed   under  Art.  19(1)(a)  and  19(1)(c)   of   the Constitution  did not include a right to resort to a  strike or the right to demonstrate so far as servants of Government were   concerned.   The  learned  Judges  however,   further considered  the validity of the rule on the assumption  that the  freedoms  enumerated in sub-cls. (a) and  (c)  of  Art. 19(1)  did  include those rights.  On this basis  they  held that  the  rule  impugned  was  saved  as  being  reasonable restraints on these guaranteed freedoms. 372 The  learned  Judges therefore directed the petition  to  be dismissed, but on application by the appellants they granted a  certificate under Art. 132 of the Constitution to  enable them to approach this Court. At  this  stage it is necessary to mention  that  a  similar conclusion  as the one by the High Court of Patna now  under appeal  was reached by the learned Judges of the High  Court of Bombay before whom the constitutional validity of a, rule in identical terms as r. 4A of the Bihar Rules was impugned. The correctness of that decision is under challenge in  this Court  in S.L. Ps. (Civil) Nos. 499 and 500 of 1961 and  the appellants in that appeal sought leave to intervene in  this appeal and we have permitted them to do so, and we heard Mr. Chari-learned Counsel for the interveners in further support of the appeal. Before  entering on a discussion of the  arguments  advanced before  us it might be convenient to state  certain  matters which are common ground and not in controversy : (1)  The impugned rule 4-A was framed under Art. 309 of  the Constitution which enacts, to quote the material words:               "309.   Subject  to  the  provisions  of  this               Constitution, Acts of the appropriate Legisla-               ture may regulate the recruitment, and  condi-               tions  of  service of  persons  appointed,  to               public services................. and provision is made by the proviso to the Article for  the Governors of States to make rules until ,,provision in  that behalf  is  made  by  or under an  Act  of  the  appropriate Legislature".   We  are’ drawing attention  to  the  Article under which the rule is made for the purpose of pointing out that the rulemaking power being subject to the Constitution, the validity of the rule would have to be tested by the same criteria  as  are  applicable to all  laws  and  subordinate legislation.  In other words, if                             373 there  are  any constitutional limitations  upon  lawmaking, such of them as are appropriate to the subject dealt with by the rule would be applicable to them. (2)It  would be seen that the rule prohibits two types  of activities,  both in connection with matters  pertaining  to the conditions of service (i) the holding of demonstrations, and (ii) resort to strikes to achieve the purpose indicated. This -Court had, in All India Bank Employees’ Association v. National  Industrial  Tribunal  (1)  (Bank  disputes  Bombay etc.),  to consider the question as to whether the right  to form an association guaranteed by Art. 19(1) (c) involved or implied  the right to resort to a strike and answered it  in the negative.  In view of this decision learned Counsel  for the  appellants,  as  also Mr. Chari  for.  the  interveners confined their arguments to the question of the legality  of the  provision  as  regards the  right  ,,,to  hold  demons- trations".  The validity of the rule therefore in so far  as it prohibits strikes, is no longer under challenge.

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The argument addressed to us on behalf of the appellants may be  shortly stated thus : The servicerule being  one  framed under  Art.  309 is a "law" within the  definition  of  Art. 13(3) of the Constitution and it would have to be pronounced invalid  to  the  extent that it is  inconsistent  with  the provisions  of  Part III of the Constitution .  Art.  13(2). Article  19(1) confers on all citizens the right by  sub-cl. (a) to freedom of speech and expression, and by sub-cl.  (b) to  assemble peacefully and without arms, and the  right  to "demonstrate"would be covered by these two sub-clauses.   By the  mere fact that a person enters Government  service,  be does  not  cease to be "a citizen of India", nor  does  that disentitle  him  to claim the freedoms guaranteed  to  every citizen.  In fact, Art. 33 which enacts :               "Parliament may by law determine to               (1)   CA, 154 of 1961 (Not yet reported).               374                what  extent any of the rights  conferred  by               this  Part shall, in their application to  the               members  of  the Armed Forces  or  the  Forces               charged  with maintenance of public order,  be               restricted  or abrogated so as to  ensure  the               proper discharge of their duties and the main-               tenance of discipline among them." obviously proceeds on the basis of persons in the service of Government   being  entitled  to  the  Protection   of   the fundamental   rights   guaranteed  by  Part   III   of   the Constitution  and  is inserted to enable  special  provision being  made  for  the  abrogation,  if  necessary,  of   the guaranteed  freedoms  in the case of  two  special  services only, viz., the army and the police force.  The approach  to the  question  regarding the constitutionality of  the  rule should be whether the ban that it imposes on  demonstrations would be covered by the limitation of the guaranteed  rights contained in Art. 19(2) and 19(3).  In regard to both  these clauses the only relevant criteria which has been  suggested by  the respondent-State is that the rule is framed -in  the interest  of public order".  A demonstration may be  defined as  "an expression of one’s feelings by outward  signs".   A demonstration  such as is prohibited by, the rule may be  of the  most innocent type- peaceful orderly such as  the  mere wearing  of  a badge by a Government servant or  even  by  a silent  assembly  say  outside  office  hours-demonstrations which  could in no sense be suggested to involve any  breach of  tranquillity,  or of a type involving incitement  to  or capable  of leading to disorder.  If the rule  had  confined itself  to  demonstrations  of  type  which  would  lead  to disorder  then  the validity of that rule  could  have  been sustained  but  what the rule does is the  imposition  of  a blanket-ban on all demonstrations of whatever  type-innocent as well as otherwise-and in consequence its validity  cannot be upheld. Before considering these arguments of learned  375 Counsel  it is necessary to deal with the submission by  Mr. Sen  who appeared for the Union of India who  intervened  in this appeal which, if accepted, would cut at the root of the entire  argument  for  the  appellant.   He  endeavoured  to persuade  us to hold that though the power to frame  Service Rules  under Art. 309 was subject to the Constitution  with. the  result  that  the  rules so framed  ought  not  to  -be contrary  to any constitutional provision, still it did  not follow  that every one of the fundamental rights  guaranteed by  Part III could be claimed by a Government  servant.   He urged  that  as  a  person  voluntarily  entered  Government

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service he must by that very act be demeed to have consented to enter that service in such reasonable conditions as might be   framed   for  ensuring  the  proper  working   of   the administrative  machinery  of  the Government  and  for  the proper  maintenance  of discipline in  the  Service  itself. Under  Art.  310  every  office  is  held,  subject  to  the provisions  of  the  Constitution, at the  pleasure  of  the President  or  of  the  Governor as the  case  may  be,  and provided  a  rule regulating the conditions of  service  was reasonable and was calculated to ensure the purposes  above- named  he  submitted that its  reasonableness  and  validity could not be tested solely by reference to the criteria laid down in cls.(2), (3) or (4) of Art. 19. In  this connection we were referred to a few  decisions  of the   American   Courts  for  the   proposition   that   the constitutionality   of   special  rules  enacted   for   the discipline  of those in the service of Government bad to  be tested  by  criteria  different  from  those  applicable  to ordinary  citzens.   Thus  in  Ex  Parte:  Curtis  (1)   the constitutionality of a law prohibiting officers or employees of  the  United  States  from  ’(requesting,  giving  to  or receiving  from  any  other  officer  or  employee  of   the government any money or property or other thing of value for political  purposes,"  under a penalty of  being  discharged and, on conviction fined, was upheld.  In the majority (1)  27 Law.  Ed. 232, 106 U. S. 371. 376 judgment   which   was  delivered  by   Waite,   C.J.,   the reasonableness of such a rule is pointed out.  It is however manifest that no fundamental right could be claimed to  have been  infringed by the provision there impugned.  In  United Public  Workers  v. Mitchell(1), which was another  case  to which our attention was invited, one of the questions raised related  to  the validity of an Act of Congress  (The  Hatch Act,  1940)  making  it unlawful for the  employees  in  the Executive  Branch of the Federal Government to take part  in political  campaigns  and  making the  same  the  basis  for disciplinary  departmental  action.  It was  contended  tbat this  was an interference with the right of free  speech  as well as with political rights.  Keed, J., who spoke for  the majority observed:               "The interference with free expression has  to               be seen in comparison with the requirements of               orderly    management    of     administrative               personnel.......   .... We accept  appellant’s               contention that the nature of political rights               reserved  to  the people  are  involved.   The               right  claimed as inviolate may be  stated  as               the  right  of  a citizen to act  as  a  party               official   or  worker  to  further   his   own               political  views.  Thus we have a  measure  of               interference  by the Hatch Act and  the  Rules               with  what otherwise would be the  freedom  of               the  civil servant under the First  Amendment.               And,  if  we  look  upon  due  process  as   a               guarantee of freedom in those fields, there is               a corresponding impairment of that right under               the Fifth Amendment................ We do  not               find  persuation in appellants’ argument  that               such  activities  during  free  time  are  not               subject  to regulation even though  admittedly               political  activites  cannot  be  indulged  in               during   working  hours.   The  influence   of               political activity by government employees, if               evil in its effects on the

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             (1)   91 Law -Ed. 754, 330 U.S. 75.                                    377               service, the employees or people dealing  with               them, is hardly less so because that  activity               takes  place  after  hours............  It  is               accepted  constitutional doctrine  that  these               fundamental     human    rights    are     not               absolutes............ The essential rights  of               the   First  Amendment  are  subject  to   the               elemental  need  for order without  which  the               guarantees, of civil rights to others would be               a mockery". Mr.  Sen also referred us to Mc Auliffe v. New  Bedford  (1) which  is cited at p.791 in 91’ Law.  Ed. in support of  the position that servants of Government formed a class and that conditions of service imposed upon them which are reasonable and necessary to ensure efficiency and discipline cannot  be questioned   on  the  ground  of  their   contravening   any constitutional  guarantees.  Mr. Sen drew our  attention  in particular  to  the following passage in.  the  judgment  of Holmes, J.:               "There  is nothing in the Constitution or  the               statute  to  prevent the city  from  attaching               obedience  to this rule as a condition to  the               office of policeman, and making it part of the               good  conduct  required.  The  petitioner  may               have a constitutional right to talk  politics,               -but  he has no constitutional right to  be  a               policeman.  There are few employments for hire               in  which  the,  servant  does  not  agree  to               suspend  his  constitutional  right  of   free               speech, as well as of idleness, by the-implied               terms  of  his contract.  The  servant  cannot               complain,  as he takes the employment  on  the               terms  which  are offered him.   On  the  same               principle, the city may impose any  reasonable               condition  upon  holding  offices  within  its               control.    This   condition   seems   to   us               reasonable,  if  that be a  question  open  to               revision    here   (The   Police    Regulation               prohibiting members of the depart-               (1)   (1892) 155 Mass. 216.               378               ment from soliciting money etc. for  political               purposes)". As regards these decisions of the American Courts, it should be  borne  in mind that though the First  Amendment  to  the Constitution  of  the United State reading  "Congress  shall make    no   law.........   abridging   the    freedom    of speech........... appears to confer no power on the Congress to impose any restriction on the exercise of the  guaranteed right, still it has always been understood that the  freedom guaranteed  is subject to the’ police power --the scope.  of which  however  has  not  been  defined  with  precision  or uniformly.   It  is  on the basis of  the  police  power  to abridge  that  freedom that the constitutional  validity  of lawa  penalising libels, and those relating to sedition,  or to  obscene  publications  etc., has  been  sustained.   The resultant  flexibility  of the restrictions  that  could  be validly imposed renders the American decisions  inapplicable to and without must use for resolving the questions  arising under  Art. 19(1)(a) or (b) of our Constitution wherein  the grounds,  on  which  limitations  might  be  placed  on  the guaranteed   right  are  set  out  with   definiteness   and precision.

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Learned  Counsel invited our attention also to the  decision of  this  Court  in Balakotaiah v.Union of India  (1)  to  a similar  effect.   But  it must however, be  noted  that  in Balakotaiah’s  case  the  validity  of  the  rule  was   not challenged. In  further  support  of his submission  that  the  freedoms guaranteed  to  citizens  by Art. 19 cannot  in  their  very nature,  be applied to those who are employed in  government service  out attention was invited to sub-cls. (d), (e)  and (g)  of cl. (1).  It was said that a Government servant  who was  posted  to  a particular  place  could  obviously  riot exercise  the  freedom to move throughout the  territory  of India  and similarly, his right to reside and settle in  any part of India could be said to be violated by his (1)  [1958]S.C.R.1052.                             379 being posted to any particular place.  Similarly, so long as he  was  in government service he would not be  entitled  to practicise  any  profession or trade and  it  was  therefore urged that to hold that these freedoms guaranteed under Art. 19  were  applicable  to government  servants  would  render public  service or administration impossible.  This line  of argument,   however,   does  not  take  into   account   the limitations which might be imposed on the exercise of  these rights by cls. (5) and (6) under which res’ trictions on the exercise of the rights conferred by sub-cls. (d) and (g) may be  imposed  if reasonable in the interest  of  the  general public. In  this connection he laid stress on the fact  that  speial provision had been made in regard to Service underthe  State in  some  of the Articles in Partlll-such  as  for  instance Arts.  15, 16 and 18(3) and (4)-and he desired us  therefrom to draw the inference that the other Articles in which there was  no  specific  reference  to  Government  servants  were inapplicable  to  them.   He  realised  however,  that   the implication  arising from Art. 33 would run counter to  this line of argument but as regards this Article his  submission was  that it was concerned solely to save  Army  Regulations which  permitted  detention in a manner which would  not  be countenanced  by  Art.  22 of  the  Constitution.   We  find ourselves   unable   to  accept  the   argument   that   the Constitution  excludes Government servants as a  class  from the  protection  of  the several rights  guaranteed  by  the several Articles in Part III save in those cases where  such persons were specifically named. In  our opinion, this argument even if  otherwise  possible, has  to be repelled in view of the terms of Art.  33.   That Article- selects two of the Services under the State-members of  the armed forces charged with the maintenance of  public order  and  saves the rules prescribing  the  conditions  of service  in regard to them-from invalidity on the ground  of violation of-any of the fundamental 380 rights  guaranteed by Part III and also defines the  purpose for which such abrogation or restriction migeht take  place, this being limited to ensure the proper discharge of  duties and  the maintenance of discipline among them.  The  Article having thus selected the Services members of which might be, deprived of the benefit of the fundamental rights guaranteed to other persons and citizens and also having prescribed the limits  within which such restrictions or  abrogation  might take  place, we consider that other classes of  servants  of Govern. ment in common with other persons and other citizens of the country cannot be excluded from the protection of the rights  guaranteed  by Part III by reason  merely  of  their

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being  Government servants and the nature and  incidents  of the  duties  which they have to discharge in  that  capacity might  necessarily involve restrictions of certain  freedoms as  we have pointed out in relation to Art. 19 (1)  (e)  and (g). The  first question that falls to be considered  is  whether the right to make a ",demonstration" is covered by either or both  of  the two freedoms guaranteed by Art.  19(1)(a)  and 19(1)(b).   A  "’demonstration" is defined  in  the  Concise Oxford  Dictionary as "an outward exhibition of feeling,  as an  exhibition  of opinion on political  or  other  question especially  a public meeting or procession".  In Webster  it is  defined  as  "a public exhibition by a  party,  sect  or society.........  as by a parade or mass-meeting".   Without going  very much into the niceties of language it  might  be broadly   stated   that  a  demonstration   is   a   visible manifestation of the feelings or sentiments of an individual or  a group.  It is thus a communication of one’s  ideas  to others  to  whom it is intended to be conveyed.   It  is  in effect therefore a form of speech or of expression,  because speech  need not be vocal since signs made by a dumb  person would  also  be  a form of speech.  It  has  however  to  be recognised that 381 the  argument before us is confined to the rule  prohibiting demonstration which is a form of speech and expression or of a mere assembly and speeches therein and not other forms  of demonstration  which do not fall within the content of  Art. 19(1)(a)  or 19(1)(b).  A demonstration might take the  form of  an assembly and even then the intention is to convey  to the  person  or  authority  to  whom  the  communication  is intended  the  feelings of the group  which  assembles.   It necessarily  follows that there are forms  of  demonstration which  would  fall within the freedoms  guaranteed  by  Art. 19(1)(a) and 19(1) (b).  It is needless to add that from the very  nature  of  things a demonstration  may  take  various forms;  It may be noisy and disorderly, for instance  stone- throwing by a crowd may be cited as an example of a  violent and disorderly demonstration and this would not obviously be within Art. 19(1)(a) or (b).  It can equally be peaceful and orderly such as happens when the members of the group merely wear some badge drawing attention to their grievances. If  thus particular forms of demonstration fall  within  the scope  of  Art. 19(1)(a) or 19(1)(b), the next  question  is whether r. 4-A, in so far as it lays an embargo on any  form of  demonstration  for  the redress  of  the  grievances  of Government  employees, could be sustained as falling  within the scope of Art. 19(2) and (3).               These clauses run:               "19.  (2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of  clause               (1) shall affect the operation of any existing               law, or prevent the State from making any  law               in  so  far  as such  law  imposes  reasonable               restrictions  on  the exercise  of  the  right               conferred  by  the  said  sub-clause  in   the               interests  of  the  security  of  the   State,               friendly relations with foreign States, public               order, decency or morality or in relation to               382               contempt of court defamation or incitement  to               an offence.               (3)Nothing  in sub-clause (b) of  the  said               clause shall affect the operation of any exis-               ting  law in so far as it imposes, or  prevent               the State from making any law imposing, in the

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             interests   of   public   order’    reasonable               restrictions on the exercise Of the right con-               ferred by the said sub-clause." The  learned  Judges  of the High  Court  have,  -as  stated earlier, upheld the validity of the rule by considering them as reasonable restrictions in the interest of public  order. In coming to this conclusion the learned Judges of the  High Court  did  not have the benefit of the  exposition  of  the meaning  of the expression in the interest of public  order" in  these  two  clauses by  this  Court  in  Superintendent, Central   Prison,  Fatehgarh  v.  Ram  Manohar  Lohia   (1). Speaking  for  the  Court  Subba  Rao,  J.,  summarised  his conclusion on the point in these terms:               "Public   order  (Art.  19(2)  and   (3))   is               synonymous    with    ’public    safety    and               tranquillity.   It is the absence of  disorder               involving  breaches of local  significance  in               contradistinction  to national upheavals  such               as revolution, civil strike, war affecting the               security of the State." The  learned  Judge  further stated that  in  order  that  a legislation may be "in the interests of public order"  there must be a proximate and reasonable nexus between the  nature of  the  speech prohibited and public  order.   The  learned Judge  rejected  the  argument  that  the  phrase  "in   the interests  of  public order" which is wider than  the  words ’,for  the maintenance of public order" which were found  in the  Article  as originally enacted-thereby  sanctioned  the enactment of a law which restricted the right merely because the speech had a tendency however (1)  [1960) 2 S.C.R. 821. 383 remote  to disturb public order.  The connection has  to  be intimate,  real and rational.  The validity of the rule  now impugned  has  to  be judged with reference  to  tests  here propounded. If  one  had to consider the propriety of the  rule  as  one intended   to  ensure  proper  discipline  apart  from   the limitations  on law-making, in a Government servant  and  in the  context of the other provisions made for the making  of representations and for the redress of services, grievances, and apart from the limitiations imposed by the  Constitution there  could be very little doubt nor would it be even  open to  argument that the rule now impugned was both  reasonable and  calculated to ensure discipline in the Services and  in that  sense conducive to ensure efficiency in  the  Service. Based  on  this  aspect  of the function  of  the  rule  the argument  as regards Art. 1 9(2) & (3) was put on a  twofold basis: (1) that the maintenance of public order was directly dependent  upon the existence of a body of  Government  ser- vants who were themselves subject to strict discipline.   In other words, the maintenance of discipline among  Government servants  not only contributed to the maintenance of  public order but was a sine qua non of public order. (2) The  other aspect in which it was presented was the negative of the one just  now  mentioned that if Government servants  were  ill- disciplined  and were themselves to agitate in a  disorderly manner  for  the redress of their service  grievances,  this must  lead  to a demoralisation of the public and  would  be reflected in the disappearance of public order. We find ourselves unable to uphold this submission on behalf the  State.   In the first place we are not  here  concerned with  any  rule for ensuring discipline  among  the  police, which  is  the  arm of the law primarily  charged  with  the maintenance  of  public order.  The threat to  public  order

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should therefore arise from the nature of the  demonstration prohibited.  No doubt, if the rule were so framed 384 as  to  single out those types of demonstration  which  were likely  to lead to a disturbance of public  tranquillity  or which   ’Would  fall  under  the  other  limiting   criteria specified in Art. 19(2) the validity of the rule could  have been  sustained.   The  vice of the rule,  in  our  opinion, consists  in  this  that  it lays a ban  on  every  type  of demonstration--be  the  same however  innocent  and  however incapable  of  causing a breach of public  tranquillity  and does  not  confine itself to those forms  of  demonstrations which might lead to that result. Learned  Counsel for the respondent and those who  supported the  validity  of  the rule could not suggest  that  on  the language  of the rule as -it stood, it was possible to  read it  as  to  separate the  legal  from  the  unconstitutional portion of the provision.  As no such separation is possible the entire rule has to be struck down as unconstitutional. We  have rejected the broad contention that persons  in  the service of government form a class apart to whom the  rights guaranteed  by  Part  III do not,  in  general,  apply.   By accepting  the  contention that the freedoms  guaranteed  by Part  III and in particular those in Art. 19(1)(a) apply  to the  servants of government we should not be taken to  imply that   in,   relation  to  this  class   of   citizen   ’the ,responsibility arising from official position would not  by itself  impose  some limitations on the  exercise  of  their rights as citizens.  For instance, s.54(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, enacts:               "If  a  public servant  discloses  any  parti-               culars  .  contained in  any  such  statement,               return,  accounts, documents,  evidence  affi-               davit,  deposition  or  record,  he  shall  be               punishable ’with imprisonment which may extend               to  six  months, and shall also be  liable  to               fine." Section  128(1)  of the Representation of  the  People  Act, 1951,  enjoins  on  every officer, clerk,  agent  etc.   Who performs any duty in connection, with the 385 recording or counting of votes at an election shall maintain the  secrecy of the voting and shall not communicate to  any person  any information calouluted to violate such  secrecy, and  visits  the  breach  of the  rule  by  punishment  with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three. months or with fine.  It cannot be contended that provisions on  these or  similar lines in these or other enactments restrict  the freedom  of  the  officers  etc.  merely  because  they  are prohibited  from  communicating information which  comes  to them in the course of the performance of the duties of their office, to others.  The information having been obtained  by them  in  the  course of their duties  by  virtue  of  their official   position,   rules  or  provisions  of   the   law prescribing   the   circumstances  in   which   alone   such information  might be given out or used do not infringe  the right  of  freedom of speech as is guaranteed  by  the  Con- stitution. We  would therefore allow the appeal in part and  grant  the appellants a declaration that r. 4A in the form in which  it now  stands  prohibiting  "any  form  of  demonstrations  is violative  of the appellants’ rights under Art.  19(1)(a)  & (b)  and  should  therefore  be  stuck  down.   It  is  only necessary to add that the rule, in so far as it prohibits  a strike, cannot be struck (own since there is no  fundamental

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right  to  resort  to  a strike.   As  the  appellants  have succeeded  only in part, there will be no order as to  costs in the appeal. Appeal allowed in part. 386