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PETITIONER: KALIYAPPAN

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF KERALA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT28/10/1988

BENCH: VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) BENCH: VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) KANIA, M.H.

CITATION:  1989 AIR  239            1988 SCR  Supl. (3) 648  1989 SCC  (1) 113        JT 1988 (4)   193  1988 SCALE  (2)1025

ACT:     Land  Acquisition Act, 1894; Section 11A- Period  during which an award shall be made- Two years from date of section 6  declaration two years of commencement of  Amendment  Act, 1984.

HEADNOTE:     The   Kerala  State  Government,  after  completion   of preliminary  steps,  published a  declaration  on  18.1.1984 concerning the acquisition of petitioner’s land for a public purpose. On 24.9.1984 the Land Acquisition (Amendment)  Act, 1984  came  into force whereby section 11-A  was  introduced into  the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Section 11-A  provided that  the Collector shall make an award under section 11  of the  Act  within  a period of two years  from  the  date  of publication  of the declaration, and in the case  where  the said declaration had been published before the  commencement of  the  Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984  within  two years from such commencement.     The Collector made the award on 23.9.1986. The notice of the award was served on the petitioner on 30.9.1986.     The  petitioner  challenged the award  before  the  High Court  of Kerala on the grounds (1) that the notice  of  the award  having  been served on 30.9.1986, the award  was  not made  within  the prescribed period of two years,  and  (ii) that there was inordinate delay in making the award.     Both  the  writ  petition  and  the  writ  appeal   were dismissed by the High Court.     Dismissing the special leave petition, it was,     HELD: (1) In section 11-A the words "the Collector shall make an award within a period of two years from the date  of the publication of the declaration" mean that the  Collector is  empowered to make an award till the expiry of  the  last date  of the period of two years irrespective of he date  on which  the  notice of the award is served upon  the  persons interested  in the land. ‘To make an award’ in this  section                                                   PG NO 648                                                   PG NO 649 means  ‘sign the award’. That is the ordinary meaning to  be ascribed to the words ‘to make an award’. [655C-D]     (2) It is well-known that the meaning to be assigned  to

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the  words in a  statute depends upon the context  in  which they are found and the purpose behind them.     (3)  The  object of and the reason for  prescribing  the period  of limitation under section 11-A are different  from the  object of and the reason for prescribing the period  of limitation under section 18 of the Act and the  consequences that would flow from the violation of the rule of limitation in  the  two cases are also different. There is  no  analogy between  section 11-A and section 18 of the Act  insofar  as the above question is concerned. [654C-D; 655E]     (4)  It  would be safer in such cases to rely  upon  the statute for guidance as regards the maximum time that can be taken to make an award, instead of proceeding to strike down acquisition proceedings on the ground of delay in making the award by applying varying standards to different cases  even though the maximum time of two years has not been  exceeded. The time taken by the Land Acquisition Officer in this  case to  make the award cannot be considered to be fatal  to  the acquisition proceeding. [656B-C]     Raja  Harish  Chandra  Raj  Singh  v.  The  Deputy  Land Acquisition Officer, [1962] 1 S.C.R. 676, distinguished.

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Special  Leave  Petition (Civil) No. 9096 of 1988.     From the Judgment and Order dated 2.12.87 of the  Kerala High Court in W.A. No. 933 of 1987.     P.S. Potti and E.M. Anam for the Petitioner.     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     VENKATARAMIAH,  J. A piece of land measuring ten  and  a half cents situated at Kozhippathi Village of Chittur Taluk, Palghat  District,  State of Kerala originally  belonged  to Indrani,  wife of the petitioner and it now belongs  to  the petitioner.  Under a preliminary notification  issued  under section 3(1) of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act on 24.2.1981 the  said  piece  of land along with some  other  lands  was                                                   PG NO 650 proposed  to be acquired for a certain public purpose.  Both Indrani and the petitioner filed objections to the  proposed acquisition.  After  overruling  the  objections  the  State Government  published a declaration under section 6  of  the Kerala  Land Acquisition Act on 19.1.1984. On 24.9.1984  the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 passed by  Parliament came into force in the State of Kerala and some other  parts of  India  to  which it applies. By section 9  of  the  Land Acquisition  (Amendment)  Act,  1984  a  new  section,  i.e. section  11-A was introduced into the Land Acquisition  Act, 1894  (hereinafter  referred to as ‘the  Act’)  which  reads thus:     "11-A.  Period within which an award shall be made-  The Collector  shall  make an award under section  11  within  a period of two years from the date of the publication of  the declaration and if no award is made within that period,  the entire  proceedings  for the acquisition of the  land  shall lapse:     Provided  that in a case where the said declaration  has been   published  before  the  commencement  of   the   Land Acquisition  (Amendment) Act, 1984, the award shall be  made within a period of two years from such commencement.     Explanation--In  computing  the  period  of  two   years referred  to  in this section, the period during  which  any action  or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of  the  said declaration  is  stayed  by an order of  a  Court  shall  be

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excluded."     The Land Acquisition Officer, i.e., the Sub-Collector of Palghat who was exercising the powers of the Collector under the  Act  made  an  award in respect  of  the  land  of  the Petitioner on 23.9.1986 which was filed in the office of the Collector  on 24.9.1986. The notice of the award was  served on the petitioner on 30.9.1986. The petitioner and his  wife challenged  the acquisition proceeding in a  petition  filed under  Article 226 of the Constitution of India  before  the High  Court of Kerala in O.P. No. 1536 of 1987. The  learned Single  Judge,  who heard the said  petition  overruled  the objections of the petitioner and his wife and dismissed  the petition.  Aggrieved by the decision of the  learned  Single Judge the petitioner and his wife preferred an appeal before the  Division  Bench of the High Court in W.A.  No.  933  of 1987.  The  said Writ Appeal was dismissed by  the  Division Bench of the Kerala High Court. Aggrieved by the decision of                                                   PG NO 651 the  Division Bench the petitioner has filed  this  petition under  Article  136  of the Constitution  of  India  seeking special  leave  to  appeal  against  the  judgments  of  the Division Bench of the High Court.     The two grounds on which the acquisition proceeding  was challenged  by the petitioner and his wife before  the  High Court were: (i) that the award not having been made within a period of two years from the date of the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, that is,  24.9.1984, as  required by the proviso to section 11-A of the Act,  the acquisition proceeding should be deemed to have lapsed;  and (ii)  that the land acquisition proceeding was liable to  be quashed  on  the ground that there was inordinate  delay  in making the award.     The contention of the petitioner and his wife before the High  Court  was that the notice of the  award  having  been served  on him on 30th September, 1986 it must be held  that the  award  was actually made on 30th  September,  1986  and since  more than two years had elapsed from 24.9.1984,  from the date on which the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 came  into force by the time the notice of award was  served on  him,  the acquisition proceeding should be  declared  as having  lapsed by virtue of the proviso to section  11-A  of the Act. In support of his contention the petitioner  relied upon  a  decision of this Court in Raja Harish  Chandra  Raj Singh  v. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer  and  Another, [1962]  1 S.C.R. 676 in which this Court had taken the  view that  for purposes of calculating the period  of  limitation prescribed   for  making  an  application   requesting   the Collector to refer the question relating to the valuation of the  land  acquired under the Act to the Civil  Court  under section  18 of the Act, the date on which the notice of  the award was served on the owner of the land should be  treated as  the date of the award and that the period of  limitation should  be counted from the date of the service of the  said notice. Both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of  the  High  Court  have  declined  to  accept  the   said contention and we think rightly. Before the insertion of the new  section.  i.e., section 11-A of the Act  there  was  no provision corresponding to it in the Act which provided  for the  period  within which an award should be passed  by  the Land  Acquisition Officer, that is, the Collector under  the Act.  Since  in  a large number of cases there  used  to  be abnormal  delay in making the award, Parliament  stepped  in and  introduced  section Il-A to the Act which  is  set  out above.  In the Statement of Objects and Reasons attached  to the  Bill introducing the Land Acquisition (Amendment)  Act,

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                                                 PG NO 652 1984  by which section 11-A was introduced into the  Act  it was stated that "the pendency of acquisition proceedings for long  periods often causes hardship to the affected  parties and renders unrealistic the scale of compensation offered to them".  It was further stated in it that "it is proposed  to provide  for  a  period  of  two  years  from  the  date  of publication  of the declaration under section 6 of  the  Act within  which the Collector should make his award under  the Act.  If  no award is made within that  period,  the  entire proceedings  for the acquisition of the land  would  lapse". Pursuant  to  the above object section 11-A of the  Act  was enacted. It provides that the Collector shall make an  award under  section  11 of the Act within a period of  two  years from  the date of the publication of the declaration and  if no  award is made within that period the entire  proceedings for  the  acquisition of the land shall lapse. In  the  case where  the  said declaration has been published  before  the commencement  of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act,  1984 the  award  shall  be  made  within  two  years  from   such commencement.  We  are not concerned with the  rest  of  the provisions  of  section 11-A of the Act in  this  case.  The crucial  words  which  require to be  interpreted  are  "the Collector shall make an award" appearing in section 11-A and the  words  ‘the  award shall be made’  in  the  proviso  to section  11-A. The statute prescribes the maximum period  of two  years  for  making  an  award  from  the  date  of  the publication  of the declaration under section 6 of  the  Act and  further attaches a condition that if the award  is  not made   within  the  said  period  the  proceeding  for   the acquisition  of the land shall lapse. Similarly in the  case where  the  said declaration has been published  before  the commencement  of the Land Acquisition (Amendment)  Act  l984 the  award  shall  be  made  within  two  years  from   such commencement and if the award is not so made the  proceeding for  acquisition  shall  lapse. Thus it  is  seen  that  the consequence of not making an award within the period of  two years from the date of the publication of the declaration or from  the date of the commencement of the Act, as  the  case may  be,  is that the entire project for which the  land  is acquired  will have to be abandoned or if it is intended  to proceed  with  the  project  for which  the  land  had  been originally   notified  for  acquisition  it   would   become necessary for the Government to restart the proceedings once again   with   the  publication  of  a   fresh   preliminary notification under section 4 of the Act or the corresponding provision  in any local statute in force in a State. If  the date of the communication of the notice of the award to  the person  interested  in the land is treated as  the  date  of making  the award then the maximum period  prescribed  under section  11-A  of  the Act for making the  award  would  get reduced by the period for serving the notice of the award on the owner of the land. Such maximum period may vary from one                                                   PG NO 653 case to another. Even in the same land acquisition case if a notice  of the award is to be served on two or more  persons interested  in  the land the maximum period for  making  the award  may  vary  from person to person  interested  in  the property depending upon the date of service of notice of the award  on each one of them. If the person interested in  the land  is an unwilling person who is interested in  defeating the land acquisition proceeding it is likely that it may not be possible to serve him with the notice of the award at all within  the prescribed time and if he can avoid the  service of  said notice until the period of two years is  over  from

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the date of the publication of the declaration under section 6  of  the  Act  or the date of  commencement  of  the  Land Acquisition  (Amendment)  Act,  1984, as  the  case  may  be insofar  as  his  interest in the  land  is  concerned,  the proceedings  for the acquisition would lapse thus  affecting seriously the public interest. It would also lead to  absurd and  inconvenient results since the  acquisition  proceeding may be valid against some persons and may become invalid  in the case of some others.     It  is no doubt true that in Raja Harish Chandra’s  case (supra)  while construing section 18 of the Act  this  Court held  by  giving an extended meaning that the  date  of  the award  for purposes of calculating the period of  limitation should  be  the  date on which the notice of  the  award  is served on the owner of the land. The said interpretation was given  by  this Court on the principle that if a  person  is given a right to resort to a remedy to get rid of an adverse order  within  a prescribed time limitation  should  not  be computed  from a date earlier than that on which  the  party aggrieved  actually knew of the order or had an  opportunity of  knowing  the order and, therefore, must be  presumed  to have the knowledge of the order. Under section 18 of the Act the person on whom the notice of the award is served has  to make  an  application before the  Land  Acquisition  Officer within  six weeks from the date of the award if such  person was  present  or  represented before  the  Land  Acquisition Officer  at  the time when he made his award  and  in  other cases  within six weeks of the receipt of the notice of  the Collector under section 12(2) or within six months from  the date of the award whichever expires first. In a case where a person  interested  in the land is not present at  the  time when  the award is made by the Collector he is  entitled  to make  an application under section 18 of the Act  seeking  a reference   of  the  case  to  the  Civil  Court   for   the determination of the proper compensation within six weeks of the  receipt of the notice from the Collector under  section 12(2)  of the Act or within six months from the date of  the Collector’s date whichever expires first. Since the  process of service of notice issued under section 12(2) would occupy                                                   PG NO 654 some  time this Court was of the view that it would lead  to injustice if the period of limitation prescribed by s. 18 of the  Act was computed from the date on which the  award  was actually  made  and not from the date on  which  the  notice under  section  12(2) of the Act was served  on  the  person interested  in the land as it would result in the  reduction of the period of six weeks by the time required for  serving the notice on the person interested in the land. There is no doubt  a difference between the meaning given by this  Court in Raja Harish Chandra’s case (supra) to the words "date  of the  award" in section 18 of the Act and the  interpretation of the High Court of the words ‘the Collector shall make  an award’  or ‘the award shall be made’ in section 11-A of  the Act but such a distinction had to be maintained because  the object  of  and  the reason for prescribing  the  period  of limitation under section 11-A of the Act are different  from the  object of and the reason for prescribing the period  of limitation under section 18 of the Act and the  consequences that would flow from the violation of the rule of limitation in the two cases are also different. In the former case  the period  of limitation is prescribed for preventing  official delay in making the award and the consequent adverse  effect on  the person or persons interested in the land but in  the latter  case  the  period of limitation  is  prescribed  for providing  a remedy to the persons whose lands are  acquired

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to seek a reference to the civil court for the determination of  proper  and just compensation. Secondly,  while  in  the former case violation of the rule of limitation would result in  the acquisition proceeding becoming ineffective, in  the latter case such a violation will not have any effect on the validity  of acquisition proceeding. Thirdly, while  in  the former  case the period of limitation prescribed  represents the  outer  limit within which an award can be made  in  the latter case we are concerned with the point of time at which the time to make an application under section 18 of the  Act will begin to run against the person interested in the land. The provisions of section 11-A have to be construed  bearing in  mind these points of difference. It is  well-known  that the meaning to be assigned to the words in a statute depends upon  the  context in which they are found and  the  purpose behind them.     Under section 11-A of the Act the Collector is empowered to  make  an award before the expiry of the  period  of  two years  from the date of the publication of  the  declaration under  section  6 of the Act and in a case  where  the  said declaration  has been published before the  commencement  of the  Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984     before  the expiry  of  the  period of two years from the  date  of  its commencement. If an award is not made within the  prescribed period of two years in either case, it is open to the person                                                   PG NO 655 interested  in the land to approach the Collector  and  tell him that the acquisition proceeding should be dropped unless the Collector is able to produce before him an award made by him  within the period of two years. He may also in  such  a case question the continuance of the acquisition  proceeding in  court.  Thus no prejudice will be caused to  the  person interested  in  the land. At the same time it would  not  be open  to a person interested in the land to get rid  of  the acquisition  of  proceeding by avoiding  service  of  notice issued by the Collector within the prescribed period. We are of  the  view that under section 11-A of the Act  the  words "the  Collector shall make an award.....within a  period  of two   years  from  the  date  of  the  publication  of   the declaration" mean that the Collector is empowered to make an award till the expiry of the last date of the period of  two years  irrespective of the date on which the notice  of  the award is served upon the persons interested in the land. ‘To make an award’ in this section means ‘sign the award’.  That is the ordinary meaning to be ascribed to the words ‘to make an  award’. An extended or a different meaning  assigned  to the  words  ‘the date of the award’ by this  court  in  Raja Harish Chandra’s case (supra) cannot be applied in this case since  such  an  extended or different  meaning  is  neither warranted  by equity nor will it advance the object  of  the statute. Similarly under the proviso to section 11-A of  the Collector,  the  Collector  is empowered to  make  an  award within  two years from the date of commencement of the  Land Acquisition  (Amendment) Act, 1984 irrespective of the  date on  which  the  notice  of award is  served  on  the  person concerned.  We do not find any analogy between section  11-A and  section 18 of the Act insofar as the above question  is concerned. The High Court was, therefore, right in rejecting the above contention of the petitioner.     We find very little substance in the other contention of the  petitioner,  namely, that the award was  liable  to  be quashed on the ground of inordinate delay since it had  been made  at the end of two years from the date of  commencement of  the  Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act,  1984.  While  we expect  an award to be passed by the Collector as  early  as

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possible  without delaying till the close of the  period  of two  years prescribed by section 11-A of the Act, we do  not see   any  good  reason  to  set  aside  a  proceeding   for acquisition  on  the  ground of delay by  applying  our  own standard of speed in the matter of making awards even  where the period occupied is less than two years from the date  of publication of the declaration under section 6 of the Act as such  an  approach may drive the Collector  to  make  awards without  giving  adequate time to the  claimants  to  adduce evidence  in  support  of  the  valuation  of  the  property                                                   PG NO 656 proposed  to  be  acquired  and  without  giving  sufficient consideration to the material placed before him. It would be safer in such cases to rely upon the statute for guidance as regards the maximum time that can be taken to make an award, instead of proceeding to strike down acquisition proceedings on  the  ground of delay in making the  awards  by  applying varying standards to different cases even though the maximum time of two years has not been exceeded. The very fact  that section 11-A has prescribed the period of two years from the date of the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act,  1984 as the maximum period within which the award  can be made suggests that the time taken by the Land Acquisition Officer in this case to make the award cannot be  considered to be fatal to the acquisition proceeding.     We, therefore, affirm the decision of the High Court and reject this Special Leave Petition. R.S.S.                                   Petition dismissed.