http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 15  

PETITIONER: KALAWATIBAI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SOIRYABAI AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT01/05/1991

BENCH: SAHAI, R.M. (J) BENCH: SAHAI, R.M. (J) THOMMEN, T.K. (J)

CITATION:  1991 AIR 1581            1991 SCR  (2) 599  1991 SCC  (3) 410        JT 1991 (2)   385  1991 SCALE  (1)852

ACT:     Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (No. 30 of 1956): ss. 2, 14- Hindu   widow’s   estate-Alienation  by   gift   to   female reversioner  prior  to  1956-Whether  alienee  could  become absolute  owner-‘Limited owner’-Meaning of: s. 4-Hindu  Law- Applicability of.      Hindu  Law:  Gift  of  widow’s  estate  without   legal necessity-Reversioner  can claim possession within 12  years of   widow’s  death-Whether  alienee  could  claim   adverse possession against reversioners during life time of widow.      Transfer of property Act, 1898: S.  41-Estoppel-Whether applicable  against reversioners in case of gift of  widow’s estate in favour of one of reversioners.      Statutory   Interpretation:  Section-Ascertainment   of meaning-Should be read in its entirety-Marginal note  should not be resorted to when language is plain and simple.

HEADNOTE:      A  Hindu  widow  executed a gift deed in  1954  of  the entire estate inherited by her from her husband in favour of the appellant, one of her daughters. This led to the filling of  two  cross-suits-one  by  the  appellant  for  permanent injunction  basing her claim on the gift deed and the  other by  the  respondent,  another daughter of  the  widow’s  for declaration and partition assailing the validity of the gift deed  and  claiming reversioners’ right after death  of  the mother in 1968.  The trial court decreed appellant’s suit on adverse  possession  and estoppel, but not on s. 14  of  the Hindu  Succession  Act, 1956, as in its view the  widow  who executed the gift deed in 1954, was incompetent to  alienate widow’s estate by gift permanently.      The  appellate court affirmed the finding of the  trial court  on  s. 14 of the Act, but opined that  the  appellant could  not  acquire any right by ‘estoppel under  s.  41  of Transfer  of  Property  Act,  against  the  reversioners  by reasons  of the widow’s conduct’.  It allowed the appeal  of the  respondent  and  dismissed the suit  of  the  appellant holding that adverse                                                        600 possession  against  the  widow  was  not  adverse   against reversioners,  and  the  next reversioner  was  entitled  to

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 15  

recover  the possession of the property or his share  in  it within 12 years from the date of the death of the widow.      In  second appeal the High Court, treating the  finding of  the  trial court on adverse possession as a  finding  of fact,  held that possession of the appellant must be  deemed to  be on behalf of the other co-sharers in the  absence  of any evidence before ouster of the other sister.   Aggrieved, the  appellant  filed the appeals by special leave  to  this Court.      On  the  questions  whether: (1) a  Hindu  widow  could alienate by gift the entire estate inherited by her from her husband in favour of one of the female reversioners prior to enforcement  of  Act  30 of 1956, and if so,  what  was  the nature  of right that the donee got under law? and  (2)  the donee  became  an  owner of the widow’s  estate,  a  limited owner,  an owner with some right or title so as  to  acquire rights  of  absolute ownership under s. 14 of the Act  or  a trespasser  and  acquired rights for adverse  possession  by perfecting  her  rights  against the doner only  or  it  was essential to prescribe rights against reversioners as well?      Dismissing the appeals, this Court      HELD: 1.1  Prior to the coming into force of Act 30  of 1956  a  Hindu widow succeeding or inheriting  any  property from  her  husband  or as widow  of  predeceased  son,  held limited  interest known as Hindu women’s estate,  under  the Hindu  Women’s Right  to Property Act, 1937.   However,  she had  the  right to enjoy or even destroy or dispose  of  the property  or alienate it but such destruction or  alienation should  have  been  impressed with legal  necessity  or  for religious or charitable purposes or for spiritual welfare of the  husband.   Necessary consequences that flowed  from  an alienation for legal necessity was that the property  vested in  the  transferee or alienee, and  the  reversioners  were precluded from assailing its validity.  Since such an estate could  not  be alienated under Hindu Law except  in  certain circumstances  and for specific purpose, the holder  or  the estate was known as limited owner. {613C-D;614F-G]      1.2  The  expression  ‘limited  owner’  could  not   be understood  except as it was interpreted and  understood  in Hindu   Law.   The  term  commonly  means,  a  person   with restricted  rights  as opposed to full owner  with  absolute rights.   In relation to property, absolute or  complete  or full  ownership comprises various constituents such  as  the right to                                                        601 possess, actual or constructive, power to enjoy, that is, to determine manner of use extending even to destroying,  right to alienate, transfer or dispose of etc.  Any restriction or limitation on exercise of these rights may result in limited or   qualified  ownership.   For  instance  restriction   on enjoyment  of property or its alienation.  Such  restriction or  limitation may arise by operation of law or by  deed  or instrument.  The limited ownership of female Hindu in  Hindu law  arose as a matter of law.  A Hindu widow, according  to different  schools, Benaras, Bengal or Mithila and  even  in Bombay inherited or succeeded to property whether of male or female  as a limited owner and held a limited  estate  only. [613D; 614B-D]      Janaki Ammal v. Karayanaswami, [1916] p. 43 I.A. p. 207 and  Jaisri v. Raj Diwan Dubey,, [1961] 2SCR  559,  referred to.      1.3 Prior to 1956, any alienation made by a Hindu widow or  widow’s  estate  prohibited  by  law  or  being   beyond permissible  limits  could  utmost  create  in  the  alienee temporary and transitory ownership precarious in nature  and

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 15  

vulnerable in character open to challenge if any attempt was made   to  cloud  reversioners’  interest.   The   alienee’s possession  may be good against the world and her  right  in property  may  not  be impeachable by  the  widow,  but  her interest  qua the reversioner was to continue in  possession at the maximum till the lifetime of her donor or transferor. It  was life interest, loosely, as the duration of  interest created  under invalid transfer came to an end not on  death of  donee  or  transferee but  donor  or  transferor.   Such transfer stripped the widow of her rights and she could  not acquire any rights under s. 14, and being voidable, and  not void, could be avoided by reversioners including  government taking  by escheat; but the widow was bounded by it.  [615A, E-F]      Kamala  Devi  v.  Bachu  Lal  Gupta,  [1957]  SCR  453; Collector of Masuli Patam v. Cavoly Venoata, [1861] 8 M.I.A. 529; Natwalal Punjabhai & Anr. v. Dadubhai Manubhai &  Ors., AIR  1954  SC  61 and Radhey Krishan Singh &  Ors.  v.  Shiv Shankar Singh & Ors., [1973] 2 SCC 472, referred to.      2.1 An alienee from a Hindu widow prior to 1956 did not acquire  limited  estate or widow’s estate, nor  was  she  a limited  owner who could get any benefit under s. 14 of  the Act.   It was not even a life estate except loosely, as  the right  to  continue in possession was not related  with  her span of life but of the transferor that is the Hindu  widow. [616G-H;617A]      Smt.  Chinti  v.  Smt.  Daultu,  AIR  1968  Delhi  264, disapproved.                                                        602      Sulochana  Kuer, v. Doomati Kuer, AIR 1970  Patna  352; Anath  Bandhu  v.  Chanchala Bala, AIR  1976  Calcutta  303; Parmeshwari  v.  Santokhi,  AIR  1977  Punjab  141;   Gaddam Vankayama v. Gaddam Veerayya, AIR 1957 AP 230 and Marudakkal v. Arumugha., AIR 1958 Madras, referred to.      Badri Pershad v. Smt. Kanso Devi, [1970] 2 SCR 95  held inapplicable.      2.2   In  the instant case the alienation  by  gift  of entire widow’s estate being contrary to law did not bind the reversioner  who  could file a suit after the death  of  the widow.  The appellant could not claim to have acquired title to  the property under the gift deed.  Nor had she become  a limited  owner under Hindu Law which could mature into  full ownership  when  the  Act came into  force.   In  fact  such possession   was  not  backed  by  any  title   as   against reversioner which could preclude her from bringing the  suit for declaration. [616B]      3.  As regards the adverse possession, the  High  Court was  not justified in concluding that it was a  question  of fact.   Possession under a gift deed which was found  to  be invalid  as  it  was not permitted under Hindu  Law  was  on general  principle  contrary  to law and as  such  could  be adverse.   The  appellant  could not acquire  any  right  by adverse  posession against reversioner during life  time  of her  mother.  Her claim was rightly negatived by  the  first appellate  court.   Even  assuming  that  the  alienee   had perfected  adverse possession against the donor, it was  not sufficient to clothe her with right or title in the property so  as to deprive the reversioners of their right  to  claim the  property after the death of the widow, inasmuch  as  in the  case  of  an alienation by Hindu  widow  without  legal necessity,  the reversioners were not bound to  institute  a declaratory  suit  during the lifetime of the  widow.   They could  wait  till  her death and then sue  the  alienee  for possession of the alienated property treating the alienation as a nullity. [617F-H;618A-B]

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 15  

    Radha  Rani v. Hanuman Prasad, AIR 1966 SC 216,  relied on.      4.1  Being  retrospective in operation s.  14(1)  deals with  rights of female Hindus both before and after the  Act came  into force, and the meaning of female Hindu  prior  to 1956  has to be understood in the light of Hindu Law  as  it prevailed  then.  The section enlarged the estate  of  those female Hindus who would otherwise have limited owners.  This result  flows by reading the first part with the last  which uses  the expression ‘held by her as full owner thereof  and not as a limited                                                        603 owner’.   A limited owner became a full owner  provided  she was  a  female  Hindu  who was  possessed  of  any  property acquired  before  the commencement of the  Act.   Therefore, mere  being  female Hindus  was not sufficient.  She  should have  been  of  that class of female  Hindus  who  could  on existence  of other circumstances were capable  of  becoming full  owners.  Female Hindu could become absolute  owner  of property  possessed  by her on the date the  Act  came  into force  only  if she was a limited owner whereas   she  would become  absolute  owner 1956 of the property  of  which  she would otherwise have been a limited owner. [609B-E;611F]      Bai  Vijia v. Thakorbhai Chelabhai, [1979] 3  SCC  300, relied on.      4.2  On  a  reading  of  s.  14(1)  the  conclusion  is irrisistible  that  a  limited owner  became  a  full  owner provided  she was in possession of the property on the  date of enactment of the Act.   Effect of Explanation appended to the  section was  that a female Hindu became absolute  owner not  only  in  respect of inherited  property  but  even  of property received by way of gift or on partition or in  lieu of  maintenance etc. provided she was a limited owner.   And not  that it enlarged the estate of even those who were  not limited  owner.   Any  other  construction  would   militate against  the  otherwise clear meaning  of  sub-section  (1). [608G-H;609F-H]      5.  Hindu Succession Act did not obliterate Hindu  Law. What  has ceased to be operative after coming into force  of the Act under s. 4 is text or rule etc. for which  provision is the  Act.  And under s. 4(2) any law in force immediately before the commencement of the Act ceased to have effect  if it   was  inconsistent  with  any  provision  of  the   Act. Therefore,  except to the extent provision has been made  in s. 14, that is, enlargement of the estate of limited  owner, the Hindu Law in other regards remains operative.  There  is no  provision  in the Act which   deprives  reversioners  of their rights except to the extent mentioned in s.  14.[617C- D]      6.  Marginal  note  is  usually  not  resorted  to  for construing  meaning  of a section,  particularly,  when  the language  is plain and simple.  A section has to be read  in its  entirety as one composite unit without  bifurcating  or ignoring any part of it. [608D-E]      V. Tulsamma v. Shesha Reddy, [1977] 3 SCC 99,  referred to.      Eramma  v.  Verrupana, [1966] 2  SCR  626;  Gummalapura Taggina                                                        604 Matada Kotturuswami v. Setra Veeravva & Ors., [1959] Supp  1 SCR  968, AIR 1959 SC 577; Mangal Singh v. Smt. Rattno,  AIR 1967  SC  1786  Munna Lal v. Raj Kumar., AIR  1962  SC  1495 Sukhram v. Gauri Shankar, [1968] 1 SCR 476; Kuldeep Singh v. Surain  Singh,  [1988]  Andhra Law Times,  Gulwant  Kaur  v. Mohinder  Singh, [1987] 3 SCC 674; Maharaja  Pillai  Lakshmi

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 15  

Ammal  v.  Maharaja Pillai T. Pillai, [1988] 1  SCC  99  and Jagannathan  Pillai v. Kunjithapadam Pillai., [1987]  2  SCC 572, referred to.      Mulla’s  Hindu  Law, 16th Edn. para  174,  and  Mayne’s Hindu Law, 12th Edn. para 671, referred to.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 2486-87 (N) of 1978.      From  the  Judgment and Order dated  17.3.1978  of  the Bombay High Court in Second Appeal Nos. 293 and 361 of 1972.      P.H. Parekh for the Appellant.      S.  Padumanabhan,  Amicus Curiae, R.A. Perumal  and  G. Narasimhulu for the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      R.M. SAHAI, J.  Litigation, between two sisters, by way of  cross-suits,  one,  for  permanent  injunction  by   the appellant basing her claim on gift deed executed in 1954  by her mother, a Hindu widow, of the entire estate inherited by her  from  her  husband, and  another  for  declaration  and partition by  respondent assailing validity of the gift deed and  claiming reversioner’s right after death of the  mother in  1968, has reached this Court by grant of  special  leave against  judgment of the Bombay High Court in Second  Appeal raising a legal issue of seminal importance as to nature  of right  and  title of female donee of  Hindu  widow’s  estate after   coming   into  force  of   Hidnu    Succession   Act (hereinafter refferred to as the Act).      Facts  are simple.  Stakes, also, are not  substantial, but the issue is of far-reaching consequence.  Could a Hindu widow alienate by gift the entire estate inherited from  the husband,  in favour of one of the female reversioners  prior to  enforcement of Act 20 of 1956.  In case answer to  issue is  in  the  affirmative then what was the nature  of  right that the donee got under law?  Did she become an owner of  a widow’s                                                        605 estate, a limited owner, an owner with some right  or title, so as to acquire rights of absolute ownership under  section 14 of Act or a trespasser and if trespasser then whether she acquired  rights  by adverse possession  by  perfecting  her rights  against  the  donor  only or  it  was  essential  to prescribe rights against reversioners as well?      Shorn  of  details, and various issues  raised  in  the suits,  suffice  it to mention that even  though  the  trial court  found  the gift deed to have been duly  attested  and executed  after  obtaining permission from  the  appropriate authority the claim of appellant, for permanent  injunction, was  decreed not on Section 14 of the Act as the  widow  who had  executed  the gift deed in 1954  was,  ‘incompetent  to alienate widow’s estate by gift permanently’ under Hindu Law but on adverse possession and estoppel.  The appellate court while affirming the finding on section 14 of the Act allowed the  appeal  and dismissed the suit as  ‘adverse  possession against  the widow is not adverse against reversioners,  and the  next reversioner is entitled to recover the  possession of the property or his share in it within 12  years from the date of the death  of the widow’.  It was further held  that the  appellant  could not acquire, any right  by,  ‘estoppel under  section  41 of the Transfer of Property  Act  against the reversioners by reason of the widow’s conduct’.  In view of the concurrent findings of two courts below on section 14 of  the Act the High Court appears to have been  invited  to

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 15  

adjudicate,  only, on the question if the   appellate  court was   justified  in  reversing  the  finding    on   adverse possession  wich it disposed of, treating it as  finding  of fact,  and observing that possession of appellant, ‘must  be deemed to be on behalf of other co-sharers in the absence of any  evidence before ouster of the  other sisters’.   Wheher the  High Court was justified in not examining the  question of  adverse possession is not necessary to be gone  into  as the appellant can succeed, only, if the  finding recorded by the  first  appellate  court that the  appellant  could  not acquire  any rights against reversioners during lifetime  of the widow is found to be erroneous in law.      But before doing so the claim of the appellant that she became  an  absolute  owner under section  14  of  the  Act, reiterated, once again, in this Court, may be examined as it is a question of law.  A full bench of the Delhi High  Court in Smt. Chinti v. Smt. Daultu, AIR 1968 Delhi 264 held  that possession  of  a  female donee in pursuance  of  gift  deed executed by her mother could not be characterised as illegal or  of  trespasser,  therefore,  she being  a  female  Hindu ‘possessed’ of the property on the date Hindu Succession Act came into force became an absolute owner under section 14 of the Act.   When more or less similar                                                        606 matter came up before Patna High Court in Sulochana Kuer  v. Doomati  Kuer, AIR 1970 Patna 352 the court, held  that,  "a Hindu  woman’s  estate as such is not  capable  of  transfer either by sale or gift.  The mere concept of such an  estate is  not transferred on the transfer of properties  attaching to  the   estate".  In Anath Bandhu v. Chanchala  Bala,  AIR 1976  Calcutta  303 the Calcutta High  Court,  specifically, dissented from the Delhi decision and held that, "Section 14 wanted  to  benefit  those female Hindus  who  were  limited owners in then existing Hindu Law before the commencement of the  Act.   In the present case the limited  owner  Motibala having transferred the limited interest to Chanchala  before the  passing of the Act, it cannot be said that  Chanchala’s limited  interest,if any, ripened into absolute interest  in terms  of section 14 of the Act".   A full bench  of  Punjab and  Haryana High Court in Parmeshwari v. Santokhi, AIR 1977 Punjab  141  too, did not agree with Delhi High  Court.   It went  into the background of legislation, the original  form of the bill, ambit of the  explanation, anomalies that would result  if, even, female alienee was deemed to be a  limited owner  and  held,  " that section 14 of  the   Act  was  not intended to benefit the alienees of a limited Hindu  owner". Similar  view was taken by Andhra Pradesh and  Madras,  High Court  in  AIR  1957 AP 280  and  AIR  1958  Madras,  Gaddam Venkayama  v. Gaddam Veeryya, and  Marudakkal  v.  Arumugha. Thus  according to Delhi Court a donee of even entire  Hindu widow’s estate became absolute owner under section 14 of the Act whereas according to Patna, Calcutta, Punjab, Madras and Andhra  Pradesh High Courts, rights of a female donee  under Hindu  Law, prior to coming into force of the  Act  did  not get  enlarged  under section 14 of the Act and  it  did  not preclude  reversioners from assailing validity of  the  gift deed.  To ascertain which view accords more to the objective sought  to  be achieved by the Act it appears  necessary  to extract section 14 which reads as under:                (1)  Any  property  possessed  by  a   female          Hindu,whether   acquired   before  or   after   the          commencement  of this Act, shall be held by her  as          full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.             Explanation  In  this  sub-section,   "property"          includes   both  movable  and  immovable   property

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 15  

        acquired  by  a  female  Hindu  by  inheritance  or          devise,   or  at  a  partition,  or  in   lieu   of          maintenance, or arrears of maintenance, or by  gift          from any person, whether a relative or not, before,          at  or after her marriage, or by her own  skill  or          exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or  in          any other manner what-                                                         607          soever,  and also any such property held by her  as          Stridhana   immediately before the commencement  of          this Act.               (2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall          apply  to any property acquired by way of  gift  or          under  a  will or any other instrument or  under  a          decree or order of a civil court or under an  award          where  the  terms  of  the  gift,  will  or   other          instrument or the decree, order or award  prescribe          a restricted estate in such property. Needless  to emphasise that the section was a  step  forward towards social amelioration of women who had been  subjected to  gross  dis-crimination in matter of  inheritance.   Even when  the  Hindu  Women’s Rights to Property  Act  XVIII  of 1937  was  enacted  it  succeeded  partially  only.    While providing  for inheritance and devolution to widow and  even widow  of  predeceased  son  the Act  could  not  go  beyond creating  limited  interest  or  a  Hindu  woman’s   estate. Absolute  ownerships or female heir by  effacing  inequality and  putting  male  an  female heirs at  par  in  matter  of inheritance  was achieved by the Succession Act.   A  female Hindu  inheriting property under the Act,  also,  became   a stock of descent.  In Eramma v. Verrupana, [1966] 2 SCR  626 AIR  1966 SC 1789, this Court observed, "The object  of  the section is to extinguish the estate called ‘limited  estate’ or ‘widow’s estate’ in Hindu Law and to make a Hindu  woman, who under the old law would have been only a limited  owner, a full owner of the property with all powers of  disposition and  to make the estate heritable by her own heirs  and  not revertible to the heirs of the last male holder".      But did the legislature intend to extend same  benefit, namely,  enlarge the estate, held, on the date the Act  came into  force  by  any or every female  Hindu  into  full  and absolute  estate irrespective of whether she was  a  limited owner  or not.  According to learned counsel  for  appellant the  answer should be given in affirmative.  He  urged  that since the age long traditional limitation on inheritance and disposition  by  a female was removed and  the  section  was widely  worded by using broad and comprehensive  expressions such  as,  ‘and property, ‘possessed’, ‘acquired  before  or after  the  commencement  of  the Act’  and  each  of  these expressions have received expansive of the Act’ and each  of these expressions have received expansive interpretations by the   Court  there  was  no  reason  not  to  give   similar interpretation  to  the  word  female  Hindu.   The  learned counsel submitted that there was no warrant to confine scope of  the  section to limited owners.  He argued that  if  the argument  of the respondent was accepted it shall result  in substitution  of  the  word ‘ female  Hindu’  with  ‘limited owner’ which                                                       608 would  be  contrary  to legislative  intention,  the  social philosophy  on  which  the  section  was  founded  and   the principle of interpretation.  Relying on the explanation, to the section, it was urged that it not only explained meaning of the word ‘property’ but it left no room for doubt that  a female Hindu possessed of any property, which satisfied  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 15  

extended meaning on the date the Act came into force, became an   absolute  owner.   It  was  further  argued  that   the expression ‘limited  owner’ has been used in the section not to  whittle down the otherwise  simple and plain meaning  of the  words ‘female Hindu’ by introducing narrow  concept  of widows’ estate or limited owner but to put beyond doubt  the nature  and  status  of rights of  females  after  the  Act. Support was also drawn from the marginal note of the section and it was urged that the words, ‘property of a female Hindu to be her absolute property’, was yet another indication  to interpret  the word ‘female Hindu’ widely, so as to  include in its ambit a donee from a limited owner.      That  the section is not very happily worded, does  not admit of any doubt.  It was commented upon by this Court  in V.  Tulsamma  v. Shesha Reddy, [1977] 3 SCC 99  and  it  was observed  that  the  section was,  "a  classic  instance  of statutory   provision   which,  by  reason  of   its   inapt draftsmanship has created endless confusion for  litigants". May  be so but the answer to the issue must emerge from  the section,  its background, purpose of its enactment  and  the reason  for use of such wide expression.  Nothing  turns  on the  marginal  note  as it is usually not  restored  to  for construing  meaning  of a section,  particularly,  when  the language  is  plain and simple.  It is well settled  that  a section has to be read in its entirely as one composite unit without  bifurcating it or ignoring any part of it.   Viewed from this perspective the section, undoubtedly, comprises of two   parts,  one  descriptive,  specifying  the   essential requirements   for  applicability  of  the  section,   other consequences arising out of it.  One cannot operate  without the  other.   Neither can be read in  isolation.   Both  are integral  parts  of the section.  Mere  provision  that  any property  possessed  by a female Hindu on the date  the  Act came  into  force  shall  be held by  her  would  have  been incomplete  and  insufficient to achieve  the  objective  of removing inequality amongst male and female Hindus unless it was  provided  that the otherwise limited estate of  such  a female  would become enlarged into full or absolute  estate. Any other construction would result in not only ignoring the expression,  ‘and  not as a limited owner’  which  would  be against  principle  of interpretation but also  against  the historical background of enactment of the section.   Whereas if  it is read in its entirety with one part throwing  light on  another  then  the conclusion  is  irresistible  that  a limited owner became  a full owner provided she was                                                        609 in  possession of the property on the date of  enactment  of the Act.      Property acquired by a female Hindu before the Act came into  force  comprised, broadly, of  inherited  property  or stridhana  property acquired by her from a male  or  female. Nature  of  her right in either class  of  property,  unlike males,  depended on the school by which she was governed  as well  as  whether it came to her by devolution  or  transfer from  a  male or female. This invidious  discrimination  was done away with after coming into force of 1956 Act  and  the concept  of  Hindu  widows’  estate  or  limited  estate  or stridhana  ceased to exist by operation of section  14  read with section 4 of the Act which has an overriding effect.  A female  Hindu who but for the Act would have been a  limited owner become full owner. But the section being retrospective in  operation the meaning of female Hindu prior to 1956  has to  be understood in the light of Hindu Law as it  prevailed then. The section enlarged the estate of those female  Hindu who  otherwise would have been limited owners.  This  result

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 15  

follows  by reading the first part with the last which  uses the  expression, ’held by her as full owner thereof and  not as  a limited owner’. To put it differently a limited  owner become a full owner provided she was a female Hindu who  was possessed  of any property acquired before the  commencement of  the  Act.  Therefore, mere being female  Hindu  was  not sufficient.  She should have been of that class  of   female Hindus  who could on existence of other  circumstances  were capable  of  becoming  full owners. Further  the  Act  being applicable  by  virtue of section 2 to not  only  Hindus  by religion  but also to Buddhists, Jains or Sikhs and  to  any person who was not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or Jew it  was but necessary to use an expression of such wide  connotation as female Hindu because by virtue of sub-section (3) of  the section  the word ‘Hindu’ in any portion of the  Act,  which includes  section  14,  the word had  to  be  understood  as including  not only a person who was Hindu by  religion  but even   others.  However,  the  objective  being  to   remove disparity  and  injustice to which  females  were  subjected under  Hindu  Law the section limits its operation  to  such female  Hindus  who were limited owners.  Reference  to  the explanation  by  the  learned  counsel  was  also  not  very apposite.  It was appended to widen the meaning of  property by  adding  to it the inherited property, and  the  property which  came  to  be possessed by a female  Hindu  in  manner mentioned  in it. Its effect was that a female Hindu  became absolute owner not only in respect of inherited property but even of property received by way of gift or on partition  or in  lieu  of  maintenance etc. provided she  was  a  limited owner. And not that it enlarged the estate of even those who were  not  limited  owner.  Any  other  construction   would militate  against  the,  otherwise, clear  meaning  of  sub- section (1).                                                        610      Although  this section has come up for  interpretation, by this Court, on various occasions in different context but in none of these cases the Court had occasion to examine the ambit of expression female Hindu and whether it extended  to females  other  than  limited owner.  Since  in  every  case whether  it was decided for or against it was the widow  who was alive on the date the Act came into force and she  being a   limited  owner  the  decision  turned  on  if  she   was ‘possessed’ of the property so as to become full owner.  For instance in Gummalapura Taggina Matada Kotturuswami v. Setra Veeravva & Ors., [1959] Supp. 1 SCR 968=AIR 1959 SC 577" the widow was held to have acquired rights as the adoption  made by her having been found to be invalid she was deemed to  be in  constructive  possession and thus  ‘possession’  of  the property  on the date the Act came into force. Mangal  Singh v.  Smt.  Rattno, AIR 1967 SC 1786 was  another  case  where widow’s constructive possession enured to her benefit as she having  been  dispossession by her collaterals in  1954  and filed a suit for recovery of possession before the Act  came into  force was held to be ‘possession’ of the property   so as  to  entitle her to become full owner. Munna Lal  v.  Raj Kumar,  AIR 1962 SC 1495 was a case where the share  of  the widow was declared in preliminary decree. No actual division of  share  had taken place, yet the court held that  it  was property  ‘possessed’ by her on the date the Act  came  into force. In Sukhram v. Gauri Shankar, [1968] 1 SCR 476 it  was held  that  a  widow was full owner in  joint  Hindu  family property  as she became entitled to the interest  which  her husband had by virtue of Hindu Women Right to Property  Act. The  Court  ruled that even  though a male  was  subject  to restrictions   qualienation on his interest in  joint  Hindu

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 15  

family property, but a widow acquiring an interest by virtue of  the Act did not suffer such restriction. V. Tulsamma  v. Shesha  Reddy, [1977] 3 SCC 99 and Bai Vijia  v.  Thakorbhai Chelabhai,  [1979] 3 SCC 311 were cases where the widow  was ‘possessed’  of  the property in lieu  of  maintenance,  and therefore, she was held to be full owner. In all these cases since  the widow was in possession, actual or  constructive, on  the  date the Act came into force she was held to  be  a female Hindu ‘possessed’ of the property, and  consequently, her limited ownership stood converted into full ownership by operation  of  law. Even in Eramma v. Verupana  (supra)  and Kuldeep  Singh  v. Surain Singh, [1988]  Andhra  law  Times, where  the  benefit was denied under section 14  the  female Hindu  were widows but they were not held to be  ‘possessed’ of  the property because their possession was not backed  by even the remotest vestige of title. in Eramma’s case (supra) the  benefit was denied as Hindu Women’s Right  to  Property Act  being not applicable on the date the succession  opened she  could not be held to be possessed of the property.  And in                                                        611 Kuldeep  Singh’s case (supra) she had been divested  of  her interest   as a result of transfer made by her.  Contest  in all  these  cases   was between reversioner  and  the  widow herself or the person claiming through her. Review of  these decisions  indicates that this Court has consistently  taken the view  as stated in Bai Vijia v. Thakorbhai Chelabhai,:          "For   the   applicability  of   sub-section,   two          conditions must co-exist, namely,          (i) The concerned female Hindu must be possessed of          property; and          (ii)  Such property must be possessed by her  as  a          limited owner."      mention  is  necessary to be made  in  this  connection about observation in Gulwant Kaur v. Mohinder Singh,  [1987] 3  SCC  674  that  the Court in Bai  Vijia’s  case  did  not support,  to  lay  down, that, "what was  enlarged  by  sub- section  (1) of section 14 into a full estate was the  Hindu woman’s  estate known to Hindu Law. When the Court uses  the word,  ‘limited  estate’, the words are used  to  connote  a right  in  the property to which possession  of  the  female Hindu  may  be  traced, but which is not  a  full  right  of ownership".   Gulwant   Kaur’s  case  was   concerned   with acquisition of right by wife, on entrustment of property  in lieu of maintenance, after 1956, when the concept of widows’ estate  or  limited estate or even stridhana had  ceased  to exist. Therefore, what was necessary was being possessed  of property, actual or constructive, by female Hindu under some right or title. Whereas Bai Vijia’s case was concerned  with acquisition of right in property held in lieu of maintenance before 1956. Therefore a female  Hindu could become absolute owner only if she was limited owner. Sub-section of  section 14  deals with right of female Hindu both before  and  after the Act came into force. Female Hindu could become  absolute owner of property possessed by her on the date the Act  came into force only if she was a limited owner whereas she would become  absolute owner after 1956 of the property  of  which she would otherwise have been a limited owner.      Reference may be made to Maharaja Pallai Lakshmi  Ammal v.  Maharaja Pillai T. Pilllai, [1988] 1 SCC 99  where  this Court  while  examining   right of  wife  put  in  exclusive possession of the property with the right to take the income for her maintenance was held to have become full owner under section 14(1) as she entered into possession after the death of her husband in 1955 and was in possession in 1956.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 11 of 15  

                                                      612 The  Court  held that the right to utilise  income  for  her maintenance  must be "presumed to have resulted in  property being given to her in lieu of maintenance". On this  finding the  property being possessed on the date the Act came  into force as contemplated in the explanation, the widow being  a limited  owner became a full owner and the gift executed  by her   in   favour   of   her   daughter   after   1956   was unexceptionable.  The  Court, however,  while repelling  the submission advanced on superficial conflict in Gulwant  Kaur and Bai Vijia reiterated what was observed in Gulwant Kaur’s case.  As already discussed Gulwant Kaur’s case  related  to acquisition  of property after 1956 whereas in Bai Vijia  it was  acquired before 1956. The observations made in the  two decisions  must be understood in that context.  Moreover  in Gulwant  Kaur’s  case the ratio was founded  on  Jagannathan Pillai v. Kunjithapadam Pillai, [1987] 2 SCC 572 a  decision which  shall be adverted to later. But it too was  concerned with acquisition after 1956. And the bench while  discussing scope of section 14(1) observed.          "that the limited estate or limited ownership of  a          Hindu female would enlarge into an absolute  estate          or full ownership of the property in question in th          following fact situation:          ‘Where  she  acquired  the limited  estate  in  the          property  before or after the commencement  of  the          Act   provided  she  was  in  possession   of   the          property  at the time of the coming into  force  of          the Act on June 17, 1956’."      None  of these decisions, namely, Gulwant Kaur  (supra) or Maharaja Pillai (supra ) or Jagannathan Pillai  purported to lay down that the Section 14(1) contemplated  enlargement of  estate prior to 1956 of even those females who were  not limited  owners. According to Mulla’s Hindu  Law  (sixteenth edition,  paragraph 174) every female who took a limited  or restricted  estate was known as limited heir. And  according to every school except Bombay every female who succeed as an heir  whether to a male or female took a limited  estate  in the  property.  Even  in Bombay a  female  who  by  marriage entered into Gotra (family) of the deceased male inherited a limited estate only. And in paragraph 176 it is stated  that incident of estate taken by every limited owner was  similar to  incident  of widow’s estate. Mayne’s  Hindu  Law,  (12th edition,  paragraph 671) too brings out the same by  stating that the typical form of estate inherited by a woman from  a male was compendiously known as the widow’s estate. And  the limitation  which  applied  to such estate  applied  to  all estate derived by a female by                                                        613 descent  from  a  male or female whether  she  inherited  as daughter,  mother,  grandmother,  sister  or  as  any  other relation. Even stridhana property according to Mulla created limited  interest  in its successors, except  in  Bombay  in certain circumstances and a female inheriting stridhana took a  limited interest in it and on her death it passed not  to her heirs but to the next stridhan heirs of the female  from she inherited.     Thus   on  plain  reading  of  the  Section,   and   its interpretation  by this Court in various decisions a  female possessed  of  the property on the date the  Act  came  into force could become absolute owner only if she was a  limited owner. This  being the legal position it may now be seen  if a  Hindu widow could transfer or alienate widow’s estate  by way  of gift prior to 1956 and if so to what extent. And  in such  alienation what right or interest was created  in  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 12 of 15  

alienee.  Did she become a limited owner so as to  become  a full  owner  under  Section 14 of the  Act?  A  Hindu  widow succeeding or inheriting any property from her husband or as widow  of  predeceased son, held limited interest  known  as Hindu  women’s  estate, prior to coming into force  of  1956 Act,  under the Hindu Women’s Right to Property  Act,  1937. Since such an estate could not be alienated under Hindu  Law except in certain circumstances and for specific purpose the holder  of  the  estate  was known  as  limited  owner.  The expression  ‘limited  owner’ thus could not  be  understood, except  as it was interpreted and understood in  Hindu  Law. Could  the  same be said of a female donee or  alienee?  The Delhi  High Court assumed that a female donee was a  limited owner, consequently, of she was possessed of the property on the date the Act came into force and her possession was  not ‘without title’, she became an absolute owner. Basis for the decision  was construction of the word ‘possessed’  by  this Court  in Gummalapura Taggina’s case (supra) wherein it  was held that the word was used in widest connotation so that  a widow,  even  if in constructive  possession,  was  entitled to  absolute ownership under Section 14 of the Act.  Support was  also  drawn from converse case of Eramma  (supra)  this Court  negatived the claim of widow under Section 14 as  her possession  on  the date  the Act came into  force  was  not legal  but  that of a trespasser. What the High  Court  lost sight  of was that the claim of widow in Gummalapura’s  case (supra)  was upheld because the adoption made by her  having been   found  to  be  invalid  she  was  deemed  to  be   in constructive possession on the date the ACt came into force. And  Eramma’s case (supra) was concerned with a  widow,  who claimed to have inherited through son in State of  Hyderabad where Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act did not apply  on the date the son died. Consequently, it was held that ‘‘the                                                        614 provisions  of Section 14 of the Act cannot be attracted  in the  case  of  a Hindu female who is in  possession  of  the property  of  the  last  male holder  on  the  date  of  the commencement  of  the  Act when she  is  only  a  trespasser without  any right to property’’. The High Court  overlooked the  vital observation made in earlier part of the  judgment to  the effect. ‘‘In other words, Section 14(1) of  the  Act contemplates  that  a Hindu female who in  absence  of  this provision,  would have been limited owner of the   property, will  now  become full owner of the same by virtue  of  this Section.’’     Limited  owner commonly means a person  with  restricted rights  as  opposed to full owner with absolute  rights.  In relation  to property absolute, complete or  full  ownership comprises various constituents such as the right to  posses, actual or constructive, power to enjoy, that is to determine manner  of  use  extending  even  to  destroying,  right  to alienate,  transfer  or dispose of etc. Any  restriction  or limitation on exercise of these rights may result in limited or   qualified  ownership.  For  instance   restriction   on enjoyment of property or its alienation. Such restriction or limitation  may  arise  by operation of law or  by  deed  or instrument.  The limited ownership of female Hindu in  Hindu Law  arose as a matter of law. A Hindu widow,  according  to different  schools, Banaras, Bengal or Mithila and  even  in Bombay inherited or succeeded to property whether of male or female  as a limited owner and held a limited  estate  only. Nature of such estate was explained by the Privy Council  in Janki  Ammal v. Narayanaswami, [1916] p. 43 I. A. p. 207  to be, ‘‘her right is of the nature of a right to property, her powers  in  that character are limited’’. In Jaisri  v.  Raj

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 13 of 15  

Diwan Dubey, [1961] 2 SCR 559 it was observed by this  Court that  ‘‘when  a widow succeeds as heir to  her  husband  the ownership in the property both legal and beneficial vests in her’’.  And the restriction on her power to alienate  except for  legal  necessity is imposed, ‘‘not for the  benefit  of reversioners  but is an incident of estate’’. Thus  a  Hindu widow  prior to 1956 held the property fully with  right  to enjoy  or even destroy or dispose it of or alienate  it  but such  destruction or alienation should have  been  impressed with  legal or for religious or charitable purposes  or  for spiritual  welfare  of the husband.  Necessary  consequences that  flowed from an alienation for legal  necessity  was that  the property vested in the transferee or alienee,  and the reversioners were precluded from assailing its validity. In Kamala Devi v. Bachu Lal Gupta, [1957] SCR 453 this Court after reviewing various authorities extended this  principle to  female donee. A gift made within reasonable  limits,  in favour of daughter even two years after the marriage but  in pursuance of promise made at time of the marriage was upheld and                                                        615 the   reversioners   claim  was  repelled   on   permissible alienation  under  Hindu  Law. But what right  or  title  is acquired  by  the  alienee  if  transfer  is  against  legal necessity  or contrary to law? The authorities appear to  be at one that such transfer  being not void but voidable could be avoided by reversioners including Govt. taking by escheat Collector of Masulipatam  v. Cavaly Vencata, [1861] 8 M.I.A. 529. But the widow was held bound by the transfer.     In  Natwalal  Punjabhai & Anr. v.  Dadubhai  Manubhai  & Ors., AIR 1954 SC 61, the Court held as under:             "The  Hindu Law certainly does  not  countenance          the idea of a widow alienating her property without          any necessity merely as a mode of enjoyment as  was          suggested  before  us by Mr. Ayyangar.  If  such  a          transfer is made by a Hindu widow it is not correct          to say that the transferee acquires necessarily and          in law an interest commensurate with the period  of          the  natural life of the widow or at any rate  with          the  period  of  her widowhood.  Such  transfer  is          invalid  in  Hindu  Law, but the  widow  being  the          grantor herself, cannot derorate from the grant and          the transfer cannot also be impeached so long as  a          person does not come into existence who can claim a          present right to possession of the property."     Thus if prior to 1956 any alienation was made by a Hindu widow  of widow’s estate prohibited by  law or being  beyond permissible limits, it stripped the widow of her rights  and she  could not acquire any rights under section 14.  And  so far  as  alienees  were concerned  it  could  utmost  create temporary and transitory ownership precarious  in nature and vulnerable in character open to challenge if any attempt was made to cloud reversioner’s interest. Her possession may  be good  against  the world, her right in property may  not  be impeachable   by  the  widow  but  her  interest   qua   the reversioner  was  to continue in possession at  the  maximum till  the lifetime of her donor of transferor.  It was  life interest, loosely, as the duration of interest created under invalid  transfer  came to an end not on death of  donee  or transferee  but  donor  or transferor. So far  as  the  male alienees from limited owners, that is female Hindu prior  to 1956,  are  concerned, it was held by this Court  in  Radhey Krishan Singh & Ors. v. Shiv Shankar Singh & Ors., [1973]  2 SCC  472  that, the alienation could be  challenged  by  the reversioner as there was nothing in the Hindu Succession Act

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 14 of 15  

which has taken away such a right. A female alienee did  not enjoy  better or different status as the Hindu  Law  applied universally and uniformaly                                                        616 both to male and female alienees. She did not become limited owner  or holder of a limited estate as understood in  Hindu Law.  And  the alienation without legal necessity  could  be assailed by the reversioner. No change was brought about  in this regard by the Act. If the alienation was valid i.e., it was  for legal necessity or permitted by law then the  donee became  an  owner  of  it and the right  and  title  in  the property vested in her. But if it was contrary to law, as in this  case the gift being of entire widow’s estate, then  it did not bind the reversioner who could file a suit after the death  of the widow. And the appellant cannot claim to  have acquired title to the property under the gift deed. Nor  had she  become  a  limited owner under Hindu  Law  which  could mature into full ownership when the Act came into force.  In fact  such  possession was not backed any title  as  against reversioner which could  preclude her from bringing the suit for declaration.     Reliance  was  placed  on  observations  in  Jagannathan Pillai  v.  Kunjithapadam Pillai & Ors., [1987] 2  SCR  1070 that, ‘‘To obviate hair splitting, the legislature has  made it abundantly clear that whatever be the property  possessed by a Hindu female, it will be of absolute ownership and  not of limited ownership notwithstanding the position under  the traditional  Hindu  Law’’,  and it was  submitted  that  the appellant  satisfied  the criteria to entitle her  to  claim that  her  estate irrespective of its nature Hindu  Law  got enlarged under section 14 of the Act. An observation without reference  to facts discloses neither the law nor the ratio- de-cedindi  which could be taken assistance  of.  Factually, the  issue was the effect of re-transfer by the  alienee  in favour  of  the widow after 1956. And the answer  was  that, ‘‘When the transaction was reversed and what belonged to her was  retransmitted to her, what the concerned  Hindu  female acquired  was  a  right which  she  herself  once  possessed namely,  a limited ownership (as it was known prior  to  the coming into force of the Act) which immediately matures into or enlarges into  a full ownership in view of Section  14(1) of  the  Act on the enforcement of the  Act.  The  resultant position  on the reversal of the transaction would  be  that the  right, title and interest that the alienee had  in  the property  which was under ‘eclipse’ during  the  subsistance of  the transaction had re-emerged on the  disappearance  of the  eclipse’’. Truely speaking, the interpretation of  sub- section  (1) of section 14 was no different from  the  other decisions  as is clear from the extracts quoted earlier.  It is  thus clear that an alienee from a Hindu widow  prior  to 1956  did not acquire limited estate or widow’s  estate  nor she  was  a limited owner who could get  any  benefit  under section 14 of the Act. It was not even a life estate  except loosely,  as  the right to continue in  possession  was  not related with her span of life but of the                                                        617 transferor  that is the Hindu widow. The decision  of  Delhi High Court, therefore, does not lay down the law  correctly. The  other  view taken by Patna,  Calcutta  and  Punjab  and Haryana  Courts that sub-section (1) of section 14  did  not extend  the  benefit of full ownership  to  female  alienees brings  out the objective of the section  appropriately  and correctly.     Nor is the decision in Badri Pershad v. Smt. Kanso Devi, [1970]  2 SCR 95 of any assistance. It was a case where  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 15 of 15  

widow  entitled to the interest of her husband  got  certain property  prior  to  1956 as a result  of  arbitration  with specific stipulation and  she shall have only life interest. This  was  ignored  asnd she was held, rightly,  to  be  the absolute  owner whose rights were governed by section  14(1) and not 14(2).     Further  Hindu Succession Act did not  obliterate  Hindu Law. What has ceased to be operative after coming into force of  the Act under section 4 is text or rule etc.  for  which privision is made in the Act. And under section 4(2) any law in  force  immediately before the commencement  of  the  Act ceased  to  have  effect if it  was  inconsistent  with  any provision  of  the  Act.  Therefore  except  to  the  extent provision has been made in section 14, that is,  enlargement of  the  estate  of limited owner, the Hindu  Law  in  other regards  remained opearative. There is no provision  in  the Act  which deprives reversioners of their rights  except  to the extent mentioned in section 14. In Radha Rani v. Hanuman Prasad,  AIR 1966 SC 216 this Court overruled the  decisions of  the Allahabad and Patna High Courts that there  were  no reversioners  or  reversionary rights after 1956  and  held, ‘‘it  is  open  to  reversioner  to  maintain  a  suit   for declaration  that  an  alienation made  by  a  Hindu  female limited  owner  before  the  coming  into  force  of   Hindu Succession Act 1956 was without legal necessity and was  not binding upon reversioners’’.     Coming  now to the issue of adverse possession the  High Court was not justified in concluding that it was a question of fact. Possession under a gift deed which was found to  be invalid,  as  it was not permitted under Hindu  Law  was  on general  principle  contrary to law, and as  such  could  be adverse.  When did it become adverse to the donor  and  what circumstances  constitute  adverse  possession  against  the donor  is an aspect which does not arise  for  consideration as,  even assuming in favour of the appellant, the  question is,  if adverse possession against donor was  sufficient  to clothe  her  with right or title in the property  so  as  to deprive  the  reversioners  of  their  right  to  claim  the property after the death of the widow? In Radha Rani’s  case (supra) this Court held.                                                        618          ‘‘In  the  case  of an alienation  by  Hindu  widow          without legal necessity, the reversioners were  not          bound  to institute a declaratory suit  during  the          lifetime  of  the widow. They could wait  till  her          death  and then sue the alienee for  possession  of          the alienated property trating the alienation  as a          nullity.’’ Therefore,  it  is  obvious that the   appellant  could  not acquire any right by adverse possession against  reversioner during  lifetime  of  her  mother.  Her  claim  was  rightly negatived.     Before parting with this case, we express our thanks  to Sri  Padmanabhan,  Senior  Advoacate  who,  on  our  request rendered valuable assistance. We are thankful to Sri  Parekh and Sri Narasimhulu also for their assistance.     The  result is that this appeal fails and is  dismissed. But there shall be no order as to costs. R.P.                                       Appeal dismissed.                                                    619