REPORTABLE

              IN THE SUPREME COURT OF  INDIA           CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION   

 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  861    OF 2009 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.)No. 3277/2008)

KAILASHI BAI ..  APPELLANT

vs.

AARTI ARYA & ANR. ..  RESPONDENTS

J U D  G M E N T

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT,J.

Leave granted.

Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by the learned Single  

Judge of Madhya Pradesh High Court allowing the petition filed in terms of  

Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short `the Code').

Background facts, in nutshell, are as follows:

The  present  respondent  No.1  was  married  to  Mukesh  Arya  

(hereinafter referred to as  `deceased')  in the year 2003.   According to the  

prosecution, the deceased was working as Civil Judge and was posted at the  

relevant time at  Itarsi.   Respondent  No.1's  in  laws  did  not approve of  the  

marriage  as  the  respondent  No.1  belonged  to  an  upper  caste  while  the  

deceased belonged to the Scheduled Caste.  A child was born to them. The  

deceased  consumed  some  poisonous  substance  and  lost  his  life  on  

18/3/2007.   

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It was the case of the prosecution that during enquiry it surfaced  

that the respondent No.1 accused used to harass the deceased and subject to  

mental  cruelty  as  she  belonged  to  higher  caste  and  she  did  not  like

association of deceased with his parents and relatives. This was stated to be  

the ground of suicide and the accused abetted the suicide.  Charge sheet was  

filed in Court of Magistrate. An application under Section 482 of the Code was  

filed  questioning the order passed by learned Magistrate.

The High Court  took note of  the fact  that  the present  appellant's  

statement on a fair  reading did not disclose any offence.   The High Court  

noted even at the time of marriage, the parties knew caste of the deceased  

and  the  accused   and  therefore  the  question  of  that  being  a  factor  for  

harassing the deceased.  Leading to his suicide cannot be believed.  It was  

also found that there was no material to show that the accused wanted the  

deceased to stay separately from his parents.  Accordingly, the proceedings  

were quashed.

It  was  held  that  ingredients  of  Section  306  were  not  established.  

Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the parameters of exercise  

of power under Sec.482 of the Code was not kept in mind by the High Court.  

In any event, it was not a matter which was to be dealt with in trial.  Learned  

counsel for the respondent No.1 supported the judgment.

Exercise of  power  under Section  482 of  the Code in a  case  of  this  

nature is the exception and not the rule. The Section does not confer any new  

powers on the High Court. It  only saves the inherent power  which the Court  

possessed before the enactment of the Code.It envisages three circumstances  

under

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which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect  

to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court,  

and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor  

desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise  

of  inherent  jurisdiction.  No legislative  enactment  dealing with  procedure  

can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have  

inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary  

for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law.

That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely  

recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts,  

whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision,  

as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the  

right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the  

principle "quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine  

quo res ipsae esse non potest" (when the law gives a person anything it  

gives  him  that  without  which  it  cannot  exist).  While  exercising  powers  

under  the section,  the court  does  not  function as  a  court  of  appeal  or  

revision.  Inherent  jurisdiction  under  the  section  though wide  has  to  be  

exercised  sparingly,  carefully  and  with  caution  and  only  when  such  

exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself.  

It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for  

the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists  

for advancement of justice and

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if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice,  

the court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of  

the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent  

promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to  

quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to  

abuse  of  the process  of  court  or  quashing of  these proceedings  would  

otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the  

complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is  

sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess  

what  the complainant has alleged and whether  any offence is made out  

even if the allegations are accepted in toto.  

In  R.  P.  Kapur  v.  State  of  Punjab  (AIR  1960  SC  866)  this  Court  

summarized some categories of cases where inherent power can and should  

be exercised to quash the proceedings:

(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution  

or continuance e.g. want of sanction;  

ii where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at  

its  face  value and accepted  in  their  entirety do not  constitute  the offence  

alleged; (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal  

evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove  

the charge.

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    In  dealing  with  the  last  case,  it  is  important  to  bear  in  mind  the  

distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there  

is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a  

case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not  

support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of  

the Code,  the High Court  would  not  ordinarily embark  upon an enquiry  

whether  the  evidence  in  question  is  reliable  or  not  or  whether  on  a  

reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is  

the  function  of  the  trial  Judge.  Judicial  process  should  not  be  an  

instrument  of  oppression,  or,  needless  harassment.  Court  should  be  

circumspect  and  judicious  in  exercising  discretion  and  should  take  all  

relevant  facts  and  circumstances  into  consideration  before  issuing  

process,  lest  it  would  be  an  instrument  in  the  hands  of  a  private  

complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the  

same time the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to  

short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death.  

     The scope of exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code and the  

categories of cases where the High Court may exercise its power under it  

relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of process of any court or

otherwise to secure the ends of justice were set out in some detail by this  

Court  in  State  of  Haryana v.  Bhajan Lal  (1992  Supp (1)  335).  A note  of  

caution was, however, added that the power should be exercised sparingly  

and that too in rarest of rare cases. The illustrative categories indicated by  

this Court are as follows:  

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"102.(1)  Where  the  allegations  made  in  the  first  information  report  or  the  

complaint,  even if  they are taken at  their  face value and accepted in their  

entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against  

the accused.  

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if  

any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an

investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under  

an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of  

the Code.  

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and  

the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission  

of any offence and make out a case against the accused.  

(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but  

constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a  

police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section  

155(2) of the Code.  

5 Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and  

inherently improbable  on  the  basis  of  which  no  prudent  person  can  ever  

reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against  

the accused.

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6 Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of  

the  Code  or  the  Act  concerned  (under  which  a  criminal  proceeding  is  

instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where  

there  is  a  specific  provision  in  the  Code  or  Act  concerned,  providing  

efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or  

where  the  proceeding  is  maliciously  instituted  with  an  ulterior  motive  for  

wreaking  vengeance  on the accused  and with  a  view to spite  him due to  

private and personal grudge."

As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482  

of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great  

caution  in  its  exercise.  Court  must  be  careful  to  see  that  its  decision  in  

exercise  of  this  power  is  based  on sound principles.  The  inherent  power  

should not be exercised  to stifle  a legitimate  prosecution.  The High Court  

being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima  

facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more  

so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court  

and  the  issues  involved,  whether  factual  or  legal,  are  of  magnitude  and  

cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course,  

no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High  

Court

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will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any  

stage. (See: Janata Dal v. H. S. Chowdhary (1992 (4) SCC 305), and Raghubir  

Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar (AIR 1964 SC 1). It would not be proper for the  

High  Court  to  analyse  the  case  of  the  complainant  in  the  light  of  all  

probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable  

and on such premises arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be  

quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude  

that the complaint cannot be proceeded with.  In a proceeding instituted on  

complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called  

for only in a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is  

frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint  

do not constitute  the offence of  which  cognizance  has been taken by the  

Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the  

inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code. It is not, however, necessary  

that there should be meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find  

out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. The complaint has  

to be read as a whole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations in  

the  light  of  the  statement  made  on  oath  of  the  complainant  that  the

ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material  

to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event  

there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. When an  

information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, then  

the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the  

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material  collected during the investigation and evidence led in court which  

decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against  

the informant are of no consequence and cannot by themselves be the basis  

for  quashing  the  proceedings.  (See:  Dhanalakshmi  v.  R.  Prasanna  Kumar

(1990 Supp SCC 686), State of Bihar v. P. P. Sharma (AIR 1996 SC 309), Rupan  

Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill (1995 (6) SCC 194), State of Kerala v. O. C.  

Kuttan (AIR 1999 SC 1044), State of U.P. v. O. P. Sharma (1996 (7) SCC 705),  

Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada (1997 (2) SCC 397), Satvinder Kaur v.  

State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (AIR 1996 SC 2983) and Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT  

of Delhi (1999 (3) SCC 259.

   The  above position  was  recently  highlighted  in  State  of  Karnataka  M.  

Devendrappa and Another (2002 (3) SCC 89).

   Section 306 deals with abetment of suicide and Section 107 deals with  

abetment of a thing. They read as follows:

                                                                           "306.  Abetment  of  suicide-  If  

any person commits            suicide, whoever abets the commission of such  

suicide,             shall  be  punished  with  imprisonment  of  either  

description for a term which may extend to ten years and            shall also be  

liable to fine.

       107. Abetment of a thing- A person abets the doing of a thing, who:-

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        First- Instigates any person to do that thing; or

     Secondly- Engages with one or more other person or            persons in  

any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if            an act or illegal omission  

takes place in pursuance of that            conspiracy, and in order to the doing  

of that thing; or

      Thirdly- Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission the doing of that  

thing.

  Explanation 1- A person who, by willful            misrepresentation or by  

willful concealment of a material             fact which he is bound to disclose

voluntarily causes or             procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a  

thing to be             done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing.

         Explanation 2:- Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission  

of an act, does anything in order to            facilitate the commission of that  

act, and thereby             facilitates the commission thereof, is said to aid the  

doing of that act."

There is no doubt that exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of  

the Code has to be done only in exceptional cases and where there is prima  

facie  material  trial  was  to  be  held.  But  on  the  peculiar  facts  of  the  case  

highlighted  above,  we  are  of  the  view  that  the  High  Court  was  right  in  

exercising  its  jurisdiction  under  Sec.482  of  the  Code.   Therefore,  no  

interference is called for in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed.

                          ................ .J.               (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)       

     ...................J.                                         (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY) New Delhi,

April 27, 2009.