A  

B  

K.S. SUNDARARAJU CHEITIAR  v.  

M.R. RAMACHANDRA NAIDU  

FEBRUARY 18, 1994  

(K. JAYACHANDRA REDDY AND G.N. RAY, .1.1 .J  

Tamil Nadu B11ildi11g (Lease a11d Rent Co11trol) Act, 1960: Section  10(3)(a)(iii) and 14(1)(b).  

C Landlord-Eviction-Notice-Petition-Non-mentioning of evic,tion  ground in notice-But gro1111d me111iv11ed in petition-Whetlter disent'tt.les  landlord to claim relief  

Evictiort-Bona fide req11ireme11t-Factors relevant in determin- ing-Failure of landlord to establish-Effect on bona fide requirement in  

D subsequent proceedings.  

Evictio1t-Cause of eviction-Whether recurring in nature-Landlord's  failure to establish cause of actio1i-Wl1ether debars him from establishing  cause of action in subsequent eviction proceedings.  

E Rent Act-Nature of-Wl1etlrer a legislation for protection of tenant  011ly-W/1ether regulates inter se rights of landlord and tenant.  

The appellant-landlord obtained an eviction order against his tenant  under section 14(1)(4) of the Tamil Nadu Bui!ding (Lease and Rent  Control) Act, 1960. Thereafter, he let out the suit premises to the respon·  

F dent but subsequently filed an e\ictlon petition against him under section  10(3)(a)(iii) and 14(l)(b) of the Act i.e. on the grounds that (i) he required  more space not only for expansion of his own business but also for  expansion of pawn broking partnership business of his wife and daughter- ln-law; (ii) the suit premises were old and in a dilllpidated condition  

G requiring urgent demolition and construction. The Rent Controller al- lowed the petition under section 10(3)(a)(iii) holding that the landlord  required the premises for own occupation but rejected his case that he  required the premises for demolition and construction under section  14(l)(b) . .  

. H On appeal the competent authority affirmed the findings of the Rent  20

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CHETTIAR~RAMACHANDRANAIDU 21  

Con~oller that the suit premises were bona fide required by the landlord A  for his own use and occupation.  

The respondent-tenant filed a revision petition in the High Court  

which held that (i) the landlord was not consistent with reference to tl1e  

location. of the Company which was the pawn- broking business of partner-

ship; (ii) it was not clear as to what exactly was the area that was required B  by the respondent for the saitj. pawn broking business; and (iii) the  

appellate authority had failed to consider not only the totality of facts and  

circumstances of the case but also the bona fide on the part of the landlord  on account of alleged requirement of the partnership business. According- ly the High Court by its order dated April 11, 1990 remanded the matter C  to the appellate authority to dispose of the case afresh in accordance with  

law.  

After the order of remand, the appellate authority affirmed the order  

of eviction passed by the Rent Controller against the tenant under Section D  10(3) (a) (iii) of the Rent Act holding that (i) the eviction grounds founded  

in the proceedings were not identical with grounds indicated in the notice  ror eviction inasmuch as the case of the bona fide requirement on account  of expansion of partnership business had not been mentioned in the notice;  

(ii) but in view of the tenant's admission that the landlord was running a  jewdlery shop and also a pawn broker's business run by his wire and E  daughter-in-law, the landlord was entitled to claim eviction of the tenant  bcna fide on account of the said two business concerns; (iii) the documents  filed by the landlord clearly establish that partnership business had in fact  been run even though it was not mentioned in the eviction notice; (iv)  

documents of accounts of the partnership filed after the first order of F  remand clearly establish that the partnership business had been slowly  progressing and it was assessed for income tax from the year 1985 onward;  and (v) in view of the admitted position that the said two business  establishment were being run, much importance was not required to be  attached as to the location or the pawn broking business.  

G  

Thereafter, the respondent-tenan4 filed a Revision Petition and the  High Court held that the appellate authority had not decided the appeal  after remand in conformity with the order of remand dated Aprll 11, 1990.  Accordingly the High Court by i!s order dated December 11, 1992  remanded the appeal for the second time to the appellate authority with a H

22 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] 2 S.C.R.  

A direction that the appeal should be disposed of in accordance with the  directions contained in the earlier order of remand dated April 11, 1990.  

The appellant-landlord flied an appeal in this Coiurt challenging the  second order of remand dated December 11, 1992 contending that (i)  omission in the Eviction Notice to mention about bona fide requirement  

B on account of partnership business was of little significance because in  reality the said partnership business was in existence at the time of giving  the notice for eviction and tht: said business was being run even at the time  

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of disposal of the proceedings for .eviction; (il) the High Court bas J  proceeded on bypertechnicallty and set aside the well-rtasooed order of  

C the appellate authority simply on the ground that the observation made in  the first order of remand had not be followed properly; (iii) assuming that  the appellate authority's findings were not strictly according to the obser- vatioios made in the order of remand, if the ultimate finding of the  appellate authority was in conformity with the provisions of Section  10(3)(a)iii) of the Rent Act, there was no occasion for the High Court to  

D set aside the said order and send the matter back for redetermloat!oo of  the case; and (iv) in view 9f the appellate authority's finding that the  business activities had been steadily increasing, it was not at all necessary  to specifically refer in the d~ision which exhibit related to what document.  

E Dlsposing·the appeal, this Court  

HELD : 1. Non-mention of a reasonable ground for eviction in the  notice for eviction on the basis of which a claim for eviction is later on  founded usually raises a suspicion about the existence of such gouod but  such non-mention by itself cannot disentitle a landlord to claim eviction  

F on such ground. If a claim for eviction founded on such ground in the  petition for·eviction is proved to be wellfounded and the same is consistent  with the grounds on which eviction is permissible in law, the landlord will  be entitled to a decree for eviction notwithstanding the fact that such  ground was not mentioned in the notice for eviction. [33-F-G]  

G 2". The appellate authority had rightly indicated in the facts of this  case that the partnership business was in existence even prior to giving  notice for eviction by the landlord. Therefore, it cannot be reasonably held  that the claim or bona fide requirement on account of the said partnership  business is per se ma/a fide and should not be taken Into consideration  

H simply because the case for bona fide requirement on that account had not

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-- CHETilAR v. RAMACHANDRA NAIDU 23 been mentioned in the notice for eviction. [33-G-34A·B] A  3. The High Court bas acted with hyper-technicality in discarding  

the finding of the appellate authority about the continuous expension of  the said partnership business. The appellate authority has referred to the  exhibits including the income-tax assessment orders for the purpose of  coming to the finding that the said business had been gradually expanding. B  Such finding, therefore, appears to be justified. In the aforesaid facts, it  was not proper to discard such finding of the appellate authority by  indicating that the exhibits had not been elaborated in detail.  

(34-H, 35-A-C]  

4. The requirement of spact ~·" t~ ,sqid partnership business con- C  sistent with the nature rf ba.1s'mt:ss and expanding activities had not been  gone into by the app: tlate authority and the relevant materials are also  not before this Court. Therefore, the order of remand is upheld to the  limited extent, namely, that the appellate authority on the basis of  materials already on record would consider the actual requirement of  space for the saiu lJ(ht'lership business consistent with the nature of D  business keeping in view, tli~ expanding activities in such business. If on  such consideration, the appellate authority comes to the finding that the  landlord bona fide require11 me disputed premises for running the said  business in a separate enclosure, the order of eviction under Section  10(3)(a)(iii) of the Rent Act should be passed by the appellate authority. E  

[35-D-G]  

Hameeda Hardware Stores v. B.Mohan Lal'Sowcar, A.l.R. (1988) S.C.  1060 and Krishnan Nair v. Ghouse Basha, A.l.R. (1987) S.C. 2199, referred  to.  

5. There is no manner of doubt that the bona fide requirement is F  required to be considered objectively with reference to the materials on  record and it is necessary to determine the real intention of the landlord  on the basis of evidences adduced in a case. If the materials on record  clearly justify a case of bona fide requirement, there will be no occasion  for the court to hold that the landlord did not require the premises bona G  fide simply because on a previous occasion the actton of the landlord for  bringing an eviction case was not bona fide. [34-B-C]  

6. The cause for eviction is a recurring cause of action and even if  the existence of such cause of action had not been found in a previous  proceeding for eviction, the same cannot be discarded if such claim is H

24 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) 2 S.C.R.  

A ()s,tablished by cogent evidecnes adduced by the landlord in a subsequent  proceeding. The landlord may bring an action for eviction of the tenant on  

subsequent cause of action justifying a case of bo11a fide requirement.  [34-D-E]  

7. To say that the Rent Act is a legislation for protecting a tenant  

will be over simplification of the legislative import of the Rent Act. It will  B be more appropriate to .say that the Rent Act regulates the incidence of  

tenancy and inter se rights and obli~ations of the landlord and tenant.  [34-GJ  

c  

D  

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 878 of  1994.  

From the Judgment and Order dated 11.12.92 of the Madras High  Court in C.R.P. No. 436 of 1991.  

P. Chidambaram, V.K. Vijyaraghavan and S. Mur1idhar for the Ap- pellant.  

Siva Subramanian, V. Balachandran and G. Nagarajan for the  Respondent.  

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by  

E G.N. RAY, J. Leave granted. Pursuant to the notice issued on the  special leave petition No. 1687 of 1993, the respondent has entered ap- pearance through counsel and the counter affidavit has also been filed.  

The appellant landlord is the owner of the suit premises being shop  No. 142. Gandhiji Raod, Mayiladuthurai, Tamil Nadu. On June 15, 1971,  

F the appellant landlord leased out the premises in question to Sri G.  Vasanthan on a monthly rental of Rs. 400 with effect from June 15, 1971  and the appellant landlord sought eviction of the said tenant Vasanthan  and filed a petition for eviction on April 22, 1975 under Section 14(1)( 4)  of the Tamil Nadu Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960  (hereinafter referred to as the Rent Act) before the Rent Controller  

G Mayiladutburai. By an order dated December 12, 1975, the learned Rent  Contr.oller dismissed tl.te said eviction proceeding being R.C.O.P. No. 9 of  1975. The appellant landlord preferred an appeal against the said order  of the Rent Controller before the appellate authority. By order dated  August 31, 1977. the appellate authority allowed the said appeal and  

H directed the eviction of the said tenant Vasanthun. Thereafter, the appel-

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CHETTIAR v. RAMACHANDRA NAIDU [G.N. RAY, J.] 25  

lant landlord on August 29, 1978, let out the suit premises to the respon- A  dent M.R. Ramachandra Naidu for a period of three years from August 1,  1978 to August 31, 1981 on a rental of Rs. 750 per month. The period of  lease was extended further for another term of three years with effect from  September 1, 1981 to August 31, 1984. It is the case of the landlord that  he required the suit premises for expansion of his own business and also B  the pawn broking business under the partnership of his wife and daughter- in-law. The appellant landlord served a notice dated November 5, 1984  upon the respondent tenant asking him to vacate the suit premises. The  respondent tenant refused to vacate the suit premises and on April 17,  1985, the appellant landlord filed an eviction petition under Section  10(3)(a)(iii) of the Rent Act for eviction of !he tP.nant on the ground that C  the appellant landlord required .11ore space for running the said pawn  broking shop as well as the business of his own. The appellant landlord  also urged that since the suit premises were old and in a dilapidated  condition the same required urgent demolition and construction and ac- cordingly the tenant should also be evicted under Section 14(i)(b) of the D  Rent Act. By an order c!ated L'ctober 5, 1987, the learned Rent Controller  allowed the said R.C.0 .P. No. 37 of 1985 on the ground that the appellant  landlord had made out a case under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the R~nt Act  and he required the suit premises Lvna fide for his own occupation. The  Rent Controller, however, negatived the case of the appellant landlord that  he required the premises fer demolition or construction under Section E  14(i)(b) of the Rent Act. The respondent tenant thereafter filed R.CA.  No. 4 of 1988 dated April 26, 1989. The appellant landlord also filed Cross  Appeal being R.C.A. No. 9 of 1988 against the dismissal of the appellant  landlord's case for eviction under Section 14(i)(b) of the Rent Act. By a  judgment and order dated April 26, 1988, the appellate authority dismissed F  R.C.A. No. 4 of 1988 filed by the respondent tenant after endorsing the  finding of the learned Rent Controller that the suit premises was bona fide  required by the appellant landlord for his use and occupation. The learned  appellate authority, however, dismissed the landlord's Cross Appeal being  R.C.A. No. 9 of 1988 by the same judgment. The respondent tenant  thereafter filed Civil Revision Petition No. 1448 of 1989 in the High Court G  of Madras challenging the said eviction order under Section 10(3)(lli) of  the Rent Act. By. an order dated April 11, 1990, the said Civil Revision  Petition No. 1448 of 1989 was allowed by the High Court of Madras and  the case was remanded to the appellate authority inter alia directing the  

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26 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994) 2 S.C.R.  

A appellate authority to dispose of the case afresh in accordance with law  and in terms of the directions c.ontained in the said order, Thereafter,  pursuant to the liberty granted by the Ri!!h Court to both the parties to  adduce further evid•:ncc bcfo:e th, ... p ellate authority, fresh evidence~  troth oral or docuDlentary were adduced before the appellate authori,ty.  The appellate authority by a judgment and order dated December 14, 1990,  

B dismissed the said R.CA. No. 4 of 1988 filed by the respondent tenant and  confirmed the order of eviction passed by the learned Rent Controller. The  respondent tenant thereafter filed a Civil Revision Petition being Civil  Revision Petition No. 436 of 1991 in February, 1991.  

C The said Civil Revision. Petition was allowed by the High Court by  its order dated December 11, 1992 inter alia on the finding that the  appellate authority had not decided the appeal after remand in conformity  with the order of remand dated April 11, 1990 passed by the High Court.  The appeal was remanded for the second time by the High Court before  

D the appellate authority by directing inter a/ia that the said appeal should  be disposed of by following the directions contained in the order of remand  dated April, 11, 1990. It is this second order of remand dated December ;:....  11, 1992 which has been challenged in the instant appeal by the appellant  landlord.  

E Since the impugned second order of remand has been passed by the  fligh Court inter alia on the finding that the appellate authority failed to  dispose of the appeal in accordance with the directions contained in the  earlier order of remand, it is necessary to advert to the observations made  in the first order of remand in order to appreciate as to whether or not the  

F appellate authority has failed to dispose of the appeal properly ~ accord- ance with the directions contained in the order of remand.  

The High Court had noted in the first order of remand that in the  notice for eviction the landlord stated about the reqwrement of the dis- puted premises on account of expanding his own business but in the  

G eviction petition, the case for bona fide requirement of the landlord was  founded not only for the requirement for expansion of his own business  but also for the expansion the pawn broking business '6f the wife and  daughter-in- law of the landlord, and also for demolition and construction  of the suit premises. The High Court observed that the landlord was not  

H consistent with ,reference to the location of Govindammal and Company

CHETTIAR v. RAMACHANDRANAIDU [G.N. RAY,J.] 27  

which was the paw:i broking business in partnership or' the wife and A  daug.Jiter-in-law o( the Iaudlord. The High Court also observed that it was  net clear as to what exactly was the area that was required by the respon- dent for the said pawn broking business in jewellery which was purely a  business of advancing money on the security of jewels. The High Court also  ob:;erved that the appellate authority came to the finding that the said B  partnership business had e>..'J'anded by looking at Exts. A-10, A·ll and A-12  but the High Court was of the. view that in the absence of sufficient  materials right from the date of the commencement of the business, it was  not possible to make any finding about the improvP,ment of the said  business. 'The High Court also observed that even if the business had  improved, the very nature of the business that the pledged jewels had to C  be secured either in the locker in the iron safe or in the bank, the  requirement of a very large area for c;uch business might not be bona fide.  It was, therefore, necessary to determine whether the landlord required the  suit premises after keeping in mind the nature of the said partnership  

business and the area already under the possession of the landlord. The D  High Court also observed that the triai court and the appellate authority  

..-.... did not accept the case for eviction on the ground of demolition and  reconstruction. But even for the purpose of deciding bona fide requirement  of the landlord, the entire circumstances under which the landlord bad  instituted the proceedings were required to be taken into account. Refer-

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ring to a decision of this Court in Hameeda Hardware Stores v. B. Mohand E  Lal Sowcar, AIR 1988 SC 1060, the High Court observed that it was clear  from the said decision that when a landlord had sought eviction of a tenant  from the non-residential premises under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act,  the landlord was required to establish other ingredients, referred to in the  said Judgment. It was he'd by the High Comt that as the appellate authority F  had failed to consider not only the totality and circumstances and the facts  of the case but also the bona fide on the part of the landlord in seeking  eviction from the demised premises on account of alleged requirement of  the said partnership business, the impugned order of the appellate  authority was vitiated. The High Court, therefore, held in the order of first  remand that : G  

"It is in these circumstances, the order of the appellate authority  is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the appellate  authority to consider the totality of the facts and circumstances of  the case and the bona fide on the part of the respondent's require- H

28 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) 2 S.C.R.  

A ment of the demised premises for the purpose of carrying on the  business of Govindammal and Company, by the members of the  family."  

As aforesaid, the High Court directed that both the parties would be  B at liberty to file fresh evidence both oral and documentary in support of  

their case.  

After the said first order of remand, the appellate authority held, on  consideration of the materials on record including fresh evidences ad- duced, that the grounds on which the eviction of the tenant was founded  

C in the proceedings in question were not the identical grounds as indicated  in the notice for eviction given by the landlord to the tenant because the  c.ase of the bona fide ,tequirement on account of expansion of said partner- ship business had not been mentioned. The appellate authority, however,  held that the tenan~, both in the counter as well as in his oral evidence,  

D had admitted that the landlord was running a jewellery shop in the name  of Sunder Jewellery and also a pawn broker's business run by his wife and  daughter-in-law at door No. 141 in the name and style of S. Govindammal  and Company. The appellate authority held that in view of the aforesaid  admitted position and in view of the documents filed by the landlord which  clearly established that such partnership business had in fact been run in  

E door No. 141, even though the landlord had not rr.entioned in the notice  that the landlord required the suit premises also for the said partnership  business run by his wife and daughter-in- law, the landlord was entitled to  seek eviction on account of requirement of the said premises for the said  business. The appellate authority also held that it was not the case that the  

F said business in the name and style of Govindammal and Company h~d not  been run at door No. 141 prior to the giving df notice for eviction and such  business was introduced only for the purpose of making a case for eviction.  Accordingly, it could not be contended that claim for eviction on account  of the said partnership business was not made with any good intention. The  

G appellate authority also held that on perusal of E.<t:. No. 13 filed by the  landlord it could be noted that the partnership agreement had been  entered or August 25, 1988 and from Ext. 7 it transpired that the licence  for the said business had been issued on August 28, 1982 by the Tensildar  at Myiladuthurai and from Ext. 8 and 9 it transpired that the said partner- ship firm had been registered on May 24, 1983 and from Ext. 10 it  

H transpired that the said partnership firm was assessed for income tax and  

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CHEITIAR v. RAMACHANDRA NAIDU [G.N. RAY, J.] 29  

from Exts. 11 and 12 it appeared that the income tax had been assessed A  from the year 1985 onward. The appellate authority, therefore, held that  the running of the said partnership business in the said door No. 141 was  amply proved. The appellate authority also found that the jeweliery shop  of the landlord known as Sunder Jewellery was also being run in the said  door No. 141. The appellate authority, therefore, held that the landlord was B  entitled to claim eviction of the tenant bona fide on account of the said two  business concerns. The appellate authority also held that on perusal of the  landlord's Ext: 30 to 37 and 43 to 50 pertaining to the accounts of the said  Govindarnmal and Company which were filed after the said first order of  

remand, it was clearly established that the said parternship business namely  Govindammal and Company had been slowly progressing from year 1983. C  Coming to the question of the location of the said business in pawn broking  and also the business of the landlord known as Sunder jewellary, the  appellate authority held that much importance was not required to be  attached as to the location of the pawn broking business in view of the fact  the it was an admitted position that at door No. 141 both the said two D  businesses est&blishments were being run. The appellate authority then  took into consideration as to whether the landlord had other premises in  his occupation in which requirement for running the said business concerns  could be carried out. The appellate authority came to the finding that the  tenant in his evidence had admitted that the newly constructed building of  the landlord had not been fully completed and no shop was being run in E  the aforesaid building. The appellate authority, therefore, came to the  finding that the landlord did not own any vacant building. Referring to a  decision of this Court made in Krishanan Nair v. Ghouse Basna, AIR(1987)  SC 2199, the appellate authority inter alia came to the finding that a petition  under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Rent Act on account of requirement of F  a partnership business in which the members of the family of the landlord  were partners with strangers, was admissible and. the landlord was entitled  to claim eviction of the tenant for running such partnership business with  strangers. The appellate authority also took into consideration the case of  bona fide requirement of the landlord in the context of not mentioning the  requirement of the landlord on account of the said pawn broking business G  in the notice. The appellate authority, however, hr.Id that since admittedly  both the said two businesses had been run in the said door No. 141 and  the said partnership business had existed even prior to giving notice for  eviction to the tenant, it was established that the landlord's claim of  

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30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] 2 S.C.R.  

A requirement of the suit premises for expanding the said partnership busi- ness was based on bona fide intention. The appellate authority, however,  held that the case of requirement of the disputed premises on account of  expansion of the landlord's said business in the name and style of Sunder  Jewellery was not acceptable but it was necessary to separate the said  

B  business in pawn broking in the name and style of Govindammal and  Company from the other business of the landloard known as Sunder  Jewellery. The appellate authority.dismissed the claim of the landlord for  eviction on the ground of re-building after considering the relevant  evidence about the condition of the building. Accordingly, the appellate  authority affirmed the order of eviction passed by the learned Rent Con-

C troller against the tenant under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Rent Act.  

As aforesaid, the said decision of :he appellate authority after  remand has been set aside by the High Cotrt in revision inter alia on the  finding that the appellale authority had not applied its mind about the exact  

D location where the pawn broker's shop was situated and the appellate  authority had also not taken into consideration the question of bona fide  requirement of the landlord for the purpose of carrying on the said  business in pawn broking having regard to t.he area under occupation of  the tenant and the actual requirement for the said business in pawn  broking. The High Court was of t~e view that the appellate authority was  

E expected to go into the question whether the : ntire area under the occupa- tion of the tenant was required or not. The High Court also observed that  although the appellate authority referred to Exts. 30 to 37 and 43 to 50 and  came to the finding that the said partnership business had been steadily  improving from 1983, the appellate authorit) failed to indicate what were  

F the documents under the said exhibits and bow the said doc11ments were  relevant. The High Court set aside the order of the appellate authority on  the finding that the decision of the appellate authority was not only  unsatisfactory but the same was also not in conformity with the earlier  order of remand-passed by the High Court. 1he High Court also held that  the requirement of the building for demolitio.a and reconstruction had not  

G been seriously pressed before it and such question was, therefore, not  required to be considered.  

Mr. Chidambaram, the learned senior counsel appearing for the  landlord-appellant, has very strongly contended that the High Court passed  

H the impugned ordP.r of remand for the second time without properly  

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CHETIIAR v. RAMACHM"DRA NAIDU [G.N. RAY, J.) 31  

appreci;tting the facts and circumstances of the case and the materials on A  record an<l the import of the finding made by the appellate authority after  first order of remand. He has submitted chat the High Court has proceeded  on hyper-technicality and set aside the well-reasoned order of the appellate  authority simply on the ground that the observation made in the first order  of remand bad not been followed properly. He has submitted that even if B  it is asswned that the appellate authority had not made the finding strictly  according to the observatioru made in the order of remand, if the ultimate  finding of the appellate auth lrity on the basis of the materials on record  and the evidence adduced after the first order of remand is in conformity  with the provisions of Section 10 (3)(a)(iii) of the Rent Act, there was no  occasion for the High Court to set aside the said order and send the matter C  back for redetermination of the case. The anxiety of the Court should be  not to prolong the course of litigation but to achieve its finality as early as  possible. He has submitted that the appellate authority has rightly held that  the exact location of the said partnership business was not required to be  determined because of the admitted postion that both the said two business D  concerns namely Sunder Jewellery and Govindammal and Company had  been run in door No. 141. The real question required to be considered for  the purpose of deciding the claim for eviction is whether there was neces- sity for expanding of the said two businesses and whether or not the  landlord and any alternative suitable accommodation for carrying out the  said two businesses consistent with the requirement of the same. Mr. E  Chidambaram has also contended that the appellate authority has referred  to the assessment orders passed by the income tax authority from 1985  onward in respect of the said partnership business and with reference to  such assessment orders, the appellate authority came to the finding that  the business activities had been steadily increasiog. It was, therefore, not F  at all necessary to specifically refed in the decision which exhibit related  to what document. In any event, the materials were before the High Court  and the High Court could look into the same and could appreciate as to  whether or not the finding of the appellate authority about the steady  expansion of the said business was justified or not. Mr. Chidambaram bas  also submitted that in the notice for eviction the bona fide requiremnt of G  the suit premises also on account of the accommodation of the said  partnership business was not mentioned. But such omission to mention the  said fact was of little significance because in reality· the said partnership  business was in existence at the time of giving the notice for eviction and  

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32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) 2 S.C.R.  

A the said bus.iness was being run even at the time of disposal of the  proceedings for eviction. He has, therefore, submitted that the appellate  authority was justified in holding that there was no lack of bona fide on the  part of the landlord in basing a claim for eviction also on account of said  partnership business although such case was not mentioned in the notice  

B because the said business was not brought into existence after institution  of the said eviction suit but the same was there from before. The landlord,  according to Mr. Chidambaram, has led evidence to establish that for the  said expanding business more space was necessary and as the landlord did  not have any other suitable acommodation for the said business, he bona  fide required the suit premises. He has, therefore, submitted that the  

C impugned order has resulted in gross failure of justice to the landlord  appellant and the same should be set aside and the order of eviction on  concurrent finding of bona fide requirement of the landlord by the learned  Rent Controller and the appellate authority should be upheld by this Court  and the order of eviction passed by the appellate authority should be  

D maintained.  

The learned counsel for the tenant respondent has, however, dis- puted the said submissions of Mr. Chidambararn. It has been contended  by the learned counsel for the tenant respondent that for the purpose of  coming to a finding as to whether or not the landlord has a bona fide  

E requirement in pasing a claim for eviction of the tenant under the Rent  Act, the Court is required to look into all the facts and circumstances of  the case. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the tenant that  the previous tenant was evicted on the ground of building and reconstruc- tion of the suit premises but the landlord deliberately failed to reconstruct  

F the same and having obtained the possession, he inducted a new tenant. It  is only for the purpose of evicting the tenant respondent for getting higher  rer..t the claim for eviction on the ground of building and reconstruction  has been made by the landlord but such claim bas not been upheld. The  learned counsel for the tenant has also submitted that the landlord did not  

G bona fide require the suit premises is evident from the fact that there was  no mention of requiremnt for the expansion of the said partnership busi- ness in the notice for eviction. Had there been any such requirement, the  said fact should have been mentioned in the notice for evictiou. Although j,/'  the landlord really did not require the suit premises for the alleged purpose  of expansion of the said business, the same was alleged ma/a fide in the  

H petition for eviction. The omission to mention the said ground should be

CHETI1AR v. RAMACHANDRANAIDU[G.N.RAY, J.] 33  

considered for the purpose of determining whether there was a real need A  for expansion of said business. It is precisely for the said reasons, all the  antecedent facts and circumstances are required to be taken note of for  the purpose of deciding the bona fide requirement of the landlord. The  learned counsel has submitted that the Rent Act is essentially a beneficial  legislation for protection of the tenant against the caprices and whims of B  the landloard. The avowed purpose of the legislation to give such protec- tion will be frustrated if propec consideration as to the bona fide require- ment of the landlord . .s not taken into consideration. The learned counsel  for the tenant has also submitted that even if it is assumed that the said  partnership business is expanding, it is necessary to determine the exact  nature of business and the space required for carrying out such business C  consistent with the expansion of such business. The necessity for such  determination of the requirement of space had been indicated in the first  order of remand by the High Court but despite the same, the appellate  authority failed and neglected to determine the same and simply on a  finding that the business was improving and it required expansion, the D  decree for eviction had been passed against the tenant. ln the aforesaid  facts, the High Court was justified in setting aside the decree for eviction  and sending the appeal to the appellate authority on remand for redeter- mination in accordance with the observation made in the first order of  remand. No interference is, therefore, called for in t1'is appeal and the  same should be dismissed with exemplary cost. E  

After giving our careful consideration to the facts and circumstances  of the case, it appears to us that non-mention of a reasonable ground for  eviction in the notice for eviction on the basis of which a claim for eviction  is later on founded usually raises a suspicion about the existence of such F  ground but such non-mention by itself cannot disentitle a landlord to claim  eviction on such ground. If a claim for eviction founded on such ground in  the petition for eviction is proved to be well-founded and the same is  consistent with the grounds on which eviction is permissible in law, the  landlord will be entitled to a decree for eviction notwithstanding the fact G  that such ground was not mentioned in the notice for eviction, In our Yiew,  the appellate authority has rightly indicated in the facts of this case: that  the partnership business under the name and style of Govindammal and  Company was in existence even prior to giving notice for eviction by the  landlord. Such partnership business was registered and the licence for the  business was obtained and the business had been subjected to assessments H

34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] 2 S.C.R.  

A made by the income tax authorities. Hence, such business was not brought  into existence only for the purpose of making a foundation for eviction of  the tenant with maid fide intention. Hence, in the facts and circumstances  of the case, it cannot be reasonably held that the claim of bona fide  requirement on account of the said partnership business is per se mala fide  

B and should not be taken into consideration simply because the case for  bona fide requirement on that account had not been mentioned in the  notice for eviction. There is no manner of doubt .that the bona fide  requirement is required to be considered objectively \vith reference to the  materials on record and it is necessary to determine the real intention of  the landlord on the basis of evidences adduced in a case. If the materials  

C on record clearly justify a ~se of bona fide requirement, there will be no  occasion for the court to hold that the landlord did not require the  premises bona fide simply because on a previous occasion the action of the  landlord for bringing an eviction case was not bona fide. It should be borne  in mind that cause for eviction is a recurring cause of action and even if  

D the existence of such cause of action had not been found in a previous  proceeding for eviction, the same cannot be discarded if such claim is  established by cogent evidences adduced by the landlord in a subsequent  proceeding. It will not be correct to hold that only because after a tenant  was evicted by the landlord on the ground of reasonable requirement for  building and reconstruction, the landlord did not make the alleged  

E reconstruction but let out the premises to another tenant after obtaining  possession, any subsequent eviction case for the said premises deserves to  be dismissed in limine. The landlord, in our view, may bring an action for  evictioci of the tenant on subsequent cause of action justifying a case of  bona fide requirement. Similarly, rejection of a case for building and  

F reconstruction by itself will not disentitle the landlord to get an order of -r- eviction if the eviction on such ground can be founded in a chaqged  circumstance. We may also indicate here that the contention that the Rent  Act is a legislation for protecting a tenant will be over simplification of the  ~egislative import of the Rent Act. In our view, it will be more appropriate  to hold that the Rent Act regulates the incidence of tenancy and inter se  

G rights and obligations of the landlord and tenant.  

In our view, Mr. Chidambaram is justified in his submission that the  High Court has acted with byper-~ecbnicality in discarding the finding of  the appellate authority about the continuous expansion of the said partner-

H ship business. The appellate authority has ref erred to the exhibits including  

I

I  ~  

CHETI1AR v. RAMACHANDRA NAIDU [G.N. RAY, J.] 35  

the i lcome-tax assessment orders for the purpose of coming to the finding A  that the said business had been gradually expanding. In the aforesaid facts,  it was not proper to discard such finding of the appellate authority by  indicating that the exhibits had not been elaborated in detail. In any event,  such exhibits were before the High Court for its consideration and in the  anxiety to dispose of a !is as early as practicable, the High Court should B  have looked into the records and considered the justification of the finding  made by the appellate authority. It appears to us that the appellate  authority has referred to the assessment orders from 1985 and has come  to the finding that the said assessment orders indicated that the business  was expanding. le is nobody's case that the documents did not indicate such  expansion in business activities. Such finding, therefore, appears to be C  justified.  

Since the eviction proceeding is pending for long, it would have been  only desirable if the same could have been concluded before this Court.  But the requirement of space for the said partnership businesses consistent D  with the nature of business and expanding activities had not been gone into  by the appellate authority and the relevant materials are also not before  us. We may also indicate here that the appellate authority has specifically  held that for the expansion of the business of the landlord styled as Sunder  Jewellery no further space was required but the partnership business in  pawn broking was required to be separated. Such finding has not been E  challenged before the High Court and also before us. It therefore appears  to us that the said pawn broking business requires to be run separately.  Hence, W1! upheld the order or remand to the limited extent, namely, that  the appellate authority on the basis of materials already on record would  consider the actual requirement of space for the said partnership business F  consistent with the nature of business styled as Govindammal and Com- paay after keeping in view, the expanding activities in such business. If on  such consideration, the appellate authority comes to the finding that the  landlord bona fide requires the disputed premises for runing the said  business in a separate enclosure, the order of eviction under Section 10  (3)(a)(iii) of the Rent Act should be passed by the appellate authority. G  Since parties have already led evidence pursuant to the liberty given by the  High Court in the first order of remand, no further evidence should be  allov.:ed to be led by either of the parties. This order will, however, not  preclude the tenant respondent to give additional evi ence. If any, in  support of the contention that there had been change in the circumstances H

36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] 2 S.C.R.  

A after the impugned decision of the High Court under which the landlord  has already got in his possession suitable alternative accommodation which  will satisfy the requirement of the landlord for running the aforesaid busi- ness concerns. As the matter is pending for long, we direct the appellate  authority to dispose of this matter within three months from the date of  

B the receipt of this order. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there  will be no order as to costs.  

G.N. Appeals disposed of.  

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