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PETITIONER: DR. K MADAN

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SMT. KRISHNAWATI & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       06/11/1996

BENCH: SUJATA V. MANOHAR, B.N. KIRPAL

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T KIRPAL, J.      Leave granted.      This is  an appeal by the appellant-tenant in which the challenge is to an order which had been passed under Section 14 (1)(k)  of the  Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as ’the Act’).      The appellant  is a  lady Doctor  and in the year 1963, she took  the ground  floor of  House  No.  l-II/9l,  Lajpat Nagar, New  Delhi from  one Gyan Chand Shingari at a monthly rent of Rs. 175/- p.m. According to the appellant, this rent was first raised to Rs. 265/- p.m. in the year 1968 and then to Rs. 300/- p.m. in the year l970.      In August,  1974 the aforesaid Gyan Chand Shingari died and his  widow, the  respondent herein,  became the owner of the property and the appellant attorned to her. According to the appellant,  the premises  were taken  on rent by her for residential-cum-commercial purposes. She was residing in the said premises  and was  also running  a clinic. According to the respondent,  however, the  premises were  given on  rent only for residence.      In the  year 1974,  the appellant  constructed her  own residential house  in East  of Kailash,  New Delhi and, soon thereafter she  shifted her  residence to  the new house but continued to  retain  the  premises  in  dispute  where  she maintained her clinic. It appears that possession of some of the portion  of the  ground floor,  which had  been  in  the occupation  of   the  appellant,   was  taken  back  by  the respondent but  the appellant  continued to be the tenant of two rooms with a common use of latrine and front varandah on the ground floor of the aforesaid house.      On 17.5.1978  the respondent filed an eviction petition against the  appellant before the Rent Controller being Suit No. 134  of 1978  under section 14(1)(k) and (h) of the Act. By judgment dated 13.9.1985, the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi came  to the  conclusion that  the eviction  of ground floor under  Section 14(1)(c)  of the  Act had not been made out. Eviction  orders were,  however, passed  on the  ground under  Section   14(1)(h)  namely  that  the  appellant  had acquired vacant  possession of  a residence  inasmuch as she

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had constructed  her own  house  in  East  of  Kailash.  The Additional Rent  Controller further  held  that  the  ground under Section 14(1)(k) of the Act had been made out inasmuch as the  appellant was  using the  premises as a clinic which was contrary to the terms and conditions imposed by the Land and Development Office on the respondent land-lady. The case of the  respondent was  that the  premises in  question were residential and according to the terms of the lease given by the government  the said  premises could not he used for any other purposes.  A Doctor  was allowed  to use  the premises upto 500  square feet  as his  clinic  provided  the  Doctor resided in  the said premises. Inasmuch as the appellant had shifted from the Lajpat Nagar House to her own house in East of Kailash, therefore, the submission was that her continued user of  the premise,  in question  only  as  a  clinic  was against  the   terms  of  the  lease.  The  Additional  Rent Controller  vide   his  judgment   dated  13.9.1985,   while disposing of  the petition  on the  above two  grounds under Sections 14(1)(h)  and 14(1)(k)  of the  Act, issued  notice under Section  14(11) of the Act to the Land and Development Office.      At this  stage, it  is  appropriate  to  refer  to  the relevant portion  of the  Act namely,  Sections 14(1)(k) and 14(11) of the Act which read as under:      "Clause (k)  of the proviso to sub-      section  (1)   provides  that   the      Controller may,  on an  application      made  to   him  in  the  prescribed      manner,  make   an  order  for  the      recovery  of   possession  of   the      premises on  the  ground  that  the      tenant     has,     notwithstanding      previous notice, used or dealt with      the premises  in to manner contrary      to any  condition  imposed  on  the      landlord by  the Government  or the      Delhi Development  Authority or the      Municipal  Corporation   of   Delhi      giving him  a lease  of the land on      which the premises are constructed.      The requirements  cf clause (k) may      be analysed as follows:      (1) The user of the premises by the      tenant  should  be  contrary  to  a      condition imposed  on the  landlord      by the Government, etc.      (2) Such  user must  continue  even      after a  notice to  discontinue the      same is given by the landlord.      (3)   The    condition   which   is      contravened  by  the  user  of  the      tenant  should   be  one  which  is      imposed  on  the  landlord  by  the      Government  "while   giving  him  a      lease of the land on which premises      are situate".      14(11)  This  sub-section  provides      that no  order for  the recovery of      possession of any premises shall be      made on  the  ground  specified  in      clause (k) of Section 14(1), if the      tenant, within  such time as may be      specified in  this  behalf  by  the      Controller,   complies   with   the      condition imposed  on the  landlord

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    by any  of the authorities referred      to in  that clause  or pays to that      authority such  amount  by  say  of      compensation as  the Controller may      direct." Pursuant to  the issuance  of the  aforesaid notice  by  the Additional Rent  controller under Section 14(11) of the Act, the Deputy  Land and  Development Officer  filed  a  written statement before  the  Additional  Rent  Controller,  Delhi. After stating  that the  property was  originally leased  to Gayan Chand and, after his death, the name of the respondent had been  substituted, with  regard to  alleged mis-use  and regularisation, it was stated as follows:      "That     the      question      of      regularisation/condoning        the      breaches   permanently   does   no.      arise.  However,   the  lessor  may      consider, if  proper application is      made  by   the   lessee   with   an      undertaking to remove the breaches,      within the  specified  period,  and      with   readiness    to   pay    the      misuse/additional charges  leviable      for such misuser, that may be fixed      for the  period of  the  breach  to      postpone the right of re-entry till      such time  the breaches are finally      removed.      That the  misuse in  the nature  of      running a  doctor clinic  cannot be      allowed, but  the area extending to      500 sq.  feet is  permitted in case      the  doctor   is  residing  in  the      premises. Terms  for the temperarly      regularisation  of  misuse  charges      upto 14.1.1981 were communicated to      the lessee  vide this office letter      No.  L   &   DO/PS.   II/1830   dt.      3.12.1980 but the terms have not so      far  been  complied  with.  In  the      present case  benefit  of  500  sq.      feet was  not  given  because  lady      doctor Madan who is a tenant of the      lessee, was  not  residing  in  the      premises    as    noticed    during      inspections from time to time."      After  filing  the  aforesaid  written  statement,  the statement of  mis-use charges  was  also  filed  before  the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi.      The parties  then led  evidence and,  by judgment dated 19.4.1594, the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi came at the conclusion that the appellant had been misusing the premises by  running   her  clinic  and  the  misuser/breach  of  the conditions of the lease could not be condoned permanently by the office  of Land  and Development  Office and as such, by the impugned  order, she  was directed  to stop the mis-user within two  months from  the date  of the  order in order to avoid eviction  against her. The Additional Rent Controller, Delhi also  estimated the  damages for  mis-user which  were levied by  the Land and Development Office and the appellant was directed to pay the same within two months from the date of the  order including  damages for mis-user for the period subsequent to 1.4.1989 till its stoppage.      The appellant,  thereupon filed  an appeal  before  the Rent Control  Tribunal, inter alia contending that there had

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been no  mis-user of  the premises  on her  part inasmuch as since the  inception of  the tenancy, she had been using the same as  her residence  as well  as clinic. This contention, was not  accepted and it was held by the Tribunal that there was misuse  of suit  premises. It had also been contended on behalf  of  the  appellant  before  the  Tribunal  that  the property in  question had  become free-hold  and, therefore, the appellant  was not liable to pay misuse charges. Relying upon the  evidence of an officer of the Land and Development Office,  the  Tribunal  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the property  in   question  had  not  become  free-hold.  While dismissing the  appeal, the appellant was granted two months time by the Tribunal to comply with the directions contained in the  order dated  19.4.1994 passed by the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi.      The appellant then filed an appeal to the High Court of Delhi raising  the  contentions  that  order  under  Section 14(1)(k)  of  the  Act  should  not  have  been  passed  and secondly, the Government had permitted the conversion of the property  from  lease-hold  to  free-hold.  By  order  dated 28.10.1995, the High Court held that with regard to the plea pertaining to  applicability of Section 14(1)(k) of the Act, the finding  of the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi and of the Tribunal  was a  question of fact and no question of law arose.  With   regard  to   the  policy  of  the  Government permitting conversion  of the property, it was held that the property in dispute was admittedly a lease-hold property and the owner/landlord  was not  bound to  seek conversion under the alleged policy. Hence, this appeal.      In this  appeal the  only contention raised was that an order under Section 14(1)(k) read with Section 14(11) of the Act ought  not to have been passed. It was further submitted while relying  upon the  decision  in  the  case  of  PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK  VS. ARJUN  DEV ARORA AND OTHERS, (1986) 4 SCC 660 that  no order  could be passed requiring the closure of the clinic as long as penalty for wrongful user is continued to be paid by the tenant.      After taking  into consideration the evidence on record and, in  particular, the  written statement  of the Land and Development  Officer   as  well  as  the  statement  of  the witnesses  before   the  Additional   Rent  Controller,  the Tribunal has  found as fact that the appellant was using the premises in  question in a mananer which was contrary to the terms of  lease between  the  land-lady  and  the  Land  and Development Office.  It cannot  be said that this conclusion was not  warranted. It  is contended  by Mr.  Jain,  learned counsel for  the appellant,  that as  long as  the order for payment of  compensation to  the Land and Development Office remained, the  order for  eviction or  for  closure  of  the clinic need not be passed.      It is  no doubt  true that  the observations  in Punjab National case  (supra) are to the effect that as long as the penalty was  paid the  deviation of user could be permitted, but the  attention of  the two  Judge Bench was not drawn to the earlier  decision of  three Judges  Bench in the case of FAQIR CHAND VS. SHRI RAM RATTAN BHANOT, (1973) 1 SCC 572. In that case,  property   had been  given on lease by the Delhi Development  Authority   but  the  landlords  had  permitted tenants to  use  portion  of  the  building  for  commercial purposes. The  Development Authority  issued notice  to  the landlords calling  upon them  to discontinue the use of land for commercial purposes, failing which cause should be shown as to  why the  lease  should  not  be  determined  and  the property  re-entered.   Thereupon  the   land-lords   sought eviction of  the tenants  under Section 14(1)(k) of the Act.

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One of  the contentions  which were  raised to behalf of the tenants was  that the  land-lords were estopped or otherwise prohibited from  getting possession  of the property because the land-lords  themselves  had  let-out  the  property  for commercial  purposes.  While  analysing  the  provisions  of clause (k)  and subsection (ll) of Section 14 of the Act, it was observed  in FAKIR  CHAND CASE  (supra) at  page 557  as under:      "The Legislature  has clearly taken      note  of  the  fact  that  enormous      extents of land have been leased by      the three  authorities mentioned in      that clause,  and has  expressed by      means of this clause its anxiety to      see that  these lands  are used for      the purpose  for  which  they  were      leased.   The    policy   of    the      Legislature seems  to be  to put an      end  to  unauthorised  use  of  the      leased lands  rather than merely to      enable the  authorities to get back      possession  of  the  leased  lands.      This    conclusion    is    further      fortified   by   a   reference   to      subsection (ll)  of Section 14. The      lease  is   not  forfeited   merely      because the  building put  upon the      leased   land    is   put   to   an      unauthorised  use.  The  tenant  is      given an opportunity to comply with      the  conditions   imposed  on   the      landlord by  any of the authorities      referred to  in clause  (k) of  the      proviso to sub-section (1). As long      as   the   condition   imposed   is      complied   with    there   is    no      forfeiture.  It  even  enables  the      Controller to  direct  compensation      to be  paid to the authority except      in the  presence of  the authority.      The authority  may not  be prepared      to accept  compensation  but  might      insist  upon   cessation   of   the      unauthorized  use.  The  subsection      does not also say who is to pay the      compensation,  whether  it  is  the      landlord or  the tenant. Apparently      in   awarding    compensation   the      Controller will  have to  apportion      the responsibility  for the  breach      between the lessor and the tenant."      Dealing with  the contention  that the  land-lords were estopped from filing or getting any relief under clause (k), lt was held that:      "The anxiety  of the Legislature is      to prevent unauthorized user rather      than protection  of the  tenant  or      strengthening    the    hands    of      Development Authority  in effecting      forfeiture.     The     Development      Authority can  always resort to the      terms of  the lease.  There  is  no      estoppel  here   because  both  the      landlord and  the tenant  knew that      the tenancy  was not  one permitted

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    under the terms of the lease of the      land. In  any case  there can be no      estoppel against  the  statute.  It      would not  benefit the  tenant even      if it  is held  that  the  landlord      cannot,  under  the  circumstances,      evict him.  The landlord  will lose      his property  and the  tenant  also      will lose.  He  cannot,  after  the      Development  Authority  takes  over      the   building   use   it   for   a      commercial purpose." Section 14(1)(k)  of the Act again came up for Consideration before this Court in CUREWELL (INDIA) LTED. VS. SAHIB SINGH, 1993 Supp.(1)  SCC 507.  While construing  sub-section 11 of Section 14 of the Act. it was observed as follows:      "This sub-section prevents eviction      if the tenant has complied with the      condition imposed  on the  landlord      by the  government. The  subsection      also   requires   the   person   in      possession, namely,  the sub-lessee      to pay to the authority such amount      by  way   of  compensation  as  the      Controller may direct. It is not in      dispute that  the original  lessee,      upon receipt  of notice,  from  the      government,  had   in  turn  issued      notice to  the sub-lessee,  namely,      the appellant  calling upon  him to      stop   misuser    or   vacate   the      Premises. If  the appellant has, as      contended by  him stopped  misuser,      he is  of course  not liable  to be      evicted by reason of the protection      given to  him uer sub-section (11).      Nevertheless, for the past misuser,      the appellant is liable to pay such      charges as  are payable in terms of      the sub-section.  The charges under      the subsection  are such charges as      are determined  by the  Controller.      The  Controller   must,  therefore,      after hearing the parties determine      the amount  payable by  the  person      responsible   for    the   misuser,      namely, the  appellant who  is  the      tenant of  the original  lessee and      determine the correct amount.      We  are   of  the   view  that  the      appellant is  liable to  be evicted      unless he  has already  stopped  or      stops immediately  the  misuser  of      the premises  and pays  the  misuse      charges for  the period  of misuse.      Whether the misuser has stopped and      if so  when, are questions of facts      which do  not appear  to  be  clear      from the  pleadings or the impugned      judgment  and  the  orders  of  the      statutory authorities.      In the  light of  the observations of this Court in the cases of  Fakir  Chand  (supra)  and  Curewell  (supra)  the relevant provisions may be examined.      Section 14(1)  of  the  Act  gives  protection  to  the

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tenants from  being evicted  from the  permises let  out  to them. Clauses  (a) to (l) of the proviso to Section 14(1) of the 14(1)  of the  Act contain the grounds on which recovery of  possession  of  the  premises  can  be  ordered  by  the Controller. Where the premises are used in a manner contrary to any  condition imposed on the land-lord by the Government or the  Delhi Development Authority or Municipal corporation of Delhi, then the landlord would be entitled to recovery of possession under  Section 14(1)(k)  of the  Act. Sub-section (11)  of   Section  14,  however  gives  an  option  to  the controller to  pass an  order whereby recovery of possession may not  be  directed.  The  alternative  to  an  order  for recovery of possession under Section 14 (1)(k) is to pass an order under  sub-section (11)  of  Section  14  of  the  Act whereby the tenant is directed to comply with the conditions imposed on  the landlord  by the  authorities referred to in clause (k)  namely to  stop the  misuser of  the premises in question. Sub-section (11) of Section 14 also uses the words "pays to  that authority  such amount by way of compensation as the Controller may direct". Keeping in view the fact that clause (k)  of the  proviso  to  sub-section  (1)  has  been inserted in  order that  the unauthorised  use of the leased premises should  come to  an end,  and also  bearing in mind that the continued unauthorised use would give the principal lessor the right of re-entry after cancellation of the deed, the aforesaid words occurring in sub-section (11) of Section 14 cannot  be regarded as giving an option to the Controller to direct  payment of  compensation and to permit the tenant to continue  to use  the premises in an unauthorised manner. The principal  lessor may,  in a given case be satisfied, in cases of  breach of  lease to  get compensation only and may waive its  right of  re-entry or  cancellation of  lease. In such a case the Controller may, instead of ordering eviction under  Section  14(1)(k)  of  the  Act,  direct  payment  of compensation as  demanded by  the authorities  mentioned  in clause  (k).   Where,  however,   as  in  the  present  case compensation is demanded in respect of condoning/removal the earlier breach,  but the  authority insists that the misuser must cease  then the  Controller has no authority to pass an order under  Section 14 (11) or Section 14 (1)(k) of the Act giving a  license or  liberty of continued misuser. In other words, sub-section  11 of  Section 14 enables the Controller to give  an another  opportunity to  the tenant  to avoid an order of  eviction. Where  the authority  concerned requires stoppage or  misuser then  an order to that effect has to be passed, but  where the authority merely demands compensation for misuser  and does  not require  the stoppage  of misuser then only  in such  a case would the Controller be justified in passing an order for payment of compensation alone.      The observations of this Court in Punjab National Bank’s case (supra) to the effect that as long as the penalty continued  to be  paid, deviation  to user  could be permitted, do  not appear  to  be  in  consonance  with  the decision of  the larger Bench in Fakir Chand’s case (supra). Continued wrongful  user  cannot  be  permitted  by  levying penalty but  if the  authorities do not require the stoppage of misuser,  but  merely  ask  for  payment  of  penalty  or compensation, then  in such  a case, an order of eviction or for stoppage  of premises  need not he passed and it will be sufficient if compensation is required to be paid.      Coming so the facts of the present case, the Additional Rent Controller  in order  dated  13.9.1985,  while  issuing notice under  Section 14(11)  has observed that the landlord has placed  on record  a  notice  sent  only  the  Land  and Development  Office   regarding  misuser.   In  the  written

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statement filed on behalf of the Land and Development Office in response  to the  notice issued  under Section 14(11), it was stated that the question of regularisation/condoning the breach  permanently   did  not   arise.   The   said   reply contemplates an  undertaking being given by the Landlord for removal of  breach otherwise  there is a threat of re-entry. The payment of misuse charges would only amount to temporary regularisation of  the earlier  misuser  and  the  Land  and Development Office  clearly insisted  on the stoppage of the misuser. This  being so,  the  question  of  the  Controller requiring payment  of penalty or compensation and permitting continued misuser would not be in accordance with law.      For the  aforesaid reasons,  while upholding the orders of the  court below,  we grant the appellant two months time to comply  with the  order dated 19.4.1994 of the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi. There will be no order as to costs.