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PETITIONER: K.M. ABDULLA KUNHI AND B.L. ABDUL KHADER

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA AND ORS., STATE OF KARNATAKAAND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT23/01/1991

BENCH: SHETTY, K.J. (J) BENCH: SHETTY, K.J. (J) RAY, B.C. (J) KANIA, M.H. SHARMA, L.M. (J) VERMA, JAGDISH SARAN (J)

CITATION:  1991 AIR  574            1991 SCR  (1) 102  1991 SCC  (1) 476        JT 1991 (1)   216  1991 SCALE  (1)58  CITATOR INFO :  RF&E       1992 SC2161  (9)

ACT:      Conservation  of  Foreign Exchange  and  Prevention  of Smuggling  Activities Act, 1974--Sections 3,8, 10  and  11-- Detention   order   confirmed   before   consideration    of representation   of  detenu--Whether   valid--Representation received by considered by Government after receiving  report of Advisory Board--Whether valid.      Constitution  of India 1950: Articles 22(4)  and  (5)-- Preventive detention--Rights of detenu--What are.

HEADNOTE:      A  division Bench of this Court in V.J. Jain  v.  Shri Pradhan  and  Ors.,  [1979]  4 SCC  401  observed  that  the representation  of  the detenu should be considered  by  the detaining authority as early as possible before any order is made  confirming  the detention.  The  confirmation  of  the detention order without the consideration of  representation would  be  invalid and the subsequent consideration  of  the representation would not cure the invalidity of the order of confirmation.  This view was reiterated in the later case of Om  Prakash  Bahl  v. Union of India, W.P.No.  845  of  1979 decided on 15.10.1979.      As  the  aforesaid view required  reconsideration,  the instant  SLPs  and WPs had been referred to and heard  by  a constitutional bench.      On December 1, 1988, the officers of the Directorate of Revenue   Intelligence   upon   getting   information   that contraband gold has been secreted in the room of  petitioner No.  1  searched  the room in the  presence  of  independent witnesses.  Another person was also present inside the room. The officers recovered one Samsonite punch, and some bundles of  Indian  currencies from the table drawer in  that  room. Inside  the said pouch, there were five gold biscuits of  24 ct. purity and of foreign origin, and seized the same  under a Mahazar.      On  24th February, 1989, that State  Government  passed

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two  separate orders of detention under section 3(1)(iv)  of the Conservation of                                                        103 Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities  Act 1974  and  the  petitioners  were  taken  into  custody  and detained  in the Central pension.  On 17th April, 1989,  the detenus  made representation to the Government, which  could not   be   immediately  considered   since   they   required translation, and collection of information and comments.  In the  meanwhile,  the  matter was referred  to  the  Advisory Board, which had its meeting on 20th April, 1989  considered the  case  of  the  detenus, and  reported  that  there  was sufficient  cause for detention.  On 27th april,  1989,  the Government  accepted the report and confirmed the  detention orders.  On 6th and 7th May, 1989 the Government  considered and rejected on representation of the detenus and they  were informed of the same.      The detention orders were challenged in the High  Court through  a  writ petition but the High Court  dismissed  the same.      In  the  appeals and writ petition to this  Court,  the main   question   for   consideration   was,   whether   the confirmation of detention order upon accepting the report of the  Advisory  Board renders itself invalid  solely  on  the ground  that  the  representation  of  the  detenu  was  not considered,   and  the  subsequent  consideration  of   the representation would not cure that invalidity.      Disposing of the matters, the Court,      HELD: 1(a) With regard to liberty of citizens the Court stands  guard  over the facts and requirements of  law,  but Court cannot draw presumption against any authority  without material. [115G]      (b) The confirmation of detention does not preclude the Government  from  revoking  the  order  of  detention   upon considering the representation of the detenu. [115G]      (c)  There  may be cases where the  Government  has  to consider  the representation only after the confirmation  of the detention. [115H]      2(a)  There  are two  constitutional  safeguards,  viz: Clause (4) of Article 22, and Clause(5) of Article 22.   The former  requires  that if a detenu is liable to be  detained for  a  longer period than three months,  hiscase  shall  be referred to the Advisory Board which, must report before the expiration of the said period of three months that there  is in  its  opinion sufficient cause for such  detention.   The latter  provides  that  when  any  person  is  detained   in pursuance of an order made under any                                                        104 law providing for preventive detention the authority  making the  order  shall, as soon as may be,  communicate  to  such person  the  grounds on which the order has  been  made  and shall  afford  him  the earliest  opportunity  of  making  a representation against the order. [108E-G]      2(b)  The  detenu has two rights under  clause  (5)  of Article 22 of the Constitution: (i) to be informed, as  soon as may be, of the grounds on which the order of detention is based,  that  is, the grounds which led  to  the  subjective satisfaction  of  the  detaining  authority,  and  (ii)   to afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention. [108H; 109A]      3.  The  function  of  the  Advisory  Board  is  purely advisory and its report will enable the Government to detain the  person  beyond three months provided the  detention  is valid  on  its  merits and does  not  otherwise  offend  the Constitution. [108F]

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    4(a)  The  constitution right  to  make  representation under  clause  (5) of Article 22  by  necessary  implication guarantees   the   constitutional   right   to   a    proper consideration of the representation.  The obligation of  the Government  to afford to the detenu an opportunity  to  make representation  and  to  consider  such  representation   is distinct from the Government’s obligation to refer the  case of  detenu  along with the representation  to  the  Advisory Board  to enable it to from its opinion and send a report to the Government. [110B-C]      4(b) It is implicit in clause (4) and (5) of Article 22 that  the Government while discharging its duty to  consider the  representation,  cannot depend upon the  views  of  the Board  on  such  representation. it  has  to  consider   the representation  on its own without being influenced  by  any such view of the Board.  The obligation of the Government to consider the representation is different from the obligation of  the Board to consider the representation at the time  of hearing   the  reference.   The  Government   consider   the representation to ascertain essentially whether the order is in conformity with the power under  the law. [110C-D]      4(c)  The  Board,  on the  other  hand,  considers  the representation and the case of the detenu to examine whether there  is sufficient case for detention.  The  consideration by the Board is in additional safeguard and not a substitute for  consideration of the representation by the  Government. [110E]      4(d) The right to have the representation considered by the                                                        105 Government, is safeguarded by clause (5) of Article 22,  and it is independent of the consideration of the detenu’s  case and  his representation by the Advisory Board  under  clause (4) of Article 22 read with section 8(c) of the Conservation of  Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling  Activities Act, 1974. [110F]      SK. Abdul Karim & Ors. v. State of West Bengal,  [1969] 1 SCC 433, Pankaj Kumar Chakrabarty & Ors. v. State of  West bengal,  [1970]  1  SCR 543; Shayamal  Chakraborty  v.   The Commissioner  of Police Calcutta and Anr.,[1969] 2 SCC  426; B.  Sundar Rao & Ors. v. State of Orissa, [1972] 3  SCC  11; John Martin v. State of West Bengal, [1975] 3SCR 211; . S.K. Sekawat  v.  State  of West Bengal, [1983]  2  SCR  161  and Haradhan Saha & Anr. v. State of West Bengal & Ors.,[1975] 1 SCR 778, referred to.      5(a)  The representation relates to the liberty of  the individual, the highly cherished right enshrined in  Article 21 of our Constitution.  Clause (5) of Article 22 therefore, casts  a legal obligation on the Government to consider  the representation as early as possible.  It is a constitutional mandate commanding the concerned authority to whom the detenu submits  his representation to consider  the  representation and  dispose  of  the same as  expeditiously  as  possible. [110H;111A]      5(b)  The words "as soon as may be" occuring in  clause (5)  of Article 22 reflect the concern of the  Framers  that the  representation  should be expeditiously  considered  and disposed  of  with a sense of urgency without  an  avoidable delay.  However, there can be no hard and fast rule in  this regard.  It depends upon the fact and circumstances of  each case.   There  is  no period  prescribed  either  under  the Constitution  or under the concerned detention  law,  within which   the   representation  should  be  dealt   with   the requirement  however,  is that there should not  be  supine indifference  slackness or callous attitude  in  considering

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the  representation.  Any unexplained delay in the  disposal of   the   representation   would  be  a   breach   of   the constitutional  imperative and it would render the continued detention impermissible and illegal. [11B-D]      Jayanarayan Sukul v. State of West Bengal, [1970] 1 SCC 219; Frances Coralie Mullin v. W.C. Khambra and Ors., [1980] 2 SCC 275; Rama Dhondu Borade v. V.K. Saraf, Commissioner of Police  &  Ors., [1989] 3 SCC 173; and  Aslam  Ahmed  Zahire Ahmed  Shaik  v. Union of India & Ors., [1989]  3  ScC  277, referred to.      6(a)  There is no constitutional mandate  under  clause (5) of Arti-                                                   106 cle 22, much less any statutory requirement to consider  the representation before confirming the order of detention.  As long   as   the  Government  without  delay   considers  the representation  with an unbiased mind there is no basis  for concluding that the absence of independent consideration  is the  obvious result if the representation is not  considered before  the confirmation of detention.  indeed there  is  no justification  for imposing the restriction on the power  of the Government. [115C-D]      6(b)   Clause  5)  of  Article  22  suggests that   the representation could be received even after confirmation  of the  order  of detention.  The words "shall afford  him  the earliest  opportunity of making a representation against the order"  in  clause  (5)  of  Article  22  suggest  that  the obligation  of  the  Government is to offer  the  detenu  an opportunity  of making a representation against  the  order, before it is confirmed according to the procedure laid  down under  section  8  of the Act. But  ifthe  detenu  does  not exercise his right to make representation at that stage, but presents  it  to  the Government after  the  Government  has confirmed  the order of detention, the Government still  has to consider such representation and release the detenu if the detention  is  not  within the  power  conferred  under  the statue.   The confirmation of the order of detention is  not conclusive  as  against the detenu.  It can be  revoked  suo motu  under  Section  11 or upon  a  representation  of  the detenu. [116A-B]      6(c)  So  long as the representation  is  independently considered  by  the government and if there is no  delay  in considering   the  representation,  the  fact  that  it   is considered  after the confirmation of detention makes little difference on the validity of the detention or  confirmation of  the detention.  The confirmation cannot  be  invalidated solely  on the ground that the representation is  considered subsequent  to confirmation of the detention.  Nor it  could be  presumed that such consideration is not  an  independent consideration. [116C-D]      V.J. Jain v. Shri Pradhan & Ors., [1979] 4 SCC 401;  Om Prakash Bahl v. Union of India & Ors., W.P. No. 845 of  1979 decided  on  15.10.1979 and Khairul Haque v. State  of  West Bengal  W.P.No. 246/69 decided on 10.9.1969,  over  ruled; Khudiram  Das v. State of West Bengal & Ors., [1975]  2 SCC 81, distinguished.

JUDGMENT:      CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Writ Petition  (Crl.) No. 508 of 1989 etc. etc.      (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).                                                        107      Harjinder   singh  R.N.  Joshi,  A.   Acharjee,   Navin

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Malhotra,  Jagan  M.  Rao  and  Raju  Ramchandran  for   the Petitioners.      V.C.  Mahajan, B. Parthasarthy. P. Parmeswaran  and  M. Veerappa for the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J. A Division Bench of this Court while expressing the view that the decisions in J.V. Jain v. Shri Pradhan and Ors., [1979] 4 SCC 401 and Om Prakash  Bahl v.  Union of India and Ors, W.P. No. 845 of 1979 decided  on 15.10.1979   (Unreported)  require    re-consideration   has referred these matters to the Constitution Bench.      It  is  convenient  at  this  point  to  refer  to  the statement  of law laid down in the aforesaid two cases.   In both the cases, as in present case the persons were detained under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 ("the Act’).  The detenu made representation  to the appropriate government.  By then  the Advisory Board was already constituted and it was scheduled to meet to consider the case of the detenu.  The  Government forwarded the detenu’s representation to the Advisory Board. The  Advisory  Board considered the case of the  detenu  and also the representation and submitted report expressing  the opinion that there was sufficient cause for the detention of the  person.   The Government after considering  that report confirmed  the  order  of detention.  It  appears  that  the representation  of  the  detenu was  not  considered  before confirming the detention order and it came to be  considered and  rejected only thereafter in v.J. Jain case  this  Court observed  that  the representation of the detenu  should  be considered  by the detaining authority as early as  possible before  any   order is made confirming the  detention.   The confirmation   of   the   detention   order   without    the consideration  of  representation would be invalid  and  the subsequent  consideration  of the representation  would  not cure the invalidity of the order of confirmation.  This view has  been  reiterated  in the  unreported  judgement  in  Om Prakash Bahl case.      The  relevant  facts  of the present case  may  now  be narrated:   On  1  December,  1988,  the  officers  of   the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence upon getting information that  the  contraband  gold has been secreted  in  the  room occupied  by  K.M. Abdulla Kunhi, searched the room  in  the presence of independent witnesses.  Another person called                                                   108 Mohammed Ali was also present inside the room.  The officers recovered  one  Samsonite  pouch  and some  bundles  of  the Indian  currencies  amounting to Rs. 34,800 from  the  table drawer in the room.  Inside the said pouch, there were  five gold biscuits of 24 ct. purity and of foreign origin.   under the Mahazar, the officer seized the gold biscuits along with the  Indian  currency.   On  24  February  1989,  the  State Government  passed  two separate orders of  detention  under Section 3(1)(iv) of the Act, directing the detention of K.M. Abdulla Kunhi, the common petitioner in W.P. (Crl.) No.  508 of 1989 and SLP (crl.) 2009 of 1989, and B.L. Mohammed  Ali, the common petitioner in W.P. (Crl.) No. 542 of 1989 and SLP (Crl)   No 2117 of 1989.  On 9 March 1989, Mohammed Ali  was taken  into custody.  both of them were detained in  Central Prison,  Banglaore.   On 17 April, 1989,  the  detenus  made representations to the Government. The representations could not   be   immediately  considered   since   they   required translation and collection of information and comments  from different  authorities.   In  the meantime,   the  case  was referred  to the Advisory Board which had its meeting on  20 April  1989.  The Board considered the case of  the  detenus

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and  reported that there was sufficient cause for their  was unexplained  delay in considering the representation of  the detenu.  Indeed,  counsel  for the  petitioners very  fairly submitted  that they are not raising the question of  delay. They  also  did  not  argue  that  the  rejection   of   the representation  after the confirmation of detention was  not an independent consideration.      There are two constitutional safeguards, namely, clause (4) of Article 22, and clause (5) of Article 22.  the former requires  that  if a detenu is liable to be detained  for  a longer period than three months, his case shall be  referred to   the  Advisory  Board  which  must  report  before   the expiration of the said period of three months that there  is in  its  opinion sufficient cause for such  detention.   The function  of  the Board is purely advisory  and  its  report will enable the Government to detain the person beyond three months  provided  the detention is valid on its  merits  and does not otherwise offend the Constitution.   Clause (5)  of Article  22  provides that when any person  is  detained  in pursuance  of  an order made under any  law  providing   for preventive  detention the authority making the order  shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which  the  order  has been made and shall  afford  him  the earliest opportunity of making a representation against  the order.      The  detenu has two rights under clause (5) of  Article 22  of the constitution: (i) to be informed, as soon as  may be, of the grounds on                                                        109 which the order of detention is based, that is, the  grounds which  led to the subjective satisfaction of  the  detaining authority, and (ii) to be afforded the earliest  opportunity of making a representation  against the order of detention.      There  are  also statutory safeguards  with  regard  to detention  of  persons  under  the  Act  in  tune  with  the Constitutional requirements.  Section 3 of the Act  provides power  to make detention orders.  Sub-Section (1) speaks  of authorities  who  are competent to  make  detention  orders. Sub-section  (2) states that when an order of  detention  is made  by the State Government or by an officer empowered  by the State Government, the State Government shall, within ten days, forward to the Central Government a report in  respect of  that order.   Sub-section (3) thereof  provides  that  a person  detained in pursuance of a detention order shall  be furnished with the grounds of detention order as soon as may be,  but  ordinarily  not later than  five  days  after  the detention.  But in exceptional circumstances and for  reasons to  be recorded in writing, the grounds shall  be  furnished not later than fifteen days from the date of detention.      Section  8  of the Act provides for  reference  of  the detenu’s  case  to  the Advisory  Board,  the  Chairman  and members of which shall possess the qualification specified in sub-clause   (a)  of  clause  (4)  of  Article  22  of   the Constitution.   They must be persons who are, or have  been, or are qualified to be appointed as, Judges of a High Court. Clause  (b)  of  Section  8  makes  it  obligatory  for  the Government to refer the case of the detenu to Advisory Board within five weeks from the date of detention.  Clause (c) of Section  8 provides that the Board shall  after  considering the  reference and other material place before it and  after hearing the detenu if he desires to be heard in person, give its  report as to whether or not there is  sufficient  cause for the detention of the person concerned.  The Board  shall submit  the  report  within eleven week  from  the  date  of detention of the person concerned.  Clause (f) of Section  8

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states  that  in  every case where the  Advisory  Board  has reported  that there is in its opinion sufficient cause  for the  detention of a person, the Government may  confirm  the detention  order and continue his detention for such  period as   the Government deems fit subject to the maximum  period permissible under the Act. In every case where the  Advisory Board  has  reported  that  there  is  in  its  opinion   no sufficient  cause  for  the detention  of  the  person,  the Government shall revoke the detention order and release  the person forthwith.  This provision, of course, is subject  to Section 9 with which we are not concerned.                                                      110      Section 10 prescribes the maximum period for which  any person  may be detained.  Section 11 provides power  to  the State  Government  or the Central Government to  revoke  the detention  order  without  prejudice to  the  provisions  of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. This revocation shall not bar the making of another detention order under  section 3 against the same person.      It  is  now  beyond the pale of  controversy  that  the constitutional right to make representation under clause  (5) of  Article  22  by  necessary  implication  guarantees  the constitutional   right to a proper  consideration   of   the representation.  Secondly, the obligation of the  Government to   afford   to   the  detenu  an   opportunity   to   make representation  and  to  consider  such  representation  is distinct from the Government’s obligation to refer the  case of  detenu  along with the representation  to  the  Advisory Board to enable it to form its opinion and send a report  to the  Government.   It is implicit in clauses (4) and (5)  of Article 22 that the Government while discharging its duty to consider the representation, cannot depend upon the views of the  Board  on such representation.  It has to consider  the representation  on its own without being influenced  by  any such view of the Board.  The obligation of the Government to consider the representation is different from the obligation of  the Board to consider the representation at the time  of hearing  the  references.   The  Government  considers   the representation to ascertain essentially whether the order is in  conformity with the power under the law.  The Board,  on the other hand, considers the representation and the case of the  detenu to examine whether there is sufficient case  for detention.  The consideration by the Board is an  additional safeguard  and  not a substitute for consideration  of  the representation  by  the Government.  The right to  have  the representation considered by the Government, is, safeguarded by  cl.  (5)  of Article 22 and it  is  independent  of  the consideration of the detenu’s case and his representation by the  Advisory  Board  under cl. (4) of  Art.  22  read  with section  8(c)  of the Act. (See: Sk. Abdul Karim &  Ors.  v. State  of  West  Bengal,  [1969] 1  SCC  433;  Pankaj  Kumar Chakrabarty  &  Ors. v. State of west Bengal, [1970]  1  SCR 543;  Shayamal  Chakraborty v. The  Commissioner  of  Police Calcutta and Anr., [1969] 2 SCC 426; B. Sundar Rao and  Ors. v. State of Orissa, [1972] 3 SCC 11; John Matrin v. State of West Bengal, [1975] 3SCR 211; S.K. Sekawat v. State of  West Bengal,  [1983] 2 SCR 161 and haradhan Saha & Anr. v.  State of West Bengal and Ors.,[1975] 1 SCR 778.      The  representation  relates  to  the  liberty  of  the individual, the highly cherished right enshrined in  Article 21 of our Constitution.                                              111 Clause (5) of Article 22 therefore, casts a legal obligation on the Government to consider the representation as early as possible.  it  is a constitutional  mandate  commanding  the

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concerned   authority  to  whom  the  detenu   submits   his representation to consider the representation and dispose of the  same as expeditiously as possible.  The words "as  soon as may be" occuring in clause (5) of Article 22 reflects the concern  of the Framers that the representation   should  be expeditiously  considered  and disposed of with a  sense  of urgency  without an avoidable delay.  However, there can  be no  hard  and fast rule in this regard it depends  upon  the facts  and circumstances of each case.  There is  no  period prescribed  either  under  the  Constitution  or  under  the concerned  detention  law, within which  the  representation should  be  dealt with.  The requirement  however,  is  that there should not be supine indifference slackness or callous attitude in considering the representation.  Any unexplained delay in the disposal of representation would be a breach of the  constitutional  imperative  and  it  would  render  the continued  detention  impermissible and illegal.   This  has been  emphasised and re-emphasised by a series of  decisions of  the  Court.  (See: Jayanarayan Sukul v.  State  of  West bengal,  {1970]  1 SCC 219; Frances Coralie Mullin  v.  W.C. Kambra  and  Ors., [1980] 2 SCC 275; Rama Dhondu  Borade  v. V.K.  Saraf, Commissioner of Police and Ors., [1989]  3  SCC 173 and Aslam Ahmed Zahire Ahmed Shaik v. Union of India and ors., [1989] 3 SCC 277.      In  Jayanarayan  Sukul case, A.N. Ray, J., as  he  then was, speaking for the Constitution Bench has laid down  four principles   which  should  govern  the   consideration   of representation of detenus (at p.224):           "First the appropriate authority is bound to  give          an   opportunity   to   the  detenu   to   make   a          representation  and to consider the  representation          of the detenu as early as possible.  Secondly,  the          consideration  of the representation of the  detenu          by   the   appropriate   authority   is    entirely          independent  of  any action by the  Advisory  Board          including  the consideration of the  representation          of  the  detenu by the  Advisory  Board.   Thirdly,          there   should  not be any delay in the  matter  of          consideration.   It is true that no hard  and  fast          rule  can  be laid down as to the measure  of  time          taken    by   the   appropriate    authority    for          consideration but it has to be remembered that  the          Government has to be vigilant in the governance  of          the   citizens.    A  citizen’s  right   raised   a          correlative  duty  of  the  state.   fourthly,  the          appropriate                                                        112           Government is to exercise its opinion and judgment          on the representation before sending the case along          with  the detenu’s representation to  the  Advisory          Board.  If the appropriate Government will  release          the  detnu the Government will not send the  matter          to the Advisory Board. If, however, the  Government          will  not  release the detenu the  Government  will          send    the   case   along   with   the    detenu’s          representation   to   the   Advisory   Board.    If          thereafter  the  Advisory  Board  will  express  an          opinion  in  favour of release of  the  detenu  the          Government  will  release the detenu.  If  the  the          Advisory Board will express any opinion against the          release  of  the  detnu the  Government  may  still          exercise the power to release the detenu."      In  frances  Coralie Mullin v. W.C. Khambra  and  Ors., Chinappa  Reddy, J., while dealing with the time  imperative for  consideration of the representation has emphasised  (at

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279):           "We,   however,  hasten  to  add  that  the   time          imperative can never be absolute or obessive.   The          Court’s  observations are not to be so  understood.          There   has  to  be  lee-way,  depending   on   the          necessities   (we  refrain  from  using  the   word          ’circumstances’) of the case.  One may well imagine          a  case where a detenu does not make  representation          before  the  Board  makes  its  report  making   it          impossible  for the detaining authority  either  to          consider  it or to forward it to the Board in  time          or a case where a detenu makes a representation  to          the  detaining  authority  so  shortly  before  the          Advisory  Board  takes up the  reference  that  the          detaining    authority    cannot    consider    the          representation  before then but may merely  forward          it  to  the Board without himself  considering  it.          Several   such  situations  may  arise   compelling          departure   from  the  time-imperative.    But   no          allowance  can be made for lethargic  indifference.          No    allowance   can   be   made   for    needless          procrastination  .   But allowance must  surely  be          made   for  necessary  consultation   where   legal          intricacies and factual ramifications are involved.          The  burden  of explaining the  necessity  for  the          slightest departure from the time-imperative is  on          the detaining authority."      In   Frances   Coralie  Mullin’s  case   the   detenu’s representation  was received by the detaining  authority  on December  26,  1979.  Without any loss of time copy  of  the representation was sent to the customs-                                                   113 authorities for their remarks which was obviously  necessary because  the information leading to the order  of  detention was  collected  by the customs authorities.  The  fact  were undoubtedly  complex  since allegation  against  the  detenu revealed  an involvement with an international gang of  dope smugglers.   The  comments of the customs  authorities  were received on January 4, 1980.  The Advisory Board was meeting on january 4, 1980 and so there could be no question of  the detaining authority considering the representation of detenu before  the  board met, unless it was done in  a  great  and undue  haste.  After obtaining  the comments of the  customs authorities,  it  was found necessary to take  legal  advice as  the representation posed many legal  and  constitutional question,  so, after consultation with the  Secreatary  (Law and  Judicial) Delhi Administration, the representation  was finally  rejected by the Administrator or January 15,  1980. it  was held that if there appeared to be any delay  it  was not  due to any want of care but because the  representation required   a  thorough  examination  in  consultation   with investigation agencies and advisers of law      We  agree  with  the observations  in  frances  Coralie Mullin  case.   The  time  imperative  for  consideration  of representation  can  never  be absolute  or  obsessive.   it depends  upon  the  necessities and the time  at  which  the representation is made.  The representation may be  received before the case is referred to the Advisory Board, but there may  not  be time to dispose of  the  representation  before referring the case to the Advisory Board.  In that situation the  representation must also be forwarded to  the  Advisory Board along with the case of the detenu.  The representation may  be received after the case of the detenu isreferred  to the Board.  Even in this situation the representation should be  forwarded to the Advisory Board provided the  Board  has

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not concluded the proceedings.  In both the situations there is no question of consideration of the representation before the  receipt of report of the Advisory Board.  Nor it  could be said that the government has delayed consideration of the representation,  unnecessarily  awaiting the report  of  the Board.   It is proper for the Government in such  situations to  await  the report of the Board.  If the Board  finds  no material for detention on the merits andreports accordingly, the  Government is bound to revoke the order  of  detention. Secondly, even if the Board expresses the view that there is sufficient   cause  for  detention,  the  Government   after considering  the representation could revoke the  detention. The Board has to submit its report within eleven weeks  from the  date  of detention.  The Advisory Board  may  hear  the detenu at his request.  The Constitution of the Board  shows that it consists of eminent persons who are Judges or person qualified to be Judges of                                                        114 The High Court.  It is therefore, proper that the Government considers the representation in the aforesaid two situations only  after the receipt of the report of the Board.  If  the representation  is  received  by the  Government  after  the Advisory  Board  has made its report, there  could  then  of course  be no question of sending the representation to  the Advisory Board.  It will have to be dealt with and  disposed of by the Government as early as possible.      The crucial question that remains for consideration  is whether  the Government should consider and dispose  of  the representation before confirming the detention.  This  Court in  V.J.  Jain  case  has observed (at 405)  that  it  is  a constitutional obligation under clause (5) of Article 22  to consider the representation  before confirming the order  of detention.   if  it is not so considered,  the  confirmation becomes   invalid  and  the  subsequent  consideration   and rejection   of  the  representation  could  not   cure   the invalidity of the order of confirmation. To  reach  this conclusion, the Court has  relied  upon  two earlier  judgments of this Court: (i) Khudiram Das v.  State of  West Bengal and Ors., [1975] 2 SCC 81 and  (ii)  Khairul Haque  v.  State of West Bengal, W.P. No.246/69  decided  on 10.9.1969(Unreported).      The decision in Khudiram case is of title assistance to the  principle stated in V.J. Jain case.  It was a  case  of belated   consideration   of  the   representation   without acceptable explanation.  The decision in Khairul Haque case, however,  relevant.   It is also unreported  decision.   The facts  of the case and the principles stated therein may  be furnished.   There the petitioner was detained by  an  order dated  5 June 1969 of the District Magistrate, 24  Parganas, West bengal, under Section 3(2) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950. He  was arrested and detained in Dum Dum  Central Jail  on 6 June 1969.  The District magistrate informed  the State  Government of his said order on 9 June 1969.   On  14 June  1969, the Governor gave his approval and reported  the case  of the Central Government.  On or about 23 June  1969, the Government received the representation of the petitioner. On  30  June  1969 the Governor referred  the  case  of  the petitioner to the Advisory  Board.  The Advisory Board  made its  report on 11 August 1969 to the effect that  there  was sufficient  cause  for  the  detention  of  the  petitioner. Thereafter,  on 12 August 1969, the Governor  confirmed  the order  of  detention.   On  29  August  1969,  the  Governor rejected  the petitioner’s representation.  The Court  while referring these facts said that there was unaccounted  delay of  little more than two months in the consideration of  the

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representation .  Doubtless the detention was invalid on this delay alone and the Court could have quashed the                                                        115 detention on that ground.  But the Court, however,  observed that  it is doubtful whether the Government’s  consideration of  the  representation was independent as implicit  in  the language  of  Article  22(5).  If the  confirmation  by  the Government  of the order of the District magistrate is  made first   and   the  Government  rejects  the   representation thereafter,   such   rejection   is   not   an   independent consideration  but as the result of its decision to  confirm the  order  of  detention.  It was also  observed  that  the process  of decision-making has to be the other  way  about, that  is  to  say, the Government must  first  consider  the representation  and  only  later decide  whether  it  should confirm the order of the District magistrate on the basis of the  report of the Advisory Board.  The decision in  Khairul Haque case has been followed in V.J. Jain case which in turn was followed in Om Prakash Bahl case.      There  is  no constitutional mandate under cl.  (5)  of Article  22, much less any statutory requirement to  consider the representation before confirming the order of detention. As  long  as  the Government  without  delay  considers  the representation  with an unbiased mind there is no basis  for concluding that the absence of independent consideration  is the  obvious result if the representation is not  considered before  the confirmation of detention.  Indeed, there is  no justification for imposing this restriction on the power  of the  Government.   As  observed  earlier,  the  Government’s consideration  of  the  representation is  for  a  different purpose,  namely  to find out whether the  detention  is  in conformity with  the power under the statute.  This has been explained  in Haradhan Saha case, where Ray, C.J.,  speaking for  the Constitution Bench observed that the  consideration of the representation by the Government is only to ascertain whether the detention order is in conformity with the  power under  the  law.   There need not be  a  speaking  order  in disposing such representation.  There is also no failure  of justice by the order not being  a speaking order.  All  that is  necessary  is  that  there should  be  real  and  proper consideration by the Government.      It is necessary to mention that with regard to  liberty of  citizen  the  Court  stands guard  over  the  facts  and requirement  of  law,  but  Court  cannot  draw  presumption against any authority without material.  It may be borne  in mind  that the confirmation of detention does  not  preclude the  Government  from revoking the order of  detention  upon considering  the  representation.  Secondly,  there  may  be cases   where   the   Government   has   to   consider   the representation only after confirmation of detention.  Clause (5) of Article 22 suggests that the representation could  be received even after confirmation of the order                                                      116 of  detention.   The words ’shall afford  him  the  earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order’  in clause (5) of Article 22 suggest that the obligation of  the Government is to offer the detenu an opportunity of making a representation  against  the order, before it  is  confirmed according to the procedure laid down under Section 8 of  the Act.  But if the detenu does not exercise his right to  make representation  at  that  stage,  but  presents  it  to  the government  after the Government has confirmed the order  of detention,  the  Government  still  has  to  consider   such representation  and release the detenu if the  detention  is not  within  the  power conferred under  the  statute.   The

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confirmation  ofthe order of detention is not conclusive  as against  the  detenu.   It can be  revoked  suo  motu  under Section 11 or upon a representation of the detenu.  It seems to  us  therefore,  that so long as  the  representation  is independently  considered by the Government and if there  is no  delay in considering the representation, the  fact  that it  is considered after the confirmation of detention  makes little  difference  on  the validity  of  the  detention  or confirmation  of the detention.  The confirmation cannot  be invalidated solely on the ground that the representation  is considered subsequent to confirmation of the detention.  Nor it  could  be  presumed that such consideration  is  not  an independent  consideration.   With all respect, we  are  not inclined  to subscribe to the views expressed in V.J.  Jain. Om  Prakash  Bahl and Khairul Haque cases.  They  cannot  be considered to be good law and hence stand overruled.      Counsel  however, submitted that the representation  of the   detenu  was  not  sent  to  the  Advisory  Board   for consideration.  This question was not raised before the High Court,  nor  in  the Writ Petitions  before  us  and  hence rejected.      These petitions will now be placed before the  Division Bench for final disposal. N.V.K.                                  Petitions disposed of.                                                        117