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PETITIONER: THE K C P LIMITED

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE PRESIDING OFFICER & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       12/09/1996

BENCH: MAJMUDAR S.B. (J) BENCH: MAJMUDAR S.B. (J) AHMADI A.M. (CJ) KIRPAL B.N. (J)

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T S.B. Majmudar, J.      Leave granted.      This appeal by special leave arises out of the judgment and order  dated 4th  April,  1995  of  the  High  Court  of Judicature at  Madras in  Writ Appeal  No. 1186  of 1993.  A Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the appeal of the appellant company  and confirmed  the judgment  and order of the learned  Single Judge  in writ  petition No. 611 of 1993 dismissing the same.      A few  relevant facts leading to this appeal deserve to be  noted   at  the  outset.  The  appellant  is  having  an Engineering  Unit   at   Tiruvottiyur,   Madras   where   it manufactures  machinery   for  sugar,   cement  and   allied industries and  employs about  500 workmen. Respondent No. 2 is the only recognized and a representative union of all the workmen  in   the  said   establishment.  In  the  past  all industrial disputes were settled by the appellant company on the basis of long time settlements entered into with the 2nd respondent union,  the last  of which was dated December 30, 1991.      In September,  1990 when  the issue  of bonus  for  the financial year  1989-90 was  under consideration the workmen at the  instance of 2nd respondent union resorted to go slow insisting the  appellant to  pay more  bonus even  though as contended by  the appellant  under  the  provisions  of  the Payment of  Bonus Act  only minimum  bonus of  8.33% of  the earned wages was payable for the financial year 1989-90. The go slow  resorted  to  by  the  workmen  resulted  in  total stoppage of  work and  an alleged illegal strike on and from October 26,  1990. It  is the  case of the appellant that in view to  protect personal  security of  the Supervisory  and Managerial staff,  it had  to declare  a lock out on October 39,  1990.  The  appellant  also  chargesheeted  29  workmen including respondents 3 to 14 herein on November 5, 1990 for various acts of miscount allegedly committed by them between

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September 25, 1990 and October 29, 1990 when the workmen has resorted to  go slow  and  other  alleged  violent  acts  of misconduct.      The explanation  given by  29 workmen  having not  been found satisfactory  the appellant  decided to  hold  inquiry into the  charges involved  against  the  said  29  workmen. Inquiries were  conducted by the two retired District Judges and during  the inquiries all the 29 workmen participated in the inquiry proceedings which continued from January 8, 1991 to August 21, 1992.      On October  31,  1990  the  Government  of  Tamil  Nadu intervened and  initiated conciliation  proceedings to bring about  settlement   in  respect   of  the  pending  disputed including lock  out. As  on  settlement  take  place  during conciliation proceedings, the conciliation Officer submitted report to  the Appropriate  Government on  April 9, 1991. On May 7,  1991 the  Government  of  Tamil  Nadu  issued  three different orders  referring certain  industrial disputes for adjudication. G.O.No.  485 was  in respect  of  revision  of scale of  pay, revision  of dearness  allowance, revision of house rent  allowance etc.  By G.O.No. 486 the Government of Tamil Nadu  declined to refer certain disputes such as leave facility,  housing   scheme,  medical  facilities  etc.  for adjudication by giving reasons in the said G.O. No. 486. The third G.O.  No.487 was  issued under  Section  10-B  of  the Industrial Disputes  Act, 1947  (hereinafter referred  to as "the Act")  directing the  appellant to  lift lock out on or before 13.5191  and allow  all except  29 workmen  to resume work. In the said G.O. No. 487 the appellant was directed to maintain status  quo obtaining prior to the date of the lock out in regard to the terms and conditions of service and the appellant  was   further  directed   to   complete   inquiry proceedings against 29 workmen on or before 10.6.1991 and to pay them  full  wages  during  the  period  of  disciplinary proceedings. In  the said  G.O. No.  487  the  workmen  were directed to  maintain  normal  production  which  they  were giving prior to the date of the High Court order and also to maintain  discipline  in  the  factory.  By  August  19,1991 inquiries in  respect of  all the  29 workmen were completed and on  the basis of the findings by the Inquiry Officer and other  extenuating   circumstances,  the   29  workmen  were dismissed from service between 23.8.1991 to 1.10.1991.      In a  meeting held  before the  Joint  Commissioner  of Labour on  October 4, 1991 between the appellant and the 2nd respondent, an  agreement was  reached  on  the  quantum  of increase in  wages, recoverable  advance and  issue of bonus for the  years 1989-90  and 1990-91.  It was  further agreed that the  issue of  non-employment of  29 dismissed  workmen would be  discussed separately and on that basis all workmen except the said 29 workmen agreed to resume work in a phased manner not later than October 12, 1991 although the lock out was lifted on May 13, 1991.      Subsequently, a  settlement was  arrived at between the appellant and  the 2nd respondent under Section 12(3) of the Act wherein  it was  agreed that the issue of non-employment of  29   dismissed  workmen   would  be   discussed  in  the proceedings to be initiated by the Joint Labour Commissioner as early  as possible.  The joint  Labour Commissioner  held meetings between January 8, 1992 and March 6, 1992 and as no settlement could be reached report with regard to failure of the conciliation proceedings was submitted to the Government of Tamil  Nadu which  by order  dated 13.5.1992 referred the issue of  non-employment of  29 workmen  for adjudication to the I.D.No.  708 of  1992 on the file of the 1st respondent. The said  industrial dispute  was referred  for adjudication

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pursuant to  the demand  espoused by  all  the  workmen  and raised by the 2nd respondent union under Section 2(k) of the Act. All  the said  29 workmen who were members of the union has also  authorised the  2nd respondent  to represent  them before the  Conciliation Officer  whereafter  reference  was made to  the 1st  respondent. None  of the  said 29  workmen raised industrial dispute in their individual capacity under Section 2A of the Act.      It appears that thereafter the appellant company on the one hand  and second  respondent -  union on  the other held discussions  regarding   non-employment   of   29   workmen. Ultimately  on  7th  November,  1992  an  understanding  was reached between the appellant and the 2nd respondent - union that option  would be given to the said 29 workmen either to accept reinstatement  without backwages  or a lumpsum amount of Rs. 75,000/- with other monetary benefits may be accepted by the concerned workmen.      Respondent Nos.  3 to  14 (in  all 12  workmen) out  of these 29  workmen did not accept the proposed settlement and accordingly addressed a letter to the Commissioner of Labour on  2nd  December,  1992.  Thereafter,  the  2nd  respondent entered into  a settlement  with the appellant company under Section 18(i)  of the  Act on  behalf of  all the 29 workmen whose industrial  dispute with  regard to non-employment was espoused and  raised by it under Section 2(k) of the Act. On 14th December,  1992 a  comprehensive settlement was arrived at and  signed by  the appellant  and the  2nd respondent  - union. Copies  of the  said  settlement  were  forwarded  to various authorities  as contemplated under the provisions of the  and Rules thereunder.      A joint  memorandum signed  by the  respondent No.2 and the appellant  company was  filed before  Presiding Officer. First  Additional  Labour  Court,  Madras,  respondent  No.1 herein, before  whom the  industrial dispute was pending for adjudication. It was requested that an award in terms of the settlement may  be passed  in the pending industrial dispute reference No.  708 of 1992. However, respondent No.1, by his order dated 28th December, 1992 declined to make an award in terms of  the settlement  dated 14th  December, 1992  on the ground that the respondent Nos.3 to 14 have not approved the settlement and  therefore industrial  dispute in  respect of these respondents  will continue and proceed further. It may be stated that out of the 29 dismissed workmen in connection with whose dismissal, respondent No.2 - union had raised the industrial dispute under Section 2(k) of the Act. 17 workmen had already  agreed to  abide by the terms of the settlement and had got reinstated in exercise of their option. Only the remaining 12  dismissed workmen,  respondent Nos.  3  to  14 herein, proceeded  with the dispute and did not agree to the terms of  the settlement  even though  admittedly they  were members of  the respondent  NO.2 -  union who  was acting on their behalf  and even  till date  they have continued to be the members of the said union.      As the 1st respondent decided to continue the reference in connection  with respondent  Nos. 3  to 14  the appellant company filed  Writ Petition  No. 611  of  1993  before  the Madras High Court. As seen earlier, the learned Single Judge by  his  judgment  and  order  dated  29th  September,  1993 dismissed the  said Writ  Petition. The appellant thereafter moved the  Division Bench  of the High Court in appeal which also got  dismissed on  the 4th  April, 1995 and that is how the appellant  company has  moved  this  appeal  on  special leave.      Learned counsel  for the  appellant company  vehemently submitted that  when respondent  No. 2  - union had espoused

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the cause of all the 29 dismissed workmen, and the reference was got  made by it under Section 2(k) of the Act, the union which represented  all the  workmen including  the dismissed respondents 3  to 14 was entitled to act on behalf of all of them by  way of collective bargaining and could legitimately enter into  the settlement  which was for the benefit of all concerned workmen.  Under  these  circumstances,  individual workmen had  no independent right to contest their dismissal orders and  were bound by the settlement which was not shown by them  to be in any way ex-facie, unfair or unjust that it was a  package deal entered into by respondent No. 2 - union with  the   appellant  company  and  in  such  a  collective industrial bargaining  there was  always give  and take that there were  no exceptional  grounds  for  rejecting  such  a settlement which  was  for  the  benefit  of  all  concerned workmen and  the Labour  Court ought  to have acted upon the same. Consequently,  the order  of the Labour Court refusing to act upon said settlement so far as respondent Nos.3 to 14 are concerned,  was patently erroneous in law and hence, the order  of  the  learned  Single  Judge  of  the  High  Court confirming such  order of respondent No. 1 and further order of the  Division Bench  also equally  suffered  from  patent errors of  law. In  support of  these  submissions,  various decisions of  this Court were cited to which we will refer a little later.      Learned counsel  for respondent  Nos. 3  to 14  on  the other hand  submitted that  though  these  respondents  were admittedly members  of the  respondent - union, they had not accepted the terms of the settlement and the said settlement was not  binding on  them; that  in fact,  according to  the learned counsel,  a settlement  was arrived at by respondent No. 2  - union not on behalf of these contesting workmen but only for  the remaining  17 workmen  who  had  accepted  the settlement by  giving it  in writing  to  the  President  of respondent No.  2 -  union. He  also tried to submit that in any case,  the settlement  was not  fair  and  just  as  the workmen were  required to  give up  all the  back wages even though they  were given  reinstatement  with  continuity  of service and  they were  further required to give a letter in writing to  the Management  stating that  they would  acquit themselves in  an orderly  manner and would assure that they would not  give room  for any  misconduct  and  disciplinary action  in   future.  It  was  submitted  that  under  these circumstances the  contesting respondents  were entitled  to insist that their dispute should be adjudicated on merits by the Labour Court.      Having given  our anxious  consideration to these rival submissions, we find that the terms of the settlement cannot be considered to be in any way exfacie, unjust or unfair and that the  said settlement  consequently must  be held  to be binding on these contesting workmen also.      It has  to be  kept in view that the industrial dispute was raised  by respondent No. 2 - union on behalf of all the 29 workmen  who were dismissed from service by the appellant company. It  was an industrial dispute as defined by Section 2(k) of  the Act  raised by  the  union  on  behalf  of  its members. Respondents Nos. 3 to 14 were at the relevant time, members of  the union and even till date they continue to be the  members  of  the  sponsoring  union.  This  was  not  a reference raised  by a  dismissed employee as per Section 2A of the  Act. Consequently,  as which  was  incharge  of  the proceedings and could represent all the 29 dismissed workmen on whose  behalf the dispute was raised by it. When the said union having  considered the pros and cons of the situation, entered into  the settlement  on behalf  of all  the workmen

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from whom  it had  taken cudgels  unless the said settlement was found  to be  ex-facie, unjust or unfair it could not be gone behind  by these  respondents who  can be  said  to  be parties to  the same  through their  representative union  - respondent No.  2. In  this connection  a reference  is also required to  be made  to Section 18(1) of the Act which lays down as under:      "A   settlement   arrived   at   by      agreement between  the employer and      workman  otherwise   than  in   the      course of  conciliation  proceeding      shall be  binding on the parties to      the agreement.      It is  not in dispute that the settlement arrived at by respondent No.  2 - union with the appellant company was not in the  course of  conciliation proceedings.  Therefore,  it would be  binding to  the parties  to the agreement, namely, the appellant company on the one hand and respondent No. 2 - union representing  all the  29 dismissed employees, who wee its members and on whose behalf it had raised the industrial dispute under Section 2(k) of the Act, on the other.      Section 2(p)  of the Act defines a settlement to mean a settlement arrived  at in course of conciliation proceedings and includes  a written  agreement between  the employer and workmen  arrived   at  otherwise   than  in  the  course  of conciliation  proceedings  where  such  agreement  has  been signed by  the parties  thereto in  such manner  as  may  be prescribed and  a copy  thereof has  been sent to an officer authorised in  this behalf by the appropriate Government and the Conciliation Officer.      It  is   also  not  in  dispute  that  parties  to  the settlement were  the appellant  company on  the one hand and respondent No. 2 - union on the other, which acted on behalf of all  the 29  dismissed workmen  for  whom  reference  was pending in  the Labour  Court. It  was duly  signed by  both these parties.  Under these circumstances, respondent Nos. 3 to 14  also would  be ordinarily  bound by  this  settlement entered into  by their representative union with the company unless it  is shown  that the  said settlement was ex-facie, unfair, unjust  or malafied.  No such  case  could  be  even alleged much less made out by the dissenting respondent Nos. 3 to  14 before  the trial  court. It is interesting to note that before  the Labour  Court the only argument put forward on behalf  of the  respondent Nos 3 to 14 was that they were not parties  to the  settlement and  therefore, it  was  not binding on  them. Once  it is  kept in  view that the entire industrial dispute  was raised  by respondent No. 2 union on behalf of  all the 29 dismissed workmen and as it was not an industrial  dispute   covered  by   Section  2A   whereunder individual dismissed  workman could  come in  the  arena  of contest, it  could not  be held,  as wrongly  assumed by the Labour Court that this settlement was not entered into under Section 18(1)  of the  Act by  these dissenting workmen when the respondent  - union did represent then from beginning to end and  is still  representing them  as they are members of the union  even at  present.  In  the  case  of  Ram  Prasad Vishwakarma vs.  The Chairman  Industrial Tribunal  1961 (3) SCR 196 a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges of this Court had an occasion to consider the effect of a settlement entered into by the  union of workmen which had espoused the cause of its members by  raising an industrial dispute under section 2(k) of  the   Act  and  further  question  whether  under  these circumstances an  individual  workman  had  any  independent locus standi  in proceedings  before  the  reference  court. Rejecting  the   contention  on  behalf  of  the  individual

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workman, it  was observed  by Das Gupta, J. speaking for the court  that  the  concerned  workman  was  not  entitled  to separate representation  when  already  represented  by  the Secretary of  the union  which espoused his cause. A dispute between an  individual workman  and an employer cannot be an industrial dispute  as defined  in Section  2(k) of  the Act unless it  is taken  up by  a  union  of  workmen  or  by  a considerable number  of workmen.  When an individual workman becomes a  party to  a dispute  under the Act he is a party, not independently of the union which has espoused his cause. It was further observed that although no general rule can be laid down  in the  matter, the  ordinary rule should be that representation by  an officer  of  the  trade  union  should continue  throughout  the  proceedings  in  the  absence  of exceptional circumstances justifying other representation of the workman concerned.      It is true that the said decision was rendered prior to the insertion  of Section 2-A in the Act by which individual workmen were  also given a right to raise industrial dispute in case of discharge, dismissal or retrenchment or otherwise termination of  service. It  is also  true that  the present controversy has  arisen after  the coming  into operation of Section 2-A  but as  noted earlier  the  industrial  dispute raised for  29 dismissed  workmen was  raised by the union - respondent no.2  under Section 2(k) of the Act and there was no reference  under Section  2-A  of  the  Act,  so  far  as respondent nos. 3 to 14 are concerned.      In the  case of  Herbertsons Ltd.  v.  The  Workmen  of Herbertsons Ltd.  and Ors.  AIR 1977 SC 322 another Bench of three learned  Judges of this court considered the effect of a settlement  arrived at  by recognised union of majority of workers pending  appeal to Supreme Court. It was observed by Goswami, J.,  speaking for  the Court that when a recognised union negotiates with an employer the workers as individuals do not  come into the picture. It is not necessary that each individual  worker  should  know  the  implications  of  the settlement since  a recognised  union, which  is expected to protect the  legitimate interests  of labour  enteres into a settlement in  the best  interests of  labour. This would be the normal  rule. There may be exceptional cases where there may be  allegations of  mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. But in the absence of such allegations a settlement  in the  course  of  collective  bargaining  is entitled to due weight and consideration.      In connection  with the  justness and  fairness of  the settlement it was observed that this has to be considered in the light  of the  conditions that were in force at the time of the  reference. When,  therefore, negotiations take place which have to be encouraged, particularly between labour and employer in the interest of industrial peace and well-being, there is  always give  and take.  The settlement  has to  be taken as  a package  deal and  when labour has gained in the matter  of  dearness  allowance  so  far  as  the  award  is concerned, it  cannot be said that the settlement as a whole is unfair and unjust. It was further observed that it is not possible to  scan the settlement in bits and pieces and hold some parts good and acceptable and others bad. Unless it can be demonstrated  that the objectionable portion is such that it completely  outweighs all  other  advantages  gained  the Court will  slow to  hold a settlement as unfair and unjust. The settlement has to be accepted or rejected as a whole. It has  to be  kept in  view that under the scheme of labour legislations like  the Act  in the  present case, collective bargaining  and   the  principle   of  industrial  democracy permitted the  relations between  the management  on the one

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hand and the union which resorts to collective bargaining on behalf of  its members-workmen  with the  management on  the other. Such a collective bargaining which may result in just and fair  settlement  would  always  be  beneficial  to  the management as well as to the body of the workmen and society at large  as there would be industrial peace and tranquility pursuant  to   such  settlement   and  which   would   avoid unnecessary social  strife and  tribulation on  the one hand and promote  industrial and  commercial development  on  the other hand.  Keeping in  view the aforesaid salient features of the Act the settlement which is sought to be impugned has to be  scanned and  scrutinized and collective bargaining is always to  be preferred  for it  is the  best  guarantee  of industrial peace  which is  the aim  of all legislations for settlement of  labour disputes. In order to bring about such a settlement  more easily  and to  make it more workable and effective it  may not  be always  possible or necessary that such  a   settlement  is   arrived  at   in  the  course  of conciliation proceedings which may be the first step towards resolving the  industrial dispute  which  may  be  lingering between the employers and their workmen represented by their unions but  even if  at that  stage such settlement does not take place  and the  industrial dispute  gets  referred  for adjudication, even  pending such  disputes, the  parties can arrive at  amicable settlement  which may  be binding to the parties to  the  settlement  unlike  settlement  arrived  at during conciliation  proceedings which  may be  binding  not only to the parties to the settlement but even to the entire labour force  working in  the  concerned  organization  even though they may not be members of the union which might have entered into settlement during conciliation proceedings. The difference between  the settlement  arrived at under the Act during  conciliation   proceedings  by   parties   and   the settlement arrived  at otherwise  than  during  conciliation proceedings has  been succinctly brought out by the decision of this  Court  in  Barauni  Refinery  Pragatisheel  Shramik Parishad etc.  etc. v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. etc. etc. (1991) 1  SCC 4  wherein Ahmadi,  J. (  as His Lordship then was) spoke for the Court to the following effect :      "Settlements are  divided into  two      categories,   namely,   (i)   those      arrived at outside the conciliation      proceedings  [Section   18(i)]  and      (ii) those arrived at in the course      of     conciliation     proceedings      [Section 18(3)]. A settlement which      belongs to  the first  category has      limited  application   in  that  it      merely binds  the  parties  to  the      agreement. But a settlement arrived      at in  the course  of  conciliation      proceedings   with   a   recognized      majority   union    has    extended      application as  it will  be binding      on    all     workmen    of     the      establishment,   even   those   who      belong to  the minority union which      had objected  to the  same. To that      extent it departs from the ordinary      law   of   contract.   The   object      obviously is to uphold the sanctity      of  settlements  reached  with  the      active    assistance     of     the      Conciliation   Officer    and    to      discourage an  individual  employee

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    or a  minority union from scuttling      the   settlement.   There   is   an      underlying   assumption    that   a      settlement reached with the help of      the Conciliation  Officer  must  be      fair  and   reasonable   and   can,      therefore, safely  be made  binding      not only  on the  workmen belonging      to the union signing the settlement      but also on the others. That is why      a  settlement  arrived  at  in  the      course of  conciliation proceedings      is put on par with an award made by      an adjudicatory authority.      As in  the  present  case  the  settlement  arrived  at between the parties was not during conciliation proceedings, it would remain binding to parties to  the settlement as per Section 18(1)  of the  Act.  But  as  we  have  seen  above, respondent no.  2 union  while entering into that settlement acted on behalf of all the 29 dismissed workmen who were its members including  the   present respondent  nos.3 to 14 who are also  its members  as noted  earlier. We  have also seen earlier that  the Labour  court had erred in taking the view that respondents  3 to  14 were  not  parties  to  the  said settlement as individually they had no locus standi and they were represented  by their  union respondent  no.2 which had signed the  settlement on behalf of its members for whom the dispute was raised by the union. Nothing could be alleged by respondents 3  to 14  to the effect that the said settlement was in  any way  unjust or  unfair or  was a  mala fide one. There were  no  exceptional  circumstances  to  reject  this settlement qua  even the contesting respondents. However, as learned counsel  for the respondent-workmen tried faintly to suggest to  the effect  we have  carefully gone  through the circumstances which  are brought  on record which had led to the settlement.  It may  be noted that about 500 workmen had done on  strike and that had resulted in the lock-out by the appellant company  and ultimately  disciplinary  action  was initiated against  29 workmen  who had indulged into various acts of  misconduct. It  is for  these 29  workmen who  were ultimately dismissed  from service that the respondent-union had raised  a dispute under Section 2(k) of the Act on their behalf. Earlier the remaining workmen had gone on strike for nearly 5 months. Ultimately, the strike was withdrawn; lock- out was lifted and a broad understanding was reached between the appellant  company and  the workmen represented by their union whereby  it was  agreed  that  29  workmen,  who  were dismissed, would  be either given Rs75,000/- as compensation or reinstatement  with continuity  of service  without  back wages and  the concerned  workmen should express apology for mis-conduct and also assure good conduct in future.      Out of  29 workmen  for whom the industrial dispute was raised 17  workmen agreed and accepted settlement and joined the service.  Remaining 12  workmen (respondent nos.3 to 14) have not  agreed to  the said  settlement. It is under these circumstances that the settlement arrived at by the union on behalf of  all of them has to be scrutinized. It has clearly transpired on  the record  of this  case that  all  the  500 workmen excluding  29 dismissed  workmen and  had struck the work. Ultimately,  when  they  were  reinstated  in  service leaving aside  the 29  workmen for  whom industrial  dispute lingered on, all the remaining workmen lost their wages from 20.10.1990  to   21.5.1991  and   also  from   13.5.1991  to 6.10.1991.  They   lost  their   wages  because   they  were expressing sympathy  for their 29 colleagues who were facing

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disciplinary action and even for these 29 workmen respondent no.2 union  entered into  a settlement so that they could be reinstated in  service with  continuity of  service or could walk out  from service  with Rs.75,000/-  and other monetary benefits. All that was agreed to by the union as a condition for reinstatement was that the workmen would be give up back wages and  had to  sign  a  written  undertaking  to  behave properly  in   future.  In   our  view   there  was  nothing unreasonable or  unfair in  these terms  of settlement.  The relief of reinstatement without back wages could not be said to be unreasonable as for nearly 12 months all other workmen lost their  back wages only because they supported the cause of these  colleagues of theirs and hence there was no reason why the  workmen who  indulged in the acts of misconduct and who were  also to  be taken in service should not lose their wages for  12  months.  Relief  of  reinstatement  was  made available to  respondents 3 to 14 on the same line as it was made available  to their  17 remaining  colleagues who  were covered by  the very  same settlement  and who  accepted the relief  of  settlement  without  back  wages  or  a  lumpsum compensation of  Rs.75,000/- and  other monetary benefits in lieu of  that. In  our view such a package deal entered into by respondents  no.2 in  the best  interest of these workmen could not  be said to be unfair or unjust from any angle. On the contrary, if the back wages were given to them, then the remaining workmen  against whom  there was  no  disciplinary action or any alleged misconduct and who had also lost wages for 12  months only because they were in sympathy with these 29 dismissed workmen would have stood discriminated against. Consequently, it  is not  possible to agree with the learned counsel  for   respondents  nos.13   to  14  that  the  said settlement was  in any  way  unfair  or  unjust.  Once  this conclusion  is   reached  it  is  obvious  that  the  entire industrial dispute should have been disposed of in the light of this  settlement and  an award in terms of the settlement should have been passed by the first respondent-court in the case  of   respondents  3  to  14  also.  Consequently,  the judgement and  order of the Division Bench of the High Court dated 4th.  April, 1995  and the order of the learned Single Judge dated  29th September, 1993 are quashed and set aside. The writ  petition filed by the appellant company will stand allowed with  a direction  to  the  first  respondent-Labour Court to  pass award  in terms  of the settlement dated 14th December, 1992  by treating  it to  be binding to respondent nos. 3 to 14 also.      Learned  Counsel   for  these   respondents  ultimately submitted that  the time  during which the concerned workmen had to  exercise their  option  as  per  the  terms  of  the settlement is  now over  and the  appellant company  may not make available  the said option to them. His apprehension on behalf of the respondents was set at rest by learned counsel for the  appellant company  who stated  that  the  appellant company is  willing to  make available  the option  to these respondent nos. 3  to 14 to either accept reinstatement with continuity of  service without back wages on their executing the writing  as per  the  said  settlement  or  to  be  paid Rs.75,000/- each  in addition to gratuity as per the payment of Gratuity Act, wages for unavailed leave and bonus, if any payable.      In view  of this  fair stand  taken  by  the  appellant company it  is directed  that if the respondent nos. 3 to 14 exercise their  option as per the procedure laid down in the settlement  dated   14th  December   1992  either   to   get reinstatement without  back wages  for the  period  of  non- employment and  with continuity  of service  or to  accept a

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lumpsum monetary compensation as laid down in the settlement within a period of 8 weeks from today, the appellant company will act  upon the said option exercised by the said workmen and shall  give appropriate benefit of the option as per the settlement to  the  concerned  workmen.  As  the  period  of lumpsum payment  of Rs.75,000/- by instalments (as laid down by the  settlement) is  already over, it is directed that if any of  the concerned  workmen-respondents 3 to 14 exercises the option of receiving the lumpsum amount of Rs.75,000/- in lieu of  the reinstatement,  a sum of Rs.40,000/- out of the said amount shall be paid to the concerned workmen within 15 days of  the exercise  of such  option and  the  balance  of Rs.35,000/- with other monetary benefits as indicated in the settlement shall  be paid  to the concerned workmen within a further period of 2 months thereafter.      The appeal  is allowed  in the  aforesaid terms. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.