http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 9  

PETITIONER: K. ACHUTA BHAT

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: VEERAMANANI MANGA DEVI

DATE OF JUDGMENT23/09/1988

BENCH: NATRAJAN, S. (J) BENCH: NATRAJAN, S. (J) PATHAK, R.S. (CJ)

CITATION:  1989 AIR   93            1988 SCR  Supl. (3) 200  1989 SCC  (1)   9        1988 SCALE  (2)1590

ACT:     Andhra  Pradesh  Buildings (Lease,  Rent  and  Eviction) Control Act, 1960. Section 10-Tenant--Eviction on ground  of sub-letting--Transfer of managing rights of the business and transfer of business in toto with right to occupy the leased premises--Ascertainment of.

HEADNOTE:     The appellant had taken the demised premises on lease in 1953  for running a hotel. In August 1969 the hotel came  to be run by the second respondent. Thereupon, the landlady-Ist respondent  terminated  the tenancy as she  had  reasons  to believe that the appellant had either transferred his rights under  the  lease or sublet the premises. On  the  appellant refusing  to  vacate, the first  respondent  filed  petition under  section  10 of the Andhra Pradesh  Buildings  (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 seeking eviction on the ground of sub-letting. The Rent Controller ordered eviction. The appeals before the Appellate Authority failed. The  High Court, in revision, affirmed the finding of sub-letting.     Before this Court, it was contended on the basis of  the terms  of the agreement entered into between  the  appellant and  the second respondent, that the  appellant  transferred only the management rights of the hotel and had retained his rights  under the lease. It was urged that the  courts  must look at the dominant intention of the parties. On the  other hand, the first respondent contended that the true nature of the  transaction  was  the handing over of the  hotel  on  a permanent  basis  together with the tenancy  rights  of  the appellant.     Dismissing the appeal, it was,     HELD:  (I)  On  a conspectus of all  the  terms  of  the agreement  the High Court was fully justified in taking  the view  that the appellant and the second respondent had  used all  the ingenuity at their command to camouflage  the  real nature of the transaction and made it appear that there  was only  a transfer of the managing rights of the business  and                                                   PG NO 200                                                   PG NO 201 not  a  transfer of the business in toto together  with  the right to occupy the leased premises. [208G-H]     (2) It was patent that the burden of paying the rent had

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 9  

been passed on to the second respondent and this could occur only if the premises had been sublet to him. [208B]     (3)  Though the agreement was initially for  11  months, the renewal clause would enable its extension for any length of  time which was binding upon the heirs,  successors,  and assigns of the parties.[207G]     (4)  The agreement conferred proprietary rights  on  the second respondent over the hotel business inasmuch as he was made  the  sole authority to appoint the staff  as  well  as terminate  their  services  and empowered  him  to  run  the business on his own account and responsibility. [208B-C]     (5)  Besides  the  agreement, the manner  in  which  the second  respondent  had been conducting the  business  would also show that he was not a transfer of the managing  rights alone  but was a transfer of the business together with  the appellant s interest in the leased premises also. [209C]     Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Barar, 11976] I SCR 277; Md. Salim v. Md. Ali, [1987] 4 SCC 270, distinguished.     M. Rodgers v. N. Prakash Rao Naidu, 11969] I MLJ 352 and Bhagwan  Das  v.  S.  Rajeev Singh,  [1971]  3  S.C.C.  852, referred to.     (6)  At  the  end of the arguments in the  case  it  was represented at the Bar that the second respondent has  since vacated  the  premises and handed over the business  to  the appellant and hat the appellant himself was now running  the hotel through his son. The changed circumstances could  not, in  the  Court  s opinion, affect the rights  of  the  first respondent  in any manner to have the appellant  evicted  on the ground of subletting. [211C-D]

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2468  of 1982.     From  the Judgment and Order dated 8.3.1982 of the  High Court of Andhra Pradesh in C.R.P. Nos. 3726, 3727, 3910  and 4883 of 1979.                                                   PG NO 202     Dr. Y.S. Chitale and G. Narasimhulu for the Appellant.     T.S. Krishnamurti Iyer, Krishan Kumar and Rajeshwar  Rao for the Respondents.     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     NATARAJAN,  J. This appeal by special leave by a  tenant arises  out of a common judgment rendered by the High  Court of  Andhra Pradesh in four Civil Writ Petitions. Two of  the Revision  Petitions were filed by the appellant  herein  and the other two were filed by one Narsimha Murthy, the  second respondent  herein.  By  a common judgment  the  High  Court d_missed  all  the four revision Petitions.  While  Narsimha Murthy has not preferred any appeal the appellant has  filed this  appeal by special leave to question the  legality  and propriety  of the decree for eviction passed against him  on the ground he had unauthorisedly sublet the leased  premises to the second respondent for running a hotel.     Originally the building bearing door nos. 7-2-606,  607, 617   and  618  (old  door  No.  2540)   Rashtrapati   Road, Secunderabad  belonged to one Bhima Rao. The appellant  took the  ground floor of the premises on lease in the year  1953 from  the  said Bhima Rao on a monthly rent  of  Rs.250  for running a hotel in the name and style of Sharada Bhavan.  In or  about September 1967 Bhima Rao conveyed the premises  by means  of  a Deed of Gift to his daughter  Manga  Devi,  the first respondent herein and the appellant duly attorned  his tenancy  and was paying her the rent. After August l969  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 9  

hotel came to be run by the second respondent instead of the appellant.  As the first respondent had reasons  to  believe that  the appellant had either transferred his rights  under the  lease  or  sublet the leased  premises  to  the  second respondent,  she terminated the tenancy by means  of  notice with  effect  from 31st January, l97 l and called  upon  the appellant to surrender possession thereafter. The  appellant refused to vacate and sent a reply refuting the  allegations contained in the notice issued to him. This led to the first respondent filing a petition under Section 10 of the  Andhra Pradesh  Buildings (Lease. Rent and Eviction)  Control  Act. 1960 (for short the Act’ hereafter) to seek the eviction  of the  appellant  and the second respondent on  three  grounds viz. (1) wilful default in payment of rent, (2) unauthorised subletting  and (3) causing waste to the property. The  Rent Controller ordered eviction on the second and third grounds. The  appellant and the second respondent preferred  seperate appeals to the Appellate Authority and both the appeals were dismissed.  Thereafter  the two affected parties  filed  two                                                   PG NO 203 revisions each against the dismissal of the appeals and  the High  Court  clubbed all the four revisions and  rendered  a common  judgment dismissing all the revision petitions.  The High  Court,  however, affirmed the finding  of  the  courts below  only on the ground of sub-letting  and  consequently, the  sole  question  for consideration  in  this  appeal  is whether  the  High Court has erred in law in  upholding  the order  for  eviction passed by the first two Courts  on  the ground of sub-letting.     Dr.  Chitale, learned counsel for the appellant took  us through the terms of the agreement Exhibit R-14 entered into between  the appellant and the second respondent as well  as the  relevant portions of the judgments of the Courts  below and the High Court and argued that this was a case where the appellant  had only transferred the managing rights  of  the hotel to the second respondent and hence there was no  basis or  material for the Rent Controller or the Appellate  Court to hold that the appellant had sublet the leased premises to the  second respondent and therefore the High Court too  was in error in confirming the order of eviction passed  against the appellant and the second respondent. The learned counsel further contended that neither the agreement nor the conduct of the parties afforded any ground for taking the view  that the appellant had transferred his rights under the lease  or had sublet the premises to the second respondent, and on the other  hand  there was adequate material to  show  that  the appellant  had  retained his rights in the  leased  premises notwithstanding his placing the hotel business in the  hands of the second respondent. To substantiate these  contentions Dr. Chitale laid stress on certain clauses in the  agreement which  seek  to  emphasise  that  the  transfer  of   rights pertained to the business alone and not the leasehold rights of  the  appellant  in  the  leased  premises.  The  clauses referred to are as follows. Clause 2 sets out that the first party (the appellant) ’has agreed to allow the second  party (the  second respondent) to manage the said  Sharada  Bhawan with all the furniture etc.". Clause 7 interdicts the second party  from  permitting  "the use of the  premises  for  any purpose other than that for which it is being used viz. as a vegetarian restaurant" without the consent in writing of the first party. Clause 8 enjoins the second party to  "maintain the  standard  and reputation which the  said  business  has earned  and acquired". Clause 9 prohibits the  second  party from assigning or underletting or otherwise parting with the business  without  the permission in writing  of  the  first

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 9  

party.  Clause  11 stipulates that the  second  party  shall observe all the rules and regulations governing the licences granted to the first party by the Municipality, Police  etc. and further sets out that if any breach is committed by  the                                                   PG NO 204 second  party  he should indemnify the  first  party.  Under Clause  13 the first party has reserved a right  to  inspect the business at all reasonable times to satisfy himself that The  second party was fulfilling the conditions set  out  in the agreement. Clause 15 provides that on the expiry of  the agreement  the second party should "peacefully  and  quietly surrender  and hand over possession of the business  to  the first  party  together  with all  the  furniture,  fixtures, utensils  etc."  Clauses 16 and 17 are of  significance  for both parties and, therefore, they are extracted in full:     "Clause  16-The lease of the premises wherein  the  said business  is  being  run,  shall  continue  to  be   enjoyed exclusively by the first party at all times, and first party shall  be  liable to pay the monthly rent of Rs.250  or  any other  enhanced  rent that may be Agreed  upon  between  the first  party and the landlord and in such event  the  second party  shall pay to the first party the  difference  between the present rent of Rs.250 and the enhanced rent along  with the  monthly  amounts payable vide clause  (2)  hereof,  and shall  observe  faithfully all terms and conditions  of  the agreement  of tenancy between the first party and the  owner of  the premises. It is clearly understood and  agreed  this agreement  is only with respect to the running of  the  said business  on  a "MUNAFA" basis to the second party  and  not subletting or underletting of the premises housing the  said business.     Clause  17--The  essence of this agreement is  that  the second party shall run the said business on his own  account making  use  of  the existing property  such  as  furniture, fixture,  etc. which continue to belong to the  first  party with-out  any proprietory rights or interest to  the  second party  on  any  of  the  said  property.  It  is  distinctly understood  and agreed between the parties here to that  the second  party shall not be entitled to obtain any credit  or accommodation  from any third party on the security  of  the said  business.  The parties hereto agree  that  the  second party  shall carry on the said business on his  own  account and  responsibility and the first party shall not be  liable in  any  manner or to any extent in respect  of  the  second party’s  liabilities  arising out of his  running  the  said business or otherwise."     Placing  reliance  on  these clauses  it  was  seriously canvassed on behalf of the appellant that the agreement  was                                                   PG NO 205 explicit in its terms and there was no ambiguity and as  per the  terms  the transfer effected was only the  business  of running  the hotel and not the appellant’s interest  in  the leased property and no sub-tenancy was created in favour  of the second respondent.     The  appellant’s counsel urged that in almost  identical circumstances  this Court has held in Md. Salim v. Md.  Ali, [1987]  4  SCC 270 that the transfer effected was  only  the right to manage the business run by the lessee and there was no  transfer of any interest of the lessee in  the  business premises. It was the further contention of Dr. Chitale  that in  all  such  cases the Courts must look  to  the  dominant intention  of  the parties while effecting the  transfer  to find  out whether the transfer amounted to a sub-letting  of the leased premises. A reference was made to the decision in Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf; [ 19761 1 SCR 277 in this

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 9  

behalf.     Disputing    the   contentions   of    Dr.Chitale    Mr. Krishnamurthy Iyer, learned counsel appearing for the  first respondent, stated that the intention of the parties and the true nature of the transaction between them was the  handing over  of  the  hotel  on a permanent  basis  to  the  second respondent   together  with  the  tenancy  rights   of   the appellant.  Mr.  Iyer  said that  for  obvious  reasons  the parties   had   to  camouflage  the  real  nature   of   the transaction, by making it appear that the managing rights of the business alone were transferred but the truth could  not be  suppressed and hence the lower courts had  rightly  held that  the transfer had all the trappings of sub-letting  and the  appellant  was therefore liable for  eviction.  It  was urged  that  in  view of the  concurrent  findings  rendered against  the  appellant  by  the  Rent  Controller  and  the Appellate  Authority,  the High Court could have  very  well declined  to  go  into the merits of  the  findings  without reappraisal  of the evidence but even so the High Court  had given the appellant the indulgence of a detailed examination of  the  evidence  for itself and has  after  such  exercise confirmed  the  findings of the Courts below  and  as  such, there   is  no  need  or  justification  for   any   further examination  the contentions of the appellant.  The  learned counsel  submitted  that  if nevertheless the  case  of  the appellant  has  to be considered once ever again,  then  the agreement. though subtly worded, provided adequate  material to show that the transfer of the business had brought  about a  subletting of the premises also. The manner in which  the hotel  had been run by the second respondent, it was  added, afforded  additional  material to prove the factum  of  sub- letting  of  the premises. Mr.Krishnamurthy  Iyer  drew  our attention  to  several terms in the agreement, to  which  we                                                   PG NO 206 shall   advert  to  in  due  course,  to  substantiate   his contentions.  The  learned  counsel  also  placed  for   our consideration  a  decision of Alagiriswamy, J., as  he  then was,  in M. Rodgers v. Prakash Rao Naidu, [1969] 1  MLJ  352 and  of this court in Bhagwan Das v. Rajeev Singh, [1971]  3 S.C.C. 852.     Since  both the parties lay emphasis upon the  terms  of the agreement to support their respective contentions, it is necessary  that we look into the terms of the agreement  for ourselves.  The  preamble  sets out that  the  terms  "first party"  and "second party", cannoting the appellant and  the second respondent, will wherever the context permits include their  heirs,  successors, administrators and  assigns.  The agreement  would say that the first party, as the  owner  of the  vegetarian  restaurant "Sharada Bhawan" has  agreed  to allow the second party to manage the said hotel with all the furniture  etc.  The  agreement is for a  period  of  eleven months from the 1st day of September 1969 and thereafter the same could be renewed or extended for any further period  by mutual consent except in the event of the first party  being evicted,  in  which  event the second  party  would  not  be entitled  to any compensation for any loss or damage  caused to him by reason of the eviction. Clause 2 provides that "in consideration  of obtaining on hire on munafa basis  of  the business  together  with all the furniture etc.  the  second party  should  pay to the first party a sum  of  Rs.750  per month   during  the  period  of  first  eleven  months   and thereafter  at  the  rate of Rs.900  per  month  during  the subsequent renewed or extended period." As per Clause 3  the second  party  should pay all taxes, tees, rates  and  other statutory  outgoings in respect of the business and  ii  any

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 9  

loss is caused to the first party by non payment, the latter was  entitled  to recover all such charges from  the  second party and would also be entitled to cancel or terminate  the agreement forthwith. According to Clause 4 the second  party was  responsible  for not only payment of all  expenses  and charges relating to the running of the business but also for carrying out "repairs to business premises, painting, colour wash.  etc.  and  the like". The same  Clause  empowers  the second party to appoint, dismiss, promote or otherwise  deal with  all  members  of  the  staff  and  employees  of   all categories’’ and makes him liable for all claims and demands relating to the period covered by the agreement. ’ Clause  7 prohibits  the second party from using the premises for  any purpose  other  than  for running  a  vegetarian  restaurant without the consent of the first party. Clause 9  interdicts the   second  party  from  assigning  or  under-letting   or otherwise  parting  with the business  without  the  written permission of the first party. Clause 13 stipulates that the second  party  should allow the first party to  inspect  the business at all reasonable times to satisfy himself that the                                                   PG NO 207 second  party  was fulfilling the conditions  governing  the agreement.  Clause 15 sets out that "the second party  shall on  the  expiry  of the  agreement  peacefully  and  quietly surrender  and hand over possession of the said business  to the  first  party  with  all  the  furniture  and  fixtures, utensils,  etc." Clause 16 which has already been  extracted states  that the lease of the premises shall continue to  be enjoyed exclusively by the first party at all times, and the first  party  shall  be liable to pay the  monthly  rent  of Rs.250  or any other enhanced rate that may be  agreed  upon between  the  first party and the landlord and  in  such  an event  the  second party shall pay to the  first  party  the difference  between  the  present rent  of  Rs.250  and  the enhance rent along with the monthly amounts payable by  him. There is an explanatory clause stating that the agreement is only with respect to the running of the business and not  to any  subletting or underletting of the premises.  Clause  17 stipulates  that  the business was to be run by  the  second party on his own account making use of the existing property such as furniture, fixture etc. belonging to the first party without  any  proprietory rights or interest  and  that  the second  party  was  not entitled to  obtain  any  credit  or accommodation  from any third party on the security  of  the business  and  that he was to run the business  on  his  own account  and  responsibility.  Clause 18  makes  the  second respondent  solely responsible for any consequences  arising out  of  non-compliance  with  the  orders  passed  by   the competent  authorities  or for contravention of any  of  the provisions  of the laws in force Clauses 19 and  20  provide for  the  second respondent furnishing a  cash  security  of Rs.5000 and the first respondent being entitled to reimburse himself  from out of the deposit amount any loss or  damages suffered  by him on account of any default committed by  the second party     On a reading of the various provisions of the  agreement unable to accept the contentions of the appellant that  what was  transferred  was only the hotel business  and  not  the appellant’s  interest  in the leased premises as  a  lessee. Though the agreement is initially for a period of 11  months the  renewal  clause  would  enable the  parties  to  go  on extending  the lease for any length of time and as  per  the preamble such extensions of lease would be binding upon  the heirs,  successors,  administrators  and  assigns  of   both parties.  The  appellant  had  handed  over  the  furniture,

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 9  

utensils etc. to the second respondent and received a sum of Rs.5,000  as  security  and he  was  entitled  to  reimburse himself  for any loss or damage caused to the furniture  and the utensils. Though the agreement states that the appellant will continue to be the lessee of the property it is obvious that  the rent of Rs.250 per month was really to be paid  by                                                   PG NO 208 the  second  respondent through the appellant.  There  is  a specific  provision  in Clause 16 that in the event  of  the landlord  enhancing the rent, the second  respondent  should pay  "the difference between the present rent of Rs.250  and the enhanced rent along with the monthly amounts payable  as per  clause  2." It is therefore patent that the  burden  of paying the rent has been passed on to the second  respondent and  this can occur only if the premises had been sublet  to him.The  agreement confers proprietory rights on the  second respondent  over the hotel business inasmuch as he  is  made the sole authority to appoint the staff as well as terminate their  services  and also take disciplinary  action  against them. He is empowered to run the business on his own account and responsibility so long as he pays the appellant a sum of Rs.750 per month or the first eleven months and thereafter a sum of Rs.900 per month All the taxes, fees, rates and other statutory outgoings are to be paid by the second  respondent himself. Even the cost of effecting repairs to the  business premises  and  painting and colour washing etc.  are  to  be borne  by  him alone. Clauses 7 and  although  appearing  to interdict  the second respondent from changing the  user  of the  premises or from assigning or subletting the  business, really  permit  him to do so, if he obtains the  consent  or permission  in  writing  of  the  appellant.  If  what   was transferred  to the second respondent was only the right  to manage  the hotel business, it is incomprehensible  that  he would  be  called  upon  to effect  repairs  to  the  leased premises  or to undertake painting, colour washing  etc.  at his  own  expense.  Similarly the  question  of  the  second respondent changing the user of the premises or assigning or subletting  or  parting with the business with  the  written consent or the appellant will not arise if his rights  under the  agreement  were  restricted to the  management  of  the business  alone.  Clause 15 is curiously worded  because  it speaks  about the second respondent peacefully  and  quietly surrendering and handing over possession of the business  to the  first party with all the furniture, fixtures,  utensils etc.’’ The clause would show that what was really meant  was surrendering the possession of the building but in order  to conceal  matters,  the word ’business has been used  in  the place of ’building’.     On  a  conspectus of all the terms of the  agreement  we feel  that the High Court was fully justified in taking  the view  that the appellant and the second respondent had  used all  the ingenuity at their command to camaflouge  the  real nature of the transaction and make it appear that there  was only  a transfer of the managing rights of the business  and not  a  transfer of the business in toto together  with  the right to occupy the leased premises The clauses on which the appellant’s   counsel   placed  reliance  to   project   the                                                   PG NO 209 appellant’s  case are only make believe clauses  which  have been  introduced with a design and purpose viz.  to  conceal the real nature of the contract so that the landlord may not seek  the  eviction  of  the  appellant  on  the  ground  of subletting  the premises. In spite of the introduction of  a few  cleverly  worded  clauses the other  clauses  are  self revealing  and go to show that the parties were fully  aware

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 9  

of  the  vulnerability  of  their action  and  the  risk  of eviction  ensuing  therefrom.  It  is  on  account  of  such awareness  the  appellant  has  carefully  provided  in  the agreement  that in the event of his being evicted  from  the premises  he will not be liable to pay any compensation  for any loss or damage resulting to the second respondent.     Besides  the agreement, the manner in which  the  second respondent had been conducting the business would also  show that  he was not a transferee of the managing  rights  alone but  he was a transferee of the business together  with  the appellant’s  interest  in  the  leased  premises  also.  The business  turnover increased from Rs.200 to 250 per  day  to Rs.700 to 800 per day. The second respondent was assessed to income  tax and sales tax in his own name as the  proprietor of  Sharada Bhawan and not as the manager of the  hotel.  He was  recognised as the proprietor of the hotel and  admitted to membership of the Hotel Owner’s Association. He exercised absolute  control over the business and over the members  of the  staff  and was the sole authority to  appoint  them  or terminate their services or take disciplinary action against them.  He was not bound to render accounts to the  appellant or share with him the profits or losses of the business.  He became  solely responsible to bear all the expenses  and  to pay all the taxes, public charges etc. Thus even the conduct of  the  parties afford material to conclude that  what  was transferred to the second respondent was much more than  the right to run the hotel business for a limited period. It  is therefore futile for the appellant to say he had not  parted with  his  interests in the leased premises  to  the  second respondent.     As regards the decisions cited by Dr. Chitale we do  not think that either of them can advance the appellant s case m any  manner. In Md. Salim v. Md. Ali (supra) the facts  were perceptibly different. That was also a case where the  right of management of a shop run by a tenant was conferred on one Md.  Salim and it was agreed between the parties  that  from out  of the amount paid by Md. Salim, the lessee was to  pay the rent to the landlord. The agreement, however,  expressly stated that the transferer will remain the proprietor of the business, and that the licence for the business should stand in  his  name  and  that after a period  of  two  years  the transferee will restore the business along with the articles                                                   PG NO 210 in good condition to the transferor. The transfer  agreement had  been attested by the landlord himself. It was on  these facts it was decided in that case that there was no transfer of   interest  in  the  business  premises  and   what   was transferred  was only the right to manage the  business.  In the  present  case  the agreement provides  for  the  second respondent being allowed to run the business for any  length of  time as his own proprietory concern and to have all  the benefits  exclusively  for  himself. In the  other  case  of Dwarka  Prasad (supra) the court dealt with the  application of  the  ’ dominant intention" test with  reference  to  the facts  of  that case. The question in there  was  whether  a cinema  theatre equipped with projectors and other  fittings and  ready  to  be launched as an  entertainment  house  was "accommodation",  as defined in Section 2(1)(d) of the  U.P. (Temporary)  Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, and  if so,  whether  the Act "barricades eviction by  the  landlord because  the premises let constitutes an  accommodation"  It was in that context the Court observed that where the  lease is  composite  and has a plurality of purpose  the  decisive test  is  a  dominant purpose of the  demise.  There  is  no occasion  in this case for the test of  ’dominant  intention

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 9  

being applied because there was and there can be no lease of the managing rights of the hotel business as such and on the contrary  what was transferred was an outright  transfer  of the  hotel  together with the furniture, equipment  etc.  as well  as the lease-hold right of the erstwhile  hotelier  in the  leased  premises. The facts of this case bear  a  close similarity to the facts noticed in Bhagwan Das v .S.  Rajdev Singh,  (supra)- That was a case where the premises let  out to  one  Usha  Sales was put under  the  occupation  of  one Bhagwan Das and when the landlord sought the eviction of the tenant on the ground of sub-letting the plea raised was that Bhagwan Das had been appointed as an agent by Usha Sales for displaying and selling the protect o Usha Sales and  Bhagwan Das was in the occupation of the premises on his own  behalf for  the  purposes of his business as an  agent.  The  Court after perusing the agreement entered into between Usha  Sale and  Bhagwan Das held that the appellant was given  complete control  and  supervision  of the  premises,  and  that  the agreement  was a curious mixture of inconsistencies and  was plainly a clumsy attempt to camouflage the sub tenancy which was intended to be created thereby. The facts of the present nt case, have a striking similarity to the facts noticed  in that  case  and. therefore, the same  conclusion  should  be reached  in this case also. Besides the above said  decision Mr. Iyer referred us to a decision of the Madras High  Court in  M.  Rodgers  v. N. Prakash Rao Naidu.  (supra)  where  a tenant who was running a printing press in a leased building stopped the business and the manager began running the press as the lessee of the machinery without the tenant having any                                                   PG NO 211 share  in the business. On the landlord  sueing  the  tenant for  eviction  on the ground of subletting, the  High  Court held  that  since the machinery cannot be run unless  it  is placed  in the premises where it is situated, the lessee  of the  machinery  would get the advantage of the  use  of  the business  premises  also  and  as  such  the  lease   amount stipulated for the lease of the machinery would also include the  lease  amount payable for the building  and  hence  the transaction  would clearly amount to the  lessee  subletting the  building  simultaneously with the leasing  out  of  the machinery.  The  present case warrants the same  view  being taken  especially  in  the  light of  the  recitals  in  the agreement  which  stipulate that the amount payable  by  the second  respondent would comprise in it the rent payable  by the appellant landlord for the leased premises.     At  the end of the arguments it was represented  at  the bar  that  the  second  respondent  has  since  vacated  the premises  and handed over the business to the appellant  and that the appellant himself is now running the hotel  through his  son.  We  do not think the  changed  circumstances  can affect  the rights of the first respondent in any manner  to have the appellant evicted on the ground of subletting.     In the light of our conclusions, the appeal fails and is dismissed.  However,  having  regard to the  fact  that  the appellant would require some time to find an alternate place to  shift  his hotel, he is granted six  month’s  time  from today  to  vacate  the premises subject  to  his  filing  an undertaking within four weeks from today on the usual terms. There will be no order as to costs. R.S.S.                                    Appeal dismissed.