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PETITIONER: JOSEPH PETER

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF GOA, DAMAN AND DIU

DATE OF JUDGMENT04/05/1977

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. SINGH, JASWANT

CITATION:  1977 AIR 1812            1977 SCR  (3) 771  1977 SCC  (3) 280  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1989 SC 653  (12)  RF         1989 SC1335  (14)

ACT:         Criminal  Procedure  Code, 1973 (Act II  of  1974),  Section         354(3)--Discretionary  power to choose between capital  sen-         tence  and  life term is  a  limited  one--Leave  should  be         refused  when it is difficult to fault the court  which  has         exercised such a power under Art. 136 of the Constitution.         Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, Section 377--Scope of.         Goa,   Daman   and  Diu  (Judicial   Commissioner’s   Court)         Regulation.1963--Regulation  8(1) does not bar the  referred         jurisdiction of the  Judicial Commissioner’s Court.         Sentence--Extenuating   circumstances---Circumstance    that         the    accused is a young man or that the sentence of  death         has been haunting him for  long alone cannot entitle him for         judicial clemency.

HEADNOTE:         The petitioner was convicted for the offence of murder under         s.  302, I.P.C. and sentenced to death by the  Trial  Court.         The Judicial Commissioner, Goa confirmed the death  sentence         in  the  referred  trial under s. 374 of the  1898  Code  of         Criminal Procedure.         Dismissing the special leave petition to appeal, the Court.         HELD: (1) Discretion to choose between the capital  sentence         and  life term under s. 354(3) of the 1973 Code of  Criminal         Procedure  is limited.  If the offence has been  perpetrated         with attendant aggravating circumstances, if the perpetrator         discloses an extremely depraved state of mind and   diaboli-         cal  trickery  in committing the  homicide,  accompanied  by         brutal dealing with the cadaver, infliction of death penalty         cannot  be avoided.  Special  leave  under Art. 136. of  the         Constitution cannot be granted when it is difficult to fault         the court on any ground, statutory or precedential. [772  G-         H, 773 A]         Ediga Annamma, AIR 1974 SC 799, referred to.         (2)  Section 377 of 1898 Code of Criminal Procedure  applies         only  to situations where the court at the time of the  con-         firmation  of  the death sentence consists of  two  or  more         Judges.   Section 4(1)(i) of the Code  of   Criminal  proce-         dure,  in relation to a Union Territory, brings  within  the

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       definition   of "High Court", the highest court of  criminal         appeal  for that area, namely, the  Judicial  Commissioner’s         Court.  If, at the time the case for confirmation  of  death         sentence  is being heard, the Judicial Commissioner’s  Court         consists  of more than one Judge, at least two  Judges  must         attest  the confirmation.  So long as one  Judicial  Commis-         sioner  alone functions in the Court, section  377  was  not         attracted.  In the present case there is nothing illegal  in         a  single (i.e.the only) Judicial Commissioner deciding  the         reference. [773 D-F]           (3)  Referral  jurisdiction  under s.  377  is   akin   to         appeal  and  revision.Regulation 8(1) of the Goa, Daman  and         Diu (Judicial Commissioner’s Court) Regulation 1963 does not         disentitle  the Judicial Commissioner from exercising  power         u/s. 377, Cr.P.C.  In the instant case, the Judicial Commis-         sioner’s  confirmation  of  death sentence  is  not  without         jurisdiction. [774 C-D]             (4)  Judicial clemency cannot attenuate the sentence  of         death on the  sole circumstance that the accused was a young         man  and the sentence  of  death been haunting him for  long         without other supplement factors or in the face of surround-         ing beastly circumstances of the crime.  Possibly, Presiden-         tial power wider but judicial power is embanked.  [774  E-F]         10--707SCI/77         772

JUDGMENT:             CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special  Leave   Peti-         tion (Criminal) No. 216/1977.             (From  the  Judgment and Order dated  28-9-1973  of  the         Judicial  Commissioner, Court, Goa Daman and  Diu  in   Crl.         Appeal No. 17/72).         S.J.S. Fernandez, amicus curiae, for the petitioner.         The Order of the Court was delivered by         KRISHNA  IYER, J.--A death sentence, with all  its  dreadful         scenario  swinging  desperately out of the  last  breath  of         mortal life, is   an excrutiating hour for the judges called         upon to lend signature to tiffs macabre stroke of the execu-         tioner’s  rope.   Even so, judges   must enforce  the  laws,         whatever they be, and decide according to the best of  their         lights,  but  the laws, are not always just and  the  lights         are not always luminous.   Nor, again, are judicial  methods         always  adequate  to secure justice.   We are bound  by  the         Penal  Code  and the Criminal Procedure Code, by  the,  very         oath of our office.             Section  354(3)  of the new Code  gives  the  convicting         judge,  on a murder charge, a discretion to  choose  between         capital  sentence  and life term.   It is true that  in  the         present Code, the unmistakable shift in legislative emphasis         is  on life imprisonment for murder as the rule and  capital         sentence an exception, to be resorted to for reasons   to be         stated  (Edige  Annamma, 1974 SC 799, AIR).   Even  so,  the         discretion is limited and courts can never afford to  forget         Benjamin’ Cardozo’s wise guidance:                         "The  judge, even when he is free, is  still                       not  wholly  free.  He is not to  innovate  at                       pleasure.    He is not a knight  errant  roam-                       ing  at  will in pursuit of his own  ideal  of                       beauty   or  of goodness. He is  to  draw  his                       inspiration  from  consecrated     principles.                       He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment,  to                       vague and unregulated benevolence.   He is  to                       exercise  a  discretion informed by tradition,

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                     methodized  by  analogy,  disciplined by  sys-                       tem,   and  subordinated  to  the   primordial                       necessity of order in the social life.    Wide                       enough in all conscience is the field of  dis-                       cretion that remains."                       (Cardoze:  The Nature of the Judicial    Proc-                       ess:  Wale University Press ( 1921 ) ).             We  have  heard counsel on the  merits  and.perused  the         paper  book with some care and see no ground to disturb  the         conviction.    The question of ’sentence’  projects  sharply         before  us and what we.   have stated above turns our  focus         on  cicumstances  justifying  the  graver  sentence.     The         learned  Sessions Judge has given valid reasons   as to  why         he  is  imposing the death sentence.   The  guidelines  laid         down by this Court, in its precedents which bind us, tell us         that  if  the offence has been  perpetrated  with  attendant         aggravating circumstances,  if the perpetrator discloses  an         extremely depraved state of mind and diabolical trickery  in         committing the homicide, accompanied by brutal dealing  with         the cadaver, the court can hardly help in the present  state         of the law, avoiding infliction of the death penalty.   When         discretion  has been exercised by the trial Court and it  is         difficult to fault that         773         court on any ground, statutory or precedential, an appellate         review and even referral action become too narrow to  demol-         ish  the  discretionary exercise of power  by  the  inferior         court.    So viewed, it is clear  that the learned  Judicial         Commissioner  has  acted rightly in  affirming    the  death         sentence.    We  are unable to, grant leave on,  this  score         either.             Counsel  for the petitioner has urged that the  affirma-         tion  by the Judicial Commissioner’s court of Goa,  Diu  and         Daman, of the Death sentence is illegal.   According to. him         s. 377 of the old code (which govern the instant case), is a         missile which will bit down the confirmation by the Judicial         Commissioner.  The said section reads:                             "377.   In every case so  submitted  the                       confirmation  of  the  sentence,  or  any  new                       sentence  or order passed by the  High  Court,                       shall, when such Court consists of two or more                       Judges,  be  made,  passed and  signed  by  at                       least  two  of them."             This  section means, as we understand it, that when  the         High  Court  concerned consists of two or more  judges,  the         confirmation  or other sentence shall be signed by at  least         two  of  them.   This provision obviously  applies  only  to         situations where the court, at the time of the  confirmation         of  the  death sentence., consists of two  or  more  judges.         It   is   true   that   s.    4 (1) (i)   in    relation  to         a  Union  Territory  brings  within  the definition  of  the         ’High  Court’ the highest court of criminal appeal for  that         area  viz. the Judicial Commissioner’s court.   It therefore         follows  that if, at the time the case for  confirmation  of         the death sentence is being heard, the Judicial  Commission-         er’s  court consists of more than one judge,   at least  two         judges must attest the confirmation.   In the present   case         it  is common ground that when the case was heard and  judg-         ment  pronounced there was. only one Judicial  Commissioner,         although  the sanctioned strength was two.   So long as  one         Judicial Commissioner alone functioned in the court, s.  377         was   not  attracted.  The  necessary inference is  that  in         the  present  case there is  nothing illegal  in   a  Single         (i.e.  the only) Judicial Commissioner deciding  the  refer-         ence.

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       We  are aware that the insistence of the Code on two  judges         hearing  the  matter  of such gravity as  a  death  sentence         involves is because    of the law’s grave concern that human         life  shall not be judicially deprived unless at  least  two         minds  at  almost the highest level are. applied.  Even  so,         exceptional  situations may arise where two judges  are  not         available  in a High Court and, in that narrow  contingency,         the Code permits what has now happened.  We cannot fault the         judgment on this ground either.             Counsel  for the petitioner contends that  the  Criminal         Procedure  Code is a general statute but the Goa, Daman  and         Diu  (Judicial  Commissioners Court) Regulation, 1963  is  a         special  law which prevails against the general.    On  that         footing he argues that under Regulation, 8 (1) the Court  of         the Judicial Commissioner shall have only such  jurisdiction         as  is exercisable in respect of Goa, Daman and Diu  by  the         Tribunal de Relacao.  According to him, the  said   Tribunal         did not have the powers of confirmation of death   sentence,         and,         774         therefore, the judicial Commissioner cannot  exercise   such         power.  He  also argues that under the  said  provision  the         Judicial  Commissioner’ is the highest Court of  Appeal  and         Revision  but  not of Reference and for that  reason  cannot         exercise the powers  under  section  377  of the old  Crimi-         nal Procedure Code.   We see no force in these  twin submis-         sions.   A Code is complete and that marks  the  distinction         between  a  Code and an ordinary enactment.    The  Criminal         Procedure  Code, by that canon, is serf-contained  and  com-         plete.  It  defines  a High Court which takes in a  Judicial         Commissioner’s  Court. (Section 4(1)(i).   We need  not  and         indeed may not travel beyond the Code into the territory  of         the  Regulation.    Even  otherwise,  there  is  nothing  in         Regulation   8 ( 1 )  which  helps the petitioner.  It  pro-         vides  that the Judicial Commissioner shall be  the  highest         criminal ’Court, Appeal and Revision’ used in that provision         are  words  of the widest import and cover  all  proceedings         which  are  not  original proceedings   but are  by  way  of         judicial review for a higher level.   Referral jurisdiction,         under  section  377, is skin to appeal and revision  and  we         think that Regulation 8(1) does not disentitle the  Judicial         Commissioner from exercising power under section 377 of  the         Code:  nor are we inclined to accept the submission that  on         the speculative assumption that the Tribunal de Relacao  did         not  have the power to confirm death sentences, and,  there-         fore,  the Judicial Commissioner, acting as the  High  Court         under  the Code, cannot enjoy such power.   Regulation  8(1)         does not limit the jurisdiction of the. Judicial Commission-         er  in the sense counsel wants us to accept.   We  therefore         hold  that  the Judicial Commissioner’s confirmation of  the         death sentence is   not without jurisdiction.             Undeterred  by  the  fact that the  murder  is  gruesome         counsel  has pleaded that at least on the question  of  sen-         tence leave should be granted because his client is a  young         man and the sentence of death has been haunting him  agonis-         ingly for around six years. May be that such a long spell of         torment  may be one circumstance in giving the  lesser  sen-         tence.    Even  s0, we have to be guided by the  rulings  of         this Court which have not gone to the extent of holding that         based on this circumstance alone, without other  supplement-         ing  factors or in the face of surrounding  beastly  circum-         stances  of the crime, judicial clemency can  attenuate  the         sentence. Possibly, Presidential power is wider but judicial         power is embanked.         We refuse special leave and dismiss the petition.

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                                             Petition dismissed.         775